Rouleau,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
under
subsection
172(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148
as
amended,
(“ITA”).
The
matter
in
issue
is
whether
the
appellant,
in
computing
his
income
for
income
tax
purposes
in
1980,
may
deduct
from
the
wages
of
his
employment
certain
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
travelling
and
transporting
a
police
dog
from
his
home
to
his
place
of
employment
and
to
other
locations
all
related
to
exercise,
training
and
handling
of
the
dog.
The
deduction
is
claimed
under
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
of
the
ITA.
Facts
The
plaintiff
joined
the
Regina
City
Police
Force
in
January
1974
as
a
probationary
constable.
In
January
1975,
He
became
an
accredited
member
of
the
Patrol
Division.
In
January
1980,
he
volunteered
for
service
in
the
Canine
Division
(“CD")
of
the
Force,
to
which
he
was
transferred.
A
member
of
the
CD,
though
entitled
to
some
privileges,
is
required
to
perform
certain
additional
tasks.
The
Police
Department
provides
the
officer
with
a
dog,
a
kennel
and
a
dog
house,
pays
for
the
feeding
of
the
dog
and
the
veterinarian
bills;
the
member
is
provided
with
a
cleaning
allowance
because
of
dog
hair
and
a
$70
per
month
allowance
for
an
undetermined
reason.
Tnis
amount
is
specified
in
the
collective
agreement.
The
plaintiff
reported
as
income
this
latter
allowance.
CD
policemen's
shifts
are
divided
in
two
segments
instead
of
three
as
for
the
regular
patrol
officers.
It
is
considered
privileged
to
be
a
member
of
the
CD
of
which
only
four
volunteers
from
the
approximately
350
policemen
of
the
Regina
Force
are
selected
for
these
five-year
assignments.
It
is
a
demanding
job
which
requires
considerable
hours
of
training
with
the
dog
during
off-duty
hours.
The
officer
is
also
responsible
for
looking
after
the
dog's
grooming
and
for
visits
to
the
veterinarian
when
required.
The
CD
policeman
must
further
suffer
the
inconvenience
of
having
a
dog
house
and
kennel
located
on
his
property.
It
is
also
suggested
that
the
plaintiff
acquire
a
vehicle
suitable
for
carrying
the
dog
wherever
he
went
such
as
to
shopping
malls
and
on
vacation
trips.
This
was
necessary
to
familiarize
the
dog
with
crowds,
emergency
situations
and
other
day-to-day
encounters.
It
was
also
part
of
the
overall
obedience
training.
The
plaintiff
claims
travelling
expenses
incurred
in
transporting
the
dog
for
the
taxation
year
1980
a
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
ITA.
The
Minister
disallowed
the
deduction
and
assessed
the
plaintiff
accordingly
(pursuant
to
section
152
of
the
ITA).
This
assessment
was
confirmed
by
a
notice
of
confirmation
by
the
Minister
(section
165
ITA)
against
which
the
plaintiff
has
filed
the
present
appeal
(subsection
172(2)
ITA
and
section
24
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
1970,
2nd
Suppl,
c
10).
Submissions
of
the
Parties
The
plaintiff
alleges
that
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
ITA
is
applicable
because
his
duties
of
employment
required
to
him
to
house,
keep,
care
for,
train,
transport
and
exercise
the
dog
assigned
to
him;
this
he
did
during
all
of
1980.
Because
of
this
obligation,
the
plaintiff
submits
that
a
verbal
secondary
contract
of
employment
was
entered
into
by
him
and
his
employer
when
he
joined
the
CD.
His
first
or
primary
contract
of
employment
was
governed
by
the
collective
agreement
between
the
police
association
of
Regina
and
the
municipality.
One
of
the
conditions
of
this
secondary
contract,
by
implication,
requires
the
plaintiff
to
pay
his
travelling
expenses
incurred
in
carrying
out
his
duty
of
employment
as
a
dog
master-handler.
He
then
argues
that
The
Police
Act,
RSS
1978,
c
P-15,
requires
that
a
constable
obey
all
instructions
and
orders
given
by
his
superiors.
