Christie,
A.C.J.T.C.:—These
appeals
were
heard
together.
By
notice
of
appeal
dated
April
7,
1985,
Forest
Lane
Holdings
Limited
("Forest
Lane")
appealed
to
this
Court
regarding
its
1980,
1981
and
1982
taxation
years.
By
notice
of
appeal
of
the
same
date
Bonibo
Holdings
Limited
("Bonibo")
appealed
regarding
the
same
taxation
years.
Both
are
private
companies.
The
issue
in
each
appeal
is
the
familiar
one
of
whether
in
respect
of
their
dealings
in
the
acquisition
and
sale
of
corporate
shares
during
the
period
relevant
to
these
appeals
the
appellants’
conduct
was
that
of
traders
or
investors.
There
was
a
nil
assessment
in
respect
of
the
1982
taxation
year
of
each
appellant.
The
appeals
in
this
regard
must
therefore
be
dismissed
because
an
assessment
of
this
kind
is
not
an
"assessment"
within
the
meaning
of
section
169
of
the
Income
Tax
Act*
("the
Act’’):
Okalta
Oils
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1955]
C.T.C.
271;
55
D.T.C.
1176
(S.C.C.);
The
Queen
v.
Garry
Bowl
Limited,
[1974]
C.T.C.
457;
74
D.T.C.
6401
(F.C.A.)
and
The
Queen
v.
B.
&
J.
Music
Ltd.,
[1980]
C.T.C.
287;
80
D.T.C.
6219
(F.C.T.D.).
Nevertheless
the
issue
previously
stated
must
be
determined
in
respect
of
that
taxation
year
regarding
both
appellants
because
what
they
allege
to
be
capital
losses
in
1982
were
carried
back
to
their
1981
taxation
year.
This
is
consistent
with
Day
&
Ross
Limited
v.
The
Queen,
[1976]
C.T.C.
707;
76
D.T.C.
6433
(F.C.T.D.).
Mr.
David
J.
Hennigar
is
a
shareholder,
director
and
the
active
directing
mind
and
will
of
the
appellants.
He
is
an
entrepreneur
with
expert
knowledge
of
dealing
in
securities.
He
has
enjoyed
significant
success
in
his
business
activities.
Inter
alia,
he
is
a
director
of
ten
public
corporations,
four
subsidiaries
of
public
corporations
and
24
private
corporations
in
addition
to
the
appellants.
He
received
the
degree
of
Bachelor
of
Commerce
from
Mount
Allison
University
in
1960
and
the
degree
of
Master
of
Business
Administration
from
Queen's
University
in
1962.
He
joined
Burns
Fry
Limited,
a
national
investment
dealer
at
its
head
office
in
Toronto
on
March
1,
1963,
as
a
security
analyst.
This
involved
endeavouring
to
determine
the
merit
of
corporate
shares
as
potential
investments
for
clients.
In
June
1966
he
and
another
employee
were
sent
to
Halifax
to
open
a
branch
office.
Hennigar
was
appointed
associate
manager
and
the
following
year
he
became
manager
of
the
branch.
He
was
appointed
a
director
of
Burns
Fry
Limited
in
1972.
While
manager
he
was
engaged
in
selling
stocks,
but
by
reason
of
the
pressure
of
other
matters
he
gave
up
being
a
stockbroker
in
1978
or
1979.
He
regards
himself
as
being
an
investment
dealer
from
that
time
on.
He
remained
associated
with
Burns
Fry
Limited.
He
said
he
is
a
“value
oriented
investor".
He
has
never
sold
short
or
bought
on
margin.
Nor
has
he
ever
written
a
naked
call
or
put
option
or
indulged
in
trading
in
commodities.
He
has
written
covered
options,
i.e.,
option
contracts
where
he
held
the
shares
underlying
the
option.
Naked
options
are
generally
recognized
in
the
securities
field
as
involving
considerable
risk.
On
the
other
hand,
the
witness
said
that
“by
and
large,
approximately
85
per
cent
of
all
options
that
are
written
against
an
underlying
position
tend
to
expire
unexercised."
Although
he
has,
over
the
years,
had
recourse
to
bank
loans
Hennigar
has
been
careful
in
this
regard
not
to
assume
burdens
of
debt
he
cannot
comfortably
manage.
