Taylor,
T.C.J.:—These
are
appeals
heard
in
Ottawa,
Ontario,
on
May
20
and
21,
1987,
against
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1978,
1979,
1980,
1981
and
1982,
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
increased
the
reported
fair
market
value
of
certain
properties,
sold
by
the
appellant.
The
essential
portions
of
the
notice
of
appeal
are:
—
In
1974
.
.
.
a
property
was
acquired
by
the
taxpayer.
—
A
home
was
constructed
on
the
.
.
.
property
and
this
home
was
rented
to
the
Company
President.
—
In
approximately
1978,
the
taxpayer
had
the
.
.
.
property
subdivided
for
the
purpose
of
constructing
homes
on
the
vacant
land.
—
Commencing
in
1978,
the
taxpayer
sold
certain
of
the
newly
constructed
homes
on
an
arm's
length
basis.
—
In
1981,
the
taxpayer
sold
one
of
the
newly
subdivided
lots
to
the
Company
President's
son
(for
$10,000).
An
appraisal
from
a
duly
qualified
appraiser
indicated
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
lot
at
the
time
of
disposition
was
$15,000.00.
Revenue
Canada
subsequently
appraised
the
property
at
$25,000.00
as
of
the
date
of
disposition
and
reassessed
the
taxpayer
on
this
basis.
—
In
1982
the
home
constructed
on
the
.
.
.
property
which
had
been
rented
by
the
Company
President
was
transferred
to
his
wife
for
a
price
of
$140,000.00.
The
taxpayer
obtained
an
appraisal
indicating
that
the
fair
market
value
as
of
the
date
of
disposition
was
$139,000.00.
With
regard
to
the
sale
in
1981
(supra)
the
Minister
contended:
—
.
.
.
the
fair
market
value
of
the
lot
was
$25,000.00
at
the
time
of
the
disposition.
Equally
with
regard
to
the
1982
sale
(supra)
the
Minister
contended
—
.
.
.
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
was
$200,000.00
as
of
the
date
of
disposition.
The
appellant
provided
the
Court
with
testimonies
from
Mr.
David
Patrick
Reid,
son
of
the
president
of
the
Company;
Mr.
Dan
J.
Gary
MacDonald,
independent
appraiser;
and
Mr.
Charles
Stanley
Reid,
president
of
the
Corporation.
For
the
Minister,
Mr.
Bernard
Patrick
Murphy,
appraiser
with
Revenue
Canada,
presented
his
report.
Analysis
The
appeals
cannot
be
dealt
with
simply
on
the
basis
of
whether
the
appellant
completely
substantiated
its
valuation
of
$140,000
for
Lot
#1
and
$15,000
for
Lot
#7.
I
do
agree
with
the
judgment
in
Dubbel
Wear
Holdings
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1981]
C.T.C.
2348;
81
D.T.C.
351,
wherein
on
page
2350
(D.T.C.
353)
it
states:
The
onus
in
an
appeal
such
as
this
is
on
the
appellant.
It
is
not
enough
for
the
appellant
simply
to
attempt
to
cast
doubt
on
the
value
used
on
assessment.
In
order
to
succeed
the
appellant
must
affirmatively
establish,
on
the
balance
of
probabilities,
that
the
value
used
by
the
Minister
is
too
low
and
he
must
show,
with
some
degree
of
accuracy,
by
how
much.
Similar
sentiments
were
expressed
in
Eric
W.
Lewis
v.
M.N.R.,
[1983]
C.T.C.
2122
at
2124;
83
D.T.C.
104
at
105:
.
.
.
As
I
see
it,
the
appellant
has
failed
to
establish
even
a
prima
facie
case
for
the
valuation
he
used
in
filing
his
tax
return
for
the
year
of
$375,000,
and
certainly
not
for
the
$416,000
estimate
suggested
by
his
appraiser,
or
any
figure
remotely
approaching
either
one
of
them
.
In
this
matter,
while
the
appellant's
appraisal
report
was
insufficient
in
itself
to
fulfill
the
appellant’s
responsibilities
(see
later),
when
taken
in
the
context
of
the
testimony
of
Mr.
Charles
Stanley
Reid,
president
of
the
Corporation,
there
was
[sic]
good
reasons
advanced
to
look
carefully
at
the
appellant's
contentions.
I
shall
deal
with
Lot
#1
first,
for
reasons
which
will
become
obvious.
The
appraisal
reports
presented
by
Mr.
MacDonald
—
Exhibit
A-1
—
and
by
Mr.
