Rip,
TCJ:—In
computing
its
income
from
a
business
for
1976
the
appellant,
Oriole
Oil
&
Gas
Ltd,
("Oriole")
deducted
the
sum
of
$1
million
paid
to
two
employees
purportedly
in
satisfaction
of
loss
of
office
and
also
in
consideration
for
releases
by
the
employees
of
the
appellant
"from
all
rights,
claims,
and
demands
whatsoever
under
or
arising
out
of
employment
contracts"
between
the
appellant
and
the
employees;
as
a
result
of
the
deduction
by
Oriole,
it
incurred
an
income
loss
in
1976
which
it
carried
forward
to
the
1977,
1978
and
1979
taxation
years.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
the
respondent,
disallowed
the
deduction
on
the
basis
that
the
expenditure
was
not
made
or
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
("Act")
and,
if
allowed
as
a
deduction
to
Oriole,
it
would
unduly
or
artificially
reduce
Oriole’s
income
for
its
1976
to
1979
taxation
years
inclusive
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
245(1)
of
the
Act;
the
Minister
also
claimed
the
amount
of
the
deduction
is
not
reasonable
in
the
circumstances
and
pursuant
to
section
67
of
the
Act
should
be
disallowed.
Oriole
was
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Alberta
in
1972
by
Herbert
C
Flanagan
for
the
purpose
of
acquiring
mineral
leases
for
properties
having
shallow
gas
plays,
that
is
a
formation
of
natural
gas
within
2,000
to
2,500
feet
from
the
surface.
Prior
to
1972
Mr
Flanagan
had
been
employed
for
16
years
as
a
petroleum
landman
by
two
oil
companies
in
Alberta,
Midwest
Oil
Corporation
and
Pacific
Petroleum
Ltd.
A
petroleum
landman
was
described
by
Mr
Flanagan
as
one
who
assembles
land
for
oil
and
gas
development
and
deals
and
negotiates
on
a
company's
behalf.
Shortly
after
Oriole
was
incorporated
Mr
Flanagan
invited
Mr
L
R
Burroughs,
a
petroleum
engineer
whom
he
had
known
for
about
four
years,
to
join
him
as
a
shareholder
in
the
newly
formed
corporation;
each
of
Mr
Flanagan
and
Mr
Burroughs
owned
50
per
cent
of
the
issued
shares
of
Oriole.
Mr
Flanagan
gave
evidence
on
behalf
of
Oriole.
He
and
Mr
Burroughs
had
been
involved
previously
in
two
small
drilling
ventures
in
southern
Alberta.
In
the
course
of
drilling
those
wells
they
extended
the
shallow
gas
plays
from
about
Township
16
to
about
Township
22,
and
at
that
point
Mr
Flanagan
invited
Mr
Burroughs
to
participate
in
Oriole.
They
then
"decided
to
go
after
some
big
blocks
of
land".
Oriole
searched
for
areas
of
land
having
shallow
gas
plays
and
according
to
Mr
Flanagan
was
successful
in
finding
these
reserves.
Mr
Flanagan
testified
that
as
the
petroleum
landman
he
looked
at
"hundreds
and
hundreds
of
logs”
and
finally
blocked
off
"about
60
thousand
acres
of
mineral
rights"
in
southern
Alberta.
He
then
went
to
various
oil
companies
that
controlled
the
leases
on
these
lands
and
made
several
drilling
deals
and
committed
Oriole
to
drill
eight
to
ten
earn-
ing
wells
with
options
to
drill
wells
on
the
remaining
acreage.
But
Oriole
did
not
have
any
drilling
money
and
therefore
sold
its
contracts
for
the
drilling
rights
to
other
companies
which
had
funds
available
for
drilling
for
a
net
profit
interest
in
the
properties.
In
other
words,
Oriole
would
obtain
drilling
rights
from
companies
owning
the
mineral
leases
in
the
property
and
would
then
sell
the
rights
to
companies
that
were
financially
able
to
drill;
Oriole
would
retain
a
certain
portion
of
the
profits
after
operating
expenses.
Oriole
had
a
95
per
cent
success
ratio
in
drilling
wells.
After
completing
its
work
in
southern
Alberta
Oriole
then
made
two
or
three
smaller
deals
in
central
Alberta
and
then,
in
1974,
completed
its
drilling
prospects.
At
the
time
Oriole
had
gas
reserves
of
approximately
20
billion
cubic
feet.
The
business
carried
on
by
Oriole
did
not
require
a
large
number
of
employees.
In
1972
the
only
employees
of
Oriole
were
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
and
later
on
a
secretary.
Once
Oriole
no
longer
looked
for
drilling
prospects
its
activities
consisted
primarily
of
maintaining
the
properties,
collecting
rents
from
leases
and
verifying
wells
on
stream.
Leases
eligible
for
future
development
had
to
be
supervised
carefully.
Oriole
had
very
little
cash
flow
because
most
of
its
reserves
were
shut
in
gas
which
it
anticipated
would
come
on
stream
three
to
four
years
later
once
it
obtained
gas
contracts.
Oriole’s
interest
was
ultimately
limited
by
the
term
of
the
leases
which
ran
for
10
years,
but
once
a
well
produces,
the
life
of
a
lease
goes
on
until
the
well
runs
dry.