Forest
Lane
was
incorporated
in
1977
and
Bonibo
about
a
year
later.
Two
reasons
were
given
for
this.
First,
to
avoid
the
problems
encountered
by
estates
in
transferring
ownership
of
American
securities
previously
owned
by
the
deceased.
By
way
of
example
it
was
said
that
if
an
estate
includes
stocks
in
American
railway
companies,
a
release
must
be
secured
from
officials
of
every
state
in
which
the
railway
operates.
Second,
Hennigar
desired
to
"build,
hopefully,
some
equity
for
my
wife
and
my
two
children".
Mrs.
Hennigar
is
a
shareholder
of
both
appellants
and
the
Hennigar
children
are
shareholders
of
Bonibo.
The
witness
testified
that
he
is
not
a
trader
in
securities
nor
are
the
appellants.
He
described
the
performance
of
the
stock
market
during
the
time
(b)
90
days
have
elapsed
after
service
of
the
notice
of
objection
and
the
Minister
has
not
notified
the
taxpayer
that
he
has
vacated
or
confirmed
the
assessment
or
reassessed;
but
no
appeal
under
this
section
may
be
instituted
after
the
expiration
of
90
days
from
the
day
notice
has
been
mailed
to
the
taxpayer
under
section
165
that
the
Minister
has
confirmed
the
assessment
or
reassessed.
relevant
to
these
appeals
as
one
of
its
“most
unique
periods”.
This
was
precipitated
by
take-over
activities
which
commenced
about
1978
in
the
Canadian
market.
By
1980
“take-over
fever”
had
set
in.
In
support
of
this,
evidence
was
adduced
that
traced
rises
and
falls
in
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
index
and
volumes
traded
during
the
period
1971
to
1982.
Also
a
comparison
of
annual
volumes
traded
on
that
Exchange
during
the
period
1971
to
1978
with
volumes
traded
during
the
period
1979
to
1982
shows
a
very
significant
increase
during
the
latter.
The
phrase
“extraordinarily
volatile”
was
employed
by
Hennigar
to
characterize
the
market.
It
was
said
that
the
appellants’
acquisition
and
sale
of
shares
simply
reflected
that
condition.
He
added:
“If
one
were
to
look
at
the
history
of
those
companies
(the
appellants)
subsequent
to
that
period
of
time
the
‘trading
activity’,
so-called
has
declined
very
remarkably,
very
substantially.
It
tends
to
follow
the
level
of
activity
in
the
marketplace.”
A
record
prepared
under
the
direction
of
Hennigar
of
the
appellants’
dealing
in
securities
during
the
period
February
1,
1979,
to
January
31,
1982,
is
in
evidence.
It
consists
of
several
pages
of
detailed
information,
the
reproduction
of
which
in
these
reasons
I
do
not
regard
as
necessary.
I
shall
indicate
in
abated
form
what
is
salient
therein.
This
evidence
divides
the
transactions
into
three
components
in
respect
of
each
appellant:
(1)
shares
held
under
six
months,
(2)
shares
held
from
six
months
to
one
year
and
(3)
shares
held
in
excess
of
one
year.
In
addition
there
is
in
evidence
a
statement
showing
the
portfolio
of
each
appellant
as
at
January
31,
1982.
All
shares
dealt
with
are
shares
of
public
corporations,
many
of
which
are
prominent
in
the
world
of
Canadian
business.
With
respect
to
Forest
Lane
the
first
category
shows
that
36,849
shares
were
sold.
Shares
of
27
corporations
were
involved.
The
total
cost*
of
the
shares
was
$758,694.13.
They
were
held
for
periods
ranging
from
one
day
to
five
months
and
27
days.
On
average
the
period
of
retention
was
one
month
and
23
days.
There
were
11,000
shares
sold
in
the
second
category.
Shares
of
ten
corporations
were
involved.
The
total
cost
was
$151,500.15.
The
shares
were
held
for
periods
ranging
from
six
months
to
eleven
months
and
three
days.
On
average
the
period
of
retention
was
eight
months.
There
were
9,450
shares
sold
in
the
third
category.
Shares
of
twelve
corporations
were
involved.
