Brulé
T.C.J.:—These
are
appeals
against
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1979
and
1980.
In
the
appellant’s
1979
return
a
$782,045
deduction
was
made
from
taxable
income
pursuant
to
paragraph
110(1)(b.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
a
similar
deduction
in
1980
in
the
amount
of
$150,963
was
claimed.
The
Minister
disallowed
the
deduction
for
1980
and
varied
the
deduction
for
the
1979
year.
Facts
In
November
of
1979
the
appellant
made
a
donation
to
the
University
of
Calgary
(Nickle
Arts
Museum)
of
97
Canadian
Proof
and
Specimen
Bank
Notes
and
a
number
of
Byzantine
coins.
In
that
year
he
claimed
a
deduction
from
his
taxable
income
of
$782,045
on
the
basis
that
the
deduction
was
in
respect
of
a
portion
of
the
fair
market
value
of
the
donation
made
by
him
to
the
University
pursuant
to
the
terms
and
criteria
set
out
and
referred
to
in
paragraph
110(1)(b.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
total
value
of
the
gift
he
claimed
was
$1
million
and
part
of
the
balance
was
claimed
as
set
out
above
in
the
1980
taxation
year.
In
his
1979
income
tax
return
the
appellant
included
letters
from
experts
in
the
field
of
Canadian
bank
notes
and
coin
collections
which
supported
the
valuation
of
the
donation
of
$1
million,
which
was
the
amount
stated
by
the
appellant
as
to
the
value
of
the
gift.
On
February
26,
1980
the
Canadian
Cultural
Property
Export
Review
Board
confirmed
that
the
property
donated
or
gifted
by
Mr.
Conn
met
all
of
the
criteria
set
out
in
paragraphs
23(3)(b)
and
(c)
of
the
Cultural
Property
Export
and
Import
Act
as
referred
to
in
paragraph
110(1)(b.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
Canadian
Cultural
Property
Export
Review
Board
did
not
attempt
to
estimate
the
fair
market
value
of
the
gift.
In
March
of
1981,
Revenue
Canada
reassessed
the
appellant
in
respect
to
the
deduction
of
$782,045
claimed
by
him
in
his
1979
income
tax
return
by
reducing
the
said
deduction
to
$110,000
which
amount
represented
in
so
far
as
Revenue
Canada
was
concerned
the
value
of
the
entire
gift
to
the
University
including
the
Bank
Notes
and
the
Byzantine
coins.
The
appellant
objected
to
the
reassessment
and
appeals
to
this
Court
for
adjudication
In
April
of
1982,
Revenue
Canada
in
the
appellant’s
notice
of
assessment
reduced
the
deduction
taken
by
him
for
the
1980
taxation
year
to
nil
on
the
ground
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
entire
gift
in
the
sum
of
$110,000
had
been
utilized
in
the
1979
taxation
year.
There
then
resulted
the
appeal
for
the
1980
year.
In
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
the
Minister
admitted
a
value
of
$150,000
for
the
Bank
Notes
and
$60,000
for
the
Byzantine
coins
for
a
total
donation
exemption
of
$210,000.
At
the
outset
of
the
hearing
counsel
for
the
appellant
and
for
the
respondent
agreed
as
to
the
fair
market
value
of
the
Byzantine
coins
as
of
November
1979
and
further
that
such
value
would
be
made
available
to
the
Court
for
confirmation
only
when
the
Court
had
determined
the
fair
market
value
of
the
Canadian
Proof
and
Specimen
Notes
as
of
November
1979.
This
valuation
will
be
referred
to
later
in
this
judgment.
Issue
The
sole
issue
to
be
determined
therefore
by
this
Court
is
the
fair
market
value
as
of
November
1979
of
the
Canadian
Proof
and
Specimen
Notes,
numbering
97
in
all.
As
this
appears
to
be
the
first
case
to
be
tried
on
the
application
of
paragraph
110(1)(b.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
some
background
information
might
be
helpful.
The
relevant
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
as
follows:
110(1)
For
the
purpose
of
computing
the
taxable
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
from
his
income
for
the
year
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable.
(b.1)
(as
it
read
in
1979)
[Gifts
to
institutions].
—
the
aggregate
of
gifts
of
objects
that
the
Canadian
Cultural
Property
Export
Review
Board
has
determined
meet
all
of
the
criteria
set
out
in
paragraphs
23(3)(b)
and
(c)
of
the
Cultural
Property
Export
and
Import
Act,
which
gifts
were
not
deducted
under
paragraph
(a)
or
(b)
and
were
made
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
(and
in
the
immediately
preceding
year,
to
the
extent
of
the
amount
thereof
that
was
not
deductible
under
this
Act
in
computing
the
taxable
income
of
the
taxpayer
for
that
immediately
preceding
year)
to
institutions
or
public
authorities
in
Canada
that
were,
at
the
time
the
gifts
were
made,
designated
under
subsection
26(2)
of
the
Act
either
generally
or
for
a
purpose
related
to
those
objects,
not
exceeding
the
amount
remaining,
if
any,
when
the
amounts
deductible
for
the
year
under
paragraphs
(a)
and
(b)
are
deducted
from
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
for
the
year,
if
payment
of
the
amounts
given
is
proven
by
filing
receipts
with
the
Minister;
The
Cultural
Property
Export
and
Import
Act
(“CPEIA”),
is
designed,
inter
alia,
to
allow
property
identified
by
the
Canadian
Cultural
Property
Export
Review
Board
to
be
donated
to
a
designated
Canadian
institution,
and
provides
that
the
value
of
such
donation
is
deductible
in
computing
taxable
income
by
virtue
of
paragraph
110(1)(b.1).
To
be
eligible
for
deduction
under
paragraph
110(1)(b.1)
a
gift
must
meet
the
following
criteria:
1.
the
object
must
have
been
determined
by
the
Canadian
Cultural
Property
Export
Review
Board
to
meet
the
criteria
set
out
in
paragraphs
23(3)(b)
and
(c)
of
the
CPEIA,
namely:
—
it
is
of
outstanding
significance
by
reason
of
(a)
its
close
association
with
Canadian
history
or
national
life,
(b)
its
aesthetic
qualities,
or
(c)
its
value
in
the
study
of
the
arts
or
sciences,
and
—
it
is
of
such
a
degree
of
national
importance
that
its
loss
to
Canada
would
significantly
diminish
the
national
heritage;
2.
the
object
must
have
been
donated
to
a
public
institution
or
governmental
authority
in
Canada
that
has
been
designated
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
the
purpose;
and
3.
an
official
receipt
containing
prescribed
information
issued
by
the
recipient
for
the
value
of
the
donated
object
must
be
filed
with
the
taxpayer's
tax
return.
While
the
CPEIA
speaks
only
of
the
value
of
the
donated
objects
the
deduction
will
be
for
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
at
the
date
of
the
disposition.
The
appellant
is
deemed
to
have
received
that
fair
market
value
as
the
proceeds
of
disposition
under
paragraph
69(1)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
filing
his
1979
income
tax
return
the
appellant
included
letters
of
valuation
for
the
Bank
Notes
but
there
was
no
evidence
in
the
court
file
of
a
value
for
the
Byzantine
coins.
Of
the
five
values
in
letters
submitted
for
the
Bank
Notes
it
is
interesting
to
find
that
no
details
were
furnished
in
any
of
them
as
to
how
the
values
were
arrived
at,
but
that
two
letters
each
suggested
a
value
of
$500,000,
one
letter
of
$510,000
and
one
letter
of
$455,000,
with
an
explanation
that
this
was
a
low
figure.
The
fifth
letter
was
from
England
showing
a
rounded
value
of
1200,000
sterling
or
about
$520,000
Canadian
as
of
early
1980.
In
order
to
arrive
at
a
valuation
for
the
donation
as
of
1979,
the
Court
considered
the
situation
under
the
following
headings:
(1)
The
meaning
of
the
fair
market
value
as
applied
to
this
donation.
(2)
The
significance
of
the
donation
as
being
a
collection
or
simply
a
group
of
notes.
(3)
The
question
of
whether
or
not
there
is
any
historic
value
to
the
donation.
(4)
The
addition,
if
any,
of
a
premium
value
attaching
to
the
donation.
(5)
The
reliability
of
the
witnesses
called.
(6)
The
placement
of
a
value
on
the
notes
donated.
1
—
Fair
Market
Value
An
in-depth
argument
by
each
counsel
as
to
the
meaning
of
"fair
market
value”
which
must
be
determined
in
this
case,
according
to
the
facts,
was
presented
to
the
Court.
As
some
of
the
Canadian
proofs
and
specimens
in
the
subject
matter
of
these
appeals
were
quite
rare
none
of
the
expert
witnesses
for
the
appellant
nor
the
expert
witnesses
for
the
respondent
were
able
to
provide
their
opinion
as
to
the
value
of
all
such
notes.
Hence
it
becomes
difficult
to
attribute
a
fair
market
value
to
this
donation.
A
reference
to
this
problem
is
found
in
the
case
of
Gold
Coast
Selection
Trust
Limited
v.
Humphrey,
[1948]
A.C.
459;
[1948]
2
All
E.R.
379,
a
decision
of
the
House
of
Lords.
Viscount
Simonds
in
his
judgment
said
at
473
(All
E.R.
384):
.
.
.
If
the
asset
is
difficult
to
value,
but
is
none
the
less
of
a
money
value,
the
best
valuation
possible
must
be
made.
Valuation
is
an
art,
not
an
exact
science.
