Taylor,
TCJ:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
Vancouver,
British
Columbia
on
January
30,
1985,
against
income
tax
assessments
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
all
deductions
claimed
as
expenses
against
employment
income
for
the
year
1980
and
all
but
$139
of
the
amount
claimed
in
1981.
The
notice
of
appeal
filed
by
the
taxpayer
contains
certain
references
to
information
and
advice
which
he
indicated
had
been
received
by
Revenue
Canada
with
regards
to
the
claims
made,
indeed
before
many
of
the
expenses
had
been
incurred.
It
was
explained
to
him
by
the
Court
that
whether
or
not
these
occurred
as
he
related
them,
the
situation
facing
him
at
the
hearing,
was
to
establish
that
he
was
entitled,
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72
c
63,
as
amended,
to
the
deductions
claimed.
There
was
a
certain
degree
of
confusion
in
the
appellant’s
mind
regarding
the
status
he
could
claim,
as
a
taxpayer,
in
order
to
be
so
entitled.
He
had
used
the
term
“‘to
run
a
business”
in
his
notice
of
appeal,
but
there
was
no
indication
therein,
or
in
his
income
tax
return,
that
he
was
“in
business”.
He
was
an
employee,
but
the
precise
nature
of
his
employment
appeared
to
be
somewhat
in
doubt
—
whether
the
income
was
from
salary
or
commissions.
The
respondent
in
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
set
out
the
situation
as:
In
the
1980
and
1981
taxation
years
the
Appellant
worked
as
a
commission
sales
employee
of
RJR
—
MacDonald
Incorporated.
—
In
his
1980
and
1981
individual
Income
Tax
Returns
the
Appellant
claimed
a
deduction
for
expenses
incurred
in
the
maintenance
of
an
office
in
his
home
in
the
amount
of
$7,393.60
in
1980
and
$2,952.00
in
1981.
The
Respondent
reassessed
the
Appellant
for
the
1980
and
1981
taxation
years
and
disallowed
a
deduction
for
the
home
office
expenses
in
1980
and
reduced
the
Appellant’s
claim
for
home
office
expenses
from
$2,952.00
to
$139.00
in
1981.
In
so
reassessing
the
Appellant
for
the
1981
taxation
year,
the
Respondent
relied
upon
the
following
assumptions
of
fact,
inter
alia:
in
1980
the
Appellant
did
not
maintain
a
room
or
area
in
his
home
that
was
used
solely
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income;
—
in
1981,
the
Appellant
maintained
an
office
occupying
approximately
150
sq
ft
in
his
home
which
had
a
total
square
footage
of
1,130
sq
ft.;
—
that
portion
of
the
Appellant’s
home
maintenance
expenses
attributable
to
the
said
home
office
amounted
to
$139.00
in
the
1981
taxation
year.
The
respondent
relies,
inter
alia,
upon
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(iv)
and
section
67
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
For
the
taxation
year
1981,
neither
the
T4
wage
slips
nor
the
filed
tax
return
of
the
appellant
indicated
that
any
of
the
income
($24,776.60)
came
from
commissions.
For
the
year
1980,
there
still
was
no
indication
of
“commission”
income,
on
the
T4
wage
slips,
but
in
preparing
his
income
tax
returns
Mr
Thompson
showed
an
amount
of
$1,365.64
as
from
commissions,
out
of
the
total
of
$21,874.60.
It
was
his
testimony
that
in
both
years
he
had
received
some
commission
income
—
a
kind
of
“override”
when
his
quota
of
sales
—
related
to
his
base
salary
—
had
been
exceeded.
Mr
Thompson
agreed
with
the
$1,365.64
figure
for
1980,
and
indicated
that
the
similar
amount
for
1981
would
have
been
about
$300.
The
Minister
agreed
with
the
appellant’s
position
on
this
part
—
without
further
confirmation.
For
the
year
1980,
the
taxpayer
in
claiming
the
deductions
of
$7,393.60,
gave
as
details:
My
Regional
Office
is
Located
in
Richmond,
BC,
a
distance
of
480
miles.