Murphy
—
Exhibit
R-2
—
have
much
in
common
with
regard
to
valuing
the
building
on
Lot
#1.
In
general
the
methodology
of
each
(while
different)
is
acceptable,
along
with
relevant
supporting
documentation
and
testimony.
I
would
however
comment
that
I
do
not
consider
the
“appraisal
report"
prepared
and
presented
by
Mr.
MacDonald
alone
as
being
acceptable
—
in
fact
I
do
not
consider
it
to
be
an
appraisal
report,
it
is
merely
an
opinion
—
an
expert
opinion
perhaps,
but
nevertheless
just
an
opinion
as
I
see
it,
which
is
quite
different
from
a
professional
appraisal
report.
When
related
back
to
its
source
data
—
the
calculations
presented
on
Exhibits
A-5
and
A-6,
and
reliance
placed
therein
the
appraisal
report
does
have
substance.
In
general,
the
approach
used
by
Mr.
MacDonald
for
the
building
was
to
select
four
sales
as
"comparables"
and
make
adjustments
to
the
known
selling
prices
of
each
of
these
"comparables"
to
produce
an
amount
in
each
case
which
he
could
reference
as
that
for
which
the
subject
property
should
have
sold
at
the
critical
date.
The
first
three
of
these
"comparables"
were
in
another
subdivision
"Dochart
Estates"
—
by
any
reasonable
standards
one
of
lesser
quality,
restrictions
and
environment
then
“Old
Orchard
Estates",
in
which
the
subject
was
located.
The
selling
prices
of
these
three
selected
sales
were
respectively
$62,000,
$90,000
and
$87,000
—
including
the
land,
which
Mr.
MacDonald
understood
to
have
been
available
at
$15,000
for
each
two-acre
subdivided
lot
in
Dochart
Estates.
Mr.
MacDonald's
attempts
to
bridge
this
price
differential
(by
calculated
adjustments)
were
subject
to
substantial
criticism,
but
the
deficiencies
in
carrying
out
his
methodology
were
most
noticeable
in
two
specific
very
important
areas
of
these
adjustments
—
notably
those
for
difference
in
size
(square
feet
of
living
space);
and
for
relative
quality
of
the
buidings
—
inferior
or
similar.
With
regard
to
the
first
noted
deficiency,
the
evidence
from
Mr.
David
Reid,
a
witness
who
was
an
engineer,
indicated
that
relative
costs
for
buildings
was
estimated
at
$50
per
square
foot
for
larger
buildings,
$52
per
square
foot
for
smaller
buildings.
Both
Mr.
Murphy
and
Mr.
MacDonald
seemed
to
agree
with
this
in
general,
but
Mr.
MacDonald
did
not
follow
it
in
his
report
as
I
see
it.
I
did
not
find
any
support
for
MacDonald's
clearly
expressed
view
that
the
total
costs
of
houses
of
similar
quality
decreased
dramatically
as
the
square
footage
of
the
house
increased
—
in
other
words
if
a
house
of
1200
square
feet
cost
$60,000
to
construct
(at
$50
per
square
foot),
a
house
of
2400
square
feet
would
not
cost
something
close
to
$120,000
to
construct
(according
to
Mr.
MacDonald's
view)
but
perhaps
something
closer
to
$75,000
to
construct.
I
shall
deal
with
the
#2
comparable
presented
by
Mr.
MacDonald
as
an
example
—
favoured
by
him
as
the
best
comparable.
Mr.
MacDonald
considered
the
building
on
#2
to
be
valued
at
$75,000
($90,000
=
$15,000
for
land)
and
since
it
contained
only
1400
square
feet
of
space
he
added
on
15
per
cent
to
make
it
comparable
to
the
subject
property
which
had
2150
square
feet
—
an
addition
of
$11,300.
In
my
view,
there
was
no
reasonable
basis
supplied
to
the
Court
by
Mr.
MacDonald
which
should
deter
an
appraiser
from
increasing
the
$75,000
amount
above
(#2)
by
50
per
cent
for
this
factor
alone,
an
amount
of
as
much
as
$37,500,
thereby
increasing
Mr.
MacDonald's
building
estimates
by
a
further
$26,200.
On
the
“quality”
point
above
Mr.
MacDonald
regarded
#2
and
the
subject
property
as
similar.
From
my
review
of
the
description
provided
of
the
properties
during
the
hearing,
an
increase
of
at
least
10
per
cent
possibly
20
per
cent
for
overall
better
quality
in
the
subject
would
not
be
unreasonable
—
at
least
$11,250
(10
per
cent
of
$75,000
#
$37,500).