If
one
does
not,
it
can
be
considered
a
breach
of
duty
and
give
rise
to
disciplinary
measures.
He
further
alleges
that
the
sum
of
$70
per
month
paid
to
him,
in
addition
to
his
salary,
is
an
allowance
because
of
the
inconvenience
of
housing
the
dog
at
his
place
of
residence.
For
these
reasons,
the
plaintiff
concludes
that
he
should
be
allowed
to
deduct
the
sum
of
$4,733.43
as
travelling
expenses
for
the
taxation
year
1980,
under
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
of
the
ITA;
that
the
order
for
reassessment
be
vacated
and
that
the
sum
paid
for
income
tax
be
refunded
to
him
by
the
Minister.
The
defendant
submits
that
an
employee
has
the
onus
of
proving
that
he
qualifies
for
a
deduction
under
the
ITA.
The
Crown
suggested
that
the
expenses
incurred
for
travel
were
personal
and
not
a
duty
or
requirement
of
the
employment
but
rather
a
consequence
of
the
job.
The
defendant
further
argues
that
the
actual
employment
of
the
plaintiff
was
that
of
a
back-up
patrol
officer
and
that
the
additional
training
and
exercising
of
the
dog
in
his
off-duty
hours
is
not
his
primary
duty
or
work
for
which
he
must
be
paid.
The
Police
Department
exercises
no
control
over
the
constable
during
his
off-duty
hours.
The
defendant
contends
that
there
exists
but
one
contract,
the
collective
agreement;
it
does
not
require
a
member
of
the
Force
to
volunteer
to
join
the
CD
or
for
the
CD
to
pay
for
travelling
expenses.
Joining
the
CD
is
purely
voluntary
and
the
plaintiff
cannot
be
punished
if
he
does
not
perform
his
duty
or
pay
his
expenses.
He
would
simply
be
asked
to
leave
the
CD
and
would
resume
his
former
patrol
duties.
As
for
the
$70
allowance,
the
Crown
acquiesces
in
the
plaintiff's
allegation
but
maintains
it
was
for
more
than
the
appellant
contends.
The
defendant,
in
conclusion,
states
that
the
cost
of
travelling
between
the
plaintiff’s
residence
and
the
employer's
place
of
business
or
elsewhere
was
a
personal
expense.
It
is
further
submitted
that
the
plaintiff
was
not
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
any
duties
of
employment
away
from
his
employer's
place
of
business
except
on
a
voluntary
basis
and
the
employer
was
not
required
to
pay
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
primary
employment.
Reasons
for
Judgment
The
plaintiff
has
the
burden
of
proving
the
incorrectness
of
the
defendant's
assessment:
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182
(SCC).
The
Supreme
Court
also
decided
in
the
Johnston
case
that
the
assumed
facts
on
which
the
Minister
based
his
reassessment
are
deemed
to
be
correct.
In
the
present
case,
the
Minister
has
assumed
the
following
facts
as
they
appear
in
paragraph
18
of
his
statement
of
defence:
18.
In
assessing
the
tax
of
the
Plaintiff
for
his
1980
taxation
year
and
with
respect
to
the
matters
here
in
issue,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
assumed,
inter
alia,
(a)
that
the
place
of
business
of
the
Plaintiff’s
employer
was
at
police
headquarters
or
stations
in
the
City
of
Regina,
Province
of
Saskatchewan;
(b)
that
the
cost
of
travelling
between
the
Plaintiff’s
residence
and
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
elsewhere
was
a
personal
or
living
expense
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
18(1
)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
(c)
that
the
Plaintiff
was
not
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places;
and
(d)
that
under
the
contract
of
employment
the
Plaintiff
was
not
required
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
his
duties
of
his
office
or
employment.
Paragraph
8(1)(h)
and
subsection
8(2)
of
the
ITA
are
included
in
Part
I
(Income
Tax),
Division
B
(Computation
of
Income),
Subdivision
(a)
(Income
or
Loss
from
an
Office
or
Employment,
Deduction).
They
read
as
follows:
8.