Mathematical
certainty
is
not
demanded,
nor,
indeed,
is
it
possible.
It
is
for
the
commissioners
to
express
in
the
money
value
attributed
by
them
to
the
asset
their
estimate,
and
this
is
a
conclusion
of
fact
to
be
drawn
from
the
evidence
before
them.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
expressed
that
the
phrase
"fair
market
value”
had
been
the
subject
of
a
number
of
Canadian
judgments
some
of
which
have
been
summarized
by
Mr.
Justice
McIntyre
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
British
Columbia.
In
Re
Mann
Estate,
[1972]
5
W.W.R.
23,
at
page
26
of
that
judgment
the
learned
Justice
said
as
follows:
The
expression
“fair
market
value”
is
well
known
in
law
and,
indeed,
there
is
little
dispute
before
me
as
to
the
definition
of
the
term.
It
has
been
the
subject
of
much
judicial
discussion
and
the
appellants
referred
to
such
cases
as:
Untermyer
v.
Attorney
General
of
British
Columbia,
[1929]
S.C.R.
84,
[1929]
1
D.L.R.
315;
Montreal
Island
Power
Co.
v.
Laval,
[1935]
S.C.R.
304,
[1936]
1
D.L.R.
621;
Re
Leiser;
Forman
and
Fowkes
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
51
B.C.R.
368,
[1937]
2
W.W.R.
428,
[1937]
2
D.L.R.
341
(C.A.);
Attorney
General
of
Alberta
v.
Royal
Trust
Co.,
[1945]
S.C.R.
267,
[1945]
2
D.L.R.
274;
Smith
and
Rudd
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1950]
S.C.R.
602;
[1950]
C.T.C.
247;
Semet-Solvay
Co.
v.
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1959]
Ex.
C.R.
172,
20
D.L.R.
(2d)
663.
I
do
not
intend
to
quote
at
length
from
these
authorities,
but
it
is
clear,
from
an
examination
of
them,
that
the
expression
“fair
market
value”
means
the
exchange
value,
the
value
an
asset
will
bring
in
the
market
and,
where
no
market
exists,
that
value
must
be
determined
by
other
indicia
of
value.
I
refer
to
a
passage
in
the
judgment
of
Estey
J.
in
Attorney
General
of
Alberta
v.
Royal
Trust
Co.,
(supra),
at
p.
288
[S.C.R.],
which
is
representative
of
the
views
expressed
in
the
other
authorities
referred
to:
It
is
not
suggested
that
the
Commissioner
has
overlooked
any
factor
that
ought
properly
to
have
been
taken
into
account
in
determing
the
value
of
the
property.
He
had
to
determine
the
market
value
and
when,
as
in
this
case,
no
market
exists,
it
is
the
task
of
the
Commissioner,
so
far
as
he
can,
to
construct
a
normal
market
and
to
determine
the
value
by
taking
into
account
all
the
factors
which
would
exist
in
an
actual
normal
market
—
a
market
which
is
not
disturbed
by
factors
similar
to
either
boom
or
depression,
and
where
vendors,
ready
but
not
too
anxious
to
sell,
meet
with
purchasers
ready
and
able
to
purchase.
Such
a
task
is
often
very
difficult,
and
this
case
is
no
exception.
And
at
p.
27:
Where
there
is
a
ready
market
for
shares
such
as
the
stock
exchange
provides
for
its
listed
shares,
the
market
price,
as
revealed
in
regular
market
quotations,
is
probably
the
best
but
not
necessarily
the
only
indication
of
value.
However,
where,
as
here,
no
market
exists
in
that
form,
regard
must
be
had
to
other
indicia
of
value:
other
circumstances
and
conditions
must
be
considered.
Whatever
tests
are
applied,
however
and
whatever
considerations
are
weighed,
the
effort
of
the
valuer
must
be
directed
to
finding
that
fair
market
value
in
a
hypothetical
transaction
in
a
hypothetical
market.
The
problem
of
where
no
ready
market
exists
was
considered
by
Mr.
Justice
Kellock
in
his
judgment
in
Smith
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1950]
S.C.R.
602;
[1950]
C.T.C.
247
wherein
he
said
at
605
(C.T.C.
251):
In
determining
the
fair
market
value
where
there
is
no
competitive
market
at
the
date
as
of
which
the
value
is
to
be
ascertained,
other
indicia
may
be
resorted
to
as
pointed
out
by
Sir
Lyman
Duff
C.J.
in
Montreal
Island
Power
Co.
v.
Town
of
Laval
des
Rapides,.'
The
learned
Chief
Justice
went
on
to
say:—
There
may
be
reasonable
prospects
of
the
return
of
a
market,
in
which
case
it
might
not
be
unreasonable
for
the
assessor
to
evaluate
the
present
worth
of
such
prospects
and
the
probability
of
an
investor
being
found
who
would
invest
his
money
on
the
strength
of
such
prospects;
and
there
may
be
other
relevant
circumstances
which
it
might
be
proper
to
take
into
account
as
evidence
of
its
actual
capital
value.
ney
General
of
the
Province
of
Alberta
v.
The
Royal
Trust
Company,
supra
said
at
287:
The
authorities
are
clear
that
under
such
statutory
provision
as
we
are
here
concerned
with,
value
means
market
value
as
that
term
is
properly
understood.
The
value
with
which
we
are
concerned
here
is
the
value
at
Untermyer's
death,
that
is
to
say,
the
then
value
of
every
advantage
which
his
property
possessed,
for
these
advantages
as
they
stood,
would
naturally
have
an
effect
on
the
market
price.
.
.
.
The
sum
of
all
these
advantages
controls
the
market
price,
which,
if
it
be
not
spasmodic
or
ephemeral,
is
the
best
test
of
the
fair
market
value
of
property
of
this
description.
Mignault
J.,
in
Untermyer
Estate
v.
Attorney
General
for
British
Columbia
.
The
Commissioner
had
a
difficult
task,
but
an
examination
of
the
evidence
and
his
report
will
indicate
how
well
he
has
succeeded
in
the
performance
of
that
task.
prefers
to
case
reported
[1929]
S.C.R.
84
at
91.]
Counsel
for
the
respondent
also
referred
to
the
Mann
case
supra
as
demonstrating
a
number
of
principles,
one
of
which
is
the
classic
thin
market
situation
where
there
are
no
comparable
sales.
The
Court
stated
at
page
27:
.
.
.
it
is
clear,
from
an
examination
of
them
(that
is
the
other
authorities)
that
the
expression
“fair
market
value”
means
the
exchange
value,
the
value
an
asset
will
bring
in
the
market
and,
where
no
market
exists,
that
value
must
be
determined
by
other
indicia
of
value.
In
the
next
paragraph
he
says:
.
it
is
the
task
of
the
Commissioner,
so
far
as
he
can,
to
construct
a
normal
market
and
to
determine
the
value
by
taking
into
account
all
the
factors
which
would
exist
in
an
actual
normal
market
.
.
.
(which
it
was
submitted
is
what
the
respondent's
expert
did
in
applying
the
price
of
sales
of
comparable
notes.)
The
Court
goes
on
to
say:
.
.
.
a
market
which
is
not
disturbed
by
factors
similar
to
either
boom
or
depression,
and
where
vendors,
ready
but
not
too
anxious
to
sell
meet
with
purchasers
ready
and
able
to
purchase.
Such
a
task
is
often
very
difficult
..
.
In
the
case
of
Estate
of
A.M.
Collings
Henderson
v.
M.N.R.,
[1973]
C.T.C.
636;
73
D.T.C.
5471
Mr.
Justice
Cattanach,
of
the
Federal
Court
had
this
to
say
at
644
(D.T.C.
5476):
The
statute
does
not
define
the
expression
“fair
market
value”
.
.
.
Then
he
goes
on
to
say:
That
common
understanding
I
take
to
mean
the
highest
price
an
asset
might
reasonably
be
expected
to
bring
if
sold
by
the
owner
in
the
normal
method
applicable
to
the
asset
in
question
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business
in
a
market
not
exposed
to
any
undue
stresses
and
composed
of
willing
buyers
and
sellers
dealing
at
arm’s
length
and
under
no
compulsion
to
buy
or
sell.
He
goes
on
further
to
say
that
the
foregoing:
.
includes
what
I
conceive
to
be
the
essential
element
which
is
an
open
and
unrestricted
market
in
which
.
..
and
counsel
emphasized
the
following:
the
price
is
hammered
out
between
willing
and
informed
buyers
and
sellers
on
the
anvil
of
supply
and
demand.
Then
counsel
added
that
Mr.
Conn
was
not
a
purchaser
hammering
out
a
market
price
on
the
anvil
of
supply
and
demand.
Mr.
Conn
was
a
purchaser
who
would
buy
at
any
price.
On
page
5477
the
Court
in
the
Collings
Henderson
case
referring
to
the
Untermyer
case,
supra,
continued
by
saying:
The
recurrent
thought
in
these
extracts
is
that
the
market
price
must
have
the
element
of
consistency
which
precludes
the
existence
of
a
transient
boom
or
sudden
panic
and
that
the
market
price
should
be
realistic
rather
than
“ephemeral”.
A
useful
discussion
of
valuations
is
found
in
the
case
of
The
Queen
v.
National
System
of
Baking
of
Alberta
Limited,
1978
C.T.C.
30;
78
D.T.C.
6018.
At
page
34
(D.T.C.
6021),
Mr.
Justice
Mahoney
said:
.
