Couture,
C.J.T.C.:βThe
appellant
appeals
from
assessments
made
on
October
5,
1983
in
respect
of
his
1978,1979
and
1980
taxation
years.
A
number
of
matters
that
were
in
dispute
have
been
disposed
of
by
agreement
between
the
parties.
The
only
question
left
is
whether
the
appellant
had
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
from
the
leasing
of
a
property
he
owned
in
Florida.
If
the
answer
is
yes
he
is
entitled
to
deduct
the
losses
he
incurred
from
this
activity
during
his
1978,
1979
and
1980
taxation
years.
If
the
answer
is
no
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
These
are
the
salient
facts.
In
January
1978
the
appellant,
a
physician
who
practised
in
Toronto,
purchased
a
semi-detached
house
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
"the
property")
on
Stonybrook
Drive
in
Boynton
Beach,
Florida.
Stonybrook
Drive
is
located
some
seven
miles
inland
from
the
Atlantic
Ocean.
The
appellant
testified
that
his
purpose
in
making
this
acquisition
was
to
secure
an
income-producing
investment.
He
said
that
he
was
not
interested
in
the
securities
market
and
regarded
real
estate
as
better
suited
for
his
investment
objectives.
In
1975
he
had
purchased
a
triplex
in
Toronto
that
he
still
owned
at
the
time
of
the
hearing
as
part
of
a
real
estate
investment
portfolio.
According
to
the
information
in
a
capital
cost
allowance
schedule
filed
with
his
income
tax
returns
for
the
taxation
years
under
appeal
the
price
of
the
building
excluding
land
was
$94,478.
After
the
sale
of
the
property
in
1980
he
purchased
other
real
estate
in
Toronto
as
a
revenue
yielding
investment
at
a
cost
of
$260,000
which
amount
also
did
not
take
into
account
the
cost
of
the
land.
The
appellant
reported
net
professional
income
for
the
taxation
years
under
review
of
$156,108,
$161,120
and
$173,509
respectively.
It
appears
that
his
decision
to
invest
in
Boynton
Beach
was
influenced
by
a
friend
of
his
who
had
purchased
some
property
there,
and
also
by
the
sales
pitch
of
the
sales
agent
of
the
contractor
who
was
developing
the
area
where
the
property
is.
The
appellant
was
informed
at
the
time
by
the
agent
that
there
would
be
no
difficulty
in
renting
the
property.
He
had
also
visited
the
area
a
couple
of
years
before
and
was
familiar
with
it.
From
the
appellant's
description
of
the
property
it
seems
that
he
was
justified
in
relying
on
the
agent's
representations
regarding
the
prospect
of
easily
renting
the
property.
It
was
located
in
a
very
attractive
area
along
a
golf
course
where
the
price
of
houses
ranged
between
$70,000
and
$90,000.
At
the
time
there
were
also
large
houses
in
the
$300,000
to
$400,000
class
being
built
on
the
fairways.
The
appellant
paid
$80,000
for
the
property.
Additionally
there
was
a
completed
development
across
the
road
from
the
development
that
included
the
appellant's
property.
The
homes
there
were
at
the
time
continually
totally
rented.
Therefore
to
the
appellant
the
financial
prospect
of
his
proposed
investment
appeared
quite
favourable.
The
agent
suggested
a
rent
of
$500
a
week
or
$1,000
a
month
for
a
long-term
lease.
Early
in
1978
the
appellant
furnished
the
house
at
a
cost
of
some
$15,000
and
made
arrangements
for
its
maintenance
throughout
the
year.
A
gardener
was
hired
who
in
addition
to
his
other
duties
was
responsible
for
security.
In
spite
of
the
sales
agent's
assurances
and
the
appellant's
own
conclusions
regarding
the
possibility
of
renting
the
property,
it
was
leased
sparingly
during
the
period
from
January
1978
to
May
1980
when
it
was
sold.
In
1978
the
appellant
and
his
wife
occupied
the
house
for
two
weeks
and
later
for
an
additional
week.
This
was
for
the
purpose
of
furnishing
the
house.
In
his
records
regarding
the
property,
$1,500
in
rent
is
attributed
to
these
three
weeks
and
was
declared
as
income
from
that
source.
The
appellant
informed
the
Court
that
his
wife
did
not
enjoy
Florida.
The
property
could
not
be
considered
as
a
vacation
retreat
because
she
refused
to
holiday
there.
He
also
succeeded
in
renting
the
property
for
another
month
in
that
year
for
$1,000.
The
total
rental
from
the
property
in
1978
was
$2,500.
In
1979
the
appellant
rented
the
property
from
December
15,
1978
to
April
15,
1979
for
which
he
received
$4,000.
Because
of
the
failure
of
the
sales
agent
in
Boynton
Beach
to
rent
the
property
the
appellant
had
his
secretary
place
ads
in
Toronto
newspapers
advertising
the
availability
of
the
property
for
rent,
but
again
without
success.
At
the
end
of
1978,
Cadillac
Fairview
acquired
the
development
where
the
property
was
and
began
constructing
houses.
As
the
number
of
houses
increased
the
opportunity
to
rent
the
property
decreased.
The
appellant
realized
that
he
was
involved
in
a
losing
proposition,
that
the
glowing
image
that
had
been
projected
to
him
respecting
the
financial
soundness
of
his
investment
was
superficial
and
its
lustre
was
fading
as
time
went
by.
He
listed
the
property
for
sale
in
May
1979
and
it
was
sold
in
1980
for
$115,000.
