The
Associate
Chief
Justice:—On
February
14,
1985,
at
Ottawa,
I
filed
written
reasons
for
my
disposition
of
appeals
in
these
two
actions
from
the
decision
of
John
E
Clegg,
Taxing
Officer,
given
by
him
at
Toronto,
March
20,
1984.
In
the
concluding
paragraph,
I
invited
counsel
to
make
further
representations
as
required
and
I
heard
them
at
London,
Ontario,
on
April
10,
1985.
At
the
conclusion
of
these
further
submissions,
I
was
satisfied
that
my
reasons
did
not
deal
sufficiently
with
two
matters:
costs
upon
pre-trial
conference
and
expert
witnesses
at
trial.
I
do
not
need
to
elaborate
on
my
reasons
given
earlier
in
which
I
indicated
that
disallowance
of
$650
in
the
Smith
action
should
be
restored.
For
the
same
reasons,
the
sum
of
$950
disallowed
in
the
Campbell
action
should
also
be
restored.
The
subject
of
expert
witnesses
is
somewhat
more
complex.
My
earlier
reasons
approve
of
the
allowance
made
by
the
Taxing
Officer
for
preparation
for
trial
at
$150
per
hour
for
the
witness
Pearson
and
$85
per
hour
for
the
witness
Strung.
I
did
not
go
on,
however,
to
carry
that
forward
into
the
attendance
of
these
two
witnesses
during
the
trial.
I
should
underline
here
that
the
proper
compensation
for
expert
witnesses
is
invariably
best
dealt
with
by
the
trial
judge
and
wherever
possible,
appeals
from
decisions
such
as
these
should
be
returned
to
the
judge
who
presided
over
the
trial.
In
this
case,
that
was
not
possible
and
it
may
be
that
my
disposition
of
this
matter
will
be
somewhat
arbitrary.
The
relevant
portion
of
the
Taxing
Officer’s
decision
is
as
follows:
Expert
Fees:
That
portion
of
the
order
of
December
1,
1983
regarding
the
expert
witnesses
reads
as
follows:
1.
The
expert
witnesses,
Norman
Pearson
and
Joseph
Strung,
are
entitled
(pursuant
to
ss
4(2)
Tariff
A)
to
reasonable
payment
for
the
services
performed
by
them
in
preparing
to
give
evidence,
and
in
giving
evidence.
If
the
parties
cannot
agree
on
what
is
“reasonable
payment”,
then
the
taxing
officer
shall
determine
the
amount.
The
direction
entitles
the
expert
witness
to
reasonable
payment
for
the
services
performed
by
them,
rather
than
services
performed
by
others
in
assisting
them
to
prepare
and
to
give
evidence.
The
account
of
Norman
Pearson
Planning
Associates
Limited
dated
March
1,
1983
(one
week
after
the
Reasons
for
Judgment
were
given
from
the
Bench)
was
for
$14,956.63
for
the
time
spent
by
Dr
Norman
Pearson
in
preparing
to
give
evidence
and
in
giving
evidence
at
$15.00
per
hour
plus
the
expenses
incurred.
The
amount
submitted
on
the
Plaintiffs
Bill
of
Costs
is
for
$15,240.92,
I
was
given
no
explanation
for
the
$284.29
difference
between
that
amount
and
the
amount
showing
on
the
Norman
Pearson
Planning
Associates
Limited
account
dated
March
1,
1983.
As
at
the
commencement
of
trial,
February
14,
1983,
Dr
Pearson’s
fee
plus
disbursement
amounted
to
$9,844.13.
The
remaining
$5,112.50
is
for
the
five
days
spent
at
trial
by
Dr
Pearson
at
his
hourly
rate
of
of
$150.00.
In
the
case
Spur
Oil
v
The
Queen
(Court
file
T-3596-76),
The
Hounourable
Mr
Justice
Cattanach
in
his
Reasons
for
Judgment
dated
June
8,
1982,
considered
the
matter
of
taxable
fees
allowable
to
counsel
and
to
expert
witnesses
at
trial,
and
their
respective
responsibilities.