.
.
it
is
the
value
in
the
market-place,
not
the
value
to
a
particularly
situated
or
motivated
investor,
that
is
to
be
determined.
The
case
of
Re
Domglas
Inc.
v.
Jarislowsky
et
al.,
13
B.L.R.
135
was
set
forth
before
the
Court
to
consider
a
decision
on
valuation.
In
that
particular
judgment
Mr.
Justice
Greenberg
of
the
Quebec
Superior
Court
quoted
from
a
book
entitled
Valuation
of
Property
by
Professor
James
C.
Bonbright,
(1937)
in
which
he
says
at
page
192:
“Market
Value”
itself
imports
no
idea
either
of
a
justified
price,
or
of
an
enduring
price,
and
the
ridiculously
inflated
prices
prevailing
during
a
boom,
like
the
panicky
prices
prevailing
during
a
depression,
are
just
as
true
market
values
as
are
the
prices
that
are
supposed
to
reflect
both
normal
conditions
and
intrinsic
values.
One
of
the
most
true
things
about
market
values
is
that
they
are
likely
to
be
crazy
values.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
suggested
that
this
is
a
definition
of
market
value
but
not
fair
market
value
and
that
the
appellant’s
evidence
was
directed
to
market
value
and
not
to
fair
market
value
as
is
required.
E.N.R.
Campbell
in
Canada
Valuation
Service,
published
by
Richard
De
Boo
Limited,
indicates
that
there
are
two
distinct
markets
where
valuation
determination
may
be
required.
One
is
the
open
market
in
which
transactions
are
constantly
consummated
and
the
other
is
the
less
familiar
notional
market
where
valuation
requirements
are
necessary
for
such
things
as
income
tax,
expropriation,
arbitration
or
divorce
proceedings.
In
this
latter
instance,
although
it
is
necessary
to
make
a
value
determination,
there
may
be
no
contemplation
of
open
market
transactions.
In
this
particular
case
there
seems
to
be,
from
the
testimony
of
the
expert
witnesses,
very
few
open
market
transactions.
Rather,
a
notional
market
was
being
spoken
of.
In
the
Untermyer
case
(supra)
the
Court
distinguishes
the
difference
between
market
price
and
fair
market
price.
Fair
market
price
is
market
price
plus
consistency.
In
the
absence
of
consistency
it
was
submitted
that
you
do
not
have
fair
market
values,
you
have
market
price.
This,
said
the
respondent,
is
what
the
evidence
offered
by
the
appellant
indicated.
In
addition,
the
respondent
said,
as
will
be
discussed
below,
that
Mr.
Conn
paid
more
than
fair
market
value
for
many
items,
and
he
should
be
limited
to
a
deduction
for
the
amount
of
the
fair
market
value,
not
the
amount
he
paid.
This
I
accept
as
being
reasonable.
There
was
some
argument
as
to
the
value
of
one
set
of
the
notes
because
it
seems
it
was
illegal
for
these
to
be
in
the
hands
of
a
private
collector.
This
does
not
mean
that
they
do
not
have
a
value
if
people
are
willing
to
buy
and
sell
at
a
price.
2
—
The
Donation
as
a
Collection
A
great
deal
of
discussion
took
place
as
to
whether
or
not
the
donation
by
the
appellant
was
simply
a
group
of
notes
or
a
collection.
The
Greater
Oxford
Dictionary
includes
under
the
definition
of
collection
“a
number
of
objects
collected
or
gathered
together,
viewed
as
a
whole;
a
group
of
things
collected
and
arranged".
The
definition
goes
on
to
show
that
a
collection
includes
“objects
of
interest,
works
of
art,
etc."
While
counsel
for
the
respondent
admitted
that
nothing
turns
on
calling
it
a
group
or
collection
the
main
reason
for
referring
to
the
donation
as
a
group
instead
of
a
collection
was
to
narrow
any
opportunity
for
attaching
a
premium
to
it.
At
best
it
was
admitted
that
this
was
only
part
of
a
collection
because
the
appellant
only
donated
in
1979
as
part
of
a
total
number
of
Bank
Notes
of
this
classification
in
his
possession.
Evidence
of
witnesses
for
both
the
appellant
and
respondent
was
that
there
are
perhaps
15
active
collectors
of
proof
and
specimen
notes
and
perhaps
a
few
others
who
were
interested
in
a
special
area
of
such.
Further,
approximately
1,500
to
2,000
issues
of
proof
and
specimen
notes
were
produced
by
some
132
Canadian
banking
institutions.
Of
those
132,
27
are
represented
in
this
donation.
According
to
the
respondent
this
small
number
of
27
out
of
a
132
does
not
constitute
a
large
enough
group
that
would
lead
to
considering
this
donation
as
a
collection
and
therefore
to
a
corresponding
increase
in
its
value
as
a
collection.
While
evidence
was
given,
and
discussed
below,
that
this
donation
was
a
collection
of
historic
value
the
respondent
pointed
out
at
page
681
of
the
evidence,
where
the
appellant
said:
.
.
.
I
just
kind
of
reached
into
the
bag
except
when
it
came
to
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
Kingston
Notes,
because
you
wouldn’t
break
that
up.
So,
I
looked
through
to
make
sure
that
I
gave
them
the
pair.
You
also
wouldn’t
break
up
the
fronts
and
the
backs,
so
again,
I
went
through
to
make
sure
I
gave
them
the
pair.
But,
I
had
no
reason
to
give
them
those.
I
could
have
given
them
any
of
the
others.
In
fact,
I
could
have
given
all
300
if
my
tax
needs
hadn’t
been
that
great.
[Presumably
the
word
“hadn’t’’
should
be
“had".]
This
would
seem
to
indicate
two
things:
first
of
all
that
the
selection
was
made
at
random
by
the
appellant
with
no
conceived
thought
of
producing
any
theme
or
historic
significance
for
a
“collection"
purpose;
and,
secondly,
that
if
it
was
done
for
tax
needs
as
set
out
by
the
appellant
then
surely
he
must
have
had
some
fair
knowledge
of
the
values
that
he
required
for
a
certain
tax
receipt
amount,
otherwise
he
may
have
given
fewer
or
more
from
the
300
such
notes
he
claimed
to
have
on
hand.
The
respondent
said
that
this
admission
coming
from
the
appellant
should
be
given
far
greater
weight
than
the
evidence
of
any
of
the
other
experts
who
could
conjecture
that
there
was
a
theme
or
reason
for
these
notes
being
donated
at
one
time.
I
do
not
however
attach
much
significance
as
to
whether
or
not
the
donation
was
a
group
or
a
collection
in
so
far
as
value
is
concerned.
3
—
Historic
Value
Counsel
for
the
appellant
called
James
A.
Haxby
as
a
witness.
He
was
qualified
as
an
expert
in
the
field
of
historical
value
and
rarity
of
Canadian
proofs
and
specimens
of
Dominion
of
Canada
Bank
Notes,
but
not
as
to
their
value.
The
witness,
prior
to
his
present
position
as
a
writer,
was
considered
as
a
numismatic
consultant
in
currency
history.
In
general
the
witness
described
the
collection
and
its
significance
at
page
70
of
the
transcript
as
follows:
It
has
aesthetic
significance,
without
doubt.
It
covers
a
fairly
broad
period
of
Canadian
banking
history
from
the
1830’s
all
the
way
up
to
1954,
I
believe,
that’s
the
Bank
of
Canada
series.
One
could
certainly
look
at
this
in
aesthetic
terms
from
the
standpoint
of
the
evolution
of
bank
note
design,
paper
money
design,
from
the
standpoint
of
the
introduction
of
more
than
one
color
into
bank
notes,
the
introduction
of
back
designs
on
bank
notes.
All
of
these
things
could
be
looked
at
from
an
aesthetic
point
of
view.
In
fact,
some
people
have
said
that
the
bank
notes
of
the
19th
Century
are
miniature
works
of
art,
and
indeed,
I
believe
some
of
them
to
be
so.
There
are
many
different
levels
on
which
one
could
look
at
a
collection
like
this.
You
want
to
examine
the
styles
of
the
different
engravers
involved
who
produce
these
things,
the
security
printers.
Obviously,
the
bigger
collection,
the
more
one
could
do
these
things,
but
one
could
certainly
do
some
of
that
on
this
collection.
One
has
a
representation
of
American,
English,
and
Canadian
printers,
and
we
have
historic
importance
too
in
having
examples
of
banks
that
are
now
long
gone,
and
banks
that
changed
their
names,
or
who
were
absorbed
by
other
banks,
for
example,
number
68,
the
Merchants
Bank
of
Halifax
became
the
Royal
Bank
of
Canada,
now
one
of
Canada’s
leading
banks.
And,
we
have
examples
from
the
Bank
of
Montreal
as
well.
We
have
examples,
not
all
across
the
country,
because
we
don’t
have
anything
in
this
collection
from
the
far
west.
Nevertheless,
there
are
pieces
from
Manitoba,
as
well
as
pieces
from
the
Maritimes.
Anyone
looking
at
this
collection
on
display
would
at
least
begin
to
get
a
feeling
for
the
kind
of
notes
that
were
in
circulation
in
the
early
20th
Century.
We
see,
for
example,
that
the
chartered
banks
issued
their
own
notes,
which
many
people
don’t
seem
to
be
aware
of,
and
you
see
a
nice
sample
of
Dominion
notes
as
well
as
examples
of
the
Bank
of
Canada
issue
that
succeeded
them.