50%
of
the
square
footage
of
my
house
is
used
for
warehouse
and
office
space.
A
new
office
was
constructed
in
a
portion
of
the
basement.
|
Expenses
|
Allowable
Expenses
|
Rent
for
12
mos
600
X
12
|
|
7200.00
|
3600.00
|
Gas
|
|
—
|
274.94
|
137.47
|
Utilities
45.90
X
4
|
—
|
183.60
|
91.80
|
Hydro
|
|
—
|
227.55
|
113.77
|
Phone
|
|
176.40
|
88.20
|
Office
Construction
|
-
|
|
3084.36
|
Labour
|
600.00
|
|
Material
|
2484.36
|
|
Total
|
3084.36
|
|
Insurance
Home
Fire
|
|
172.00
|
86.00
|
Improvements
|
|
384.00
|
192.00
|
|
Total
for
allowable
|
|
expenses
Home
used
|
|
as
office
and
|
|
Warehouse
|
|
$7,393.60
|
Following
is
a
list
of
office
expenses
incurred
while
performing
my
job
functions
of
which
only
25%
of
my
residence
was
required
First
the
Court
would
refer
to
the
Minister’s
pleadings
(supra)
and
in
particular
the
reliance
on
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(iv)
of
the
Act.
I
cannot
imagine
what
relevance
that
particular
reference
has
in
this
appeal,
and
counsel
for
the
Minister
made
no
move
to
amend
it.
Based
on
the
Minister’s
position
at
the
hearing
I
am
led
to
believe
that
the
proper
reference
would
be
8(l)(i)(ii)
and
8(l)(i)(iii)
and/or
8(l)(f)
of
the
Act.
The
paragraph
8(l)(i)
refers
to
a
particular
kind
of
expense
deduction
“dues
and
other
expenses
of
performing
duties’’
and
“office
rent”
available
to
a
salaried
employee
as
a
deduction,
if
the
employee
appropriately
qualifies.
The
latter
8(l)(f)
is
a
specific
section
relating
to
“commission”
salesmen.
With
the
wording
of
section
8(1)(f)
so
broad
“—
amounts
expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
income
from
employment
—”,
I
fail
to
see
any
reason
that
a
bona
fide
commission
salesman
should
be
required
to
rely
on
any
subsection
under
section
8
of
the
Act,
other
than
that
particular
one,
(8(l)(f)),
in
order
to
deduct
legitimate
expenses.
As
I
see
it
—
everything
available
to
salaried
employees
under
the
other
subsections
is
automatically
available
to
the
commission
salesman
under
paragraph
8(l)(f)
of
the
Act
—
the
separate
and
individual
type
of
expenses
(eg)
“rent”,
“office
supplies”
etc,
do
not
need
to
be
further
identified
as
covered
under
a
different
subsection.
I
am
aware
that
a
detailed
examination
of
the
income
of
this
appellant
might
reveal
that
he
was
disentitled
to
the
benefits
of
paragraph
8(1
)(f)
of
the
Act,
by
virtue
of
the
conditions
enumerated
under
clauses
(i),
(ii),
(iii)
or
(iv)
thereof,
but
counsel
for
the
Minister
did
not
raise
that
issue.
At
the
Court
appearance
stage
of
an
income
tax
dispute,
it
is
the
responsibility
of
the
Minister
to
identify
clearly
and
succinctly
the
exact
task
facing
the
appellant
and
that
appears
to
be
two-fold
from
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
(supra)
—
1980
—
“the
appellant
did
not
maintain
a
room
or
area
in
his
home
that
was
used
solely
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income;”
and
1981
—
“that
portion
of
the
Appellant’s
home
maintenance
expenses
attributable
to
the
said
home
office
amounted
to
$139.00’.
The
first
point
above
(“a
room
—
used
solely”)
is
one
which
is
not
founded
in
legislation
or
jurisprudence,
to
my
knowledge,
and
the
Minister
rapidly
abandoned
it.