Without
even
considering
other
factors,
that
would
increase
Mr.
MacDonald's
comparable
building
estimate
of
$110,400
to
$159,150
even
using
Mr.
MacDonald's
own
value
of
the
land
at
the
subject
property
of
$27,000.
That
would
bring
his
estimate
to
$186,150
—
not
too
distant
from
the
Minister's
appraisal.
I
shall
leave
comments
about
the
"land"
value
question
for
later
in
this
decision.
Mr.
MacDonald
also
provided
as
“comparable”
the
sale
of
a
property
right
in
the
same
subdivision
—
Old
Orchard
Estates
as
his
#4,
but
in
my
view
a
similar
critical
examination
of
the
adjustments
made
in
his
report,
would
show
the
same
general
magnitude
of
differential.
Simply
put,
Mr.
MacDonald's
appraisal
report
—
at
least
as
it
refers
to
the
nature
of
the
buildings
on
the
subject
property
—
does
not
support
the
contention
of
the
appellant,
but
rather
goes
some
considerable
distance
toward
substantiating
the
Minister's
value.
I
would
quote
for
the
record,
the
concluding
portion
of
each
report:
Mr.
MacDonald
—
Sales
were
in
the
range
of
$62,000
to
$139,000.
The
lowest
is
not
a
good
comparable,
being
much
smaller,
with
few
extras.
It
does,
however,
indicate
a
typical
price
for
a
standard
home
in
the
area,
on
a
2
acre
lot.
Hence,
the
range
narrows
from
$87,000
to
$139,000.
Sale
#3
although
large,
with
extra
plumbing,
basement
finish,
2
car
garage
2
acre
lot
is
of
inferior
quality.
Sale
#2,
is
similar
quality,
with
extra
plumbing,
full
basement
finish,
fireplace,
double
garage,
and
central
air
conditioning.
At
time
of
sale
it
was
10%
unfinished
and
subsequently
may
have
sold
for
$100,000
plus.
Sale
#4
the
passive
solar
heated
home
had
similar
size,
location
and
quality
as
that
of
the
subject.
It
had
extra
plumbing,
double
garage,
heat
pump,
vacuum
system,
fireplace
and
part
basement
finish.
Due
to
its
design,
the
windows
were
superior
quality
to
that
of
the
subject.
Lot
size
is
smaller.
Taking
these
sales
into
consideration,
it
is
estimated
that
as
of
the
date
of
the
appraisal
(January
01
1982)
the
subject
property
had
a
market
value
of
approximately
ONE
HUNDRED
AND
THIRTY
EIGHT
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
($138,000.00)
Mr.
Murphy
In
summary,
we
have
obtained
the
following
value
indicators,
as
of
February
1,
1982
for
the
property
under
appraisal:
Depreciated
Value
Estimate
of
$204,000.00
New
construction
equivalent
purchase
prices
ranging
from
$151,400.00
to
$214,000.00.
Market
comparisons
of
new
and
relatively
new
housing
stock
indicate
the
subject
would
sell
in
a
range
from
$176,100.00
to
$205,700.00.
From
all
the
evidence
analyzed
herein,
it
is
the
opinion
of
this
appraiser
that
as
of
February
1,
1982
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
under
appraisal
would
realistically
be
$200,000.00.
Allocation
of
this
is
considered
to
be:
Land
Value
|
$
76,500.00
|
Value
of
Improvements
|
123,500.00
|
Total
Value
|
200,000.00
|
There
is
little
reason
to
seriously
question
any
of
the
methodology
used
by
Mr.
Murphy
in
arriving
at
four
separate
“building”
valuations
for
Lot
#1
from
the
comparables
used
—
of
$135,600,
$99,620,
$114,171,
$129,194.
The
average
valuation
for
the
buildings
(per
Mr.
Murphy)
I
would
calculate
from
the
above
at
$119,646.
Mr.
Murphy
also
supplied
background
data
(Analyses
from
a
computer
program
available
to
Revenue
Canada)
in
support
of
his
alternate
valuations
of
"Depreciated
Value
Estimate
of
$204,000.00”
and
"New
Construction
equivalent
purchase
price
ranging
from
$151,400.06
to
$214,000.00”.
From
these
amounts
and
analyses,
the
“building”
segment
valuations
would
have
been
$127,400
(depreciated
value)
and
$153,207
(new
construction
equivalent).
