Strayer,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
dated
February
10,
1981.
It
concerns
reassessments
made
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
of
the
plaintiff's
income
taxes
in
respect
of
1973,
1974,
and
1975.
During
this
period
the
plaintiff
was
a
peddler
of
scrap
metal.
He
operated
by
himself
with
one
truck,
visiting
certain
business
premises
and
sometimes
farmers
to
buy
scrap
metal
from
them.
The
businesses
visited
included
small
factories
or
fabricating
shops
which
would
from
time
to
time
have
scrap
metal
such
as
copper,
brass,
aluminum,
steel,
zinc,
stainless
steel,
etc.
He
bought
such
scrap
and
then
resold
it
to
one
of
a
limited
number
of
dealers
who
would
in
turn
sell
it
to
foundries
or
other
users
who
could
recycle
it.
According
to
the
plaintiff,
he
would
normally
check
on
a
regular
basis
as
to
how
much
the
dealers
were
paying
for
such
scrap,
and
then
would
know
how
much
he
could
offer
when
purchasing
it
in
order
to
make
a
small
profit
on
resale.
About
purchases
by
him
where
he
made
payment
by
cheque,
there
is
no
dispute.
According
to
him
the
vast
majority
of
purchases
were,
however,
made
by
cash
because
suppliers
insisted
on
this
and
refused
to
give
receipts.
It
is
fair
to
assume
that
many
of
them
took
this
position
in
order
to
avoid
any
record
for
tax
purposes
of
such
income
received
by
them.
It
is
these
cash
purchases
which
are
in
dispute.
In
respect
of
1973,
the
plaintiff
declared
gross
sales
by
him
of
$97,778.90,
and
purchases
by
him
of
scrap
metal
totalling
$85,294.57
(of
which
$82,200
was
purchased
by
way
of
cash
payments)
making
a
declared
gross
profit
of
$12,484.
In
respect
of
1974
the
plaintiff
declared
total
sales
of
$157,206.64,
based
on
purchases
of
$139,923.75
of
which
$137,100
was
by
way
of
cash
payments,
earning
a
gross
profit
of
$17,282.89.
In
respect
of
1975
the
plaintiff
declared
gross
sales
of
$108,182.61
based
on
declared
purchases
of
$96,255.33
of
which
$92,300
was
by
cash
payments,
earning
declared
gross
profits
of
$11,927.28.
On
November
29,
1977
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
plaintiff's
1973,1974
and
1975
income
tax
and
increased
the
plaintiff's
income
by
$20,550
for
1973,
$34,275
for
1974,
and
$23,075
for
1975.
This
was
on
the
basis
that
the
cash
purchases
claimed
by
the
plaintiff
were
not
supported
by
vouchers
nor
had
the
plaintiff
kept
any
proper
books,
records,
or
accounts
of
such
purchases.
The
Minister
estimated
that
the
cash
purchases
had
in
each
year
been
25
per
cent
less
than
claimed
by
the
plaintiff,
and
thus
assessed
increases
in
his
income
accordingly.
The
plaintiff
appealed
these
reassessments
to
the
Tax
Review
Board
which
dismissed
his
appeal
in
1981.
It
was
common
ground
at
the
hearing
of
this
appeal
that
the
onus
is
on
the
taxpayer
to
prove
that
the
Minister's
assumptions
and
assessments
are
wrong.*
Somewhat
regretfully,
I
find
that
the
plaintiff
has
not
met
that
onus
in
this
case.
I
have
considerable
sympathy
for
the
plaintiff
and
his
problem.
He
is
a
person
of
a
limited
education,
having
had
only
some
five
years
of
schooling
in
his
native
Poland
prior
to
World
War
II.
During
the
War
he
was
interned
for
five
and
one-half
years.
Since
he
has
come
to
Canada
in
1952
he
has
worked
very
hard
to
make
what
has
obviously
been
a
modest
living.
I
also
accept
that
it
would
have
been
difficult
for
him
in
many
instances
to
have
paid
by
cheque,
or
obtained
receipts
from,
persons
from
whom
he
purchased
scrap
metal.
I
am
inclined
to
think
that
he
was
initially
seen
by
taxation
authorities
as
an
instrument
through
which
they
could
reach
undeclared
income
in
the
hands
of
some
of
those
persons.
That
prospect
would
appear
long
since
to
have
disappeared.
The
law
places
the
onus
on
the
taxpayer
in
such
cases
to
prove
wrong
the
Minister's
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
taxpayer
is
in
a
better
position
to
prove
what
actually
happened,
if
he
chooses
and
is
able
to
do
so.
Unfortunately,
the
plaintiff
has
not
been
willing
or
able
to
particularize
in
any
way
the
purchases
made
by
him.
He
has
confirmed
on
many
occasions
that
the
figures
provided
by
his
accountant
as
to
his
total
purchases
were
correct.
If
he
had
made
any
effort
to
corroborate
this
and
if
his
oral
evidence
had
seemed
forthcoming
and
credible,
it
might
have
been
possible
to
find
in
his
favour
even
in
the
absence
of
any
vouchers,
receipts,
or
other
written
records.
Unfortunately
neither
of
these
requirements
were
met.
The
plaintiff
says
that
when
he
bought
scrap
for
cash
he
made
a
note
of
the
quantity,
price
paid
per
pound,
and
total
payment
and
that
at
the
end
of
the
year
he
turned
these
notes
over
to
his
accountant,
a
Mr.