It
is
therefore,
the
second
point
which
must
be
overcome
by
the
appellant
to
be
successful
in
this
appeal.
Hydro
|
—
|
450.00
per
annum
+
1/4
|
|
180.00
|
Heat
|
—
|
600.00
per
annum
+
*/4
|
|
240.00
|
Taxes
|
—
|
718.00
per
annum
4-
l/4
|
|
287.20
|
Rent
|
—
|
5340.00
per
annum
4-
>/
|
=
|
2136.00
|
Phone
Rent
|
—
|
72.00
per
annum
4-
*/
|
|
28.80
|
Not
reimbursed
by
Co
|
|
House
Insurance
|
—
|
200.00
per
annum
4-
>/
|
|
80.00
|
Total
employment
expense
|
|
for
198]
|
|
2952.00
|
Therefore
there
appeared
to
be
no
quarrel
that
he
earned
a
part
of
his
income
from
commissions
—
now
agreed
by
the
Minister
to
be,
1980
—
$1,365.64
and
1981
—
$300,
and
that
he
was
entitled
to
“office
rent”,
or
some
substitute
for
rent,
($139)
at
least
in
1981.
The
Minister
informed
the
Court
that
the
$139
allowed
the
appellant
was
calculated
on
the
percentage
of
the
floor
area
used
for
his
office
(150
square
feet)
in
1981
related
to
the
total
of
the
house
1130
square
feet
—
but
that
only
heat
and
light
were
considered
as
applicable.
I
don’t
know
whether
that
is
fair
or
reasonable
and
I
really
see
no
reason
to
be
concerned
about
it.
But
I
am
satisfied
that
if
“heat”
and
“light”
are
somehow
deductible
(proportionately)
then
so
should
be
other
expenses
of
maintaining
the
‘‘office
and
warehouse”
portion
of
the
house
—
taxes,
mortgage
interest,
repairs,
insurance,
etc.
Clearly
the
appellant
cannot
charge
as
expenses,
certain
portions
of
these
costs
(as
a
substitute
for
rent)
and
then
also
deduct
something
called
“rent”
which
he
has
done
in
filing
his
returns.
The
same
applied
to
the
year
1980,
even
though
nothing
was
allowed
by
the
Minister
and,
it
should
be
added,
a
considerable
portion
of
the
deduction
claimed
was
for
“capital
expenditures”.
But
all
of
that
is
an
assessing
problem,
not
one
for
the
Court.
Under
the
most
favourable
circumstances
then,
this
taxpayer
could
be
entitled
to
deductions
of
$1,365.64
for
1980
and
$300
for
1981,
under
paragraph
8(l)(f)
of
the
Act
alone.
The
question
then
becomes
—
what
was
there
to
distinguish
the
requirement
of
this
appellant
for
the
expenses
claimed
in
relation
only
to
the
small
amounts
of
commission
income,
as
opposed
to
the
much
greater
amounts
of
salary
income?
The
testimony
of
the
appellant
would
indicate
there
was
no
difference.
He
spent
about
40
per
cent
of
his
total
working
time
in
his
office
and
warehouse
—
both
part
of
his
home
—
and
60
per
cent
of
his
time
on
the
road.
There
was
nothing
to
indicate
that
the
expenses
he
claimed
had
to
do
only
with
the
commission
income
—
and,
more
importantly,
there
is
no
support
for
a
conclusion
that
his
employer
required
him
to
maintain
an
“office”,
or
to
incur
“expenses”
related
to
the
commission
income,
while
not
requiring
that
his
duties
in
order
to
earn
the
salary
income
mandated
the
same
facilities
and
latitude.
Yet
the
Minister
has
accepted
his
requirement
for
an
office,
at
least
in
1981.
It
was
the
appellant’s
testimony
that
the
office
and
expenses
were
needed
to
earn
his
total
income
and
that
would
have
included
his
salary
income.
According
to
the
appellant
it
was
an
understood
part
of
his
employment
arrangement
with
his
employer.