On
March
28,
1980
the
Canadian
Cultural
Property
Export
Review
Board
granted
an
income
tax
certificate
to
the
University
of
Calgary
thus
acknowledging
that
the
donation
met
the
requirements
of
the
CPEIA.
On
April
2,
1980
the
University
of
Calgary
acknowledged
that
the
donation
was
beneficial
to
the
educational
objective
of
the
University.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
said
that
the
historic
value
was
of
little
benefit
to
the
Court.
The
comments
made
by
Dr.
Haxby
applied
to
all
Canadian
notes,
circulated
notes,
uncirculated
notes,
proof
and
specimen
notes,
proof
and
specimen
notes
in
the
particular
group
of
donation,
and
proof
and
specimen
notes
not
in
the
group.
They
are
all
Canadiana.
Also
as
was
seen
supra
Mr.
Conn
made
the
selection
at
random
from
his
inventory
and
thus
did
not
put
any
thought
into
assembling
a
donation
for
the
purpose
of
historic
value.
4
—
Premium
Value
One
of
the
major
issues
in
this
particular
case
is
whether
or
not
some
premium
value
should
be
assigned
to
the
donation
over
and
above
the
individual
total
of
the
values
of
the
various
notes.
In
other
words,
is
the
whole
of
the
donation
worth
more
than
the
sum
of
its
individual
parts?
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
notwithstanding
the
variance
in
values
both
with
respect
to
individual
notes
and
to
the
aggregate
value
of
those
notes,
all
of
the
experts
called
as
witnesses
agreed
there
should
be
added
some
premium
value
to
the
aggregate
value
of
the
individual
notes
or
collection.
As
set
out
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
on
page
73
of
his
written
argument
there
was
the
following:
None
of
the
three
witnesses
referred
to
above
were
able
to
specifically
identify
all
of
the
criteria
and
reasons
for
a
collection
or
premium
value.
It,
however,
appears
to
be
universally
agreed
by
each
witness
that
a
premium
value
relates
to
the
direct
and
indirect
costs
incurred
by
a
collector
in
the
acquisition
on
an
item-by-item
basis
of
what
eventually
becomes
a
collection.
The
three
witnesses
referred
to
in
the
above
quotation
were
Messrs.
Robinson
and
Pratt
for
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Charlton
for
the
respondent.
As
to
a
premium
value
each
had
the
following
to
say:
Mr.
Robinson,
in
answer
to
a
question
as
to
whether
he
would
assign
a
premium
value,
said
at
page
162
of
the
transcript:
Definitely.
The
cost
of
acquiring
them,
which
is
tremendous
in
many
cases,
as
much
as
the
note
itself.
And
at
transcript
pp.
228-29:
And
then,
when
you
accumulate
that
you
have
to
allow
for
the
cost
of
accumulating
it,
and
then
when
you
say
to
me
as
a
dealer
what
is
the
value
of
that
to
replace,
then
you
have
to
take
that
into
consideration,
and
I
knew
that
I
could
not
replace
it
for
$500,000.
Mr.
Robinson,
as
an
example,
described
direct
and
indirect
costs
incurred
in
acquiring
a
particular
$3,000
note
when
he
stated
at
p.
163
of
the
transcript:
If
I
were
a
collector,
that
is
not
my
cost.
I
have
got
time
and
effort
and
air
fare
and
hotel
rooms,
and
other
costs
associated
with
acquiring
that
particular
note.
All
right,
if
my
appraisal
for
that
note
was
$3,000,
if
I
had
it
in
my
hand,
if
I
could
dispose
of
it,
if
the
collector
is
going
out
to
locate
that
bill,
he's
going
to
show
after
show,
and
telephoning
dealers
all
over
the
world,
then
his
cost
is
far
greater
than
that
one
bill.
Mr.
Pratt,
in
dealing
with
the
need
to
assign
a
premium
value
to
a
collection,
said
at
transcript
pp.
462-63:
Well,
if
you’re
doing
it,
I'm
not
saying
the
way
that
I
started,
or
the
way
I
did
it
was
the
right
way,
or
the
only
way,
but
if
you're
anyone
who's
going
out
and
collecting,
and
if
they
take
the
attitude
that
what
they're
going
to
buy
and
add
to
their
collection
is
going
to
be
the
best
that
they
can
get,
and
if
they
can’t
afford
it,
they'll
wait
until
they
can
afford
it
to
get
it
in
their
collection.
At
times
you
can
spend
a
lot
of
time
and
money
searching
these
various
collections
out,
or
the
various
items
you
want,
or
you're
looking
for.
Over
the
years,
you
know,
I
would
suggest
that
as
a
private
collector,
that
you
can
quite
easily,
depending
on
the
price
of
notes,
I
know
of
some
notes
that
I
have
acquired
that
what
it
actually
cost
me
to
get
them,
whether
it
be
travelling
to
different
shows,
or
in
phone
calls,
or
time
that
I
had
spent
doing
work
for
people,
or
research
that
I
had
done
to
come
up
with
this,
that
if
I
had
actually
valued,
paid
$11,000
for
the
note,
I
easily
have
that
much
involved
in
travelling
time
and
if
I
valued
my
time
in
it,
it
would
go
up
again.
So,
normally
you
try
to
take,
at
least
what
I
try
to
do
is
just
work
it
into
my
straight
out
of
pocket
expenses.
And
at
transcript
p.
471:
Okay,
if
I
had
that
collection,
and
based
on
the
numbers
that
I
came
up
with
of
300
and
—
approximately,
ballparking,
$325,000.00
knowing
what
I
do
about
the
cost
of
acquiring
some
of
these
notes,
I
would
be
using
a
formula
not
too
different
to
what
Mr.
Charlton
used,
and
that
would
be
a
premium
somewhere
in
the
40
to
50
per
cent.
So,
you
know,
if
we're
talking
of
$325,000.00
then
you're
adding
another
100.
So,
you'd
be
talking
around
the
455,
450,
455.
I
would,
Sir,
I
would
take
into
consideration
on
that
would
be
the
cost
of
my
money
tied
up
over
that
time,
the
cost
of
the
travel,
the
cost
of
hotels,
and
that
type
of
thing,
but
I
sure
wouldn’t
be
including
time.
Mr.
Charlton,
in
his
appraisal
report
of
the
Conn
collection
(Exhibit
R-2)
in
these
proceedings,
stated
at
p.
5(a)
as
follows:
Due
to
the
lack
of
recorded
recent
transactions
in
some
of
these
notes,
the
pricing
is
based
on
notes
of
comparative
rarity.
The
available
supply
of
these
notes,
in
most
cases,
is
quite
limited
and
the
demand
is
also
limited
which
results
in
a
very
thin
market
and
often
a
considerable
difference
in
bid
and
ask
prices.
While
I
have
priced
the
notes
individually,
it
would
be
unreasonable
to
expect
anyone
to
assemble
such
an
extensive
collection
in
a
short
time
without
paying
a
substantial
premium.
My
appraised
value
for
the
collection
is
$150,000.
Then
the
appellant,
Mr.
Conn,
described
in
his
evidence
how
direct
and
indirect
costs
were
incurred
by
a
collector
in
pursuing
the
acquisition
of
a
particular
rarity
at
transcript
pp.
677-78:
Look,
I
have
various
collections,
and
whenever
you
know
that
something
is
happening,
in
a
worthwhile
place,
like
you
can
assume
that
if
they
have
a
gun
show
in
Las
Vegas,
which
has
to
be
probably
the
biggest
in
the
world,
everybody
that's
anybody
with
any
goods
will
turn
up.
Now,
the
cost
of
going
there,
and
staying
there,
and
doing
whatever
you
do
when
you’re
there,
and
food,
and
hotels,
it’s
the
same,
you
go
to
New
York,
you
go
to
St.
Louis,
you
go
to
any
coin
show,
how
do
you
get
there?
The
costs
are
quite
often
as
much
as,
you
know,
I
mean,
if
you
bought
40
pieces
of
paper,
which
I
never
have,
but
if
you
could
buy
40
pieces,
then
your
cost
is
only
$2,000.00
so
it's
only
a
few
bucks
apiece.
But,
if
you
went
there,
and
you
only
turned
up
with
one
piece
.
..
Now,
if
you
add
the
$2,000
onto
the
bill,
and
you
say
gee,
that
bill
is
now
worth
$2,000
for
travel,
and
$2,000.
I
mean,
I
don't
know
how
you’d
put
an
exact
premium
on
that,
and
it’s
a
number
everybody
gropes
for.
Mr.
Charlton
came
up
with
about
45
or
48
per
cent
as
a
premium
for
having
a
big
collection.
I
suspect
that
that’s
probably
right.
We've
heard
other
numbers
the
same,
so
that
would
be
my
best
guess.
When
the
appellant,
Mr.
Conn,
was
questioned
as
to
the
time
and
effort
he
had
spent
in
assembling
the
Conn
collection,
he
answered
at
transcript
pp.
679-80:
We're
looking
nearly
30
years,
and
thousands
of
plane
trips,
and
attending
hundreds
of
coin
shows,
and
food,
and
air
travel,
and
I
don’t
know
if
it
came
out
here
yet,
or
whether
Mr.
Haxby
or
Mr.
Pratt,
but
when
I
would
buy
a
collection
from
them,
they
know
me
so
well
that
they
would
send
it
from
any
part
of
the
world,
and
yet,
I
was
afraid
to,
I
mean,
it’s
hard
to
put
that
stuff
in
the
mail
because
who's
responsible
if
it
gets
lost?