(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(h)
where
the
taxpayer,
in
the
year,
(i)
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places,
(ii)
under
the
contract
of
employment
was
required
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment,
and
(iii)
was
not
in
receipt
of
an
allowance
for
travelling
expenses
that
was,
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v),
(vi)
or
(vii),
not
included
in
computing
his
income
and
did
not
claim
any
deduction
for
the
year
under
paragraph
(e),
(f)
or
(g),
amounts
expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment;
(2)
Except
as
permitted
by
this
section,
no
deductions
shall
be
made
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment.
The
underlying
principle
of
section
8
is
found
under
subsection
8(2)
where
it
states
that
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
except
as
permitted
by
this
section.
What
concerns
us
is
paragraph
8(1
)(h).
The
purpose
of
this
paragraph
is
to
allow
the
deduction
of
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
employees
in
various
circumstances
in
the
course
of
employment
and
for
which
they
are
not
entitled
to
reimbursement.
The
expenses
eligible
for
deduction
are
restricted
to
travelling
expenses
but
are
not
limited
in
amount;
exception
is
made
for
unreasonable
or
improper
sums
(pursuant
to
section
67
of
the
ITA).
In
order
for
paragraph
8(1)(h)
to
be
applicable
the
plaintiff
must
meet
two
conditions:
firstly,
the
taxpayer
must
be
an
employee
within
the
definition
of
subsection
248(1)
of
the
ITA;
secondly,
the
expenses
must
be
related
to
the
taxpayer’s
duties
of
employment.
The
parties
have
agreed
that
the
plaintiff
is
an
employee
for
the
purposes
of
the
ITA.
The
second
condition
pursuant
to
the
terms
of
paragraph
8(1)(h)
relates
to
the
expression
“duties
of
employment”
which
appears
in
three
different
areas:
in
subparagraph
(i)
the
taxpayer
is
required
“to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer's
place
of
business";
in
subparagraph
(ii)
the
expenses
must
have
been
“incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment";
in
the
concluding
subparagraph,
the
amounts
must
have
been
“expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment".
The
terms
of
the
concluding
subparagraph
are
related
to
duty,
pursuant
to
the
definition
of
“employment",
“office"
and
“employed"
as
defined
in
subsection
248(1)
of
the
ITA:
“employment”.
—
“employment”
means
the
position
of
an
individual
in
the
service
of
some
other
person
(including
Her
Majesty
or
a
foreign
state
or
sovereign)
and
“servant”
or
“employee”
means
a
person
holding
such
a
position;
“office”.
—
“office”
means
the
position
of
an
individual
entitling
him
to
a
fixed
or
ascertainable
stipend
or
remuneration
and
includes
a
judicial
office,
the
office
of
a
Minister
of
the
Crown,
the
office
of
a
member
of
the
Senate
or
House
of
Commons
of
Canada,
a
member
of
a
legislative
assembly
or
a
member
of
a
legislative
or
executive
council
and
any
other
office,
the
incumbent
of
which
is
elected
by
popular
vote
or
is
elected
or
appointed
in
a
representative
capacity
and
also
includes
the
position
of
a
corporation
director;
and
“officer”
means
a
person
holding
such
an
office;
“employed”.
—
“employed”
means
performing
the
duties
of
an
office
or
employment;
In
trying
to
determine
what
constitutes
a
duty
of
employment,
it
is
trite
law
to
say
that
one
must
first
look
at
the
applicable
contract
of
employment
which
is,
in
this
case,
the
ruling
collective
agreement.
By
agreement
of
the
parties,
the
collective
agreement
was
not
filed
in
evidence.
I
am
advised
that
the
only
mention
of
the
CD
in
the
collective
agreement
is
in
the
clause
providing
for
an
additional
allowance
of
$70
per
month
to
be
paid
to
CD
members.
The
purpose
for
this
allowance
is
not
specified
in
the
contract
of
employment;
the
parties
disagree
on
what
this
amount
is
supposed
to
compensate.
The
collective
agreement,
therefore,
does
not
help
us
to
determine
if
it
was
a
duty
of
“employment"
of
the
plaintiff
to
transport
the
dog
with
him
wherever
he
went.
The
plaintiff
has
argued
that
a
secondary
verbal
contract
of
employment
provided
for
this
duty.
