Taylor,
T.C.J.:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
Montreal,
Québec,
on
February
25,
1986,
against
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
year
1983,
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
as
a
deduction
from
employment
income
an
amount
of
$1,500
claimed
as
""rent”
under
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(ii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63,
as
amended:
Sec.
8(1)(i)
Dues
and
other
expenses
of
performing
duties.
—
amounts
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as
(ii)
office
rent,
.
.
.
the
payment
of
which
by
the
officer
or
employee
was
required
by
the
contract
of
employment,
to
the
extent
that
he
has
not
been
reimbursed,
and
is
not
entitled
to
be
reimbursed
in
respect
thereof;
It
was
agreed
that
Mr.
Merleau
met
the
prerequisite
conditions
which
would
permit
him
the
deduction,
but
the
Minister's
assertion
was:
during
the
said
taxation
year,
the
Appellant
has
not
incurred
or
disbursed
the
said
amount
claimed
for
rent;
Briefly,
the
situation
was
that
Mr.
Merleau
used
as
his
office
a
portion
of
the
home
in
which
he
also
lived,
which
home
was
owned
by
his
wife.
The
Minister
contended
that
Mr.
Merleau
had
not
paid
rent
to
his
wife
at
all,
as
such,
but
had
maintained
the
entire
house
—
paying
mortgage
interest,
municipal
taxes,
etc.
as
required
normally.
Mr.
Merleau
agreed
with
this,
but
his
contention
was
that
his
understanding
with
his
wife
was
that
a
portion
of
this
—
actually
$6,000
per
year
—
would
be
his
rent,
from
which
25
per
cent
(the
$1,500
at
issue)
would
be
regarded
as
office
rent.
He
did
use
about
25
per
cent
of
the
house
as
an
office.
The
technicality
of
a
""lease",
or
any
specific
payments
to
Mrs.
Merleau
of
$500
a
month
did
not
appear
to
Mr.
Merleau
to
invalidate
his
claim
for
""rent".
Counsel
for
the
Minister
noted
for
the
Court
that
he
had
been
unable
to
locate
case
law
which
could
be
of
assistance
in
determining
whether
""rent"
and
""payment"
as
used
in
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(ii)
of
the
Act
should
be
regarded
as
narrowly
as
the
Minister’s
assessment
intended.
It
was
simply
up
to
the
appellant
to
show
that
he
had
""paid
rent”,
and
not
only
could
he
not
do
so
he
agreed
he
had
not
done
so,
—
in
those
specific
terms.
In
my
view
the
Minister’s
position,
while
arguably
narrow
and
technical,
is
correct
in
law.
The
provisions
for
a
deduction
from
employment
income
under
subsection
8(1)
of
the
Act
are
strict
and
specific.
Any
deductions
from
employment
income
are
rare
indeed,
and
I
am
not
aware
of
jurisprudence
which
would
permit
this
Court
to
elaborate
on
the
limitations.
There
may
indeed
be
some
similarity
between
this
issue
and
the
definitions
of
alimony
or
maintenance
payments
referenced
in
section
60
of
the
Act,
and
dealt
with
by
the
courts
in
The
Queen
v.
Morton
Pascoe,
[1975]
C.T.C.
656;
75
D.T.C.
5427
and
The
Attorney
General
of
Canada
v.
James
C.
Weaver
and
Freda
J.
Weaver,
[1975]
C.T.C.
646;
75
D.T.C.
5462.
As
some
indication
of
the
nature
of
this
issue
a
reference
to
Saint
John
Ship
Building
&
Dry
Dock
Co.
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1976]
C.T.C.
2370;
76
D.T.C.
1283
will
provide
on
page
2376
(D.T.C.
1287)
an
examination
of
the
question
of
rent,
and
the
following
comments:
.
..
rent:
compensation
paid
at
intervals
to
the
owner
of
a
property:
and,
.
..
there
are
but
two
characteristics
of
the
sum,
namely
it
is
for
the
use
of
machinery,
etc.
and
it
is
paid
for
that
use
for
a
certain
time.
It
cannot
be
said
in
this
matter
that
Mr.
Merleau
made
any
payments
to
Mrs.
Merleau
which
could
qualify
as
rent.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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