Goetz,
TCJ:—This
is
an
appeal
by
Penner
&
Co
Western
Ltd
(“the
Company’’)
with
respect
to
its
1977
taxation
year.
There
are
two
issues
to
be
determined:
(1)
whether
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
an
apartment
block
known
as
South
Park
Apartments
was
on
account
of
income
or
capital;
(2)
whether
certain
expenditures
made
by
the
appellant
to
its
real
estate
agents
related
to
the
sale
of
the
apartments
or
whether
they
were
capital
expenditures.
Edgar
Penner,
President
of
the
Company
which
was
incorporated
in
1961,
had
been
a
farmer
and
a
contractor
since
1959.
His
brother,
Leslie
Penner,
held
the
same
amount
of
shares
as
he
did,
namely
each
had
a
50
per
cent
interest
in
the
Company.
Edgar
was
a
construction
contractor
whereas
his
brother
operated
a
lumberyard
business
for
the
Company.
Apparently,
most
of
the
construction
work
involved
dealing
with
the
Governments
of
Manitoba
and
Saskatchewan
in
bidding
for
and
the
construction
of
schools,
senior
citizens’
homes,
and
power
line
brush
clearing
for
hydro.
Edgar
Penner
did
the
estimating
and
visited
the
sites.
Farmland,
divided
into
approximately
50
titles,
was
held
in
the
name
of
the
Company
and
in
the
names
of
Edgar
and
Leslie
Penner
and
their
wives.
They
were
approached
by
real
estate
agents
by
the
name
of
Friesen
and
Bayne
to
purchase
some
of
their
farm
property
which
the
Company
refused.
It
was
on
the
suggestion
of
Friesen
that
the
Company
engage
in
Government
subsidized
programs
under
CMHC
Assisted
Rental
Program.
The
real
estate
agents
conducted
the
negotiations
in
Manitoba
as
well
as
in
Saskatchewan,
which
resulted
in
the
Company
constructing
three
two-storey
apartments,
slab
on
grade.
These
were
located
at
St-Pierre
and
Minnedosa,
Manitoba
and
Moosomin,
Saskatchewan.
They
were
retained
as
assets
of
the
Company.
Edgar
Penner
stated
that
he
had
carefully
checked
out
Friesen’s
qualifications
and
ascertained
that
Friesen
had
the
best
expertise
in
dealing
with
the
construction,
rental
and
sale
of
apartment
blocks
in
the
City
of
Winnipeg.
It
was
on
the
suggestion
of
Friesen
and
Bayne
that
the
Company
purchased
South
Park
Apartments
in
Winnipeg
in
October
1976
for
the
sum
of
$1,960,000.
Edgar
Penner
made
a
thorough
examination
of
South
Park
Apartments
which
consisted
of
four
separate
buildings,
known
as
“three-storey
walk-ups’’,
composed
of
168
units.
Edgar
Penner
considered
that
the
cost
of
construction
per
suite
was
considerably
less
than
what
it
cost
his
company
to
construct
a
comparable
building.
Friesen
acted
for
the
owners
of
South
Park
Apartments
and
gave
the
appellant
a
handwritten
statement
of
expenses
and
revenues
showing
a
cash
flow
per
month
of
$29,020.
Leslie
Penner
examined
this
and
extended
the
cash
flow
to
the
sum
of
$57,020.
It
was
upon
Friesen’s
document
that
the
appellant
relied
in
making
the
purchase
and
the
appellant
sought
no
further
information
such
as
monthly
revenues
and
expenses
of
South
Park
Apartments
from
the
vendor
until
after
the
purchase.
Mr
Penner
states
that
they
took
approximately
$100,000
out
of
the
working
capital
of
the
Company
on
account
of
the
purchase
price
and
the
remaining
$60,000
came
as
a
personal
loan
from
Friesen
and
Bayne
which
was
to
be
paid
out
of
the
cash
flow.
The
balance
of
the
purchase
price
was
covered
by
two
mortgages.
The
ledger
sheet
of
the
Company
showed
advances
from
Riverland
Developments
Ltd,
a
company
owned
by
Bayne,
and
from
Norman
Friesen,
in
the
amount
of
$58,511.50.
The
first
entries
on
the
ledger
sheet
commenced
on
September
30,
1976,
and
these
accounts
were
set
up
as
notes
payable
and
were
paid
out
in
September
1977.