That
does
seem
reasonable
to
me
in
view
of
the
fact
that
he
was
some
400
miles
from
his
employer’s
office
and
warehouse,
and
his
duties
obviously
necessitated
a
base
of
operations
and
some
form
of
warehouse
storage.
If
the
Court
is
to
accept,
without
further
confirmation
or
qualification,
the
Minister’s
agreement
that
the
appellant
was
required
to
have
an
office
in
1981
($139
al-
lowed)
—
I
can
think
of
no
reason
to
reject
the
appellant’s
claim
that
such
a
requirement
existed
for
the
salary
income
as
well
as
the
commission
income,
and
that
there
was
a
need
for
such
an
office
in
1980
as
well.
Further,
it
does
not
appear
logical
to
me
that
the
Minister
would
be
agreeing
to
a
requirement
by
the
employer
that
the
taxpayer
maintain
an
office
to
earn
his
salary
income
(and
thereby
deduct
the
$139
in
1981)
while
not
having
such
a
requirement
for
earning
his
commission
income.
Simply
put,
no
matter
from
which
source
(salary
or
commission)
the
Minister
permitted
the
deduction
of
$139
office
rent
—
and
that
was
not
made
crystal
clear
—
the
argument
for
legitimate
deduction
from
the
other
source
is
equally
valid.
The
signal
case
of
Cival
v
The
Queen,
[1983]
CTC
153;
83
DTC
5168,
as
I
understand
it,
stands
for
the
propositions
that
there
must
be
a
“contract
of
employment”,
and
to
be
entitled
to
the
deductions
under
paragraph
8(l)(h)
of
the
Act,
there
must
be
bilateral,
not
unilateral
recognition
of
the
requirement
for
them.
In
order
for
the
Minister
to
permit
the
deduction
of
$139
under
paragraph
8(1)(f)
—
but
not
under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
or
(i)
of
the
Act
the
Minister
would
be
required
to
argue
that
the
conditions
for
qualification
under
paragraph
8(l)(f)
are
less
stringent
than
those
under
paragraph
8(l)(h)
or
8(l)(i)
of
the
Act.
That
might
be
seen
and
contended
using
the
differences
between
the
sections,
such
as
“the
(travelling)
expenses”
(8(
l)(h)(ii)),
and
“his
own
expenses”
(8(
l)(f)(i)
),
but
the
Minister
did
not
so
argue
in
this
case.
I
also
point
out
that
Mr
Thompson’s
“travelling”
expenses
(automobile,
room
and
board)
were
reimbursed
to
him
by
his
employer
—
MacDonald
Tobacco
Limited
—
but
the
Minister
did
not
contend
that
this
reimbursement
disqualified
the
taxpayer
in
any
way
from
the
deductions
he
sought.
In
summary,
the
concession
made
by
the
Minister
to
this
appellant
sets
up
the
situation
which
gives
him
entitlement
to
some
deductions
analogous
to
“office
rent”,
from
income,
whether
he
is
considered
a
commission
salesman
or
a
salaried
employee.
While
certain
comments
about
“quantum”
were
made
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
in
argument,
that
did
not
appear
at
any
time
to
be
the
real
point
in
dispute.
The
point
in
dispute
appeared
to
be
only
whether
the
appellant
had
any
entitlement
to
the
deductions
he
sought
—
a
point
in
my
view
already
determined
in
favour
of
the
appellant,
when
the
respondent
awarded
him
the
amount
of
$139.
Based
on
the
hearing
it
is
difficult
to
determine
quantum,
but
the
only
viable
determination
for
the
Court
as
I
see
it,
is
to
find
in
favour
of
the
appellant,
to
the
degree
reasonable
on
the
available
facts.
The
appeal
is
allowed
in
part,
in
order
that
the
taxpayer
be
entitled
to
deduct
the
costs
claimed
for
rent
and
telephone
in
the
years
in
question
—
1980
—
$3,688.20,
1981
—
$2,164.80.
In
all
other
respects
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
The
entire
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
Costs
are
not
awarded.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.