I
paid,
and
I’m
sure
that
you
have
letters,
or
maybe
Andy
does
somewhere,
where
it’s
documented
that
I
paid
for
their
plane
fare,
just
to
come
out
here
and
deliver
me
the
goods,
because
I
was
afraid
that
if
something
went
wrong,
they
would
say,
well,
you
got
it,
you
pay,
and
I
paid
for
Haxby
to
come
out
to
talk
to
me.
I
paid
for
Phil
Pratt
to
bring
me
three
or
four
different
collections
that
are
at
the
museum,
and
I
paid,
like,
I
don’t
know
if
Mr.
Robinson
is
here.
He
refers
to
himself
as
the
fat
man,
but
wherever
he
goes
and
he
buys
things,
he’ll
give
them
to
me
at
his
price
and
he’ll
say,
well,
now,
I
will
take
care
the
fat
man.
Well,
I
know
what
that
means,
okay,
and
to
the
A.N.A.
last
week,
or
whenever
it
was,
it
was
$1,000.00,
and
to
the
C.N.A.
two
weeks
before
that,
it
was
$1,000.00.
You
can’t
expect
a
man
to
go
and
spend
his
time
and
do
all
these,
whatever
he’s
doing,
a
favour
for
you,
and
don’t
pay
him?
So,
how
do
I
put
those
costs
onto
what?
What
note
should
I
add
it
to?
I
know
it’s
kind
of
vague,
but
that’s
my
answer.
In
his
examination-in-chief,
Mr.
Charlton
clarified
the
use
of
the
word
"premium"
when
he
said
at
page
793
of
the
transcript
as
follows:
But,
then
that
was
based
on
the
estimated
value
of
the
individual
notes.
But
then
I
mentioned
that
the
added
value
of
such
an
extensive
collection
which
would
have
been
difficult,
if
not
impossible,
to
duplicate
in
1979,
made
my
final
value
of
$150,000.00.
One
thing
I
neglected
to
mention
there
that
I
should
was
that
this
value
was
based
on
going
out
into
the
marketplace
to
duplicate
this
collection.
Now,
on
the
other
hand,
in
all
fairness,
I
should
have
also
mentioned
that
if
an
attempt
had
been
made
to
dispose
of
such
a
collection,
and
the
price
realized
would
have
been
much
nearer
the
$100,000.00
than
the
$150,000.00.
What
Mr.
Charlton
seems
to
be
saying
is
that
there
might
exist
a
replacement
cost
if
such
were
attempted
over
a
short
period
of
time
rather
than
a
premium
which
is
alleged
to
be
attached
to
an
already
acquired
collection.
It
seems
from
these
witnesses
that
“premium”
stems
from
the
cost
of
acquisition.
As
counsel
for
the
appellant
said
at
page
1365
of
the
transcript:
.
.
.
There
is
no
suggestion
in
the
statute,
nor
in
any
interpretation
bulletin,
that
where
a
gift
is
made
that
consists
of
a
collection,
that
you
are
to
value
it
on
each
independent
part
of
the
collection.
Nor
do
I
find
one
should
add
a
premium.
There
was
no
evidence
by
any
witness
of
such
a
premium
having
been
added
previously
and
none
could
be
found
by
the
Court
in
any
Canadian,
U.S.
or
English
case.
The
argument
placed
all
the
emphasis
on
extra
cost
for
acquisitions
but
to
be
paid
by
a
purchaser
of
the
collection.
In
this
case
I
might
add
there
was
no
purchaser
in
the
ordinary
sense
of
the
word.
I
find
it
somewhat
difficult
to
attribute
costs
of
acquisition
to
a
fair
market
value.
Suppose
in
a
simple
illustration
that
a
person
buys
a
note
and
pays
X
dollars
for
this
and
in
addition
he
has
a
$1,000
cost
in
travel
or
telephone,
while
another
person
buys
the
identical
note
also
pays
X
dollars
but
has
no
additional
cost
of
$1,000.
Does
this
mean
that
the
first
person's
note
is
more
valuable
by
$1,000
on
a
fair
market
basis?
I
think
not.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
in
discussing
acquisition
costs
said
there
is
no
factual
basis
for
the
costs
presented
here
and
no
legal
basis
for
such.
Dealing
with
a
cost
component
as
part
of
a
premium,
counsel
for
the
respondent
said
at
page
1355:
Firstly,
with
regard
to
the
factual
bases
for
the
cost
component,
we
have
none.
We
don’t
even
have
a
list
of
14
trips
to
New
York,
and
three
trips
to
Los
Angeles,
etc.,
etc.
We
have
no
factual
basis
on
which
to
assign
a
value
of
$150,000,
none.
We
have
some
statements
that
people
did
travelling,
made
phone
calls,
stayed
in
hotels,
that’s
all.
Now,
the
legal
basis
for
that
$150,000
component
is
non-existent
in
our
research.
There
is
no
authority
for
the
proposition
that
in
order
to
value
an
item
you
include
what
it
cost
you
to
make
a
phone
call,
get
on
an
airplane,
and
stay
in
a
hotel.
If
one,
for
instance,
was
going
to
buy
a
painting
at
an
auction
in
New
York,
a
dealer
was
going
to
buy
a
painting
at
an
auction
in
New
York,
he,
of
course,
would
incur
expenses.
The
dealer,
when
he
sold
the
painting,
would
declare
a
profit
in
his
income,
and
hopefully
would
sell
it
for
more,
and
that
would
be
part
of
this
income,
the
difference
between
what
he
paid
for
the
painting
and
what
he
sold
it
for.
That
would
be
properly
his
income.
Expenses,
his
costs
in
acquiring
that,
are
something
else
for
tax
purposes.
For
tax
purposes,
those
costs
do
not
form
part
of
fair
market
value.
If
Mr.
Conn
were
to
have
disposed
of,
as
a
collector
or
investor,
or
hoarder
of
his
collection
for
cash,
as
opposed
to
for
philanthropic
purposes,
then
those
costs
may
well
have
come
into
the
calculation
of
his
taxable
capital
gain.
In
income
tax
matters,
it
is
necessary
to
maintain
records.
Here
we
are
dealing
with
personal
use
property
and
I
am
rather
puzzled
by
the
evidence
of
the
witnesses
who
said
that
in
dealing
with
the
items
such
as
we
have
here
there
are
no
records
kept.
When
a
disposition
is
made
of
any
of
these
items
valued
over
$1,000
surely
there
must
be
some
record
in
order
to
reconcile
the
disposition
for
income
tax
purposes.
When
questioned,
one
witness
said
such
was
not
necessary
and
was
so
advised
by
his
accountant.
I
do
not
make
any
further
comment
on
this
remark.
In
his
appraisal
report,
Mr.
Charlton,
appearing
for
the
respondent,
added
an
amount
to
his
basic
valuation
to
bring
the
figure
from
$108,500
to
$150,000.
The
appellant
then
took
this
increase,
categorizing
it
as
a
premium,
and
applied
it
as
a
percentage
to
the
values
that
were
placed
on
the
notes
by
the
expert
witnesses
for
the
appellant,
thus
bringing
their
fair
market
values
to
the
neighbourhood
of
$500,000.
I
do
not
see
where
any
percentage
figure
should
be
applied
to
a
cost
at
the
time
of
acquisition
to
achieve
a
fair
market
value
at
the
time
of
disposition.
Surely
a
fair
market
value
in
the
normal
course
would
be
dictated
by
the
market
and
any
acquisition
cost
would
be
built
into
a
particular
value
of
the
items.
Because
this
was
Classified
as
a
collection
there
was
argument
that
there
should
be
an
additional
factor
for
the
purchaser
and
this
should
be
part
of
fair
market
value.
I
believe
that
the
only
time
such
would
be
involved
would
be
where
there
was
a
special
interest
purchaser
who
wished
to
acquire
a
collection
without
the
trouble
of
trying
to
accumulate
this
in
the
market.
No
such
purchaser
existed
here.
Just
because
the
items
were
rare
would
not
bring
forth
a
premium,
rather
the
rare
items
would
be
classified
as
such
and
a
premium,
if
any,
would
be
built
into
their
individual
value.
In
support
of
this,
as
mentioned
previously,
I
could
find
no
precedent
in
Canadian,
United
States
or
English
law.
The
cost
of
any
premium
if
such
existed
would
only
be
notional
and
would
depend
on
the
whim
of
the
vendor
who
would
build
this
into
the
value
when
he
established
a
market
price
for
the
sale.
Only
in
unusual
circumstances
would
the
cost
of
acquisition
by
a
purchaser
be
added
to
the
value
he
paid
for
an
item
such
as
if
he
were
in
a
business
dealing
with
these
items.
The
same
principle
applies
for
a
collection
of
items
in
that
no
cost
of
acquisition
of
the
individual
items
should
be
included
in
order
to
place
a
fair
market
value
on
the
collection.
I
cannot
envisage
that
if
a
disposition
was
made
by
way
of
gift
the
value
of
which
disposition
was
necessary
to
be
included
for
tax
purposes,
such
as
to
a
relative,
that
a
premium
would
be
added
to
the
value
of
the
items,
such
premium
being
determined
on
the
basis
of
acquisition
cost.
Mr.
Charlton
for
the
respondent
said
that
in
order
to
collect
some
items
in
the
short
time
you
might
pay
a
premium
but
to
dispose
of
them,
no.
Here
there
is
a
disposition.