On
October
4,
1976,
the
Company
gave
a
demand
note
to
Riverland
Developments
Ltd
in
the
amount
of
$38,438
at
one
per
cent
above
prime
rate.
On
March
4,
1977,
the
Company
gave
a
further
promissory
note
to
Norman
Friesen
in
the
amount
of
$12,800.
This
note
was
given
on
the
insistence
of
Friesen.
A
statement
of
cash
receipts
and
disbursements
re
South
Park
Apartments
was
filed
showing
that
from
the
period
October
1
to
November
30,
1976,
there
was
an
operating
loss
of
$25,044.
Apparently,
between
December
1,
1976
and
April
30,
1977,
the
operating
loss
was
reduced
to
$6,165.
The
difference
arose
because
Edgar
Penner
admitted
they
had
overlooked
a
five
per
cent
management
fee
and
outstanding
taxes
in
excess
of
$40,000.
At
the
time
of
purchase
the
appellant
knew
that
there
were
rent
controls
which
had
been
proclaimed
as
law
on
May
15,
1976.
It
was
the
Penners’
fond
hope
that
the
rent
freeze
would
be
lifted,
but
they
could
give
no
real
sound
basis
for
this
hope.
Leslie
Penner
also
gave
evidence
confirming
that
which
had
been
sworn
to
by
his
brother
Edgar
Penner.
The
witnesses
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
stated
that
it
was
their
firm
intention
that
the
purchase
of
South
Park
Apartments
be
a
lasting
investment
for
the
families
of
Edgar
and
Leslie
Penner.
The
statement
of
cash
receipts
and
disbursements
shows
the
figure
of
$71,377
which
Penner
suggested
must
have
included
back
taxes.
Leslie
Penner
said
that
they
trusted
Friesen
and
Bayne
completely
and
that
they
“studied”
Friesen
and
Bayne’s
handwritten
projection
of
cash
flow.
South
Apartments
was
sold
on
June
1,
1977,
for
$2,180,000.
The
appellant
says
that
it
was
forced
into
a
position
of
having
to
sell
in
such
a
short
period
of
time
after
purchase
for
several
reasons,
the
first
of
which
was
that
Friesen
and
Bayne
were
pressing
for
repayment
of
their
loans,
even
though
a
condition
of
the
loan
was
that
they
would
only
be
repaid
out
of
the
cash
flow
over
and
above
expenses.
The
second
reason
was
that
near
the
end
of
November
1976,
their
deficit
was
over
$20,000
which
amount
had
to
be
taken
out
of
the
Company’s
working
capital.
The
appellant
states
that
their
bond
company,
on
ascertaining
the
withdrawal
of
working
capital,
was
perturbed
and
told
Mr
Penner
that
the
building
was
a
liability
rather
than
an
asset
and,
consequently,
suggested
that
they
would
have
to
cut
down
the
size
of
their
performance
bonds
on
their
many
construction
contracts.
In
its
1977
taxation
year,
the
appellant
deducted
the
sum
of
$42,164
paid
to
Friesen
and
Bayne
as
a
business
expense,
but
in
its
notice
of
appeal
contends
that
this
was
an
error
and
it
should
have
been
an
expense
on
account
of
the
disposition
of
South
Park
Apartments.
The
respondent
disallowed
this
as
an
expense
and
treated
it
as
a
capital
expenditure
except
for
the
sum
of
$10,000
and
allowed
the
appellant
to
deduct
$10,000
for
payment
to
Allan
Bayne
for
negotiations
relating
to
site
investigations
of
properties
for
building
commercial
developments.
The
appellant
used
the
services
of
Friesen
and
Bayne
to
examine
the
site
of
a
bankrupt
peat
moss
plant
which
had
been
financed
by
the
Manitoba
Government.
Messrs
Penner
felt
that
in
their
experience
in
clearing
land
involving
bogs
and
peat
moss,
this
might
be
an
appropriate
investment.
They
ascertained
that
the
plant
had
gone
bankrupt
because
of
inexperienced
staff
and
what
was
required
was
the
construction
of
a
building
on
that
site
to
be
used
in
the
drying
and
bagging
of
excavated
peat
moss.
The
Company
had
never
been
involved
in
the
peat
moss
business.