Prior
to
purchasing
the
property
the
appellant
consulted
his
accountant
who
made
some
projections
based
on
certain
assumed
facts,
and
advised
him
that
there
was
a
possibility
of
realizing
a
profit
in
the
third
year
of
operation.
The
accountant,
Leo
Vinette
CA,
testified
on
behalf
of
the
appellant.
He
confirmed
that
from
the
information
he
obtained
from
his
client
he
had
projected
that
as
soon
as
the
property
was
rented
for
a
minimum
of
30
weeks
in
a
year
the
excess
would
be
profit,
that
is,
anything
over
$15,000
in
rental
income
would
give
rise
to
a
profit.
He
also
asserted,
again
based
on
the
information
available
at
the
time,
that
he
thought
the
proposed
acquisition
by
his
client
was,
to
use
his
words,
a
fair
investment
and
he
so
informed
his
client.
The
appellant
claimed
deductions
for
these
losses
in
the
taxation
years
under
appeal:
1978β
$16,272.49
1979β
$12,369.32
1980β
$17,759.44
Vinette
was
fairly
close
to
the
reality
in
his
projections,
considering
the
above
losses
and
particularly
the
fact
that
the
appellant
had
to
borrow
an
additional
$15,000
to
satisfy
a
mortgage
on
the
land
the
existence
of
which
was
unknown
at
the
time
of
his
computations
of
the
operating
costs
of
the
property.
It
was
only
discovered
when
Cadillac
Fairview
acquired
the
development
at
the
end
of
1978.
As
indicated
at
the
commencement
of
these
reasons
the
question
that
must
be
answered
is
whether
under
the
circumstances
I
have
described
the
purchase
of
the
property
by
the
appellant
offered
him
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
Dickson
J.
(as
he
then
was)
in
William
Moldowan
v.
The
Queen,
[1977]
C.T.C.
310;
77
D.T.C.
5213
said
at
313
(D.T.C.
5215):
There
is
a
vast
case
literature
on
what
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
means
and
it
is
by
no
means
consistent.
In
my
view,
whether
a
taxpayer
has
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
is
an
objective
determination
to
be
made
from
all
the
facts.
I
understand
this
to
mean
that
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
exists
where
given
all
the
facts
pertinent
to
a
venture
it
could,
within
a
realistic
time
(the
period
will
vary
depending
on
the
nature
of
the
operation),
yield
a
profit
barring
abnormal
circumstances.
In
other
words,
is
the
venture
as
structured
and
normally
operated
capable
of
generating
a
profit?
In
a
number
of
appeals
reported
in
the
jurisprudence
the
Courts
answered
no
to
this
question
because
the
venture
that
was
the
object
of
the
litigation
could
not,
in
the
opinion
of
the
Court,
achieve
that
objective
for
a
number
of
reasons,
but
mainly
because
the
likelihood
of
its
being
financially
successful
was
only
a
dream
in
the
mind
of
the
operator
and
rested
entirely
on
his
subjective
aspirations
and
hopes
which
were
unrealistic.
In
the
present
appeal,
it
appears
to
me
that
the
appellant
conducted
himself
like
a
normal
average
investor,
an
investor
who
was
not
sophisticated
because
of
lack
of
professional
training,
but
who
nonetheless
had
a
working
knowledge
of
the
basic
rules
of
the
investment
process.
He
knew
the
area
where
the
property
was
located.
He
had
received
assurances
from
the
real
estate
agent
that
there
would
not
be
any
problem
renting
the
property
throughout
the
year
and
furthermore
the
agent
had
indicated
the
rent
that
could
be
obtained.
Being
familiar
with
the
area
and
with
the
situation
with
regard
to
the
development
across
the
road,
he
regarded
the
proposal
as
reasonable.
Also
before
buying
the
property
he
had
consulted
his
accountant.
Of
course,
risks
are
inherent
in
most
business
undertakings
of
the
kind
under
discussion.
The
key
feature
of
the
appellant's
financial
success
with
regard
to
his
investment
was
the
requirement
of
a
30-week
minimum
occupancy,
a
minimum
which
I
do
not
regard
excessive
in
the
circumstances.
The
fact
that
the
rental
projections
did
not
materialize,
which
was
the
main
and
only
cause
of
the
failure
of
the
venture
certainly
cannot
be
imputed
to
the
appellant.
It
was
simply
part
of
the
risk
related
to
the
venture.
The
fact
that
the
existence
of
a
mortgage
on
the
land
was
discovered
over
a
year
after
the
appellant
acquired
the
property
was
a
contributing
factor
to
the
failure
of
the
venture.
That
the
appellant
did
not
obtain
independent
legal
advice
with
regard
to
the
title
to
his
property
may
indicate
a
lack
of
prudence
on
his
part,
but
in
spite
of
the
added
financial
burden
created
by
the
mortgage,
it
was
not
of
sufficient
importance
to
displace
the
presence
of
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
The
appeals
for
the
1978,
1979
and
1980
taxation
years
are
allowed
and
the
assessments
are
referred
back
to
the
respondent
so
that
an
amount
of
$1,200
of
bank
interest
be
deducted
in
computing
the
appellant's
income
for
the
1980
taxation
year
and
also
that
losses
amounting
to
$16,272.49,
$12,369.32
and
$17,759.44
for
the
1978,
1979
and
1980
taxation
years
respectively
be
allowed
in
the
same
computation
of
income.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
costs
on
a
party-party
basis.
Appeals
allowed.