About
the
time
Oriole
terminated
its
activities
for
drilling
prospects
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
decided
to
sell
their
shares
in
Oriole.
At
this
time
Oriole
engaged
the
services
of
D
&
S
Petroleum
Consultants
Ltd
of
Calgary
to
prepare
a
valuation
of
Oriole’s
assets.
The
report
was
submitted
to
Oriole
on
February
8,
1974
effective
March
1,
1974.
By
letter
dated
April
25,
1974
the
valuation
of
February
8,
1974
was
changed
to
reflect
certain
items,
in
particular
the
date
of
production
from
various
leases
and
the
price
of
gas
and
its
escalation
per
year.
The
valuation
was
instigated
at
the
behest
of
Mr
Burroughs.
As
a
result
of
the
appraisal
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
were
of
the
view
they
could
receive
approximately
$4,000,000
for
their
shares.
When
the
decision
to
sell
was
made
a
document,
referred
to
by
Mr
Flanagan
as
an
“employment
contract",
was
brought
to
him
by
Mr
Burroughs
for
signature.
Mr
Flanagan’s
evidence
is
that
this
agreement
“afforded
us
monetary
protection,
and
if
Mr
Burroughs
and
I
didn't
agree
on
something,
I
can
go
my
way
and
he
could
go
his
way.
That
was
basically
the
idea”.
The
agreement
was
prepared
on
Mr
Burroughs'
initiative
and
is
reproduced
as
follows:
AGREEMENT
This
agreement
has
been
made
in
the
City
of
Calgary,
Province
of
Alberta,
effective
the
1st
day
of
May
1972
between:
HERBERT
CHARLES
FLANAGAN
hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“employee”
—
and
—
ORIOLE
OIL
AND
GAS
LTD
hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“employer”
The
employer
is
desirous
of
securing
the
services
of
the
employee
for
a
minimum
of
fifteen
years
from
the
date
hereof
and
the
employee
has
entered
into
this
agreement
under
the
following
terms:
1.
The
base
salary
for
the
first
year
shall
be
$25,000.00.
2.
The
base
salary
shall
be
increased
in
annual
increments
of
$10,000.00
to
a
maximum
of
$75,000.00.
3.
The
employer
will
pay
to
the
employee
an
annual
salary
of
$75,000.00
for
the
life
of
the
employee,
commencing
when
the
employee
attains
fifty-five
years
of
age,
or
becomes
totally
disabled
before
that
time,
or
retires
on
or
after
the
employee's
fifty-fifth
birthday.
4.
The
employer
will
pay
to
the
employee
an
annual
salary
of
$75,000.00
for
each
full
year
of
service,
prior
to
retirement
or
becoming
totally
disabled,
such
payments
to
commence
twelve
months
after
voluntary
withdrawal.
5.
The
employee
is
to
receive
a
bonus
of
7
/2%
of
the
asset
value
of
the
employer
company
if
the
employer
sells
its
assets,
business,
etc,
before
the
employee
attains
55
years
of
age.
Any
sale
of
the
employer's
shares
based
on
the
value
of
the
underlying
assets
will
be
treated
as
a
sale
of
assets.
(illegible)
|
(A
C
Flanagan)
|
Witness
|
Employee
|
|
ORIOLE
OIL
AND
GAS
LTD
|
|
(A
C
Flanagan)
|
|
(L
R
Burroughs)
|
Witness
|
Employer
|
There
was
one
agreement
between
Oriole
and
Mr
Burroughs
and
another
between
Oriole
and
Mr
Flanagan;
in
all
respects
the
agreements
were
identical.
Both
employees,
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs,
signed
the
agreement
and
the
appropriate
director's
resolution
authorized
the
officers
of
Oriole,
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs,
to
execute
the
agreement
on
Oriole's
behalf,
which
they
did.
The
employment
agreements
were
prepared
and
executed
in
1974
notwithstanding
that
they
took
effect
as
of
May
1,
1972.
In
each
of
the
years
up
to
1976
when
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
sold
their
shares
in
Oriole
to
Alberta
Eastern
Gas
Ltd
(“AEG"),
each
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
was
paid
a
salary
of
$25,000,
notwithstanding
paragraph
2
of
the
agreement.
Mr
Flanagan
testified
that
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
built
the
company
“up
from
nothing"
and
since
they
had
taken
very
little
out
of
the
company,
the
employment
agreement
offered
them
the
opportunity
to
get
something
out
of
it
in
the
event
one
of
them
retired
from
the
company
or
in
the
event
the
company's
assets
or
shares
were
sold
to
a
third
party.
Mr
Flanagan
stated
that
in
the
event
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
continued
as
employees
of
Oriole
the
agreement
also
gave
them
a
guaranteed
income.
Paragraph
5
of
the
agreement
provides
for
distribution
of
assets
in
the
event
of
a
sale.
Mr
Flanagan
testified
that
this
provision
was
to
ensure
that
each
of
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
would
receive
his
share
of
the
assets
of
the
company
in
the
event
of
the
sale
of
the
assets
of
Oriole,
or
if
either
of
them
sold
his
shares
in
Oriole.