I
frankly
have
some
reservations
about
these
computer
produced
valuations
(perhaps
only
because
they
were
not
as
familiar
to
me
as
the
“comparable”
approach),
and
to
his
credit,
Mr.
Murphy
did
not
rely
upon
them
too
heavily,
but
he
did
consider
them
in
arriving
at
his
final
valuations.
Since
they
both
produce
“building”
valuation
amounts
higher
than
the
“comparable”
approach
I
have
decided
to
leave
them
out
of
this
review
—
and
rely
more
on
Mr.
Murphy's
average
of
$119,646.
(supra),
recognizing
that
Mr.
MacDonald's
amount
of
$110,400
(supra)
is
too
low
(see
above).
Turning
then
to
the
land
question
(for
Lot
#1
again
only).
Mr.
MacDonald
simply
took
the
$15,000
per
two-acre
lot
value
for
Dochart
Estates,
and
added
an
estimated
$12,000
to
it,
totalling
$27,000
which
he
regarded
as
the
lot
value
at
the
subject
property.
In
the
case
of
his
comparable
#4
—
referred
to
above
as
another
property
in
Old
Orchard
Estates,
Mr.
MacDonald
arrived
at
a
figure
of
$28,500,
but
I
do
not
think
that
difference
is
significant
—
both
are
much
too
low
for
the
reasons
given
later.
For
the
land
value
we
do
turn
to
Mr.
Murphy's
valuation
and
calculation.
Rather
than
taking
just
an
estimated
increase
to
a
lot
of
similar
size
in
Dochart
Estates,
as
did
Mr.
MacDonald,
Mr.
Murphy
took
a
total
of
11
land
sales,
and
two
sales
of
both
land
and
improvements,
converted
the
amounts
for
each
sale
into
a
price
per
acre,
and
then
in
turn
related
that
amount
to
the
size
of
Lot
#1.
These
land
"comparables"
covered
a
wide
range
of
lot
sizes
as
well
as
a
lengthy
time
frame
bracketing
on
both
sides
the
date
relevant
for
the
sale
of
Lot
#1.
I
would
quote
from
the
summation:
Final
Land
Value
Estimate
Use
of
the
median
value
estimate
eliminates
the
extremes
of
high
and
low
and
provides
a
more
normal
market
indicator
of
value.
In
this
sales
analysis,
were
(sic)
are
provided
with
three
sets
of
median
value
indicators:
Amount
Value
|
Amount
Sale
|
Indicator
for
|
|
Price
per
Acre
|
Subject
Site
|
1.
For
All
Sales
Listed
|
$39,618.00
|
$
67,500.00
|
2.
Sales
Closest
in
Time
to
|
|
Appraisal
Date
|
42,351.00
|
72,125.00
|
3.
Sales
Most
Like
Subject
|
|
Re:
View
&
Privacy
|
74,165.00
|
126,300.00
|
As
the
subject
site
is
considerably
larger
than
most
comparables,
some
adjustment
must
be
made
to
allow
for
this
fact
as
a
larger
site
will
normally
reflect
some
allowance
in
a
lesser
unit
rate.
A
marriage
between
the
amenities
of
privacy
and
view
combines
with
time
of
sale,
site
area,
and
location
will
provide
the
subject's
fair
market
value
site
estimate.
Said
marriage
is
considered
to
be
represented
by
a
value
per
acre
between
that
offered
by
2
above
(Sales
Closest
in
time
to
Appraisal
Date)
at
$42,351.
per
acre
and
sale
#5
at
$51,948.00
per
acre.
Sale
#5
is
located
closest
to
the
subject
site,
offers
a
somewhat
better
view
of
the
Ottawa
River,
has
similar
rear
yard
privacy
as
the
subject,
however,
is
considerably
smaller
than
the
subject
(0.693
acres
versus
1.703
acres)
with
time
of
sale
being
prior
to
the
effective
appraisal
date
by
some
21
months.
Allowing
downward
adjustments
to
Sale
#5's
acreage
rate
of
$51,948.00
due
to
view,
site
area,
and
location
(directly
overlooking
the
Ottawa
river)
and
an
upward
adjustment
for
time
of
sale,
I
believe
an
acreage
rate
of
$45,000.00
per
acre
most
realistically
represents
the
subject
site’s
fair
market
value
as
of
February
1,
1982.
This
provides
a
site
estimate
as
of
February
1,
1982
of:
$45,000.00
x
1.703
$76,500.00
(Rounded).
