D
E
Taylor
[ORALLY]:—This
is
an
appeal
from
Leon
Roy
with
regard
to
his
1976,
1977,
1978
and
1979
tax
returns.
The
matter
at
issue
is
a
simple
and
direct
one:
whether
or
not
during
the
years
in
question
the
appellant
was
a
resident
of
Canada
for
purposes
of
income
tax.
I
would
make
reference
to
a
citation
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
to
be
found
in
Percy
Walker
Thomson
v
MNR,
[1946]
CTC
51;
2
DTC
812
at
63
and
815
respectively.
I
repeat
it
with
emphasis:
..
.1
think,
that
in
common
parlance
“residing”
is
not
a
term
of
invariable
elements,
all
of
which
must
be
satisfied
in
each
instance.
It
is
quite
impossible
to
give
it
a
precise
and
inclusive
definition.
It
is
highly
flexible,
and
its
many
shades
of
meaning
vary
not
only
in
the
contexts
of
different
matters,
but
also
in
different
aspects
of
the
same
matter.
In
one
case,
it
is
satisfied
by
certain
elements,
in
another
by
others,
some
common,
some
new.
I
think
that
is
completely
in
accord
with
the
general
references
made
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
matters
of
this
nature
are
to
be
reviewed
on
the
facts
as
they
appear
and
as
they
are
presented
at
the
hearing.
I
emphasize
“as
they
are
presented
at
the
hearing”,
which
is
for
the
benefit
and
use
of
the
members
of
the
Board.
Without
in
any
way
trying
to
short-circuit
the
testimony
and
evidence
provided
by
the
appellant
and
the
summary
of
it,
I
would
suggest
that
the
case
for
the
appellant
comes
down
to
roughly
the
following
points:
(1)
In
Ireland,
he
rented
a
house;
(2)
he
had
a
lady
friend;
(3)
he
had
a
bank
account;
(4)
he
purchased
some
furniture;
(5)
he
purchased
a
car;
(6)
he
worked
there
during
several
years;
(7)
he
made
a
few
visits
back
to
Canada
for
specific
reasons;
and
(8)
his
stated
intention
to
remain
there.
I
would
simply
suggest
that
thousands,
perhaps
tens
of
thousands
of
Canadians,
could
put
forward
the
same
or
somewhat
similar
valid
points
on
various
issues.
As
opposed
to
that,
I
would
point
out
the
following:
(1)
It
appears
to
be
evident
from
the
work
history
of
the
appellant
that
throughout
his
working
life,
he
went
wherever
work
was
available,
all
the
time
working
in
the
mining
industry,
not
mining
exactly,
but
opening
up
mines.
(2)
He
had
worked,
essentially,
for
the
same
company,
Canadian
Mine
Services
for
about
12
years
doing
that
kind
of
thing.
Canadian
Mine
Services
had
consistently
made
all
the
deductions
necessary
as
if
the
appellant
were
working
in
Canada,
even
when
he
was
working
in
Ireland.
(3)
He
had
kept
an
interest
in
a
house
in
Canada,
although
it
is
clear
that
he
had
visited
it
very
little
and,
perhaps,
not
at
all.
To
my
understanding,
he
still
owns
a
half
of
that
house.
(4)
He
kept
credit
union
bank
accounts,
one
“transfer
account”
and
one
“long-term
account”,
and
I
use
his
own
expression,
and
emphasize
that
point.
(5)
The
payments
for
the
mortgage
on
his
house
were
regularly
deducted
from
his
bank
account
in
British
Columbia.
(6)
In
Ireland,
our
information
is
that
there
was
no
income
tax
paid,
neither
asked
for
by
the
government
nor
any
request
or
overture
made
by
the
appellant
to
pay
any
tax.
(7)
The
appellant
was
always
working
on
a
Canadian
passport
and,
therefore,
as
a
Canadian
citizen.
(8)
Every
time
his
wife
left
him
when
she
was
in
Ireland
with
him,
she
came
back
to
Canada.
While
that’s
not
a
great
indication,
his
wife’s
conduct
in
coming
back
to
Canada
is
certainly
not
very
great
support
for
the
appellant’s
contention
that
the
spatial
bounds
of
their
“lives”
—
in
the
plural
—
had
been
relocated
to
Ireland.
(9)
He
returned
to
Canada
for
all
family
funerals.
While
I
will
point
out,
respectfully,
that
that
is
laudable
and
understandable,
nevertheless
it
is
an
indication
of
where
his
extended
family
interests
remained,
and
that
was
in
Canada.