Once
the
decision
to
sell
the
shares
of
Oriole
was
made
an
information
kit
was
prepared
describing
Oriole,
its
contracts
and
various
agreements;
these
were
made
available
to
all
interested
parties.
There
were
not
many
potential
purchasers
making
enquiries
to
purchase
the
shares.
In
Mr
Flanagan's
view
this
was
perhaps
because
of
Oriole's
net
profit
interest
and
the
location
of
its
lands.
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
were
first
in
contact
with
AEG,
a
public
company,
in
February
1976
and
on
May
6
of
that
year
a
letter
of
intent
was
forwarded
by
AEG
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
to
purchase
all
the
issued
and
outstanding
shares
in
Oriole;
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
accepted
the
offer
on
or
about
June
29,
1976.
The
letter
of
intent
provided
for
the
sale
to
take
place
for
the
consideration
of
$1,840,000
and
55,000
treasury
shares
of
AEG;
the
value
of
one
AEG
share
at
the
time
was
$11.25.
According
to
the
letter
of
intent
the
closing
of
the
transaction
was
to
be
no
earlier
than
July
1,
1976
and
no
later
than
July
31,
1976.
The
letter
of
intent
acknowledged
that
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
have
accepted
an
aggregate
sum
of
$1,100,000
as
settlement
for
'loss
of
office”
and
have
released
Oriole
from
all
rights,
claims
and
demands
whatsoever
arising
out
of
their
respective
employment
contracts.
A
further
letter,
dated
July
27,
1976
was
forwarded
by
AEG
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
confirming
the
understanding
reached
between
AEG
and
these
gentlemen.
Because
of
a
defect
in
title
in
respect
of
properties
in
the
Blackfoot
area
of
Alberta
the
purchase
price
for
the
shares
was
reduced
to
$1,628,000
and
48,000
common
shares
in
the
capital
stock
of
AEG.
In
addition
the
settlement
for
the
employment
contracts
between
Oriole
and
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
was
reduced
to
$1
million.
Provision
was
also
made
in
respect
of
additional
amounts
to
be
paid
by
AEG
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
when
the
title
defect
was
corrected:
the
purchase
price
would
be
increased
by
an
additional
$212,000
plus
7,000
shares
in
the
capital
stock
of
AEG
and
the
shareholders
would
also
receive
$101,000
as
a
fee
for
settlement
of
the
Blackfoot
interest.
A
formal
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
of
the
shares
was
executed
by
the
vendors
and
purchaser
on
July
28,
1976,
the
day
the
transaction
was
closed.
By
agreements
dated
effective
May
1,
1976,
which
was
prior
to
receiving
the
letter
of
intent
but
obviously
during
negotiations
with
AEG,
each
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
had
agreed
with
Oriole
that
each
would
accept
as
final
settlement
from
Oriole
of
deferred
compensation
in
paragraph
3
of
the
employment
agreement,
a
life
annuity
of
$75,000
per
annum
guaranteed
for
a
minimum
period
of
15
years,
commencing
at
age
55.
Mr
Flanagan
had
no
idea
as
to
the
origin
of
this
agreement,
when
it
was
actually
prepared
and
executed,
or
anything
about
the
agreement,
and
in
any
event
he
testified
the
agreement
was
never
acted
upon.
The
directors
of
Oriole,
being
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs,
passed
a
resolution
on
June
29,
1976
agreeing
to
terminate
the
employment
contracts
with
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
to
pay
each
the
sum
of
$500,000
in
settlement
for
loss
of
office,
the
said
moneys
to
be
paid
upon
execution
of
the
respective
releases.
The
date
of
closing
of
the
transaction
was
July
28,
1976.
By
documentation
dated
July
28,
1976
each
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
released
Oriole
from
the
employment
contracts,
their
loss
of
office
and
"any
pension
or
retirement
plan
or
agreement
or
any
other
benefits
whatsoever
of
employment
or
office”
of
each
of
them
with
Oriole.
In
addition
each
individual
acknowledged
in
his
release,
and
agreed,
that
"for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
of
Canada,
the
payment
herein
made
to
him
by
Oriole
Oil
and
Gas
Ltd
shall
be
considered
as
income
from
employment
or
office
with
Oriole
Oil
&
Gas
Ltd
(sic)
and
that
such
payment
shall
be
considered
as
a
deductible
expense
from
income
of
Oriole
Oil
and
Gas
Ltd”.
Mr
Flanagan
testified
he
did
not
know
the
reason
this
clause
was
added
to
the
release,
or
at
whose
insistence
it
was
included.
On
the
closing
day,
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
resigned
as
officers
and
directors
of
Oriole,
the
various
share
certificates
were
endorsed
to
AEG
and
meetings
of
the
new
shareholders
and
directors
were
held
naming
the
new
directors
and
officers
of
Oriole.
On
the
same
date
Oriole
borrowed
from
AEG
$1
million
by
security
of
a
non-interest
bearing
promissory
note
payable
on
demand
and
forthwith
issued
a
cheque
in
the
amount
of
$1
million
to
Canada
Trust
Company
for
the
benefit
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs.
The
amounts
were
deposited
in
registered
retirement
savings
plans
of
each
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs,
as
retiring
allowances.