The
shares
cost
$112,138.21.
They
were
held
for
periods
ranging
from
one
year
to
two
years
and
nine
months.
On
average
the
period
of
retention
was
one
year
and
eight
months.
As
at
January
31,
1982,
Forest
Lane’s
portfolio
consisted
of
a
total
of
17,414
shares
of
nine
corporations
that
cost
$52,731.59.
The
shares
had
been
held
for
periods
ranging
from
three
months
and
nine
days
to
29
months
and
nine
days.
The
average
period
of
retention
was
one
year
and
four
months.
With
respect
to
Bonibo,
the
first
category
shows
that
18,065
shares
were
sold.
Shares
of
19
corporations
were
involved.
The
total
cost
of
the
shares
was
$460,460.15.
They
were
held
for
periods
ranging
from
one
day
to
five
months
and
six
days.
On
average
the
period
of
retention
was
one
month
and
24
days.
On
average
the
period
of
retention
was
one
month
and
24
days.
There
were
6,650
shares
sold
in
the
second
category.
Shares
of
six
corporations
were
involved.
The
total
cost
of
the
shares
was
$132,743.18.
They
were
held
for
periods
ranging
from
six
months
and
27
days
to
nine
months.
The
average
period
of
retention
was
seven
months
and
26
days.
There
were
12,800
shares
sold
in
the
third
category.
They
related
to
two
corporations.
The
shares
cost
$41,316.39.
They
were
held
for
periods
ranging
from
one
year
and
one
month
to
one
year,
four
months
and
24
days.
The
average
period
of
retention
was
one
year,
two
months
and
27
days.
As
at
January
31,
1982,
Bonibo’s
portfolio
consisted
of
a
total
of
18,260
shares
of
ten
corporations
that
cost
$66,093.58.
The
shares
had
been
held
for
periods
ranging
from
one
month
and
18
days
to
two
years,
nine
months
and
21
days.
The
average
period
of
retention
was
12
months
and
29
days.
In
the
documents,
reasons
were
given
for
each
sale.
Among
the
most
common
related
to
take-overs,
a
quick
change
in
price
and
that
potential
was
believed
to
have
been
reached.
Exhibits
show
this
relationship
respectively
between
dividend
income
of
Forest
Lane
and
gain
(or
loss)
on
dispositions
of
shares:
1979
—
$394.50,
$8,034.48;
1980
—
$6,953.14,
$40,978.40;
1981
—
$4,732.89,
$64,260.79
and
1982
—
$2,780.43,
($29,823.21).
The
same
numbers
for
Bonibo
are:
1980
—
$3,594.36,
$9,598.89;
1981
—
$3,321.71,
$40,472.76
and
1982
—
$3,836.85,
($17,551.75).
It
has
been
said
many
times
that
the
determination
of
whether
a
transaction
or
a
number
of
transactions
involves
capital
gain
or
loss
versus
business
income
or
loss
depends
on
the
particular
facts
of
each
case.
This
passage
from
the
reasons
for
judgment
in
Leonard
Reeves
Incorporated
v.
M.N.R.,
[1985]
2
C.T.C.
2054
at
2058;
85
D.T.C.
419
at
422
is
apt
regarding
Hennigar's
assertion
that
the
appellants
were
not
traders.
The
direct
evidence
of
a
person
who
has
an
interest
in
the
outcome
of
an
appeal
regarding
the
intention
behind
a
transaction
or
series
of
transactions
is
not
determinative
of
the
existence
of
the
stated
intention.
Generally
speaking
the
intention
is
to
be
ascertained
from
the
entire
course
of
conduct
and
relevant
circumstances
and
the
inferences
flowing
therefrom:
Gairdner
Securities
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1952]
C.T.C.
371;
52
D.T.C.
1171
per
Cameron,
J.
at
381
(D.T.C.
1175)
and
Racine
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1965]
C.T.C.
150;
65
D.T.C.
5098
per
Noel,
J.
at
159
(D.T.C.
5103).
When
the
issue
of
capital
gain
or
business
income
is
involved
in
relation
to
the
purchase
and
sale
of
corporate
shares
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Irrigation
Industries
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1962]
C.T.C.
215;
62
D.T.C.