The
only
evidence
led
to
this
effect
can
be
found
in
the
plaintiff's
testimony
when
he
suggested
that
contracts
can
be
brought
about
by
way
of
policy,
and
the
policy
applicable
to
CD
members
was
that
the
dog
be
taken
everywhere
the
policeman
went.
The
existence
of
such
a
secondary
verbal
contract
has
not
been
proven
to
my
satisfaction.
In
so
deciding,
I
am
reminded
of
the
words
of
Scrutton,
LJ
in
Reigate
v
Union
Manufacturing
(Ramsbottom)Co,
[1918]
1
KB
592
at
605,
where
he
said:
.
.
.
The
first
thing
is
to
see
what
the
parties
have
expressed
in
the
contract;
and
then
an
implied
term
is
not
to
be
added
because
the
Court
thinks
it
would
have
been
reasonable
to
have
inserted
it
in
the
contract.
A
term
can
only
be
implied
if
it
is
necessary
in
the
business
sense
to
give
efficacy
to
the
contract;
that
is,
if
it
is
such
a
term
that
it
can
confidently
be
said
that
if
at
the
time
the
contract
was
being
negotiated
some
one
had
said
to
the
parties,
“What
will
happen
in
such
a
case,”
they
would
both
have
replied,
“Of
course,
so
and
so
will
happen;
we
did
not
trouble
to
say
that;
it
is
too
clear.”
Unless
the
Court
comes
to
some
such
conclusion
as
that,
it
ought
not
to
imply
a
term
which
the
parties
themselves
have
not
expressed.
I
must
now
turn
to
the
The
Police
Act
to
see
if
it
can
shed
any
light
on
the
content
of
the
plaintiff's
duty
of
employment.
Subsection
37(3)
stipulates
that:
(3)
Unless
otherwise
indicated
in
his
appointment
a
member
has
the
power
and
the
responsibility
to:
(a)
perform
all
duties
that
are
assigned
to
constables
or
peace
officers
in
relation
to:
(i)
the
preservation
of
peace;
(ii)
the
prevention
of
crime
and
offences
against
the
laws
in
force
in
the
municipality;
and
(iii)
the
apprehension
of
criminals,
offenders,
mentally
ill
persons
and
others
who
may
lawfully
be
taken
into
custody;
(b)
execute
all
warrants
and
perform
all
duties
and
services
thereunder
or
in
relation
thereto
that
under
the
laws
in
force
in
the
municipality
may
lawfully
be
executed
and
performed
by
constables
or
peace
officers;
and
(c)
perform
all
duties
that
may
lawfully
be
performed
by
constables
or
peace
officers
in
relation
to
the
escort
and
conveyance
of
persons
in
lawful
custody
to
and
from
courts,
places
of
confinement,
correctional
facilities
or
camps,
hospitals
or
other
places.
Such
general
terms
cannot,
in
my
opinion,
be
said
to
decide
the
question
of
whether
or
not
the
transportation
of
the
dog
everywhere
is
a
duty
of
employment
of
CD
members.
This
Act
(subsection
38(2))
also
requires
that
a
policeman
conduct
himself
according
to
the
Municipal
Police
Discipline
Regulations,
(1981),
77
Sask-
Gaz,
reg
92/81,
p
302-313.
This
Discipline
Code
provides
in
subparagraph
3.01
that
a
"member
of
a
police
force
commits
an
offence
against
discipline
if
he
is
guilty
of:
(1)
discreditable
conduct
.
.
.
(2)
insubordination,
that
is
if
he
(a)
is
insubordinate
by
word
or
action,
or
(b)
without
lawful
excuse,
disobeys,
omits
or
neglects
to
carry
out
any
lawful
order.
(3)
neglect
of
duty,
that
is
if
he
(a)
without
lawful
excuse,
neglects
or
omits
promptly
and
diligently
to
perform
a
duty
as
a
member
of
the
police
force;
(b)
fails
to
work
in
accordance
with
orders,
or
leaves
an
area,
detail
or
other
place
of
duty
without
due
permission
or
sufficient
cause,
or
having
left
his
place
of
duty
with
such
permission
or
sufficient
cause,
fails
to
return
thereto
without
undue
delay;
or
(c)
is
absent
from,
or
is
late
for,
duty
without
reasonable
excuse.