In
respect
of
the
employment
agreements
Mr
Flanagan
acknowledged
that
the
salary
of
$25,000
specified
under
the
agreement
for
1972
was
also
the
salary
for
1973,
1974,
1975
and
1976
and
that
the
increments
called
for
in
paragraph
2
of
the
employment
agreement
were
never
made.
Oriole
did
not
accrue
the
increments
for
the
later
years
in
its
financial
statements.
The
maximum
salary
called
for
in
the
agreement
in
the
amount
of
$75,000
was,
in
the
words
of
Mr
Flanagan,
thought
to
be
“fair”
although
he
could
not
relate
the
$75,000
to
anything
in
particular
except
that
he
thought
$75,000
had
some
bearing
on
the
value
of
the
company.
Paragraph
5
of
the
employment
agreement,
said
Mr
Flanagan,
was
not
unreasonable
for
what
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
had
put
into
the
company
and
he
thought
it
fair,
although
he
could
not
state
with
any
certainty
how
the
seven
and
one-half
per
cent
bonus
was
determined.
He
was
also
vague
in
his
evidence
as
to
what
the
asset
value
consisted
of,
as
to
whether
their
value
was
book
value,
as
shown
in
Oriole’s
balance
sheet,
or
fair
market
value.
However
Mr
Flanagan
did
say
that
paragraph
5
attempted
to
place
the
value
of
the
assets
on
what
a
purchaser
would
pay
for
the
assets
and
thus
it
would
include
the
fair
market
value
of
the
assets,
that
is,
the
value
of
proven
reserves.
The
assets
had
a
fair
market
value
in
1974
of
approximately
$6
million
to
$7
million.
Mr
Flanagan
did
not
retain
any
professional
advice
in
respect
of
the
employment
contract,
but
Mr
Burroughs
did.
Mr
Flanagan
relied
on
Mr
Burroughs.
I
conclude
from
Mr
Flanagan’s
evidence
the
employment
contract
was
planned,
conceived
and
brought
to
life
by
Mr
Burroughs
and
that
Mr
Flanagan
simply
concurred
with
its
contents,
relying
on
Mr
Burroughs.
I
did
not
have
the
advantage
of
hearing
Mr
Burroughs
testify
and
since
he
was
a
primary
actor,
if
not
the
primary
actor,
in
the
development
of
the
employment
agreements
I
am
of
the
view
some
valuable
evidence
is
lacking.
There
was
no
evidence
or
suggestion
by
counsel
for
Oriole
that
Mr
Burroughs,
who
now
resides
in
Oklahoma,
was
unable
or
unwilling
to
testify
on
its
behalf.
Mr
Flanagan
also
testified
that
once
the
defect
in
title
in
the
Blackfoot
properties
was
remedied
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
received
$400,000
cash
and
no
shares
and
not
the
mix
of
shares
and
cash
called
for
under
the
letter
of
July
27
and
agreement
of
July
28,
1976.
Under
an
agreement
made
as
of
February
16,
1978
the
$400,000
was
paid
“as
consideration
for
services
rendered”;
the
services
rendered
were
for
the
correction
of
the
deficiency
in
title
of
the
Blackfoot
lands.
The
amounts
of
$500,000
paid
to
each
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
for
the
termination
of
their
employment
contract
were
amounts
negotiated
between
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
and
AEG.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
thought
it
strange
that
the
prospective
purchaser
was
involved
in
these
negotiations.
This,
in
my
view,
is
not
unusual.
It
is
not
uncommon
for
a
prospective
purchaser
of
shares
to
negotiate
with
the
principals
involved
not
only
as
to
the
purchase
price
of
the
shares
being
purchased
but
also
for
the
cancellation
of
any
contracts
between
the
target
company
and
these
individuals,
and
in
most
cases
nothing
sinister
should
be
read
into
this.
Here
Oriole
and
AEG
appear
to
agree
that
the
purchase
price
for
the
shares
would
be
approximately
$3,500,000
of
which
$1
million
would
be
allocated
to
the
employment
agreements
and
the
balance
to
the
shares
themselves.
In
fact,
$1
million
was
allocated
towards
the
termination
of
the
employment
agreements,
$2,100,000
for
the
shares
and
subsequently
$400,000
was
paid
for
services
rendered
in
respect
of
the
correction
of
the
deficiency
of
title
of
the
Blackfoot
lands.
Under
cross-examination
by
Mr
Reynolds,
Mr
Flanagan
admitted
when
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
were
negotiating
for
the
sale
of
the
shares
they
had
a
figure
in
mind
and
they
were
not
concerned
how
the
transaction
was
structured,
so
long
as
they
would
obtain
the
amount
they
agreed
on,
that
is,
$4
million.
The
transaction
could
be
structured
as
a
combination
of
shares,
employment
contracts
“or
whatever”.
Mr
Flanagan
also
acknowledged
that
as
far
as
Oriole
was
concerned
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
were
satisfactory
employees
fulfilling
their
proper
functions.
To
structure
a
transaction
to
yield
maximum
benefits
to
both
vendor
and
purchaser
to
the
prejudice
of
the
fisc
is
not
improper;
however
one
must
ensure
the
parts
of
the
structure
are
bona
fide
and
the
value,
if
any,
allocated
to
each
is
reasonable.
