Couture,
C.J.T.C.:—In
computing
his
taxable
income
for
the
taxation
year
1981
the
appellant
deducted
an
amount
of
$1,090
under
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
109(1)(f)(i)
(as
they
were
then
in
force)
as
an
amount
expended
for
the
support
of
his
mother
who
lived
in
Tunis,
Tunisia.
It
should
be
mentioned
that
even
if
he
was
entitled
to
such
a
deduction
under
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
(i)
the
maximum
amount
that
he
could
have
deducted
was
$550
as
provided
in
subparagraph
(iv).
In
his
income
tax
return
he
indicated
that
his
mother
was
born
on
October
1,
1914.
Therefore,
she
was
67
years
old
in
1981.
However,
in
testifying
he
said
he
was
under
the
impression
that
she
was
older
than
67
and
probably
older
than
70,
but
records
whereby
her
age
could
be
accurately
ascertained
were
not
available.
According
to
his
evidence
her
health
was
good
and
that
she
did
not
suffer
from
any
particular
mental
or
physical
infirmity.
Except
for
the
fact
that
she
was
advancing
in
age
her
physical
condition
was
not
impaired
by
any
physical
or
mental
disorder
excluding
the
natural
process
of
aging.
In
support
of
his
claim
for
the
deduction
of
the
amount
of
$1,090
the
appellant
filed
as
an
exhibit
what
appeared
to
be
a
formal
document
drafted
in
Arabic
together
with
an
English
translation
which
is
captioned
“Support
Certificate”.
This
document
bears
the
signature
of
the
County
Chief
and
is
dated
January
13,
1984.
It
attests
that
the
appellant’s
mother
was
being
supported
by
her
son
Mongi
Mouehli.
I
have
no
hesitation
in
accepting
that
the
appellant
supported
his
mother
financially
and
that
she
was
relying
upon
him
for
support.
However,
in
the
light
of
the
legislation
in
force
in
1981,
did
the
appellant
meet
the
requirements
of
paragraph
109(1)(f)
on
which
he
relied
to
claim
the
deduction
which
is
the
subject
of
his
appeal?
The
paragraph
reads:
109.(1)
For
the
purpose
of
computing
the
taxable
income
of
an
individual
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
from
his
income
for
the
year
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(f)
an
amount
expended
by
the
individual
during
the
year
for
the
support
of
a
person
who,
during
the
year,
was
dependent
upon
the
individual
for
support
and
was
(i)
his
parent
or
grandparent
and
dependent
by
reason
of
mental
or
physical
infirmity.
(ii)
[not
applicable}
not
exceeding
an
amount
equal
to,
(iii)
[not
applicable]
(iv)
in
any
other
case,
$550
less
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
income
for
the
year
of
the
person
exceeds
$1,150.
Subparagraph
(i)
imposes
as
a
condition
precedent
to
the
deductibility
of
an
amount
expended
for
the
support
of
a
dependant
that
he
or
she
be
dependent
by
reason
of
mental
or
physical
infirmity.
No
evidence
was
adduced
by
the
appellant
that
his
mother
was
dependent
upon
him
by
reason
of
infirmity.
To
the
contrary
by
his
own
admission
his
mother's
health
was
good,
except
that
her
condition
apparently
reflected
her
age
with
the
limitations
imposed
upon
her
through
the
aging
process.
I
cannot
accept
that
the
mere
aging
process
per
se
may
be
characterized
as
a
physical
infirmity
within
the
meaning
that
must
be
assigned
to
this
word
in
subparagraph
(i).
The
legislators
having
decreed
that
the
deductibility
of
support
payments
for
the
purpose
of
the
Act
is
conditional
upon
the
dependant
being
afflicted
by
a
mental
or
physical
infirmity,
I
am
satisfied
that
they
intended
that
such
a
dependant
had
to
be
in
a
condition
that
impaired
him
or
her
mentally
or
physically
or
both.
I
recognize
that
age
alone
may
cause
such
a
condition,
but
age
alone
cannot
be
construed
as
an
infirmity.
I
find
support
for
this
conclusion
in
the
comments
of
the
then
Chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
in
his
judgment
in
the
appeal
of
Fouad
Zaki
v.
M.N.R.,
[1978]
C.T.C.
2843
at
2844;
78
D.T.C.
1583
at
1584:
I
am
under
the
very
strong
impression
that
section
109
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
refers
specifically
to
“his
parent
or
grandparent
and
dependent
by
reason
of
mental
or
physical
infirmity”.
This,
in
my
opinion,
goes
much
further
than
mere
old
age
at
sixty-five.
Had
she
been
ninety
or
crippled,
she
might
have
been
considered
a
dependant
under
the
Act,
but
no
evidence
has
been
offered
other
than
the
mere
fact
of
age.
To
my
mind,
this
section
of
the
Act,
which
must
be
applied
very
restrictively,
does
not
include
among
the
infirm
any
person
sixty-five
years
of
age;
therefore,
I
do
not
think
that
this
section
of
the
Act
applies
in
this
case,
and
I
am
obliged,
in
the
circumstances,
to
dismiss
the
appeal.
For
the
above
reasons
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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