Fair
market
value
does
not
seem
to
pay
any
attention
to
cost
of
acquisition,
only
what
might
be
obtained
in
the
market
at
the
time
of
disposition.
Costs
of
acquisition
can
vary
greatly,
as
has
been
illustrated,
even
for
the
same
item,
and
such
a
cost
or
an
adjusted
cost
base
might
affect
income
tax
but
in
my
opinion
does
not
affect
fair
market
value.
Unfortunately
there
is
no
comparable
market
situation
for
many
of
the
items
to
be
valued
but
that
is
not
sufficient
reason
to
add
a
premium
to
the
value
of
all
the
notes.
Hence
I
do
not
consider
the
addition
of
a
premium
to
be
part
of
the
value
of
the
Conn
donation.
5
—
Reliability
of
Witnesses
There
were
some
ten
volumes
compiled
from
the
evidence
presented
at
this
hearing
by
the
various
witnesses.
For
the
greater
part
they
spent
time
in
examination-in-chief
and
in
cross-examination
going
over
each
or
many
of
the
pieces,
numbering
97
in
all,
in
this
particular
collection
donated
to
the
Nickle
Arts
Museum.
Dr.
Haxby
spoke
of
the
historic
value
of
the
collection
and
I
have
already
dealt
with
this.
The
second
witness
was
a
Mr.
Soner
James.
This
gentleman
was
a
proprietor
of
the
Regency
Coin
and
Stamp
Western
Limited
but
had
little
experience
in
dealing
with
proofs
and
specimens
such
as
are
to
be
valued
here.
He
expressed
an
opinion
found
at
page
109
of
the
transcript
as
follows:
I
think
at
that
time,
in
November,
if
I
were
given
a
sum
of
$650,000.00
to
go
and
duplicate
that
collection,
or
something
similar
to
it,
I
don't
think
it
could
have
been
accomplished.
The
material
just
wouldn’t
have
been
there.
Those
that
would
have
had
it
wouldn’t
have
released
it
at
anywhere
near
the
prices
to
stay
within
those
limitations.
He
further
stated
at
page
110
of
the
transcript:
Within
a
few
hours
after
looking
at
the
collection,
and
discussing
it
with
the
other
witnesses
and
Mr.
Conn,
and
I
came
to
my
own
conclusions
on
the
basis
of
the
volume
of
the
material.
Talking
about
the
collection,
he
said
at
page
126:
I
never
handled
them,
so
I
wouldn’t
know.
It
would
be
just
a
guess.
I
haven’t
seen
market
values
placed
on
them,
I
can’t
recall
them
being
listed,
and
I
haven’t
handled
them.
This
witness
was
not
of
much
assistance
to
the
Court
in
placing
a
value
on
the
collection
and
I
choose
now
not
to
consider
his
evidence
very
seriously.
The
next
expert
for
the
appellant
was
Mr.
Richard
Robinson
who,
although
retired,
had
many
years'
experience
in
the
particular
field
of
numismatics.
This
witness
was
undoubtedly
quite
knowledgeable
in
this
particular
field.
He
frequently,
by
his
evidence,
sold
notes
to
the
appellant,
but
in
valuing
some
notes
was
not
consistent
in
his
evidence.
For
example,
in
his
explanation
of
note
number
11
it
was
disclosed
that
such
was
sold
in
1977
or
1978
for
$1,100.
The
witness
valued
the
note
for
purposes
of
this
appraisal
at
$3,000
and
mentioned
that
a
similar
note
had
been
sold
in
1981
for
$8,000.
In
giving
his
explanation
as
to
why
he
increased
the
value
from
1978
to
the
date
of
the
donation
in
1979
by
two
and
one-half
times,
the
witness
replied
that
the
market
for
notes
was
rising
some
250
per
cent
between
November
of
1978
and
November
of
1979.
Mr.
Robinson
also
told
the
Court
that
he
sold
two
notes
to
Mr.
Conn,
number
86
and
number
89
in
1977
or
1978
for
$5,000
and
$9,000
respectively.
These
were
the
same
values
placed
by
him
in
his
appraisal
of
the
subject
matter.
It
illustrates
that
there
was
no
effect
for
inflation
in
his
estimation
with
respect
to
these
two
notes,
thus
demonstrating
an
inconsistency.
This
also
manifested
itself
in
more
than
this
one
instance.
There
were
other
cases
where
he
expressed
an
opinion
as
to
values
and
said
that
from
his
personal
knowledge
he
knew
that
such
had
been
sold
at
certain
prices,
such
as
number
11
indicated
above,
but
he
would
not
mention
either
the
seller
or
the
buyer
thus
lending
some
doubt
as
to
the
actual
value
of
the
sales.
When
confronted
with
the
matter
of
other
notes
selling
below
his
value
Mr.
Robinson
replied
that
“the
values
for
those
sales
were
too
low,”
and
that
in
his
opinion
they
should
have
been
higher.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
said
Robinson’s
dealings
with
Conn
constituted
a
market,
but
this
comment
as
to
being
evidence
of
a
fair
market
price
must
be
tempered
with
the
fact
that
Robinson
“‘was
a
shrewd
dealer,
and
he
wanted
a
dollar
in
it
for
himself’’
(page
1206
of
the
evidence)
and
the
fact
that
Conn
indicated
he
would
pay
any
price
to
acquire
an
item
(page
1171).
Mr.
P.
S.
Pratt
the
other
expert
witness
for
the
appellant
was
also
somewhat
inconsistent
in
his
evidence.
He
was
described
as
a
friend
of
the
appellant
and
I
will
deal
with
this
in
greater
detail
shortly.
Mr.
Pratt
disposed
of
part
of
his
collection
to
Mr.
Conn
in
1977
there
being
approximately
some
87
pieces
in
total
in
the
sale
and
he
received
the
sum
of
about
$60,000
for
these.
Although
he
was
fairly
certain
of
the
approximate
price
he
could
not
remember
which
banks
were
represented
in
this
disposition
and
such
is
set
out
at
page
554
of
the
transcript.
At
page
589
he
says
he
could
not
remember
what
notes
he
bought
later
as
Mr.
Conn's
agent
but
he
does
however
remember
the
cost
price
of
the
notes
he
sold
to
Conn.
When
Mr.
Pratt
sold
the
notes
to
Mr.
Conn
for
some
$60,000
he
indicated
to
the
Court
that
this
was
what
he
had
invested
in
them
but
he
could
not
describe
the
details
of
what
notes
were
in
the
87
sold.
When
reviewing
the
notes,
one
by
one,
Mr.
Pratt
attributed
an
“R”
factor
or
a
rarity
factor
between
one
and
ten
for
each
note.
While
he
had
no
appraisal
report
he
had
no
difficulty
placing
an
“R"
factor
on
each
individual
note
in
the
Conn
collection.
Subsequently
under
cross-examination
at
page
584
he
admitted
that
the
value
of
a
note
was
not
determinative
on
the
“R”
factor
but
rather
by
virtue
of
the
location
of
the
note,
either
in
a
private
or
public
collection.
This
hardly,
then,
is
a
barometer
of
fair
market
value.
Further,
after
mentioning
positively
that
only
certain
numbers
of
some
notes
existed,
such
as
there
being
3
of
Note
No.
40,
he
said
at
page
495:
I
don’t
think
anyone
has
the
overall
knowledge
to
come
right
out
and
specifically
say
in
the
world
there
are
only
two
or
five
of
anything.
Thus,
in
my
opinion,
the
importance
of
the
“R”
factor
is
diminished.
Mr.
Pratt
by
his
evidence
admitted
to
being
a
business
person
but
he
did
not
keep
any
records
of
the
transactions
either
on
his
own
account
or
for
those
on
Mr.
Conn's
account.
He
did
not
make
available
any
records
whatsoever
to
the
Court
but
seemed
to
give
all
his
evidence
based
on
a
spotty
memory
and
his
opinion.
A
further
example
of
Mr.
Pratt's
evidence
not
being
consistent
stems
from
a
comment
made
by
him
commencing
at
page
479
of
the
transcript
wherein
he
states
that
he
performed
an
appraisal
of
the
Conn
donation
in
the
latter
part
of
1978
or
early
in
1979.
He
arrived
at
a
value
but
kept
no
record
of
this
valuation
nor
did
he
indicate
to
the
Court
the
amount
determined.
The
inconsistency
is
with
Mr.
Conn's
evidence
when
he
indicated
at
p.
681
of
the
transcript
that
the
donation
was
put
together
completely
at
random
and
for
tax
needs.
It
would
seem
impossible
for
any
tax
problems
of
Mr.
Conn
for
the
year
1979
to
be
determined
late
in
1978
or
early
1979
as
Mr.
Pratt
indicated.
Further
Mr.
Conn
said
at
page
697
with
reference
to
putting
together
the
donation:
...
I
usually
wait
until
the
very
last
possible
second
in
the
year
until
I
find
out
about
what
tax
I’m
going
to
pay,
how
it
looks,
and
then
I
run
like
mad,
and
the
last
donation
we
gave,
I
believe
it
was
one
day
until
Christmas,
this
particular
one
would
be
the
same.
You
can’t
decide
in
May
what
you’re
going
to
give,
because
you
don’t
know
how
much
money
you’re
paying,
but
by
November
you’ve
got
an
idea.
And
so,
then,
you
go
like
the
devil
to
do
this
as
fast
as
you
can,
get
as
many
things
as
you
can
so
that
you
can
donate
it,
if
that’s
for
tax
reasons,
okay.
