Cardin,
TCJ:—In
his
1979
and
1980
tax
returns,
Charles
Roy
claimed
deductions
of
$1,468.65
and
$1,599.12
respectively
as
“in-residence”
office
expenses
which
the
Minister
disallowed
on
the
grounds
that
they
had
not
been
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property
but
were
personal
living
expenses
and
not
deductible
by
virtue
of
both
paragraphs
18(1)(a)
and
18(1)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148.
The
appellant,
a
bachelor,
had
prior
to
1975
been
manager
of
the
Niagara
Falls
office
of
AGF
Management
Limited,
which
was
eventually
dissolved.
He
then
began
a
business
as
an
independent
Investment
Fund
dealer,
licensed
through
a
broker
of
Regal
Capital
Planners
Ltd.
His
income
was
exclusively
on
a
commission
basis.
It
is
the
appellant’s
contention
that,
in
order
to
minimize
operational
costs,
he
decided
in
1975
to
conduct
his
new
business
from
a
one-bedroom
apartment
situated
on
the
top
floor
of
a
high-rise
apartment
in
St
Catharines
which
he
had
occupied
since
1966.
The
alternative,
according
to
the
appellant,
would
have
been
to
rent
much
smaller
office
space
in
Pen
Centre
nearby,
at
a
cost
of
$550
a
month.
It
is
alleged
that
all
but
the
bedroom
was
used
as
an
office.
The
dining-room
area
contained
a
desk
with
a
stationary
typewriter,
filing
cabinets;
the
livingroom
area
was
arranged
with
a
desk
and
office-like
furniture
for
clients,
a
black-
board,
tape
recorders
and,
more
recently,
video
was
used
to
inform
clients
of
market
trends.
The
kitchen
was
used
to
prepare
and
serve
coffee
and
drinks
to
clients,
creating
thereby
a
more
congenial
atmosphere
that
could
not
have
been
realized
in
a
conventional
office.
Although
the
appellant’s
business
required
him
to
travel
considerably,
he
received
clients
at
their
convenience
in
his
apartment
two
or
three
days
a
week,
mostly
in
the
evenings
and
on
week-ends.
The
uncontradicted
evidence
is
that,
in
this
way,
the
appellant,
who
had
no
other
business
office,
more
than
doubled
his
income
from
1975
to
1983,
with
sales
of
over
$1
million.
The
appellant
admitted
that
the
apartment
was
used
occasionally
to
entertain
personal
friends
but
he
stated
that
he
never
prepared
or
cooked
meals
in
his
kitchen.
He
also
alleged
that
he
usually
ate
in
restaurants
and
slept
at
his
girlfriend’s
house
most
of
the
time.
It
was
admitted
that
there
were
no
external
indications
that
the
apartment
was
being
used
as
an
office
and
no
licence
or
permit
for
that
purpose
had
been
obtained.
Furthermore,
no
business
tax
had
been
paid.
In
argument
the
respondent
submitted
that
in
1975,
the
appellant,
in
using
his
apartment
to
conduct
his
business,
had
not
incurred
additional
expenses.
Actually,
no
evidence
one
way
or
another
was
adduced
on
that
point.
I
do
not
believe,
however,
that
paragraph
18(l)(a)
requires
that
additional
expenses
be
incurred.
It
appears
to
me
that
any
expense
directly
related
to
the
gaining
or
producing
of
income
from
a
business
is
deductible.
Furthermore,
it
is
not
clear
to
what
extent
and
how
the
apartment
was
used
by
the
appellant
prior
to
1975
when
he
was
manager
of
the
Niagara
Falls
office
of
AGF
Management
Limited.
However,
what
the
evidence
clearly
showed
was
that
the
appellant,
for
business
reasons,
decided
in
1975
to
operate
his
new
business
from
his
apartment.
The
respondent
does
not
deny
that
in
1978
and
1979,
the
appellant
did
just
that,
nor
that
taxable
income
was
produced
as
a
result.
Moreover,
it
would
appear
that
all
of
the
apartment
except
for
the
bedroom
was
used
principally
for
business
purposes
rather
than
as
a
residence,
even
though
some
personal
use
was
made
of
the
premises.
As
I
understand
it,
the
use
made
by
the
appellant
of
the
kitchen,
the
bar
and
the
living-room,
is
not
unlike
the
use
made
in
executive
suites
of
large
corporations.
In
both
cases,
the
purpose
is
to
increase
sales
through
a
more
personal
and
congenial
approach
to
business
relationships.
The
facts
in
this
appeal,
while
perhaps
not
unique,
are
unusual
and
differ
from
those
of
most
“in-residence
office
expense”
cases
cited
by
the
respondent.
However,
the
facts
in
The
Queen
v
Justin
Cork
([1984]
CTC
479;
84
DTC
6515)
are
indeed
not
basically
unlike
those
of
the
case
at
bar.
It
was
held
by
Muldoon,
J,
of
the
Federal
Court
—
Trial
Division,
that:
The
taxpayer’s
decision
to
minimize
expenses
by
establishing
his
office
in
his
home
rather
than
at
another
place
was
entirely
a
matter
of
his
own
business
judgment
and
was
perfectly
reasonable.
(DTC
Headnote)
In
E
F
Anthony
Merchant
v
MNR,
[1982]
CTC
2742;
82
DTC
1764,
M
J
Bonner,
Esq,
QC
(Member
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
as
he
then
was),
found
that
the
appellant
had
maintained
an
office
in
his
home
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
his
law
practice
pursuant
to
paragraph
18(l)(a).
At
2743
(DTC
1765),
he
stated:
The
question
whether
the
purpose
test
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act
is
met
or
not
is
essentially
one
of
fact
and
the
cases
relied
upon
by
the
respondent
have
little
bearing,
having
regard
to
what
was
established
in
evidence
here.
These
remarks
are
equally
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar
in
which
the
purpose,
the
use
and
indeed
the
result
of
the
appellant’s
“in-residence”
office
were
satisfactorily
established.
In
my
opinion,
an
office
was
necessary
in
the
appellant’s
business;
there
was
nothing
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
preclude
him
from
establishing
his
only
office
in
his
residence,
the
purpose
of
which
was
not
one
of
convenience
but
to
gain
or
produce
income
from
his
business
and
he
succeeded
in
doing
so.
On
the
basis
of
uncontradicted
evidence,
the
appellant’s
apartment
was
used
principally
as
a
business
office
and
only
occasionally
for
his
personal
use.
The
office
expenses
claimed
in
each
of
the
taxation
years
represent
one-half
of
the
rent
of
the
apartment
which,
in
my
view,
is
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
amounts
of
$1,468.65
and
$1,599.12
for
each
of
the
taxation
years
1979
and
1980
respectively
were
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
and
producing
income
from
a
business
and
are
deductible
under
paragraph
18(l)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
appellant
is
allowed
party
and
party
costs.
Appeal
allowed.