Oriole
also
called
Mr
Francis
G
Vetsch,
president
of
AEG
at
the
time
of
the
transaction,
as
a
witness.
Mr
Vetsch
is
presently
president
of
Tripet
Resources
Ltd,
a
general
oil
and
gas
exploration
and
production
company
which
is
not
related
to
Oriole
or
AEG.
Mr
Vetsch
testified
that
prior
to
the
transaction
taking
place
AEG
did
an
internal
valuation
of
the
assets
of
Oriole
and
determined
that
the
value
of
the
company
was
$4,800,000,
discounted
at
20
per
cent.
Based
on
the
valuation
of
the
assets
of
Oriole
he
then
recommended
to
his
directors
that
he
negotiate
for
the
purchase
of
the
shares
and
employment
contract
“payoff”
all
in
the
order
of
$3
million
to
$4
million.
He
testified
that
he
believed
the
employment
contract
to
be
a
“‘bona
fide”
contract
between
Oriole
and
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs.
He
says
he
took
the
agreement
on
its
face
value
and
did
what
he
thought
had
to
be
done
in
respect
of
completing
the
purchase.
He
stated
that
AEG
did
not
wish
to
retain.
either
Messrs
Flanagan
or
Burroughs
once
it
had
acquired
Oriole
since
AEG
was
fully
staffed
and
did
not
require
executives
of
their
calibre.
Mr
Vetsch
testified
that
his
company,
AEG,
made
a
sincere
effort
to
value
the
employment
contracts
and
make
certain
that
Oriole’s
liability
under
contracts
would
be
reflected
in
the
purchase
of
the
shares.
In
his
view
clause
3
of
the
agreement
had
a
time
problem
but
clauses
4
and
5
were
straightforward.
Originally
in
negotiating
the
sale
and
purchase
of
the
shares
the
employment
contracts
were
valued
at
$550,000
each.
An
internal
calculation
by
employees
of
AEG
had
valued
the
contracts
at
$800,000
to
$900,000
per
contract,
that
is
$1,600,000
for
both
contracts.
There
was
no
evidence
as
to
how
this
calculation
was
done.
However
in
preparing
the
letter
of
intent
AEG
felt
the
employment
contracts
were
generous
and
tried
to
“make
them
more
reasonable”.
There
was
also
a
deficiency
problem
in
respect
of
the
Blackfoot
property
which
reduced
the
value
of
the
assets
by
$400,000;
as
a
result
all
the
items
in
the
transaction
—
the
shares,
employment
contract
and
money
payments
—
were
renegotiated
and
all,
including
the
employment
contract,
were
reduced
on
a
pro
rata
basis.
I
infer
from
Mr
Vetsch's
evidence
that
in
his
view
all
the
items
in
the
transaction
were
part
and
parcel
of
a
single
transaction,
the
acquisition
of
Oriole
shares.
Mr
Vetsch
said
that
AEG's
preference
would
have
been
to
acquire
assets
outright
because
of
the
beneficial
tax
treatment
that
would
accrue
to
the
purchaser,
but
that
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
insisted
that
all
they
would
sell
were
shares
and
therefore
AEG
had
to
modify
its
offer
to
make
it
more
equal
to
an
asset
sale.
In
cross-examination,
Mr
Vetsch
acknowledged
that
Oriole
made
available
to
AEG
the
D
&
S
Petroleum
Consultants
Ltd
report
and
this
was
reviewed
by
officials
of
AEG.
The
present
worth
of
the
assets
of
Oriole
as
of
1974,
in
the
view
of
AEG,
was
$2,980,000,
discounted
at
20
per
cent.
He
affirmed
that
AEG's
internal
valuation
in
1976
of
Oriole’s
assets
gave
a
value
to
Oriole's
assets
in
the
amount
of
$4,800,000
which
was
not
necessarily
a
real
value.
Mr
Vetsch
stated
that
a
company
president
would
look
at
a
value
of
a
company
differently
than
petroleum
engineers
since
he
has
to
consider
risk
factors.
Mr
Vetsch
also
testified
that
AEG
was
active
in
the
same
area
of
Alberta
as
Oriole
and
was
of
the
view
Oriole’s
properties
were
good
properties.
AEG
was
a
pioneer
in
the
area
and
it
had
the
confidence
in
the
ability
of
Oriole’s
properties
to
produce.
Mr
Vetsch
stated
that
there
were
some
risks
in
the
assets
valued
by
his
staff
in
1976
but
these
risks
were
not
substantial;
nevertheless
he
stated
that
he
would
not
pay
$4,800,000
for
the
assets.
Mr
Vetsch
admitted
that
he
knew
the
employment
contracts
had
to
be
settled
with
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
if
the
sale
of
shares
was
to
take
place;
AEG
looked
at
this
as
a
package.
Mr
Vetsch
testified
that
Oriole
was
faced
with
the
situation
of
settling
the
employment
contracts
if
they
wanted
to
purchase
the
shares.
Mr
Penner,
a
chartered
accountant
practising
as
a
partner
with
Thorne
&
Riddell
in
Calgary,
was
also
called
as
a
witness
by
the
appellant.
