The
Chairman:—The
appeals
of
Robert
McCaw
and
his
spouse
Jean
McCaw,
from
assessments
with
respect
to
the
1977,
1978,
1979
and
1980
taxation
years,
were
heard
on
common
evidence.
In
issue
is
the
deductibility
of
certain
expenses
claimed
by
the
appellants
to
have
been
incurred
as
a
result
of
farming
operations
carried
on
in
partnership.
The
partnership
as
I
understand
it
was
on
a
50/50%
basis
for
the
years
1976
to
1979
inclusively
and
75/25%
basis
in
1980,
Robert
McCaw
having
the
greater
interest.
In
seeking
to
deduct
full
farm
losses
of
$4,737.02
in
1977,
$7,073.19
in
1978,
$9,655.15
in
1979
and
$12,867.94
in
1980
and
on
the
basis
of
their
respective
interest
in
the
partnership
Jean
McCaw
claimed
as
her
share
of
farm
losses
amounts
of
$2,368.51,
$3,536.60,
$4,827.58
and
$3,216.98
respectively
for
each
of
the
years
under
review
and
Robert
McCaw
claimed
amounts
of
$2,368.51,
$3,536.60,
$4,827.58
and
$9,650.96
as
his
share
of
the
farm
losses
for
the
same
period.
The
respondent
disallowed
the
deductions
on
the
grounds
that
the
appellants
were
not
engaged
in
the
business
of
farming
and
that
the
expenses
were
not
incurred
to
earn
income
but
were
personal
living
expenses
and
therefore
not
deductible
under
paragraph
18(1)(a)
and
paragraph
18(1
)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended.
The
respondent
pleading
in
the
alternative
submitted
that
if
the
appellants
were
engaged
in
the
business
of
farming,
their
farm
losses
should
be
calculated
and
restricted
in
accordance
with
subsection
31(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
appellants,
both
of
whom
have
farming
background
were,
prior
to
the
pertinent
years,
employed
as
full-time
teachers.
Indeed,
Robert
McCaw
taught
horticulture
for
the
Durham
Board
of
Education
and
was
a
member
of
the
Growers’
Association.
In
October
of
1975
the
appellants,
in
partnership,
acquired
a
10-acre
farm
for
$19,000.
A
downpayment
of
$2,000
was
made
on
the
property
and
a
$17,000
mortgage
was
repaid
over
a
period
of
five
years.
In
the
Spring
of
1976
the
appellants
moved
to
the
farm
and
commenced
operating
it.
In
June
of
1977
Jean
McCaw
discontinued
her
employment
as
a
teacher
and
farmed
the
property
on
a
full-time
basis.
Robert
McCaw
worked
on
the
farm
in
the
mornings
and
evenings
and
during
the
summer
months
until
1981
at
which
time
he
retired
from
the
teaching
profession.
Some
5
to
6
acres
of
the
appellants’
farm
were
an
apple
orchard.
Contrary
to
the
Minister’s
assumption,
the
rest
of
the
farm
was
not
made
up
of
fallow
as
stated
but
consisted
of
one
and
one
half
acre
of
strawberry,
raspberry
and
asparagus
plants
which
were
in
existence
and
were
producing
at
the
time
of
acquisition.
To
this
cash
crop,
the
appellants
added
mixed
farming
and
grew
corn,
carrots,
beets,
tomatoes,
cabbage,
etc.
The
appellants
also
invested
in
livestock
which
consisted
of
chickens,
ducks,
geese,
sheep,
goats
and
pigs.
The
appellants’
alleged
intention
in
acquiring
the
farm
was
to
earn
income
from
it
and
they
expected
an
immediate
profit
from
the
sale
of
the
apples
and
other
fruit
crops
and
a
profit
from
the
livestock
was
expected
within
a
period
of
five
years,
once
the
herds
had
grown
and
offspring
could
be
marketed.
In
the
Fall
of
1976
pigs
and
goats
were
purchased
for
breeding
purposes.
In
1978
sheep
were
added
to
the
livestock
which
also
included
25
laying
hens
and
100
meat
birds.
During
the
period
under
review
the
sheep
and
pigs
produced
and
the
lambs
and
piglets
were
sold.
However,
during
an
exceptionally
cold
winter
spell,
some
40
piglets
were
lost
by
freezing.
The
unseasonable
weather
also
destroyed
many
apple
trees.
Other
than
the
initial
cost
of
the
farm,
the
appellants
invested
additional
capital.
They
purchased
an
additional
7
acres
of
land;
among
other
improvements,
they
increased
the
size
of
their
barn
facilities,
installed
additional
heaters,
excavated
a
duck
pond
and
built
a
greenhouse
for
an
early
start
of
their
market
garden
products.
In
1980
Jean
McCaw
withdrew
her
superannuation
in
the
amount
of
$5,320
in
order
to
purchase
farm
equipment.
The
amount
of
money
invested
by
the
appellants
on
the
farm,
the
nature
of
the
work
and
the
activities
involved
in
the
operation
of
the
farm
can
hardly
be
said
to
be
the
exercise
of
a
pleasant
hobby
nor
can
the
expenditures
be
accurately
described
as
personal
living
expenses.
No
profit
was
in
fact
realized
in
the
first
five
years
of
operation,
as
stated
by
the
respondent
in
his
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
The
figures
are
not
contested:
4
(f)
The
farming
operation
incurred
the
following
farming
losses:
Year
|
Income
|
Income
|
Expenses
|
Loss
|
Loss
|
1976
|
|
$2,360.00
|
$
4,129.69
|
$
1,769.69
|
1977
|
|
$2,350.00
|
$
7,087.00
|
$
4,737.02
|
1978
|
|
$3,760.01
|
$10,833.20
|
$
7,073.19
|
1979
|
|
$1,741.83
|
$11,396.98
|
$
9,655.15
|
1980
|
|
$2,782.55
|
$15,650.49
|
$12,867.94
|
The
1981
taxation
year
also
showed
a
loss
of
some
$9,000.