The
other
matter
involved
in
the
payments
to
Friesen
and
Bayne
was
for
negotiations
and
inquiries
with
respect
to
sites
for
low
cost
housing.
Friesen
and
Bayne
did
deal
with
the
Government
engineers
and
contacted
trailer
companies.
In
December
1976,
after
the
first
two
months
of
operation
of
the
apartment
building,
the
Company
sent
a
very
detailed
and
explicit
inquiry
with
respect
to
small
items
of
expense
and
lack
of
revenue
to
John
A
Flanders
Limited,
which
company
had
been
retained
as
manager
of
the
apartment
block
on
the
recommendation
of
Friesen.
Findings
The
appellant
argued
that
the
ledger
sheet
relating
to
notes
payable
belies
a
trading
intention.
In
my
view,
it
has
the
opposite
effect
because
the
condition
of
the
loans
from
the
real
estate
agents
was
that
the
loans
would
only
be
repaid
out
of
revenue
that
exceeded
expenditures
each
month.
Counsel
further
argued
that
the
Penners
relied
upon
the
expertise
of
Friesen
and
I
am
at
a
loss
to
understand
why
they
paid
Friesen
and
Bayne
any
moneys
at
all,
other
than
duly
earned
commissions.
The
Company
had
an
abundance
of
experience
in
dealing
with
Government
contracts
involving
the
construction
of
post
offices
and
public
buildings,
schools,
etc.
When
the
Penners
found
out
that
they
had
been
misled
by
Friesen
and
Bayne,
I
cannot
understand
why
they
continued
to
deal
with
them.
Counsel
further
argued
that
the
$42,164
is
properly
deductible
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
paragraph
20(l)(dd)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
which
reads
as
follows:
20.
(1)
Notwithstanding
paragraphs
18(l)(a),
(b)
and
(h),
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(dd)
an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
for
investigating
the
suitability
of
a
site
for
a
building
or
other
structure
planned
by
the
taxpayer
for
use
in
connection
with
a
business
carried
on
by
him;
The
Company
was
never
ever
engaged
in
the
business
of
the
peat
moss
plant
nor
in
the
operation
of
a
mobile
home
park
and
it
clearly
does
not
come
within
the
purview
of
paragraph
20(l)(dd).
It
was
Friesen
and
Bayne
whose
common
knowledge
of
the
market
brought
a
prospective
purchaser
to
the
Company
resulting
in
the
sale
in
June
1977.
The
appellant
made
a
point
that
it
never
advertised
the
apartments
for
sale,
but
acknowledged
that
Friesen
was
the
most
experienced
realtor
in
apartment
blocks
in
the
City
of
Winnipeg.
Advertising
would
obviously
be
unnecessary.
The
urgency
for
sale
escapes
me
because
the
Company
carried
on
construction
business
through
to
1981
and
from
their
financial
statements
filed
with
the
1977
income
tax
return,
it
is
apparent
that
in
1976
the
Company
had
retained
earnings
of
$571,660
and
in
1977
it
had
retained
earnings
in
the
amount
of
$755,147.
Net
earnings
in
1976
were
$98,023
and
in
1977,
$183,487.
The
Company
certainly
was
not
in
any
financial
straits
and
I
do
not
accept
Edgar
Penner’s
evidence
with
respect
to
the
bond
company
as
being
very
material
to
the
need
to
sell
the
apartments
because
the
size
of
the
performance
bonds
was
reduced.
The
appellant
had
considerable
expertise
in
the
construction
business
and
in
financing
same.
Its
careful
analysis
of
the
income
picture
from
the
apartments
for
October-
November
1976,
as
expressed
to
Flanders
and
Company,
clearly
indicates
to
me
that
they
were
indeed
careful
and
knowledgeable
in
financial
matters.
The
Penners’
casual
acceptance
of
a
handwritten
sheet
of
expenses
and
revenue
to
produce
the
cash
flow
presented
to
them
by
Friesen,
and
the
fact
that
they
did
not
check
same
with
regard
to
the
cost
of
the
purchase,
leave
me
very
doubtful
as
to
the
appellant’s
avowed
intention
to
acquire
the
apartments
as
a
lasting
investment.
