Christie,
CJTC:—The
appellant
sought
to
deduct
the
restricted
farming
losses
provided
for
by
subsection
31(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(“the
Act”)
in
respect
of
his
1977
to
1980
taxation
years
inclusive.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant’s
tree
farming
activities
constituted
a
business
during
the
years
mentioned.
As
was
said
in
Kerr
and
Forbes
v
MNR,
[1984]
CTC
2071;
84
DTC
1094
at
2072
[1095]:
.
.
.
This
in
turn
raises
the
question
whether
the
appellant
has
established,
by
a
preponderance
of
evidence,
the
existence
of
profit
or
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
.
.
.
The
existence
of
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
is
not
to
be
determined
by
the
presence
of
subjective
hopes
or
aspirations,
no
matter
how
genuine
or
deep-felt
they
may
be.
The
issue
is
to
be
decided
by
objective
testing.
In
Moldowan
this
is
said
at
page
5215:
There
is
a
vast
case
literature
on
what
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
means
and
it
is
by
no
means
entirely
consistent.
In
my
view,
whether
a
taxpayer
has
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
is
an
objective
determination
to
be
made
from
all
of
the
facts.
The
following
criteria
shoud
be
considered:
the
profit
and
loss
experience
in
past
years,
the
taxpayer’s
training,
the
taxpayer’s
intended
course
of
action,
the
capability
of
the
venture
as
capitalized
to
show
a
profit
after
charging
capital
cost
allowance.
The
list
is
not
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
The
factors
will
differ
with
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
undertaking:
The
Queen
v
Mathews
(1974),
28
DTC
6193.
One
would
not
expect
a
farmer
who
purchased
a
productive
going
operation
to
suffer
the
same
start-up
losses
as
the
man
who
begins
a
tree
farm
on
raw
land.
In
April
1973
the
appellant
purchased
20.11
acres
of
vacant
land
for
$6,700.
It
is
located
about
9.65
kilometres
from
Orangeville
(“the
Orangeville
property”).
At
the
time
of
the
purchase,
and
at
all
subsequent
times
relevant
to
this
appeal,
the
appellant
had
a
full-time
employment
unrelated
to
farming.
During
the
taxation
years
under
appeal
he
was
employed
by
Zentil
Plumbing
&
Heating
Co
as
a
plumbing
supervisor.
It
is
a
substantial
company,
the
activities
of
which
include
partaking
in
the
construction
of
large
apartment
buildings.
The
appellant
admitted
that
he
worked
long
hours
in
the
unrelated
employment
and
that
this
sometimes
included
Saturdays.
At
the
time
of
the
purchase
of
the
Orangeville
property,
one
of
the
motives
and
quite
possibly
the
primary
motive
was
the
expectation
of
selling
it
later
at
a
profit.
The
appellant
went
on,
however,
to
testify
that
by
1975
he
had
abandoned
the
notion
of
resale
and
decided
to
convert
the
land
into
a
tree
farm.
It
was
very
marshy
and
drainage
on
a
relatively
considerable
scale
had
to
be
undertaken
in
preparation
for
planting.
The
property
was
referred
to
by
the
appellant,
somewhat
in
jest,
as
“the
lake”.
For
this
work
the
appellant
purchased
a
backhoe
on
November
12,
1975
for
$3,550.
This
is
construction
equipment
suitable
for
digging
drainage
ditches.
He
laboured
at
tilling
the
land
during
the
weekends
and
holidays
and
estimated
that
he
spent
about
16
hours
a
month,
on
average,
doing
this
work.
His
home
was
in
Mississauga
and
the
distance
to
the
Orangeville
property
was
77.2
kilometres.
Travelling
time
by
car
or
truck
is
approximately
45
minutes
each
way.
Cultivation
continued
until
1978,
at
which
time
the
appellant
commenced
planting
seedlings.
What
follows
in
chart
form
summarizes
the
evidence
regarding
what
was
planted
during
the
taxation
years
in
question
—
the
number
of
trees
planted,
the
estimated
percentage
of
survival
and
the
estimated
time
when
what
survived
could
be
harvested
for
marketing:
|
Kind
of
|
|
|
Plant
|
Number
|
Survival
%
|
Marketing
time
|
1978
|
Red
Pine
|
1,000
|
60
|
10
years
as
Christmas
|
|
trees,
30
to
40
years
|
|
as
posts
or
lumber
|
1979
|
White
Spruce
|
1,000
|
70
|
Same
as
Red
Pine
|
|
except
more
marketable
|
|
than
Red
Pine
as
|
|
Christmas
trees
|
|
Kind
of
|
|
|
Plant
|
Number
|
Survival
%
|
Marketing
time
|
1980
|
White
Cedar
|
1,000
|
75
|
Not
for
Christmas
|
|
tree
market,
30
to
40
|
|
years
as
posts
or
|
|
lumber
|
In
1981
the
appellant
bought
a
second
property
in
the
Caledon
area
which
is
approximately
32
kilometres
from
the
appellant’s
home
in
Mississauga.
This
property
(“the
Caledon
property’’)
consisted
of
26
acres
of
vacant
land.
Unlike
the
Orangeville
property,
the
Caledon
property
was
of
attractive
rolling
configuration
and
otherwise
desirable
real
estate.