The
operation
was
obviously
not
financially
successful
for
the
period
under
review.
Could
the
appellants
have
had
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
at
the
time
of
acquisition
and
during
the
relevant
period?
Although
the
question
whether
the
appellants
had
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
should
be
answered
objectively
as
suggested
by
the
respondent
the
existence
of
a
reasonable
expectation
should
not
be
determined
on
the
basis
of
hindsight.
The
relatively
small
amount
invested,
the
size
of
the
land
at
17
acres,
the
systematic
improvements
to
the
farm
over
the
years,
the
gradual
acquisition
and
breeding
of
livestock,
and
the
sale
of
its
modest
fruit
crops
could
not
be
expected
to
yield
the
immediate
large
profit
that
a
large
initial
investment
in
a
large
operation
might
have
earned
within
a
few
short
years.
For
the
appellants
however,
the
profit
that
they
could
reasonably
expect
to
earn
from
the
small
operation
might
well
have
been
sufficient
for
their
needs
and,
in
my
opinion,
that
is
sufficient
to
meet
the
requirements
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
which
simply
requires
that
there
exist
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
and
not
a
reasonable
expectation
of
a
large
profit.
It
is
regrettable
in
my
view
that
the
appellants
felt
they
had
to
abandon
their
farming
operations
because
they
were
told
by
the
assessor
that
the
farm
could
never
be
self-supporting
unless
considerable
finance
was
borrowed
and
invested
so
as
to
make
the
farm
a
larger
operation.
The
5
or
6
acre
orchard
produced
up
to
21
tons
of
apples
sold
for
juice
and
the
one
and
one-half
acres
of
strawberry,
raspberry
and
asparagus
plants
which
the
assessor
had
not
noticed
also
produced
marketable
fruit.
While
the
operation
was
not
financially
successful
in
the
years
under
review,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
appellants,
at
the
relevant
times,
could
have
had
and
did
have
a
reasonable
expectation
that
their
farm
would
turn
a
profit
at
a
time
when
they
needed
it.
The
fact
that
it
did
not
do
so
does
not
establish
that
their
expectation
of
profit
was
not
reasonable
or
justified.
Having
found
that
the
appellants
operated
the
farm
as
a
business
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
the
question
now
is
whether
section
31(1)
restricting
the
farm
losses
is
applicable.
In
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
William
Moldowan
v
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
[1977]
CTC
310;
77
DTC
5213,
Mr
Justice
Dickson
describes
the
three
classes
of
farmers
envisaged
by
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Mr
Justice
Dickson
states
at
315
and
5216
respectively:
In
my
opinion,
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
a
whole
envisages
three
classes
of
farmers:
(1)
a
taxpayer,
for
whom
farming
may
reasonably
be
expected
to
provide
the
bulk
of
income
or
the
centre
of
work
routine.
Such
a
taxpayer,
who
looks
to
farming
for
his
livelihood,
is
free
of
the
limitation
of
s
13(1)
in
those
years
in
which
he
sustains
a
farming
loss.
(2)
the
taxpayer
who
does
not
look
to
farming,
or
to
farming
and
some
subordinate
source
of
income,
for
his
livelihood
but
carried
on
farming
as
a
sideline
business.
Such
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
the
deductions
spelled
out
in
s
13(1)
in
respect
of
farming
losses.
(3)
the
taxpayer
who
does
not
look
to
farming,
or
to
farming
and
some
subordinate
source
of
income,
for
his
livelihood
and
who
carried
on
some
farming
activities
as
a
hobby.
The
losses
sustained
by
such
a
taxpayer
on
his
nonbusiness
farming
are
not
deductible
in
any
amount.
The
appellants’
farm
was
operated
in
a
partnership
in
which
the
work
routine
of
one
of
the
partners,
Jean
McCaw,
her
way
of
life
and
principal
source
of
income
during
the
pertinent
taxation
years
was
centred
on
the
farming
operations.
In
my
opinion
she
would
come
in
class
1
as
described
by
Mr
Justice
Dickson
and
would
be
free
of
the
limitations
of
her
farm
losses
under
subsection
31(1).
Robert
McCaw
while
still
employed
as
a
teacher
devoted
a
considerable
portion
of
his
available
time
doing
chores
on
the
farm.
It
was
Robert
Mc-
Caw’s
intention
to
work
on
the
farm
on
a
full-time
basis
only
after
retirement.
Indeed
part
of
his
teaching
salary
had
to
be
spent
on
the
gradual
improvement
of
the
farm.
For
the
years
under
review
farming
was
not
the
centre
of
Robert
McCaw’s
work
routine
nor
could
farming
be
expected
to
provide
the
bulk
of
his
income
during
that
period
and
was
in
my
opinion
only
a
subordinate
source
of
income
and
a
sideline
business
for
him.
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
Robert
McCaw
falls
in
the
second
class
described
above
and
the
provisions
of
subsection
31(1)
are
applicable
to
him.
His
farm
losses
therefore
should
be
restricted
in
accordance
with
that
section
of
the
Act.
Judgment
therefore
will
go
allowing
the
appeals
and
referring
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
for
the
1977,
1978,
1979
and
1980
taxation
years
the
farm
losses
claimed
by
Jean
McCaw
are
fully
deductible
and
the
farm
losses
claimed
by
Robert
McCaw
are
deductible
only
to
the
extent
permissible
under
subsection
31
(1
)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Appeals
allowed.