Mr
Penner's
evidence
was
that
based
on
the
amounts
contained
in
the
employment
agreements,
in
particular
clauses
3,
4
and
5,
he
would
have
made
an
actuarial
calculation
that
the
values
of
the
contracts
in
1976
were
not
less
than
$500,000
each.
Counsel
for
Oriole
submitted
that
the
payment
of
$1
million
by
Oriole
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
was
a
payment
to
get
rid
of
onerous
contracts
of
employees
and
is
therefore
a
deductible
expense,
and
not
a
payment
of
capital.
Counsel
argues
that
the
employment
contracts
were
entered
into
in
1974
to
give
comfort
to
two
employees
and
were
treated
as
‘“
bona
fide”
and
enforceable
by
AEG
during
negotiations
for
the
sale
of
the
shares.
While
Oriole
was
cash
poor
in
1976
it
was
asset
rich,
argues
counsel,
its
assets
having
a
value
in
excess
of
$4
million,
which
would
have
been
sufficient
to
purchase
the
employment
contracts
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs.
In
support
of
his
position
Oriole's
counsel
referred
the
Court
to
several
well-known
and
often
cited
authorities,
including
B
W
Noble,
Limited
v
Mitchell
(1927),
11
TC
372,
Anglo-Persian
Oil
Co
Ltd
v
Dale
(1931),
16
TC
253,
Automatic
Toll
Systems
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1974]
CTC
30;
74
DTC
6060
and
Dy
mo
of
Canada
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
205;
73
DTC
5171.
The
issue
in
these
cases
was
whether
a
payment
by
a
taxpayer
to
rid
himself
of
an
onerous
contract
was
a
payment
on
capital
account,
and
therefore
not
deductible
in
computing
income,
or
on
account
of
revenue,
and
therefore
deductible
in
computing
income.
I
do
not
believe
this
is
the
issue
in
the
case
at
bar.
In
the
present
appeal
the
issue,
in
my
view,
is
whether
Oriole
made
the
payment
of
$1
million
as
an
outlay
or
expense
made
or
incurred
by
Oriole
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
its
business.
To
determine
whether
the
payment
in
question
was
made
or
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
Oriole’s
business
I
must
determine
the
reason
for
the
payment.
In
the
appellant’s
view
the
payment
was
made
pursuant
to
the
employment
agreements
which,
he
says,
were
bona
fide
and
were
acted
upon
by
the
parties.
The
Minister
argues
to
the
contrary.
Thus
the
dispute
between
the
litigants
comes
down
to
whether
the
employment
agreements
were
valid
enforceable
agreements
intended
to
be
acted
upon
by
the
parties
or
whether
they
were
documents
prepared
for
negotiating
purposes
only
in
contemplation
of
the
sale
of
shares
and
the
parties
never
intended
to
enforce
any
legal
obligations
created
by
the
agreements.
Although
the
terms
of
the
employment
are
confusing,
the
employment
agreements
did
create
legal
obligations
between
the
employees
and
Oriole
for
a
base
salary
in
the
first
year
of
the
agreements,
annual
increments,
a
pension,
and
a
lump
sum
payment
on
sale
of
Oriole’s
assets
or
the
employees'
shares.
However
it
is
also
clear
from
the
evidence
that
up
to
July
28,
1976,
the
date
of
the
sale
of
shares
to
AEG,
only
the
first
clause
of
each
employment
agreement
had
been
enforced
by
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs.
Each
agreement
was
effective
May
1,
1972
and
the
base
salary
actually
paid
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
in
1972
was
$25,000.
The
second
clause
of
the
agreement
was
never
enforced
and
indeed
there
is
no
reference
in
the
books
of
account
of
Oriole
for
any
annual
increments
for
1973,
1974,
1975
or
1976
in
accordance
with
the
agreement;
the
salaries
for
the
years
after
1972
remained
at
$25,000;
the
annual
increments
were
not
accrued
by
Oriole
either
for
accounting
or
tax
purposes.
The
third
clause
of
each
agreement
is
not
clear
in
my
view.
The
payment
of
$75,000
per
year
is
not
a
salary:
the
sum
is
to
be
paid
even
if
the
employee
is
totally
disabled
or
is
retired
and
is
no
longer
an
employee
of
Oriole.
I
would
therefore
assume
the
payment
is
some
sort
of
a
pension.
Also,
the
payment
is
to
be
made
"when
the
employee
attains
fifty-five
years
of
age
.
.
.,
or
retires
on
or
after
the
employee's
fifty-fifth
birthday".
Is
the
employee
to
receive
this
payment
once
he
reaches
55
years
of
age
but
is
not
yet
retired?
Or
must
he
first
retire?
In
any
event
by
agreements
effective
May
1,
1976
—
when
negotiations
with
AEG
were
active
—
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
accepted
“as
final
settlement
from
the
employer
of
the
entire
claim
to
deferred
compensation
in
clause
3
of
the
Employment
Agreement
entered
into
between
the
parties
May
1,
1972
a
life
annuity
of
$75,000
per
annum
guaranteed
for
a
minimum
period
of
15
years,
commencing
at
age
fifty-five
.