In
principle,
I
cannot
quarrel
with
the
methodology
for
the
value
of
$76,500
attributed
to
the
only
two-acre
lot
(Lot
#1)
at
Old
Orchard
Estates
at
the
relevant
date,
by
Mr.
Murphy.
At
the
very
least
that
result
more
related
to
identifiable
comparison
material
than
that
which
was
contended
by
Mr.
MacDonald
in
reality
his
figure
of
$27,000
for
Lot
#1.
That
could
result
in
a
valuation
for
the
real
property
of
the
subject
(land
and
buildings)
of
some
$235,650
($159,150
(above)
+
$76,500).
Again,
even
if
a
more
modest
valuation
per
acre
was
given
to
the
land
at
Lot
#1
—
(and
I
see
little
reason
for
doing
so)
—
the
result
would
exceed
the
estimate
of
total
value
used
by
the
Minister
in
assessing
—
$200,000.
I
have
three
small
other
reservations
—
in
addition
to
my
concerns
regarding
any
great
reliance
on
the
"computer
produced"
building
valuations,
already
expressed
above.
These
arose
from
testimony
provided
by
the
appellant
and
witnesses
on
its
behalf.
First,
that
there
is
no
record
of
any
normal
house
and
lot
—
in
the
general
area
of
Arnprior
—
selling
for
more
than
$155,000
(that
figure
was
indicated
by
the
appellant's
president
from
a
sale
with
which
he
was
familiar
and
it
was
not
challenged
by
the
respondent's
witness);
and
second,
that
a
very
substantial
part
of
Lot
#1
is
restricted
from
building
purposes,
by
certain
environmental
protection
provisions
(to
preserve
the
integrity
of
Dochart
Creek)
—
buildings
could
only
be
constructed
on
the
"upper"
portion
of
the
lot;
and
third,
the
difference
in
perspective
between
the
appellant’s
witnesses
and
Mr.
Murphy
—
that
Lot
#1
was
not
the
choice
lot
in
the
subdivision,
in
effect
having
only
been
formed
in
order
to
make
maximum
use
of
the
land
and
the
subdivision
(appellant's
position),
and
that
it
was
indeed
the
choice
lot
(view,
contour,
privacy,
etc.)
(Mr.
Murphy's
position).
Taking
these
above
concerns,
one
at
a
time,
I
would
note:
First
—
there
was
no
evidence
that
there
was
real
property
comparable
to
the
subject
property
in
the
general
Arnprior
area,
the
subject
would
appear
to
be
if
not
the
prominent
home
in
the
area,
amongst
the
most
prominent
—
by
any
comparison
made
by
either
party.
There
was
also
evidence
of
real
estate
listings
for
sale
of
the
subject
property
—
in
years
more
recent
than
the
dates
relevant
to
these
appeals
—
for
amounts
as
much
as
$250,000,
and
there
was
clear
evidence
that
an
offer
for
some
$180,000
had
been
received
and
rejected
for
Lot
#1.
While
counsel
for
the
two
parties
put
different
interpretations
on
this
information,
in
my
view,
it
can
only
tend
to
support
two
rather
nebulous
conslusions
—
one,
that
while
the
property
now
might
be
listed
(two
or
three
years
after
the
time
relevant
to
these
appeals)
for
more
than
$200,000
—
even
$250,000,
there
was
no
clear
indication
it
could
sell
for
that;
and
two,
that
perhaps
the
demand
for
a
home
of
the
character
of
the
subject
property
in
that
area
was
not
great
—
maybe
non-existent,
for
any
amount
approaching
its
"comparable
value”,
or
"replacement
cost".
In
any
valuation
exercise,
as
I
see
it,
the
bottom
line
must
remain
—
would
the
property
sell
for
the
amount
attributed
to
it
as
market
value?
Second,
the
environmental
protection
restrictions
do
have
an
effect
on
this
lot
—
but
it
can
be
argued,
both
good
and
bad.
Clearly
it
limits
the
space
available
for
building
—
but
it
puts
no
such
restriction
on
the
private
use
of
the
total
area
for
any
other
purpose.
I
do
not
accept
that
on
a
two-acre
lot,
when
the
local
and
subdivision
restrictions
in
themselves
permit
the
construction
of
only
one
house
(testimony
at
the
hearing)
that
any
additional
building
restrictions
resulting
form
the
environmental
protection
restrictions,
would
create
a
situation
which
would
be
a
major
impediment
to
its
marketability.
Third,
the
basic
layout
of
the
subdivision
plan
does
not
support
the
contention
of
the
appellant
that
this
lot
was
in
any
way
inferior.