It
has
been
yielding
profitable
crops
of
hay.
The
planting
of
trees
continued
after
1980
at
both
the
Orangeville
and
Caledon
properties.
No
estimated
percentage
survival
rate
was
given
regarding
the
additional
planting,
but
otherwise
the
chart
continues:
1981
|
White
Cedar
|
2,000
|
—
|
same
as
above
|
|
(1,200
at
|
|
|
Orangeville,
|
|
|
800
at
Caledon)
|
|
1982
|
White
Cedar
|
2,000
|
—
|
same
as
above
|
|
Red
Pine
|
1,000
|
—
|
same
as
above
|
|
Jack
Pine
|
1,000
|
—
|
same
as
above
|
|
(all
at
|
—
|
|
|
Caledon)
|
|
1983
|
White
Cedar
|
1,000
|
|
same
as
above
|
|
Red
Pine
|
1,000
|
—
|
same
as
above
|
|
White
Spruce
|
1,000
|
—
|
same
as
above
|
|
Norway
Spruce
|
1,000
|
—
|
same
as
Red
Pine
|
|
Scotch
Pine
|
1,000
|
—
|
same
as
Red
Pine
|
|
Black
Walnut
|
750
|
—
|
lumber
for
furniture
—
|
|
40
to
50
years.
|
All
1983
planting
was
at
the
Caledon
property
except
100
Scotch
Pine
and
100
Black
Walnut
at
the
Orangeville
property.
During
the
hearing
there
was
fairly
extensive
probing
of
the
appellant’s
background
in
relation
to
tree
farming.
He
testified
that
he
was
born
and
raised
on
a
farm
in
Yugoslavia.
It
was
mixed
farming
which
included
fruit
trees
which
were
the
source
of
wine
for
marketing.
There
were
also
other
trees
which
provided
firewood.
When
the
appellant
migrated
to
Canada
he
lived
on
an
uncle’s
farm
near
Beamsville,
Ontario.
He
said
that
while
there
he
had
some
experience
with
trees
although
he
admitted
that
this
was
not
a
tree
farm.
Later
on
he
added
that
while
in
grade
school
in
Yugoslavia
he
engaged
in
planting
pine
trees.
What
is
of
relatively
more
evidentiary
significance
is
that
when
he
decided
to
undertake
the
planting
of
trees
at
the
Orangeville
property
he
sought
and
received
advice
from
the
Ontario
Ministry
of
Natural
Resources
and
obtained
assistance
from
such
places
as
the
Midhurst
Nursery
which
is
operated
by
the
Government
of
Ontario
near
Barrie.
He
could
have
had
much
more
direct
assistance
and
involvement
by
the
Ministry
of
Natural
Resources
but
he
chose
not
to
which,
of
course,
he
was
perfectly
free
to
do.
He
tendered
in
evidence
some
of
the
literature
he
received
from
the
Ministry
concerning
the
planting
of
and
caring
for
trees.
Among
other
things,
it
describes
the
benefits
which
can
flow
from
planting
trees.
These
include
improving
the
“aesthetic
beauty’’
of
land
and
otherwise
upgrading
its
quality,
eg
as
an
aid
against
soil
erosion.
The
appellant
also
testified
that
his
work
on
large
construction
projects
gave
him
opportunities
to
observe
and
study
the
landscaping
involved
in
relation
to
the
construction.
No
profit
has
been
realized
by
the
appellant
from
his
tree
farming
activities.
The
losses
for
the
years
under
appeal
were:
1977
—
$2,911.75;
1978
—
$3,478.80;
1979
—
$2,950.06
and
1980
—
$2,886.45.
I
am
not
satisfied
that
the
purpose
of
the
appellant’s
tree
planting
activities
was
directed
at
the
ultimate
harvesting
of
the
trees
for
profit.
I
have
reached
the
conclusion,
on
the
whole
of
the
evidence,
that
his
true
intention
was
to
enhance
the
potential
marketable
value
of
the
real
estate
by
improving
it
aesthetically
and
otherwise.
What
was
expended
by
the
appellant
for
that
purpose
were
outlays
on
account
of
capital
and
do
not
constitute
a
farming
business
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
31(1)
of
the
Act.
It
follows
that
he
is
not
entitled
to
the
restricted
farm
losses
under
the
subsection.
The
judgment
rendered
by
Mr
Justice
Mahoney
in
The
Queen
v
Matthews,
[1974]
CTC
230;
74
DTC
6193
was
cited
in
argument.
In
that
case
the
appellant
was
successful
in
claiming
restricted
farm
losses
pursuant
to
subsection
13(1)
of
the
Act
(now
subsection
31(1))
in
respect
of
a
tree
farming
operation.
The
evidence
in
Matthews
was
much
different
than
that
presented
on
this
appeal;
for
example,
it
was
established
in
Matthews
that,
in
addition
to
planting
thousands
of
seedlings,
the
property
contained
marketable
timber
which
was
felled
and
sold
under
the
managerial
supervision
of
the
appellant.
In
the
case
at
hand
there
is
no
evidence
that
the
appellant
has
ever
marketed
trees
or
tree
products
from
either
the
Orangeville
or
Caledon
properties
or
that
these
properties
even
contain
marketable
trees.
Appeal
dismissed.