.
.”.
But
these
agreements
too
were
not
enforced
by
the
parties
and
were
never
acted
upon.
The
fourth
clause
of
each
employment
agreement
appears
to
provide
for
a
pension
of
$75,000
per
year
for
as
many
years
as
the
employee
was
employed
by
Oriole.
When
Mr
Penner
valued
the
employment
agreement
on
an
actuarial
basis
as
at
June
30,
1976
he
accorded
four
years'
service
to
each
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
without
regard
to
the
reasonableness
of
this
amount.
The
fifth
clause
of
the
employment
agreements
also
troubles
me.
The
clause
calls
for
a
salary
bonus
of
seven
and
one-half
per
cent
of
the
asset
value
of
Oriole
if
Oriole's
assets
are
sold
before
the
employee
reaches
age
55.
What
the
words
"asset
value’’
mean
are
vague.
Do
they
mean
the
value
of
the
assets
as
recorded
on
the
books
of
Oriole,
or
the
value
of
the
assets,
including
proven
reserves?
Mr
Flanagan
thought
the
latter.
But
what
about
Oriole’s
liabilities?
Is
the
asset
value
to
be
reduced
by
the
liabilities
of
the
company?
Also,
the
employee
is
entitled
to
a
similar
bonus
on
any
sale
of
his
shares
based
on
the
“underlying”
assets
of
Oriole.
Here,
too,
terms
are
not
clear
as
one
would
expect
in
an
agreement
of
this
type
if
the
agreement
was
one
which
the
parties
intended
to
govern
their
relationship.
Mr
Flanagan
testified
that
the
employment
agreement
was
brought
to
him
by
Mr
Burroughs
“on
or
about
the
time
we
decided
to
sell
the
company”.
He
had
no
input
into
the
decision
as
to
how
age
55
was
arrived
at
as
the
time
at
which
certain
payments
would
start.
He
testified
the
sum
of
$75,000
in
clause
2
was
fair
“for
what
we
had
done”
and
that
the
value
of
$4
million
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
put
on
Oriole
had
a
bearing
on
determining
the
salary
of
$75,000
per
year.
When
the
purchase
price
for
the
shares
had
to
be
reduced
on
closing
because
of
the
title
defect
in
the
Blackfoot
lands,
which
reduced
the
value
of
the
assets
by
$400,000,
Mr
Vetsch
testified
that
each
of
the
factors
in
the
“overall
deal”,
the
money
payments,
the
shares
of
AEG
“and
the
settlement
of
the
employee
contracts
were
reduced
more
or
less
pro
rata.
I
infer
from
the
course
of
conduct
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
and
Oriole,
which
prior
to
June
28,
1976
was
controlled
by
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs,
the
timing
of
the
agreements,
the
execution
of
the
agreements
of
May
1,
1976
but
not
enforcing
the
agreements,
the
level
of
salaries
paid
by
Oriole
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
in
1973,
1974,
1975
and
1976
notwithstanding
the
employment
agreements,
the
non-accruing
of
the
increments
by
Oriole,
that
the
employment
agreements
were
never
intended
to
be
enforced
or
to
be
acted
upon.
Clause
1
simply
reflected
what
had
taken
place
four
years
prior
to
the
time
the
employment
agreements
were
prepared
and
executed
and
is
a
confirmation
of
what
had
transpired
earlier.
The
claim
by
Mr
Flanagan
that
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
entered
into
the
employment
agreements
for
“monetary
protection”
rings
hollow:
Oriole
had
ceased
its
drilling
program
and
its
activities
consisted
of
collecting
rents,
looking
after
some
wells
at
Drumheller
and
general
maintenance;
some
leased
land
was
also
eligible
for
further
drilling.
The
aggressive
part
of
the
business
was
over.
I
cannot
accept
Mr
Flanagan’s
statement
that
if
he
and
Mr
Burroughs
did
not
agree
on
something
the
employment
agreements
permitted
each
to
go
his
separate
way.
No
clause
in
either
agreement
provides
for
such
an
eventuality.
There
is
no
evidence
that
it
was
in
the
best
interest
of
Oriole
that
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
retire;
in
fact
the
evidence
is
that
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
were
valued
employees
of
Oriole
and
resigned
because
this
was
the
wish
of
the
prospective
purchaser
of
their
shares.
Oriole
led
no
evidence
that
the
employment
contracts
were
onerous
to
it,
although
the
reasonableness
of
the
payments
was
questioned
by
the
Minister.
There
was
no
business
reason
causing
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
to
resign
as
employees
of
Oriole;
they
resigned
because
they
ceased
to
be
shareholders
in
Oriole
and
they
agreed
with
the
prospective
purchaser
during
negotiations
for
their
shares
that
they
would
resign
and
release
Oriole
from
the
employment
contracts
for
a
sum
of
$1
million.
The
aggregate
of
$1
million,
and
the
other
amounts
received
by
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
from
Oriole,
approximated
the
amounts
they
expected
to
receive
for
the
shares.
I
conclude
that
even
in
Mr
Flanagan’s
mind
the
payment
for
termination
of
the
employment
agreement
was
a
means
of
obtaining
part
of
the
purchase
price
for
the
shares.