(4)
deceit
.
.
.
(5)
improper
disclosure
of
information
.
.
.
(6)
corrupt
practice
.
.
.
(7)
abuse
of
authority
.
.
.
(8)
improper
use
of
firearms
.
.
.
(9)
damage
to
police
property
.
.
.
(10)
improper
wearing
of
uniform
and
improper
personal
appearance
..
.
(11)
misuse
of
intoxicating
liquor
or
drugs
in
a
manner
prejudicial
to
duty
.
.
.
(12)
criminal
conduct
.
..
(13)
attempting
to
commit
an
offence
against
discipline
.
.
.
I
consider
that
the
regulations
do
not
provide
the
information
required
to
convince
me
of
the
necessity
of
transporting
the
dog
being
part
of
the
plaintiff’s
duty
of
employment.
What
then
constitutes
a
duty
of
employment?
The
dictionaries
give
us
as
definition
of
duty
the
following:
..
5.
The
action
which
one’s
position
or
station
directly
requires;
business,
office
function
.
.
.
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
1969,
vol
III,
Clarendon
Press,
Great
Britain;
.
.
.
That
which
a
person
is
bound
by
any
natural,
moral,
or
legal
obligation
to
do
or
perform;
what
has
to
be
done
as
being
due
towards
another;
obligation
to
do
something;
obedience,
submission;
act
of
reverence
or
respect;
..
.
The
New
Webster
Encyclopedic
Dictionary
of
the
English
Language,
1974,
Consolidated
Book,
Chicago,
USA;
Duty
is
the
correlative
of
right.
In
practice,
however,
“duty”
is
usually
applied
to
those
acts
which
a
person
is
bound
to
do
by
virtue
of
an
office
held
by
him,
eg,
as
trustee,
executor,
director,
etc
.
.
.,
while
the
obligation
created
by
a
contract
is
called
a
debt
or
liability,
according
to
its
nature
.
..
Jowitt's
Dictionary
of
English
Law,
1977,
second
ed,
vol
I,
John
Burke,
Sweet
&
Maxwell,
London.
From
these
definitions
and
from
the
definitions
of
being
“employed”,
“office”
and
“employment”
found
in
subsection
248(1)
of
the
ITA,
it
is
my
opinion
that
a
duty
of
employment
distinguishes
itself
from
other
acts
which
may
not
constitute
non-performance.
Whereas
non-performance
of
a
duty
of
employment
gives
rise
to
disciplinary
action
by
the
employer,
such
other
acts
cannot
bring
about
such
consequences.
In
a
recent
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
Jerome/
v
MNR,
[1984]
CTC
2217;
84
DTC
1197,
it
was
decided
that
a
teacher
on
sabbatical
leave,
for
the
purpose
of
undertaking
post-graduate
studies,
could
deduct
the
expenses
he
incurred
for
travelling
from
the
university
to
various
locations
to
attend
required
classes
because,
inter
alia
these
studies
were
part
of
the
conditions
of
his
sabbatical
leave
as
evidenced
in
his
collective
agreement.
If
the
teacher
failed
to
fulfil
these
conditions,
all
moneys
received
during
the
sabbatical
leave
had
to
be
returned.
I
agree
with
the
logic
of
this
decision.
Only
non-performance
of
a
duty
of
employment
can
give
rise
to
disciplinary
action.
To
the
best
of
my
knowledge,
three
decisions
of
interest
to
us
have
dealt
with
policemen.
The
guiding
elements
were:
police
officers,
their
work
and
the
deductibility
of
travel
expenses
under
the
ITA:
Klue
v
MNR,
[1976]
CTC
2401;
76
DTC
1303;
Dale
v
MNR,
[1977]
CTC
2208;
77
DTC
124;
Orest
S
Oginski
v
MNR,
unreported
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
J
B
Goetz
judge,
Edmonton,
November
5,
1984.
In
Klue
(supra),
and
in
Dale
(supra),
the
police
officers
claimed
a
deduction
for
travel
expenses
incurred
to
attend
court.
