Sarchuk,
TCJ:—This
is
an
application
made
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
section
167
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
an
order
extending
the
time
within
which
notices
of
objection
might
be
served
with
respect
to
the
taxpayer’s
1978
to
1981
taxation
years.
Mr
Tanaka
(Tanaka)
was
not
present
at
the
hearing
of
this
application.
He
was
represented
by
Mr
Yurik
(Yurik)
a
chartered
accountant
employed
by
Touche
Ross
&
Co.
In
addition
to
appearing
on
behalf
of
Tanaka,
Yurik
testified
as
to
some
of
the
relevent
circumstances.
Notices
of
reassessment
dated
December
16,
1983
were
mailed
to
Tanaka.
On
January
13,
1984,
he
spoke
to
Yurik
and
sought
his
advice
with
respect
to
the
reassessment
and
the
penalties
which
had
been
imposed.
As
a
result
of
this
discussion
Tanaka
left
his
records
with
Yurik
with
the
understanding
that
the
matter
would
be
attended
to.
Yurik
was
away
from
his
office
for
a
period
of
time
following
this
meeting
and
upon
his
return
contacted
an
officer
of
Revenue
Canada
to
determine
the
status
of
Tanaka’s
file.
He
was
advised
that
a
reassessment
was
in
the
process
of
being
issued
and
that,
in
due
course,
if
the
taxpayer
chose
to
do
so
he
would
be
entitled
to
serve
a
notice
of
objection.
Assuming
that
the
reassessments
would
be
mailed
at
some
time
in
the
future,
Yurik
left
Tanaka’s
file
unattended
for
several
months.
When
nothing
occurred
he
contacted
Tanaka
and
inquired
whether
or
not
he
had
received
anything
from
the
respondent.
Although
Yurik
was
unclear
as
to
the
conversation
which
took
place
it
resulted
in
Tanaka’s
bringing
further
material
to
the
Touche
Ross
office,
which
material,
according
to
Yurik,
included
the
notices
of
reassessment
dated
December
16,
1983.
Yurik
had
no
knowledge
as
to
when
Tanaka
received
the
reassessments.
He
did
recall
that
Tanaka
formerly
resided
in
Gibsons,
BC
but
that
during
the
summer
of
1983
had
moved
to
Vancouver
and,
in
Yurik’s
words:
..
supposedly
(had)
left
with
the
postmaster
instructions
to
forward
all
mail
to
his
Vancouver
address”.
Yurik
went
on
to
say:
“He
used
to
go
to
Gibsons
every
once
in
awhile
still
to
pick
up
his
mail,
because
he
was
in
the
process
of
selling
his
restaurant
business
which
he
had
completed
some
time
in
1983
as
well”.
Beyond
the
suggestion
that
there
may
have
been
unavoidable
delay
in
receiving
the
reassessments
no
further
evidence
was
adduced
by
Yurik
with
respect
to
this
aspect
of
the
matter.
He
was,
however,
quite
certain
that
he
first
saw
the
notices
of
reassessment
in
his
office
on
March
20,
1984,
five
days
after
the
expiration
of
the
90-day
limitation
period.
Notwithstanding
that
fact
on
March
29
he
served
notices
of
objection.
Several
days
later
the
Appeals
Division
of
Revenue
Canada
sent
a
letter
to
Tanaka
explaining
that
these
notices
could
not
be
accepted
because
they
were
“‘late
filed”.
On
June
18,
1984
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
received
an
application
made
by
Yurik
on
behalf
of
Tanaka,
for
an
extension
of
time.
No
acceptable
explanation
was
advanced
by
Yurik
for
the
delay
in
filing
this
application.
On
the
basis
of
the
foregoing
Yurik
submitted
that
it
would
be
just
and
equitable
to
allow
the
application
because
it
appeared
that
somehow
the
notices
were
misplaced
in
some
manner
and
that
in
any
event,
in
his
conversations
with
officials
of
Revenue
Canada,
he
had
advised
them
that
a
notice
of
objection
would
be
served.
In
addition
he
submitted
that
since
the
delay
in
filing
the
application
may
have
been
his
fault
it
would
be
unfair
to
penalize
Tanaka
as
a
result
thereof.
Given
the
circumstances
of
this
case
Mr
Yurik
should
not
have
represented
Mr
Tanaka.
In
situations
where
an
accountant,
agent
or
solicitor
may
have
been
responsible
for
the
delay,
in
whole
or
in
part,
it
should
be
recognized
that
a
potential
conflict
of
interest
exists
and
in
most
cases
that
person
ought
not
to
undertake
to
act
as
counsel
or
representative
for
the
applicant.
The
impropriety
is
compounded
when
the
applicant
does
not
appear
(for
whatever
reason)
and
the
evidence
adduced
(often
hearsay)
comes
from
the
person
who
may
have
been
responsible
for
the
error
in
the
first
instance.
It
is
the
view
of
this
Court
that
acting
for
an
applicant
in
such
circumstances
is
inadvisable,
if
not
improper,
and
is
to
be
discouraged.
Mr
Tanaka’s
application
must
be
dismissed.
He
did
not
appear
at
the
hearing
and
Yurik’s
evidence
was
a
mélange
of
facts,
hearsay
and
speculation
and
did
not
satisfy
the
requirements
of
section
167
of
the
Act.
There
was
no
evidence
capable
of
establishing
when
Tanaka
received
the
notices
of
reassessment
nor
was
there
any
evidence
as
to
what
he
did
(if
anything)
when
he
received
them.
Yurik’s
submission
that
the
move
from
Gibson
to
Vancouver
may
have
delayed
the
receipt
of
the
notices
until
the
limitation
period
had
nearly
expired
was
not
supported
by
any
evidence
whatsoever.
Furthermore,
Yurik’s
explanation
of
the
delay
in
making
the
application
following
his
receipt
of
the
notices
was
not
at
all
persuasive.
The
applicant
failed
to
satisfy
the
Court
that
the
circumstances
justify
the
granting
of
the
order
sought.
One
further
comment
appears
to
be
in
order.
Far
too
many
agents,
representatives
and
indeed
some
counsel
take
what
appears
to
be
a
rather
casual
approach
to
the
presentation
of
their
clients’
cases.
It
is
incumbent
upon
any
person
who
undertakes
to
act
for
a
taxpayer
to
be
thoroughly
familiar
with
the
relevant
statutory
provisions
and
to
have
some
basic
understanding
of
procedure
and
what
constitutes
admissible
evidence.
At
the
very
least
the
representative
must
be
aware
that
the
salient
facts
on
which
he
relies
in
support
of
the
application
must
be
properly
adduced
under
oath
or
affirmation
and
this
testimony
is
subject
to
cross-examination.
An
agent
or
representative
who
appears
without
a
witness
and
who
intends
to
repeat
to
the
Court
what
he
had
been
told
by
this
applicant
or
others
or
both
does
not
in
my
view
meet
this
requirement.
The
application
is
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.
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