At
page
10
of
those
reasons,
he
states:
There
should
be
a
balance
and,
in
my
view,
that
balance
should
weigh
in
favour
of
counsel
who
have
the
paramount
responsibility
in
the
conduct
of
a
trial.
With
that
in
mind,
Dr
Pearson’s
fees
at
trial
are
taxed
at
$100.00
per
day
for
the
five
days
of
his
attendance,
and
his
total
fees
and
disbursements
are
therefore
taxed
at
$10,344.13.
The
account
submitted
by
Strung
Real
Estate
Limited
is
broken
down
by
the
number
of
hours
spent,
in
ten
different
time
categories,
by
each
of
the
four
persons
with
the
organization
who
worked
on
this
case.
As
per
the
Court
order
of
December
1,
1983,
I
concern
myself
only
with
the
services
performed
by
the
expert
witness
Joseph
Strung.
Mr
Strung’s
time
in
preparing
for
trial
was
charged
at
$85.00
per
hour
in
the
following
manner:
Meeting
with
clients
|
14.0
hours
|
Inspect
property
|
10.0
hours
|
Office
research
and
organize
work
plan
|
47.25
hours
|
Meeting
with
collègues
|
7.0
hours
|
Draft
report
|
40.0
hours
|
Prepare
file
for
Court
|
29.5
hours
|
for
a
total
of
147.30
hours
or
$12,495.00.
There
was
no
charge
for
Mr
Strung’s
time
in
the
categories
of
Registry
Office
searches,
finalizing
report,
or
telephone
discussion.
The
expenses
charged
for
by
Strung
Real
Estate
Limited
in
this
case
total
$5,247.53,
of
which
I
accredit
one-quarter
to
Mr
Strung,
or
$1,311.88.
Mr
Strung
spent
seven
days
at
trial
for
which
I
allow
$100.00
per
day
for
the
reasons
given
above.
Mr
Strung’s
total
fees
and
disbursements
are
therefore
taxed
at
$14,506.88.
As
the
Taxing
Officer
set
out
in
his
report
with
a
quote
from
Mr
Justice
Cattanach
in
Spur
Oil
Ltd
v
The
Queen,
[1983]
1
FC
244,
the
object
is
not
full
reimbursement
on
a
solicitor
and
client
basis
but
this
is
very
close
to
what
was
done
in
respect
to
the
preparation
for
trial,
and
for
good
reason.
Real
estate
appraisers,
as
with
most
expert
witnesses,
do
the
bulk
of
their
work
prior
to
the
trial,
indeed
prior
to
the
filing
of
their
report.
One
of
the
reasons
that
the
allowances
are
as
accepted
by
the
Taxing
Officer
is
because
such
a
project
involves
the
assistance
of
a
support
team
of
research
and
office
staff.
The
experts,
of
course,
must
remain
on
through
the
trial
and
so
the
cost
for
them
goes
on,
but
I
think
the
conditions
differ,
particularly
in
terms
of
support
staff
activity,
and
I
therefore
conclude
that
compensation
during
trial
at
the
hourly
rate
allowed
for
preparation
would
be
too
generous.
The
per
diem
approach
by
the
Taxing
Officer
was
more
suitable
but
his
allowance
of
$100
a
day
is
too
low
having
in
mind
his
acceptance
of
the
hourly
rate
for
preparation.
It
is
also
difficult
for
me
to
reconcile
in
any
consistent
manner
the
difference
in
allowances
for
preparation
with
a
difference
in
the
value
of
the
contribution
by
these
two
experts
during
the
course
of
the
trial.
Some
differential
is
appropriate,
but
not
the
two-for-one
ratio
allowed
in
preparation.
I
would
allow
$400
per
day
for
the
witness
Pearson
at
five
days,
or
$2,000,
and
$300
per
day
for
the
witness
Strung
at
seven
days
or
$2,100.
Finally,
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
should
recover
for
attendance
upon
taxation
disbursements
as
claimed
of
$652.78
plus
two
days’
counsel
fee
at
the
Federal
Court
tariff.
Order
accordingly.