Mr.
Conn,
from
his
evidence,
was
obviously
a
philanthropist
and
is
to
be
commended
for
his
donation
in
this
particular
case.
However
it
was
evident
that
he
had
little
appreciation
for
the
true
or
fair
market
value
of
the
items
in
his
collection.
While
he
was
entitled
to
pay
what
he
chose
to
obtain
notes
for
his
collection
this
is
not
an
indication
of
their
fair
market
value.
To
illustrate
Mr.
Conn’s
disregard
for
cost
he
said
at
page
1171
of
the
transcript:
I
don’t
really
care
about
cost
bases
and
purchase
prices.
Little
people
do
that.
I
only
know
that
I
want
it,
and
I
want
it,
and
I
happen
to
remember
one
of
the
articles,
because
I
know
there’s
a
finite
number,
and
so
I
knew
that
I
was
closing
in
on
that
number,
and
I
thought
I
was
going
to
have
every
one
that
existed,
and
I
set
out
to
do
that,
and
I
believe
I
have
done
it.
On
page
1173,
he
said,
Now,
I
knew
that
I
was
closing
in,
and
the
price
that
I
paid
was
immaterial
to
me.
I
was
never
going
to
sell
it,
I
was
doing
it
for
a
purpose,
to
give
to
the
University
.
.
.
On
page
1174
Mr.
Conn
said
in
reference
to
certain
notes:
.
.
.
I
believe
I
have
every
one
that
exists,
and
so
when
I
—
that’s
why
I
pay
—
you
think
I
paid
a
funny
price,
or
he
does,
that’s
why.
For
the
purposes
of
this
hearing,
Mr.
Conn
placed
certain
advertisements
in
trade
periodicals
advertising
for
the
purchase
of
certain
notes
that
were
in
the
donation
at
prices
ranging
up
to
$25,000
apiece.
This
was
supported
by
the
evidence
of
a
Mr.
Ernest
Watson.
One
such
advertisement
specifically
requested
the
purchase
of
four
of
the
notes
similar
to
ones
donated
in
the
collection.
On
surveying
the
evidence
given
by
both
Mr.
Robinson
and
Mr.
Pratt
it
was
their
belief
that
probably
none
of
the
notes
(so
advertised)
existed
in
private
hands
and
therefore
it
would
seem
rather
impossible
that
any
could
have
been
purchased
at
the
price
indicated.
The
result
of
this
is
that
I
do
not
place
any
significance
on
these
advertisements
as
being
criteria
of
the
value
of
any
of
the
notes
in
the
collection
as
of
November
1979.
The
only
expert
testimony
accepted
by
the
Court
on
behalf
of
the
respondent
was
that
presented
by
James
E.
Charlton.
Mr.
Charlton
filed
an
appraisal
report
for
his
valuation.
The
best
that
can
be
said
for
Mr.
Charlton
is
that
he
was
an
honest,
disinterested
witness
while
the
worst
that
might
be
said
is
that
he
was
not
“au
courant"
with
the
market
in
1979
for
this
particular
type
of
donation.
He
was
retired
first
of
all,
and,
secondly,
had
not
dealt
with
these
types
of
notes
very
often
during
his
long
career.
Mr.
Charlton’s
valuations
were
much
lower
than
those
of
the
witnesses
provided
by
the
appellant.
He
did
however
discount
Mr.
Conn's
purchase
prices
as
being
inflated
prices
and
as
an
example
said
with
respect
to
note
number
89
at
page
1096
as
follows:
Well,
I
have
pointed
out
many
times
already
and
I
don’t
want
to
be
repetitious
but
that
doesn’t
in
my
way
of
thinking,
establish
fair
market
value
just
because
some
fellows
pay
what,
to
me,
is
an
inflated
price
for
something.
This
was
the
position
which
Mr.
Charlton
took
throughout
the
hearing
and
while
it
may
have
some
merits
I
believe
that
he
lacked
knowledge
of
the
market
as
it
existed
in
November
of
1979
especially
with
the
inflation
that
was
alleged
to
have
taken
place
between
the
time
of
his
retirement
and
the
time
of
the
donation.
He
would
change
his
mind,
he
said,
in
raising
some
prices
up
and
bringing
others
down
but
as
to
an
overall
increase
he
would
not
consent.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
pointed
out
in
respect
to
Mr.
Charlton’s
research
that
while
it
may
be
acceptable
to
have
relied
on
catalogues,
dealers’
price
lists
and
auctions
for
the
more
common
notes
in
the
collection
there
was
a
basic
flaw
in
his
valuation
approach
to
rely
on
such
material
and
to
fail
to
consult
other
reputable
sources
for
information
with
respect
not
only
to
rarity
but
more
importantly
to
fair
market
value
as
of
November
1979.
In
evidence
Mr.
Charlton
said
that
he
had
only
consulted
with
one
collector
and
one
dealer.
As
well
Mr.
Charlton
placed
all
the
notes
into
four
groups
each
having
average
prices
of
$500,
$1,000,
$1,500
and
$2,000
respectively.
This
certainly
limited
the
placement
of
a
value
above
$2,000
on
the
rarest
notes.
As
to
the
reliability
of
expert
witnesses
this
matter
was
dealt
with
in
the
case
of
Holt
and
Others
v.
Inland
Revenue
Commissioners,
[1953]
2
All
E.R.
at
1499.
In
that
case
the
Court
had
to
make
a
valuation
of
shares
for
estate
duty
purposes.
There
were
many
different
witnesses
and
as
in
this
case,
while
there
is
a
donee,
in
the
Holt
case
there
was
a
question
to
consider
of
a
hypothetical
purchaser.
I
believe,
except
for
this
difference,
I
can
say
the
same
about
the
experts
who
appeared
in
the
present
case
as
was
succinctly
expressed
by
Mr.
Justice
Danckwerts
in
Holt
at
1501
as
follows:
.
.
.
The
result
is
that
I
must
enter
into
a
dim
world
peopled
by
the
indeterminate
spirits
of
fictitious
or
unborn
sales.
It
is
necessary
to
assume
the
prophetic
vision
of
a
prospective
purchaser
at
the
moment
of
the
death
of
the
deceased,
and
firmly
to
reject
the
wisdom
which
might
be
provided
by
the
knowledge
of
subsequent
events.
In
my
task
I
have
had
the
assistance
of
a
number
of
experts
on
each
side
who
differ
in
their
opinions
in
the
manner
in
which
experts
normally
do,
and
the
frankest
of
them
admitted
that
certain
of
his
calculations
were
simply
guesswork.
It
seems
to
me
that
their
opinions
are,
indeed,
properly
described
as
guesswork,
though,
of
course,
it
is
intelligent
guesswork,
aided
by
the
experience
which
they
have
gained
by
their
work
as
stockbrokers
or
accountants.
No
possible
suggestion
can
be
made
against
the
honesty
of
these
witnesses,
but
their
methods
of
calculation
appear
to
me
to
be
inevitably
uncertain
and
controversial,
and,
in
my
view,
statements
by
several
of
them,
that
they
would
be
ready
to
buy
the
shares
at
the
price
reached
by
them,
if
they
had
had
the
opportunity
some
five
years
ago,
must
be
discounted
accordingly.
None
the
less
I
could
not
have
approached
my
task
without
their
valuable
assistance,
and
my
remarks
must
not
be
taken
to
belittle
the
efforts
which
have
been
made
by
them
to
provide
an
answer
to
a
question
to
which
no
certain
answer
is
possible.
In
an
article
on
“The
Role
of
the
Expert
Valuator"
Carl
T.
Grant,
Q.C.
in
the
Canadian
Chartered
Accountant,
July
1972
at
page
43,
had
this
to
say:
A
few
of
the
dangers
and
pitfalls
of
the
business
valuator
have
been
commented
upon.
There
are
many
more.
The
best
defence
against
them
is
and
will
continue
to
be:
(a)
ability
and
imagination,
(b)
diligent
preparation
and
research,
and
(c)
truly
professional
impartiality.
Dealing
with
each
of
Mr.
Grant’s
three
points,
the
first
one
of
ability
and
imagination,
it
is
quite
reasonable
to
comment
that
all
three
expert
witnesses
considered
at
length
by
the
Court
had
a
certain
amount
of
ability.
As
to
imagination,
while
Mr.
Charlton
exhibited
little,
both
Mr.
Robinson
and
Mr.
Pratt
exhibited
perhaps
too
much.
As
to
the
second
point
of
diligent
preparation
and
research,
again
while
Mr.
Charlton
consulted
certain
periodicals
relating
to
the
field
he
did
not
spend
a
great
deal
of
time
dealing
with
people
knowledgeable
in
the
business.
On
the
other
hand,
both
Messrs.
Pratt
and
Robinson
did
very
little
in
my
opinion
as
to
preparation
and
research.
They
provided
no
appraisal
reports
nor
did
they
furnish
any
records
to
the
Court.
Further,
and
I
wish
to
comment
here,
they
both
relied,
at
least
to
some
extent,
on
the
appraisal
report
submitted
on
behalf
of
the
respondent
by
a
Major
Carroll.
During
the
course
of
the
hearing,
counsel
for
the
appellant
made
a
motion
to
direct
Major
Carroll,
when
he
was
giving
testimony,
to
answer
certain
questions.
Major
Carroll
said
he
could
not
because
of
an
oath
he
had
taken
not
to
disclose
certain
information
obtained
while
he
was
Chief
Cur-
rator
of
the
National
Currency
Collection
at
the
Bank
of
Canada.