I
also
cannot
accept
either
Mr
Flanagan’s
position
that
the
salaries
called
for
in
the
employment
agreements
were
prepared
to
permit
him
and
Mr
Burroughs
to
take
out
of
Oriole
the
value
of
the
growth
of
the
company
that
was
due
to
them.
Shareholders
normally
receive
profit
from
a
company
by
way
of
dividends,
or
if
the
shareholders
sell
their
shares,
by
the
purchase
price
of
the
shares
which
reflects
the
value
of
the
company.
Employees
receive
salary
for
services
performed
and
salary
may
at
times
be
dependent
on
the
income
of
the
Company.
The
employment
agreement
was
simply
a
device
to
be
used
by
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
if
necessary
and
to
the
extent
necessary
as
events
unfolded
during
any
negotiations
for
sale
of
their
shares.
This
was
the
substance
of
the
matter.
The
contract,
while
enforceable,
was
not
enforced
or
acted
upon
by
either
employee.
I
doubt
whether
Messrs
Flanagan
or
Burroughs
ever
had
the
intention
of
enforcing
the
contract.
While
Mr
Vetsch
may
have
thought
during
negotiations
the
employment
agreements
were
valid
and
enforceable
there
is
no
evidence
he
knew,
or
ought
to
have
known,
the
parties
had
no
intention
of
enforcing
the
employment
agreements.
This
was
not
the
situation
in
Noble.
In
the
Noble
case
the
appellant
corporation
claimed
as
a
deduction
from
its
profits
for
tax
purposes
the
sum
of
£19,200
payable
to
a
retiring
director
in
the
following
circumstances.
The
original
directors
were
appointed
for
life
so
long
as
they
held
a
qualifying
number
of
shares,
subject
to
dismissal
forthwith
for
neglect
or
misconduct
towards
the
Company.
A
director
so
dismissed
was
only
entitled
to
receive
his
salary
then
due
and
could
be
required
to
sell
his
shares
to
the
other
directors
at
par.
He
would
also
have
to
surrender
for
cancellation
certain
notes
issued
by
the
Company
entitling
him
to
participate
in
surplus
profits.
Circumstances
arose
in
1920
and
1921
in
which
the
Company
might
possibly
have
been
justified
in
dismissing
one
of
the
directors,
but,
to
avoid
publicity
injurious
to
the
Company’s
reputation,
it
entered
into
negotiation
with
him
for
his
retirement.
He
claimed
£50,000
compensation,
but
a
compromise
was
arrived
at
and
embodied
in
an
agreement
by
which
he
agreed
to
retire
from
the
Company,
to
transfer
his
300
one
pound
shares
to
the
other
directors
at
par
value,
although
they
were
worth
considerably
more,
and
to
surrender
his
participating
notes.
The
Company
agreed
to
pay
him
£19,200
and
the
directors
to
pay
him
£300
(expressed
to
be
consideration
for
his
shares),
making
together
£19,500
which
he
agreed
to
accept
in
full
satisfaction
of
all
claims
against
the
Company
and
the
directors.
In
the
King’s
Bench
Division,
Mr
Justice
Rowlatt
gave
judgment
in
favour
of
the
Company.
He
found
a
payment
to
get
rid
of
a
servant
in
the
interests
of
the
trade
is
a
proper
deduction”
(page
413).
Rowlatt,
J
stated
the
Company
made
the
payment
to
the
directors
“because
it
was
essential
in
their
opinion
to
get
rid
of
him
for
the
sake
of
the
good
name
of
the
Company
and
they
did
not
want
any
litigation
or
publicity
or
any
scandal
or
anthing
of
that
kind,
so
they
paid
it
for
business
reasons”;
the
sum
was
paid
to
get
rid
of
the
director
(page
414).
Mr
Justice
Rowlatt
found
the
payment
to
be
a
business
expense
since
what
the
company
did
was
no
more
than
to
get
rid
of
a
servant
in
the
course
of
its
business
(page
415).
The
Court
of
Appeal
dismissed
the
appeal.
Accordingly
I
cannot
find
that
the
$1
million
paid
by
Oriole
to
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
was
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business.
The
purpose
for
the
payment
of
the
money
for
the
benefit
of
Messrs
Flanagan
and
Burroughs
had
no
relationship
to
the
business
being
carried
on
by
Oriole
and
was
not
made
in
the
course
of
its
business.
The
payment
was
part
and
parcel
consideration
for
the
shares.
As
I
indicated
earlier
it
is
conceivable
and
proper
on
the
sale
of
shares
of
a
corporation
by
a
shareholder
who
is
also
an
employee
of
the
corporation
for
him,
qua
employee,
to
receive
payments
from
the
corporation
as
a
retiring
allowance,
termination
payment
and
as
damages
on
the
cancellation
of
an
employment
contract;
however
the
payments
are
to
be
determined
without
regard
to
the
sale
of
his
shares
and
on
the
basis
that
all
contracts
are
enforceable
and
have
governed
the
relationship
of
the
employer
and
employee.
This
was
not
the
case
here.
The
deduction
of
the
$1
million
by
Oriole
is
prohibited
by
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
appeal
is
therefore
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.