Taylor,
TCJ:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
Toronto,
Ontario,
on
January
17,
1984
against
an
income
tax
assessment
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Reve-
nue
assessed
a
penalty
of
$317.75
for
late
filing
of
the
corporation’s
income
tax
return.
This
appeal
resulted
from
a
letter
from
a
Mr
Carlo
DePellegrin,
chartered
accountant,
which
reads
in
part:
I
did
on
behalf
of
my
client
prepare
tax
returns
for
the
1979
fiscal
period
on
or
about
March
1980.
I
delivered
the
tax
return
to
the
director
of
the
corporation
who
has
indicated
to
me
that
he
forthwith
executed
the
returns
and
filed
them
with
Revenue
Canada.
He
does
not
recall
the
exact
date
of
dropping
the
return
in
the
mail
box
but
indicates
that
it
was
within
a
very
short
period
of
my
delivery
of
same.
We
relied
on
Canada
Post
to
deliver
the
returns
to
Revenue
Canada
in
short
order.
The
District
Taxation
Office
has
a
record
of
my
phone
calls
in
November,
1980
querying
the
whereabouts
of
the
notice
of
assessment.
Copies
of
my
correspondence
with
the
District
Taxation
Office
dated
January
28,
1981,
August
25,
1981
are
enclosed
herein
for
your
review.
The
District
Taxation
Office’s
position
appears
to
be
that
my
client
is
lying
when
he
tells
me
that
he
has
mailed
the
tax
returns
and
that
I
am
perpetuating
this
lie
by
making
arbitrary
calls
to
Revenue
Canada
and
by
misrepresenting
the
date
of
preparation
of
the
tax
returns
by
the
date
indicated
on
the
bottom
of
the
return.
I
take
great
offense
to
the
insinuations
made
in
this
regard
and
am
prepared
to
execute
affidavits
as
to
the
date
of
preparation
of
the
returns
and
am
also
prepared
to
attend
upon
my
client
to
also
execute
affidavits
in
this
matter.
We
would
ask
that
the
late
file
penalty
be
deleted
and
that
some
credibility
be
given
to
statements
made
by
myself
and
the
taxpayer.
According
to
an
affidavit
from
an
officer
of
National
Revenue
filed
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
the
relevant
return
was
due
on
June
30,
1980,
but
received
on
January
30,
1981.
The
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
subsection
162(1)
and
paragraph
150(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended
(the
“Act”).
Mr
J
S
Stanford,
president
of
the
corporation,
testified
he
was
sure
he
caused
to
be
mailed
the
return
in
question,
together
with
three
other
corporation
returns
prepared
by
Mr
De
Pellegrin
and
apparently
mailed
in
March
of
1980.
The
reason
there
were
a
total
of
four
returns
(four
separate
envelopes
in
fact)
was
that
there
was
another
corporation
for
which
Mr
Stanford
was
responsible
with
a
similar
filing
date,
and
both
federal
and
provincial
corporate
tax
returns
prepared
for
each
one
of
the
two
companies.
Mr
Stanford
was
not
able
to
testify
that
he
recalled
exactly
and
precisely
when
he
mailed
the
returns,
(even
the
other
three
which
were
properly
provided)
or
whether
this
was
done
by
someone
else
from
his
office.
His
best
recollection
was
that
Mr
DePellegrin
normally
prepared
the
annual
returns
about
March
each
year
and
after
he
signed
them
the
returns
were
mailed
directly.
It
was
also
noted
that
the
return
received
by
Revenue
Canada
on
January
30,
1981
was
a
copy
of
the
original
return,
filed
by
the
appellant
after
enquiries
were
made,
and
not
the
original
return
itself.
No
explanation
of
the
whereabouts
of
the
original
return
was
provided
by
either
party.
The
Minister’s
counsel
took
the
position
that
if
the
Court
were
satisfied
that
the
return
had
been
mailed
the
appeal
should
be
allowed,
even
though
there
remained
some
question
in
the
jurisprudence
that
mailing
constituted
filing.
The
sincerity
of
Mr
Stanford,
and
Mr
De
Pellegrin
in
believing
that
the
return
must
have
been
mailed
cannot
be
questioned,
there
is
simply
no
logical
explanation
in
their
minds
why
or
how
anything
else
should
have
happened.
That
leaves
the
Court
with
a
dilemma
that
if
mailed,
it
was
lost
in
the
mail
or
before
receipt
by
Revenue
Canada;
or
if
received
it
was
not
properly
recorded
as
filed
and
then
it
was
lost
by
Revenue
Canada.
Either
or
both
of
these
may
be
quite
possible
—
even
probable
it
was
suggested
by
the
appellant
—
and
indeed
may
have
occurred.
Nevertheless,
the
prospect
of
this
particular
return
being
misplaced
or
lost
by
either
or
both
of
Mr
Stanford
or
Mr
De
Pellegrin
is
equally
plausible.
When
I
add
to
that,
the
lack
of
precision
in
the
testimony
of
Mr
Stanford,
regarding
the
crucial
act,
the
mailing
of
this
particular
document,
I
cannot
find
that
the
appellant
has
succeeded
in
overturning
the
Minister’s
assumptions.
Simply
put
the
Minister’s
assumptions
when
cast
against
the
known
facts
are
equally
or
more
plausible
than
the
assertions
of
the
appellant.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.