Bonner,
TCJ
[Orally]:—Each
appellant
appeals
from
assessments
of
income
tax
for
the
1979
and
1980
taxation
years.
During
those
years
the
appellants
carried
on
a
practice
of
law
in
partnership.
The
firm
had
an
account
with
an
organization
known
as
Tradex.
Tradex
operated
a
barter
exchange.
The
Tradex
scheme
was
one
under
which
member
businesses
agreed
to
accept
something
called
Tradex
credits
from
other
members
in
exchange
for
goods
or
services.
The
credits
were
apparently
expressed
in
dollar
amounts.
The
appellants
accepted
such
credits
for
professional
services
rendered,
though
not
for
disbursements.
In
computing
income
from
the
partnership
for
the
years
in
issue
the
appellants
valued
the
Tradex
credits
which
they
received
or
earned
on
the
basis
that
each
one
dollar
credit
had
a
value
of
55
cents.
In
assessing
tax
the
Minister
acted
on
the
basis
of
a
finding
or
assumption
of
fact
that
the
value
of
each
such
credit
was
one
dollar.
It
was
common
ground
that
the
credits
were
not
a
form
of
account
receivable
but,
rather,
that
they
were
received
or
accepted
in
full
satisfaction
of
each
relevant
claim
for
fees
for
legal
services
rendered
by
the
appellants.
It
was
also
common
ground
that
in
principle
the
credits
ought
to
be
brought
into
income
at
their
market
value
or
exchange
value
at
the
time
of
receipt.
It
was
not
suggested
that
the
appellants
were
entitled
to
some
sort
of
deduction
equal
to
the
difference
between
each
one
dollar
Tradex
credit
and
55
cents
in
the
form
of
a
doubtful
debt
reserve.
The
evidence
did
not
describe
the
nature
of
a
Tradex
credit
with
any
degree
of
precision.
The
nature
of
the
covenant
was
quite
unclear.
The
identity
of
the
covenantor
was
not
disclosed.
It
was
necessary
to
the
appellants’
complete
success
that
they
establish
two
things:
(a)
that
a
Tradex
credit,
having
a
one
dollar
face
amount,
was
worth
less
than
that
one
dollar;
and
(b)
the
extent
to
which
the
value
was
less
than
one
dollar.
Some
features
of
the
Tradex
system,
at
least
as
it
operated
in
practice,
which
Mr.
Karoly
suggested
tended
to
limit
the
value
of
Tradex
credits
were
the
following:
(1)
The
credits
could
only
be
exchanged
for
goods
or
services
offered
by
Tradex
members;
(2)
Tradex
permitted
and
itself
participated
in
the
creation
of
deficit
positions,
that
is
to
say,
it
acted
so
as
to
debase
the
coinage
by
issuing
credits
for
which
value
had
not
been
given;
and
(3)
Members
of
the
exchange
became
disenchanted
and
refused
to
accept
credits,
either
to
the
extent
agreed
upon
or
at
all.
This
third
factor
was
really,
at
least
in
part,
a
result
of
the
second,
according
to
the
evidence.
Trading
under
the
system
eventually
died
out.
The
Tradex
organization
collapsed
completely
and
ceased
to
operate
in
June
or
July
of
1983.
Evidence
was
given
by
Victoria
Robbins
who
operated
the
trade
desk
at
Tradex
from
May
of
1980
to
October
of
1982.
She
stated
that
the
system
deteriorated
gradually
over
the
time
while
she
was
at
Tradex.
Evidence
was
also
given
by
Samuel
Figdor,
the
appellants’
accountant.
He
was
also
the
accountant
for
Tradex.
He
stated
that
in
1980
he
sold
2,800
face
value
dollars
of
credits
for
$1,400
in
cash.
He
said
that
he
did
so
because
he
realized
he
could
not
spend
the
credits
that
he
had,
at
least
for
things
that
he
desired.
On
the
other
hand,
Mr
Linett
testified
that
he
did
not
differentiate
between
Tradex
members
and
non-members
in
fixing
the
amount
of
fees
to
be
charged
for
services
rendered.
Mr
Karoly
was
less
clear
in
his
answers
on
this
topic,
but
he
appears
to
have
done
likewise
so
far
as
I
could
tell
from
what
he
said.
Further,
Mr
Linett
was
able
to
exchange
credits
for
dental
services
for
himself
and
his
family.
Although
the
dentist
accepted
payment
of
100
per
cent
of
his
fees
in
Tradex
credits,
he
does
not
appear
to
have
inflated
his
fees
to
take
account
of
the
fact
that
he
was
accepting
Tradex
credits.
Mr
Linett
testified
that
the
55
cent
value
was
arrived
at
in
conference
with
Mr
Figdor.
There
was
no
evidence,
however,
as
to
what
took
place
at
the
conference
and
what
considerations
went
into
the
fixing
of
the
55
cent
value
which
the
appellants
asserted.
I
note
that
neither
appellant
appears
to
have
been
left
with
any
Tradex
credits
in
hand
at
the
time
the
system
collapsed.
Although
neither
appellant
testified
directly
on
that
point,
Mr
Figdor
did
state
that
he
knew
of
no
one
who
had
surplus
credits
when
the
system
ceased
to
operate
and
he
must
have
known
where
the
appellants
stood
since
he
was
and
is
their
accountant.
Although
it
is
market
value
at
the
time
of
receipt
of
the
credits
that
is
relevant
and
not
value
to
the
appellants,
the
system
does
appear
to
have
continued
to
function
to
at
least
some
degree
for
some
time
after
the
end
of
1980,
a
year
during
which
the
appellants,
as
is
evident
from
the
issue
in
these
appeals,
accepted
them.
The
value
of
money
as
a
medium
of
exchange
rests,
at
least
in
part,
on
its
broad
general
acceptance.
On
all
of
the
evidence
it
is
clear
that
the
acceptability
of
Tradex
credits
was
somewhat
limited.
It
follows
that,
to
some
degree,
those
credits
were
worth
less
than
their
face
value
expressed
in
money.
Thus,
the
appellants
have
succeeded
in
showing
that
the
assessments
were
too
high
in
that
they
were
based
on
the
premise
that
the
trade
credits
were
worth
their
face
amount
in
money.
However,
the
evidence
which
I
have
summarized
does
not
disclose
how
much
less
they
were
worth.
In
the
circumstances
the
only
proper
disposition
is
to
allow
the
appeals
and
to
refer
the
assessments
back
to
the
respndent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
in
computing
income
the
value
of
the
Tradex
credits
was
less
than
their
face
value
in
money.
Appeal
allowed.