I
would
be
inclined
to
agree
with
Mr.
Murphy
that
it
was
the
choice
lot,
but
it
is
not
necessary
for
me
to
so
determine
—
only
that
in
its
general
characteristics
it
was
not
of
standards
less
than
the
others.
While
this
may
be
a
very
desirable
situation
generally,
it
could
also
tend
to
strengthen
some
of
the
concerns
expressed
in
#2
above,
that
the
“intrinsic
value"
of
the
subject
property
may
not
be
a
real
reflection
of
its
"market
value".
I
would
note
that
the
amount
of
environmental
protected
land
is
much
more
in
Lot
#1
than
in
any
other
lot
in
the
subdivision.
As
noted
earlier,
Lot
#1
has
a
total
of
some
two
acres,
whereas
the
other
lots
in
the
subdivision,
affected
by
the
environmental
protection
restrictions
are
less
than
half
that
size
—
again
with
about
one
half
of
each
lot
subject
to
the
environmental
regulations
which
permit
no
construction.
To
make
my
point
—
I
would
suggest
that
if
Lot
#1
consisted
of
ten
acres
of
land
—
and
nine
of
the
ten
were
restricted
environmentally
in
the
same
way,
that
it
would
be
inequitable
to
value
that
land
by
the
same
yardstick
for
valuing
a
one-acre
lot
with
one
half
of
the
lot
(one-half
acre)
suitable
and
zoned
for
building.
This
recognizes
that
for
“view”,
"privacy",
etc.,
the
environmentally
protected
area
provides
its
owner
with
a
lot
of
certain
benefits
—
but
when
the
prime
purpose
of
the
lot
is
to
build
a
house,
too
much
of
a
good
thing
may
well
become
a
liability
in
the
eyes
of
a
prospective
purchaser.
In
terms
of
utility
to
the
owner
I
am
not
convinced
that
an
environmentally
protected
area
twice
the
size
(in
Lot
#1)
in
similar
area
as
the
other
adjacent
lots,
should
be
valued
at
twice
as
much.
I
am
prepared
to
agree
that
if
Lot
#1
was
comprised
of
two
lots
of
one
acre
each
—
each
would
probably
be
worth
somewhat
more
than
any
other
one-acre
lots
in
the
subdivision
—
calculated
on
an
acreage
basis
—
because
of
its
unique
and
attractive
characteristics.
But
the
total
of
two
acres,
as
one
lot,
should
not
be
calculated
on
that
same
basis.
I
do
appreciate
that
Mr.
Murphy
in
his
calculation
attempted
to
make
some
allowance
for
this
situation,
but
in
my
view
a
somewhat
larger
concession
would
be
warranted.
Under
the
circumstances
I
have
decided
to
attribute
three
quarters
of
Mr.
Murphy's
land
valuation
amount
to
the
land
component
for
Lot
#1.
That
means
an
amount
of
$57,375.
Finally
I
will
accept
Mr.
Murphy's
“average”
building
value
—
as
I
calculated
it
above
$119,646
and
add
a
land
value
—
above
of
$57,375,
for
a
total
of
$177,021.
That
portion
of
the
appeals
will
be
allowed
to
the
extent
that
the
Minister’s
valuation
will
be
reduced
from
$200,000
to
$177,021.
As
I
indicated
earlier,
it
is
largely
my
reluctance
to
place
more
weight
on
the
alternative
building
valuations
provided
by
Mr.
Murphy
that
results
in
this
much
reduced
valuation.
The
fact
that
the
"average"
figure
I
have
accepted
is
only
slightly
greater
than
that
arrived
at
by
Mr.
MacDonald
—
which
I
recognize
to
be
unreasonably
low
—
gives
me
little
comfort.
Turning
then
to
the
other
property
to
be
valued,
Lot
#7,
it
can
be
dealt
with
by
saying
there
was
little
or
nothing
presented
in
support
of
the
valuation
contended
by
the
appellant
and
the
$25,500
amount
suggested
by
the
respondent
in
a
separate
report,
is
well
within
any
range
of
land
values
arising
out
of
the
calculations
by
Mr.
Murphy.
It
will
remain
as
assessed.
At
the
hearing
the
Court
was
informed
that
the
appeals
for
the
years
1978,
1979
and
1980
were
withdrawn
by
the
appellant.
The
appeals
are
allowed
in
part
in
order
that
the
valuation
for
Lot
#1
shall
be
$177,021
rather
than
$200,000.
In
all
other
respects
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
The
entire
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
party
and
party
costs.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.