1131,
is
almost
invariably
referred
to.
It
involved
an
isolated
purchase
and
sale
at
a
profit
of
shares
of
a
mining
corporation.
It
was
held
that
on
the
facts
the
transaction
was
not
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
consequently
the
profit
was
a
capital
gain.
In
speaking
for
the
majority
of
the
Court
Mr.
Justice
Martland
said
at
220-21
(D.T.C.
1133-34):
The
nature
of
the
property
in
question
here
is
shares
issued
from
the
treasury
of
a
corporation
and
we
have
not
been
referred
to
any
reported
case
in
which
profit
from
one
isolated
purchase
and
sale
of
shares,
by
a
person
not
engaged
in
the
business
of
trading
in
securities,
has
been
claimed
to
be
taxable.
Cases
in
which
the
nature
and
quantity
of
the
property
purchased
and
sold
have
indicated
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
include
C./.R.
v.
Livingston
(1926),
11
T.C.
538
(a
cargo
vessel);
Rutledge
v.
C.I.R.
(1929),
14
T.C.
490
(a
large
quantity
of
toilet
paper);
Lindsay
v.
C.I.R.
(1932),
18
T.C.
43,
and
C.I.R.
v.
Fraser
(1942),
24
T.C.
498
(a
large
quantity
of
whisky);
Edwards
v.
Bairstow,
[1956]
A.C.
14
(a
complete
spinning
plant)
and
Regal
Heights
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1960]
S.C.R.
902;
[1960]
C.T.C.
384
(40
acres
of
vacant
city
land).
Corporate
shares
are
in
a
different
position
because
they
constitute
something
the
purchase
of
which
is,
in
itself,
an
investment.
They
are
not,
in
themselves,
articles
of
commerce,
but
represent
an
interest
in
a
corporation
which
is
itself
created
for
the
purpose
of
doing
business.
Their
acquisition
is
a
well
recognized
method
of
investing
capital
in
a
business
enterprise.
Bearing
in
mind
that
shares
in
a
corporation
are
in
a
different
position
for
present
purposes
from
some
other
kinds
of
property,
I
am
nevertheless,
after
having
considered
the
various
relevant
indicia
revealed
by
the
whole
of
the
evidence,
left
with
the
conviction
that
the
appellants’
dealings
in
corporate
shares
constituted
a
business
within
the
definition
of
that
word
in
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Act.
It
follows
that
the
gains
and
losses
therefrom
were
not
capital
gains
and
losses
as
advocated
on
behalf
of
the
appellants.
The
entire
pattern
of
their
conduct
is
consistent
with
trading
as
opposed
to
investment.
I
refer
in
particular
to
the
time-frames
between
acquisition
and
sale;
the
volume
of
sales
involved
in
relation
to
periods
of
retention,
the
reasons
assigned
for
disposition
and
the
comparison
between
reported
dividend
income
and
gains
(losses)
on
the
sale
of
shares.
The
acquisitions
and
sales
of
capital
stock
were
not
merely
incidental
to
a
primary
investment
purpose;
they
were
an
essential
feature
of
the
appellants’
businesses.
I
find
nothing
in
the
evidence
regarding
the
conduct
of
the
appellants
that
can
be
regarded
as
incompatible
with
what
a
knowledgeable,
prudent
stockbroker
and
admitted
trader
in
corporate
shares
on
his
own
account
would
have
done.
As
previously
mentioned,
Hennigar
assigned
two
reasons
for
the
incorporation
of
the
appellants.
The
first
pertaining
to
facilitating
the
transfer
of
American
securities
is,
of
course,
irrelevant
to
what
is
in
issue
on
these
appeals.
The
second,
being
his
desire
to
build
some
equity
for
his
family,
is
not
inconsistent
with
the
appellants
carrying
on
a
business
of
trading
in
securities.
While
they
are
seeking
to
be
treated
as
investors
in
relation
to
these
appeals,
their
carrying
on
as
traders
could
well
result
in
the
realization
of
what
motivated
their
creation
even
though
this
may
involve
payment
of
more
tax
than
otherwise
might
be
the
case.
In
the
light
of
the
foregoing,
these
appeals
cannot
succeed
and
accordingly
they
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.