Cardin,
TCJ:—In
1979,
Zenon
Dlagacz
claimed
an
amount
of
$2,288
as
alimony
payments
to
his
wife
for
the
support
of
his
son
Michael.
By
notice
of
reassessment,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
an
amount
of
$1,088
as
not
having
been
paid
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
pursuant
to
a
written
agreement
as
alimony
or
other
allowances
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
for
the
maintenance
of
his
child
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
60(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
The
appellant
and
his
wife
Klara
were
divorced
on
February
5,
1976.
As
a
condition
of
the
divorce
decree,
the
appellant
was
to
pay
his
wife
an
amount
of
$100
a
month
until
further
notice
(Exhibit
R-2,
Translation
of
Divorce
Decree
Certified
by
the
Royal
Danish
Consulate
General).
As
a
result
of
an
agreement
allegedly
dated
and
signed
by
the
appellant
and
his
wife
on
January
5,
1979
(attached
to
notice
of
appeal
dated
July
14,
1982),
the
alimony
payments
were
said
to
have
been
increased
from
$100
to
$190
a
month.
The
appellant
claims
that
in
accordance
with
the
agreement
he
paid
his
wife
$2,288
in
1979.
He
submits
that
the
full
amount
of
alimony
paid
in
1979
is
entirely
deductible.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
produced
as
Exhibit
R-l,
eight
Bank
of
Montreal
Foreign
Remittance
receipts
of
$170
for
the
months
of
January
to
August
1979
and
monthly
receipts
of
$340,
$185,
$180,
and
$190
for
each
of
the
months
of
September,
October,
November
and
December
1979,
respectively.
She
pointed
out
that
the
various
amounts
paid
in
1979
were
not
in
keeping
with
the
$190
monthly
alimony
payments
referred
to
in
the
agreement
allegedly
signed
on
January
5,
1979
(attached
to
the
appellant’s
notice
of
appeal
dated
July
14,
1982).
In
his
notice
of
objection
dated
January
11,
1982,
the
appellant
stated:
“As
advised
by
the
District
Taxation
Office,
I
also
enclose
an
agreement
duly
signed
by
my
ex-wife
and
myself
confirming
the
amount
of
alimony
paid
by
me
in
1979”
(Exhibit
R-3).
Enclosed
with
the
notice
of
objection
was
a
confirmation
that
an
amount
of
$2,288
was
paid
by
the
appellant
to
his
wife
for
the
support
of
their
son
in
1979
and
that
the
amount
of
child
support
in
the
future
would
be
proportioned
to
the
increased
cost
of
living.
The
appellant
claims
to
have
signed
that
certificate
on
December
9,
1981
and
his
ex-wife
on
December
28,
1981
(Exhibit
R-ll).
The
appellant
admitted
having
received
a
letter
dated
April
18,
1981
from
the
Assessing
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
asking
among
other
things
for
a
copy
of
the
court
order
or
a
written
agreement
(Exhibit
R-5).
In
his
reply
of
April
16,
1981,
the
appellant
did
not
produce
nor
indeed
did
he
even
refer
to
the
agreement
allegedly
dated
January
5,
1979
with
respect
to
the
payments
of
$190
a
month
alimony
(Exhibit
R-6).
The
appellant’s
testimony
with
respect
to
the
January
5,
1979
agreement
is
unclear
particularly
since
he
claimed
to
have
signed
the
1979
agreement
at
a
time
when
he
was
as,
he
previously
testified,
in
Pakistan.
The
appellant’s
principal
argument
appeared
to
be
that
the
cost
of
supporting
a
child
increases
each
year
with
the
increasing
cost
of
living
and
with
the
growing
needs
of
the
child
and
that
all
amounts
paid
for
that
purpose
should
be
deductible.
As
counsel
for
the
respondent
pointed
out,
paragraph
60(b)
of
the
Act,
being
an
exemption
section,
must
be
interpreted
restrictively
and
the
conditions
set
out
therein
must
be
met
before
an
amount
can
properly
be
deducted
as
alimony.
The
deduction
of
$100
a
month
was
allowed
as
alimony
because
it
was
clearly
set
out
in
the
divorce
decree
and
meets
the
conditions
of
paragraph
60(b).
No
mention
of
the
increase
from
$100
to
$190
a
month
is
made
in
the
divorce
decree
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
the
decree
has
since
been
changed
or
updated.
The
appellant
did
not
establish
that
the
written
agreement
raising
the
alimony
payment
from
$100
to
$190
a
month
was
entered
into
and
duly
signed
on
January
5,
1979.
While
a
verbal
agreement
to
that
effect
may
have
existed
between
the
appellant
and
his
ex-wife,
such
an
agreement
does
not
meet
the
conditions
of
paragraph
60(b)
as
many
court
decisions
have
upheld.
The
appellant
has
failed
to
prove
that
the
written
agreement
increasing
alimony
payments
from
$100
to
$190
a
month
was
signed
in
January
of
1979
and
he
has
not
succeeded
in
proving
that
the
Minister
was
wrong
in
allowing
him
a
deduction
of
$100
a
month
as
set
out
in
the
divorce
decree
of
January
26,
1976.
The
appeal
is
therefore
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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