(10)
He
was
expecting,
according
to
answers
given
to
questions
in
cross-
examination,
to
receive
his
old
age
pension
at
age
65,
but
left
the
country,
according
to
his
information
to
the
Board,
at
age
53,
with
no
intention
of
returning.
It
is
possible
he
would
have
had
some
very
great
difficulties
in
asserting
his
rights
to
an
old
age
pension
under
the
Canadian
law
which
then
existed,
and
yet
he
anticipated
no
problem
—
even,
as
he
says,
in
his
new
status
as
a
resident
of
Ireland.
(11)
Some
of
the
furniture
which
he
bought
in
Ireland
was
new,
but
I
do
point
out
that
some
of
it
was
second-hand
and
used.
(12)
All
the
time
he
was
away,
he
drove
a
car
using
a
Canadian
automobile
driver’s
licence.
(13)
Finally,
some
time
about
the
end
of
1978,
he
was
notified
that
his
job,
and
I
will
use
the
words
“with
TARA”
in
quotation
marks,
would
be
kept
open
for
him
for
a
period
of
three
(3)
months.
According
to
his
information,
he
was
also
aware
that
he
could
become
an
Irish
citizen
at
the
beginning
of
1979.
I
can
reach
only
one
conclusion,
and
the
conclusion
is
quite
simply
that
he
abandoned,
at
that
point,
any
thought
he
had
of
retaining
his
alleged
status
in
Ireland
and
becoming
an
Irish
citizen.
He
was
in
Canada
at
the
time
and
he
simply
didn’t
go
back
to
Ireland.
I
do
not
accept
as
sufficient
reason,
or
in
fact
as
the
only
reason,
that
his
decision
to
forsake
Ireland
and
remain
in
Canada
was
because
his
father
was
ill.
What
were
all
his
reasons
is
not
for
the
Board
to
determine,
but
that
one
is
not
satisfactory.
As
indicated
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
I
have
no
problems
whatsoever
with
the
year
1979,
and
I
don’t
believe
it
is
asserted
or
should
be
asserted
that
he
was
anything
other
than
a
Canadian
resident
in
that
year.
Ultimately,
therefore,
we
come
down
to
one
point
—
his
own
testimony
is
that
during
the
period
1976,
1977
and
1978
up
until
about
August,
he
was
employed
by
a
company,
TARA,
and
not
by
Canadian
Mine
Services.
The
possibility
—
and
I
emphasize
that
word
—
is
that
he
was
employed
in
the
years
1976,
1977
and
1978
by
TARA,
allegedly
an
Irish
company,
and
not
by
Canadian
Mine
Services.
According
to
the
appellant’s
testimony,
TARA
has
purchased
everything
formerly
owned
by
Canadian
Mine
Services
under
one
of
its
contracts
with
TARA
as
of
January
1,
1976.
I
do
not
find
it
at
all
unusual
that
the
appellant
would
have
been
offered
a
position
with
TARA
and
remained
to
assist
TARA
in
getting
the
mine
operative,
but
I
am
satisfied
that
he
clearly
continued
in
conjunction
with
an
arrangement
of
some
kind
with
Canadian
Mine
Services.
Even
if
the
appellant
worked
for
an
Irish
company,
TARA,
during
the
period
1976,
1977
and
1978,
and
even
if
it
could
be
shown
to
the
Board
that
there
was
no
relationship
whatsoever
between
TARA
and
Canadian
Mine
Services
(I
hasten
to
point
out
that
the
physical
evidence
(Exhibit
R-2)
indicates
that,
indeed,
there
was
a
direct
relationship
between
the
appellant
and
Canadian
Mine
Services),
that
fact
in
itself
and
by
itself
would
fall
short
of
filling
the
criteria
that
I
have
just
noted
in
Thomson
v
MNR
and
upon
which,
to
my
knowledge,
all
decisions
on
these
matters
are
made.
Certainly,
Mr
Roy’s
stays
or
series
of
stays
in
Ireland
may
have
lasted
longer
than
he
had
originally
planned;
the
stays
may
have
indeed
been
more
enjoyable
than
he
might
have
expected;
and
he
might
have
liked
to
stay
on
for
the
higher
pay
and
given
that
prospect
serious
consideration.
But
these
elements
did
not
release
him
either
from
the
obligations
or
the
privileges
of
a
Canadian
resident
for
income
tax
purposes
during
the
years
under
appeal.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.