The
giving
of
evidence
in
court
was
considered
to
be
an
integral
part
of
their
duty
and,
therefore,
the
travelling
expenses
in
connection
therewith,
while
they
were
not
on
duty,
were
deductible.
They
could
have
been
subjected
to
disciplinary
action
if
they
refused
to
attend
court.
In
Oginski
(supra)
the
responsibility
of
the
police
officer
was
in
training
and
breeding
of
dogs.
He
was
a
trainer
and
he
received
an
allowance
for
expenses.
The
reason
for
the
dismissal
of
his
appeal
by
the
Tax
Court
is
of
no
consequence
to
us.
The
fact
remains
that
the
duties
of
employment
of
the
police
officers
referred
to
above,
were
of
such
a
nature
that
the
non-performance
of
them
(ie
attending
court,
transporting
dogs
for
training,
breeding)
could
bring
about
disciplinary
action.
In
his
submissions,
the
plaintiff
alleges
he
was
under
instructions
to
transport
the
dog
whenever
he
travelled.
He
also
stated
that
non-compliance
with
these
instructions
could
result
in
a
bad
evaluation
and
if
he
did
not
comply,
he
would
eventually
be
asked
to
resign
from
the
CD
but
not
the
Force.
This
is
supported
by
the
evidence
given
at
trial
by
Sergeant
Forbes
who
is
in
charge
of
the
CD.
A
cursory
review
of
the
applicable
Act
and
regulations
(The
Police
Act;
Municipal
Police
Discipline
Regulations)
confirms
these
facts.
If
the
plaintiff
did
not
transport
the
dog
with
him
wherever
he
went,
his
conduct
would
not
be
questioned
by
way
of
disciplinary
action
but
rather
in
the
yearly
evaluation
of
his
work
performance
in
the
CD.
I
am
therefore
of
the
opinion
that
it
was
not
a
duty
of
employment.
In
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
ITA,
one
sees
that
the
condition
precedent
of
being
“a
duty
of
employment”
is
found
in
subparagraph
(i),
(ii)
and
the
concluding
subparagraph.
It
is
well
recognized
jurisprudence
that
the
subsections
of
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
have
to
be
cumulatively
satisfied
in
order
for
the
deduction
to
be
allowed
(see
BG
Hansen,
“The
Taxation
of
Employees
,
in
Essays
on
CanadianTaxation,Toronto,
Richard
De
Boo
Limited,
1978,
p
242).
Since
I
have
found
the
plaintiff
not
under
a
duty
of
employment
to
transport
the
dog
in
all
of
his
travels,
he
evidently
does
not
comply
with
all
the
requirements
of
paragraph
8(1)(h).
I
do
not
need
to
consider
the
other
issues
raised
by
the
parties
but
I
nevertheless
feel
the
need
to
comment
on
the
statement
of
claim.
The
plaintiff
was
seeking,
among
other
expenses,
to
obtain
a
deduction
for
transportation
of
the
dog
to
and
from
work.
The
courts
have
consistently
refused
to
allow
such
a
deduction
(see
Ricketts
v
Colquhoun,
[1926]
AC
1;
DB
Lahey
v
MNR,
[1967]
Tax
ABC
262;
67
DTC
222;
Dieter
Broese
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
225;
73
DTC
207;
Futoransky
v
MNR,
[1974]
CTC
2068;
74
DTC
1060;
M
Co/ec
v
MNR,
26
Tax
ABC
230;
61
DTC
214;
MD
Pawliuk
v
MNR,
[1971]
Tax
ABC
785;
71
DTC
559;
W
Wylde
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
3041;
79
DTC
829;
Walter
v
MNR,
5
Tax
ABC
282;
52
DTC
3;
Cohen
v
MNR,
7
Tax
ABC
154;
52
DTC
356.
Plaintiff’s
claim
for
travel
expenses
incurred
when
taking
family
vacation
trips
accompanied
by
the
dog
is
clearly
not
allowable
under
section
8
as
they
would
have
been
made
in
any
event,
whether
plaintiff
was
a
member
of
the
CD
or
not.
Appeal
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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