It
was
quite
obvious
that
Friesen,
with
his
connections
in
the
City
of
Winnipeg,
could
dispose
of
the
property
quite
readily.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
it
is
my
view
that
Friesen
had
this
in
mind
from
the
outset
of
his
dealings
with
the
Company
and
possibly
assured
the
Penners
that
if
they
ran
into
any
problems,
he
would
easily
dispose
of
the
property.
Further,
the
appellant
was
aware
of
the
rent
freeze
that
existed
at
the
time
of
the
purchase
and
the
deficit
in
the
cash
flow
as
opposed
to
Friesen
and
Bayne’s
projections
should
have
made
them
(the
Penners)
quite
leary
of
dealing
further
with
these
agents.
Nevertheless,
the
continued
to
do
business
with
them.
The
appellant’s
argument
with
respect
to
its
declared
intention
to
acquire
the
property
as
a
lasting
investment
must
be
weighed
against
all
facts
prior
to
and
after
the
purchase.
See
Joseph
Friedman
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2611;
78
DTC
1020,
where
Lucien
Cardin,
QC,
at
2614-2615
and
1022-1023
respectively,
says
as
follows:
In
cases
where
the
Board
is
to
decide
whether
profits
realized
from
the
acquisition
and
disposition
of
properties
are
income
or
capital
gain,
the
facts
are
the
determining
factor.
The
appellant’s
declared
intention
of
purchasing
the
properties
as
an
investment
in
rental
properties
must,
of
course,
be
considered
by
the
Board.
However,
the
appellant’s
course
of
conduct
over
a
period
of
time
substantiated
by
the
facts
will
or
will
not
corroborate
the
appellant’s
declared
intentions.
In
establishing
these
facts,
the
reasons
given
by
the
appellant
for
the
acquisition
and
the
disposition
of
the
properties
must
be
reasonable
and
credible.
I
have
found
and
indeed
noted
that
the
appellant’s
credibility
left
much
to
be
desired.
See
also
Luigi
Borrelli
and
Frank
Borrelli
v
MNR,
[1982]
CTC
2383;
82
DTC
1374.
Having
regard
to
the
experience
of
the
Penner
brothers
in
financial
matters,
I
find
it
incomprehensible
why
there
is
no
explanation
of
their
failure
to
check
out
the
financial
statements
of
the
operations
of
the
apartment
building
in
the
years
preceding
purchase
by
them
in
1976.
I
therefore
find
that
the
sale
on
June
1,
1977
was
on
income
account
rather
than
on
capital
account.
Dealing
further
with
the
sum
of
$42,164
paid
to
Friesen
and
Bayne
as
part
of
the
cost
of
disposition
of
South
Park
Apartments,
as
I
stated
earlier,
the
respondent
has
allowed
the
appellant
to
deduct
$10,000
on
account
of
this
amount
relating
it
to
services
rendered
by
the
real
estate
agents.
The
peat
moss
plant
and
the
mobile
home
park
were
clearly
not
part
of
the
appellant’s
business
and
the
feasibility
studies
relating
thereto
are
capital
expenditures.
See
Queen
and
Metcalfe
Carpark
Limited
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
810;
74
DTC
6007.
At
820
and
6013
respectively,
Sweet,
DJ
states:
So
far
as
the
circumstances
of
this
case
are
concerned
amounts
paid
for
the
following
purposes
wouild
be
among
those
which,
in
my
opinion,
would
not
be
incurred
in
investigatory
proceedings
within
the
meaning
of
the
legislation
and,
accordingly,
would
not
be
deductible
in
computing
income:
3.
To
attempt
to
obtain
approval
of
the
proposed
development
from
municipal,
regulatory
and
other
officials,
committees
and
authorities.
4.
For
the
preparation
of
plans,
specifications,
briefs
and
other
material
in
connection
with,
associated
with
or
incidental
to
the
above-mentioned
activities.
5.
For
the
attendance
of
representatives
of
the
appellant
at
meetings
with
prospective
tenants,
and
municipal,
regulatory
and
other
officials,
committees
and
authorities
in
connection
with,
associated
with
or
incidental
to
the
above
purposes.
7.
For
the
services
of
public
relations
counsel
in
the
attempt
to
create
a
receptive
climate
for
the
proposed
project.
I
therefore
dismiss
the
appeal
on
the
above
grounds.
Appeal
dismissed.