As
a
result
of
this
motion,
it
was
necessary
to
strike
all
Major
Carroll’s
evidence
from
the
record
and
he
was
asked
to
step
down.
The
expert
witnesses
for
the
appellant,
however,
referred
to
information
from
his
appraisal
report
such
as
it
is
found
on
page
582
of
the
transcript
when
counsel
for
the
respondent
in
cross-examining
Mr.
Pratt
asked
the
following:
Is
the
information
regarding
the
trades
to
which
you
are
referring,
information
which
you
completed
the
research
on,
or
.
.
.
And
then
Mr.
Pratt
replied:
That
was
pulled
out
of
Mr.
Carroll’s
records.
The
end
result,
therefore,
is
that
I
must
discount
any
reference
made
to
Major
Carroll’s
report
and
especially
where
the
witnesses
for
the
appellant
relied
upon
it
as
to
the
rarity
of
the
existence
of
certain
notes
donated
by
Mr.
Conn.
As
to
the
third
item
listed
by
Mr.
Grant,
that
of
truly
professional
impartiality,
I
can
readily
say
that
Mr.
Charlton
was
a
disinterested
party
but
that
neither
Mr.
Robinson
nor
Mr.
Pratt
were
quite
so.
Mr.
Robinson
had
many
dealings
with
Mr.
Conn
and
sold
him
some
of
the
items
which
he
subsequently
donated
and,
as
set
out
above,
at
some
prices
that
were
not
supported
by
any
comparable
sales.
Mr.
Pratt
who
was
originally
in
the
numismatic
business
sold
a
good
part
of
his
collection
to
Mr.
Conn
and
then
acted
as
Mr.
Conn's
agent
in
procuring
other
notes.
By
both
their
admissions
they
became
good
friends.
As
to
his
relationship
with
Mr.
Pratt,
Mr.
Conn
said
at
page
721
of
the
evidence
as
follows:
.
.
.
Phil
and
I
started
out
kind
of
businessy,
but
after
that
we
just
got
to
be
better
and
better
and
better
friends,
and
he
helped
me
to
no
end
to
try
and
make
this
museum
into
something.
On
commenting
on
this
relationship
counsel
for
the
respondent
directed
the
Court's
attention
to
the
U.S.
Court
of
Claims
case
of
Cecil
Blaffer
Furstenberg
and
Richard
M.
Sheridan
v.
United
States
reported
as
number
306-
74,
3/21/79.
This
was
a
valuation
case
involving
a
donation
of
an
object
of
art
and
in
the
headnote
there
is
the
following
comment:
.
the
trial
court
was
not
wrong
in
giving
little
weight
to
the
testimony
of
another
expert
art
appraiser
who
had
been
a
long-time
friend
and
business
associate
of
the
plaintiff.
Further
the
Court
stated:
The
record
indicates
that
Mr.
Samuels
and
Mrs.
Furstenberg
are
close
friends
and
long-time
business
associates.
Despite
his
considerable
experience,
therefore,
Mr.
Samuels’
valuation
must
be
substantially
discounted
because
of
his
relationship
with
Mrs.
Furstenberg.
In
defence
of
this
argument,
counsel
for
the
appellant
said
that
in
the
Furstenberg
case
that
Mr.
Samuels
was
“‘a
very
close
and
intimate
friend
of
the
taxpayer
and
had
a
very
intimate
business
relationship
with
the
taxpayer,
and
even
in
respect
to
the
painting
under
dispute."
On
reading
that
case
I
find
no
reference
to
the
allegation
that
Furstenberg
and
Samuels
were
intimate
friends
rather
that
they
were
only
long-time
friends
and
business
associates
as
set
out
from
the
quotation
in
the
headnote
above.
As
a
result
of
this
one
must
consider
the
evidence
presented
by
Mr.
Pratt.
In
the
Modern
Law
of
Evidence
by
Adrian
Keane,
1985,
he
said
of
opinion
evidence
at
page
377:
.
.
.
The
danger
is
particularly
acute
in
the
case
of
opinions
expressed
by
expert
witnesses,
of
whom
it
has
been
said,
not
without
some
sarcasm,
“‘it
is
often
quite
surprising
to
see
with
what
facility
and
to
what
extent,
their
views
can
be
made
to
correspond
with
the
wishes
or
the
interests
of
the
parties
who
call
them".
In
the
case
of
Whitehouse
v.
Jordan,
[1981]
1
W.L.R.
246
at
256;
[1981]
1
All
E.R.
267
at
276
(H.L.)
Lord
Wilberforce
said:
.
.
.
expert
evidence
presented
to
the
Court
should
be,
and
should
be
seen
to
be,
the
independent
product
of
the
expert,
uninfluenced
as
to
form
or
content
by
the
exigencies
of
litigation.
I
have
not
been
unmindful
of
the
import
of
these
quotations
and
of
the
association
of
the
two
expert
witnesses
for
the
appellant
with
him.
I
even
ask
if
there
was
any
hindsight
to
arrive
at
the
value
of
the
donation
plus
a
premium
to
agree
with
the
original
estimates?
This
goes
to
the
point
that
objectivity
is
an
important
quality
to
be
found
in
an
appraiser.
If
there
is
any
absence
or
lack
of
this
objectivity
then
the
evidence
presented
should
be
considered
carefully
and
perhaps
discounted
somewhat.
6
—
Value
of
the
Donation
It
becomes
most
difficult
to
place
a
value
on
this
donation
because
of
the
nature
of
the
subject
matter
in
the
absence
of
significant
comparables
to
establish
fair
market
price.
Certainly
supply
and
demand
have
a
bearing,
and
as
to
supply
the
factor
of
the
rarity
of
the
notes
must
be
taken
into
consideration,
tempered
by
the
condition
of
the
notes.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
referred
to
some
United
States
cases
as
there
has
not
been
a
reported
case
in
Canada
on
the
application
of
fair
market
value
for
gifts
of
objects.
These
have
been
of
some
help
as
has
already
been
illustrated.
I
do
not
intend
to
comment
further
on
the
fair
market
value
determination
as
this
has
been
dealt
with
above,
as
has
been
the
historic
value.
The
decision
not
to
place
a
premium
on
the
collection
donated,
and
my
comments
respecting
the
reliability
of
the
witnesses
are
sufficiently
set
out.
These,
coupled
with
the
fact
that
there
were
no
appraisal
reports
by
the
appellant's
experts,
no
records
produced,
no
evidence
of
any
insurance
on
the
collections,
and
the
poor
memories
of
those
involved,
have
not
made
the
task
any
easier.
The
appraisals
of
the
experts
involved
were
as
follows
exclusive
of
any
premium
value
attributed:
For
the
appellant
$345,250
by
Mr.
Robinson,
and
$351,400
by
Mr.
Pratt.
For
the
respondent
$108,500
by
Mr.
Charlton.
With
this
difference
how
does
one
find
the
elusive
truth
of
fair
market
value?
While
it
does
not
necessarily
resolve
itself
into
a
matter
of
conjecture
on
the
part
of
the
Court,
nevertheless
fixing
a
price
becomes
difficult.
As
Mr.
Robinson
said
in
his
testimony:
There
is
nobody
who
can
say
what
the
price
of
that
note
is.
There
isn’t,
there's
no
God,
there
is
nobody.
The
individual
man
who
pays
the
money
for
it,
he's
either
the
collector,
or
he’s
a
dealer,
and
if
I
buy
it,
I
have
to
know
that
I’m
going
to
make
a
profit
on
it,
or
I
wouldn’t
buy
it.
In
situations
such
as
this,
it
is
comforting
to
follow
the
comments
made
by
Mr.
Justice
Walsh,
in
Edna
I.
Bibby
v.
The
Queen,
[1983]
C.T.C.
121
at
131;
83
D.T.C.
5148
at
5157:
While
it
has
frequently
been
held
that
a
Court
should
not,
after
considering
all
the
expert
and
other
evidence
merely
adopt
a
figure
somewhere
between
the
figure
sought
by
the
contending
parties,
it
has
also
been
held
that
the
Court
may,
when
it
does
not
find
the
evidence
of
any
expert
completely
satisfying
or
conclusive,
nor
any
comparable
especially
apt,
form
its
own
opinion
of
valuation,
provided
this
is
always
based
on
the
careful
consideration
of
all
the
conflicting
evi-
dence.
The
figure
so
arrived
at
need
not
be
that
suggested
by
any
expert
or
contended
for
by
the
parties.
With
this
in
mind
and
based
on
all
the
factors
presented,
the
Court
has
reached
the
conclusion
that
the
appellant’s
estimates
were
too
high
and
that
the
respondent's
estimates
were
too
low.
The
net
result
then
is
that
the
Court
places
a
value
on
the
donation
of
the
97
bills
and
notes
as
of
November
1979
of
$200,000.
Conclusion
After
establishing
this
value
of
$200,000
the
Deputy
Registrar
of
the
Court,
as
set
out
above,
made
available
the
details
of
the
settlement
of
the
value
of
the
Byzantine
coins
which
was
a
part
of
the
donation
in
1979.
It
was
$70,000.
This
then
results
in
the
total
of
the
donation
being
$270,000.
The
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
exemption
for
the
value
of
the
donation
claimed
by
the
appellant
in
1979
be
reduced
from
$782,045
to
$270,000
and
in
1980
is
nil.
There
will
be
no
award
of
costs.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.
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