Daniels.
Mr.
Daniels
died
in
1976
and,
according
to
the
plaintiff,
although
he
retrieved
his
other
documents
from
the
accountant
who
took
over
from
Mr.
Daniels,
these
pieces
of
paper
were
not
among
them.
There
was
no
evidence
as
to
what
happened
to
these
or
that
a
search
was
made
for
them.
Further,
in
the
accounts
maintained
by
Mr.
Daniels
of
cash
disbursements
(see
Exhibit
23)
for
each
of
the
taxation
years
in
question,
there
is
an
item
entitled
"cash
purchases
as
per
Mr.
Schwarz'
estimate"
which
in
two
of
the
three
years
corresponds
precisely
to
the
amount
of
such
cash
purchases
now
asserted
by
the
plaintiff.
It
is
hard
to
understand
why
the
total
of
cash
purchases
was
only
treated
as
an
"estimate"
if
it
were
based
each
year
on
notes
made
by
the
plaintiff
each
time
he
made
a
cash
purchase.
A
more
serious
problem
for
the
Court
in
accepting
the
credibility
of
the
plaintiff
is
that
he
has
consistently
refused
to
name
any
person
or
business
from
whom
he
bought
scrap
metal
or
to
particularize
in
any
way
individual
purchases.
While
it
might
not
be
thought
too
surprising
that
a
t
a
trial
in
1987
it
could
be
difficult
to
give
particulars
of
transactions
in
1973,
the
plaintiff
has
consistently
refused
to
give
such
information
either
to
income
tax
officers
in
1976,
at
his
Tax
Review
Board
hearing
in
1980,
in
examination
for
discovery
in
1984,
or
today.
At
the
same
time,
he
was
able
at
the
trial
to
recount,
both
for
his
own
counsel
and
on
cross-examination,
details
of
personal
income,
goods
and
houses
bought
by
him
going
back
over
a
period
of
35
years.
At
the
trial
he
was
evasive,
however,
when
asked
about
any
of
the
persons
from
whom
he
made
cash
purchases
of
scrap
metal.
During
his
evidence,
if
I
understood
him
correctly,
he
said
in
effect
that
some
of
them
he
could
not
remember
and
as
for
the
others
he
would
not
reveal
their
names
because
he
felt
his
life
was
in
danger.
Ultimately
counsel
for
the
defendant
did
not
press
the
question
of
who
threatened
him
and
I
did
not
insist
on
an
answer
as
I
did
not
wish
to
expose
the
plaintiff
to
liability
for
contempt
of
Court.
But
his
failure
to
be
more
forthcoming
has
seriously
impaired
his
case.
In
the
first
place,
it
is
not
credible
that
he
can
remember
only
some
or
all
of
the
persons
who
threatened
but
not
the
others
who
did
not
threaten
him
if
that
is
what
he
meant
to
say.
If
he
means
that
he
has
forgotten
the
names
of
some
of
those
who
made
such
threats
to
him,
this
is
also
incredible
having
regard
to
his
general
memory
for
details.
The
whole
allegation
of
threats
is
barely
credible.
Even
he
admitted
that
no
one
had
specifically
threatened
his
life
although
he
said
that
certain
of
these
vendors
of
scrap
metal
had
told
him
that
if
he
were
to
reveal
that
they
were
receiving
money
from
him
for
scrap
metal
he
would
"be
in
trouble".
It
is
remarkable
that
there
is
no
evidence
of
him
ever
having
told
this
story
previously
during
all
the
other
investigations
and
proceedings
in
this
matter.
Further,
it
is
hard
to
believe
that
he
would
honestly
feel
endangered
in
1987
in
revealing
any
specifics
of
such
events
of
twelve
to
fourteen
years
ago
involving
many
people
who
may
not
even
be
in
the
Toronto
area
or
in
such
businesses
today.
It
is
this
kind
of
patent
implausibility
which,
I
regret
to
say,
taints
such
evidence
as
the
plaintiff
has
provided
with
respect
to
his
cash
purchases.
If
not
entirely
acceptable,
it
may
be
understandable
that
the
plaintiff
made
most
of
his
purchases
by
cash
and
without
being
able
to
insist
on
a
receipt.
What
is
not
understandable
is
that
he
apparently
kept
no
record
himself
of
dates
and
amounts
of
purchases
and
from
whom
purchased.
The
only
evidence
of
any
record
concerns
these
mysterious
pieces
of
paper
on
which
he
says
he
noted
sales,
which
were
turned
over
to
his
accountant,
and
which
had
disappeared
by
1976
—
notes
which
must
not
have
been
considered
by
his
accountant
to
be
accurate
as
he
referred
in
the
"cash
disbursements"
accounts
to
the
"estimates"
by
the
plaintiff
of
his
cash
purchases.
Like
the
Tax
Review
Board,
I
have
serious
doubts
about
the
accuracy
of
the
Minister’s
reassessment.
But
I
am
obliged
to
treat
it
as
correct
in
the
absence
of
better
evidnce
from
the
plaintiff
who
should
have
the
best
knowledge
of
anyone
of
what
happened.
The
plaintiff
has
not
demonstrated
credibility
as
to
his
oral
evidence,
and
he
has
produced
no
corroboration
in
the
form
of
further
records
or
any
other
witness.
I
must
therefore
dismiss
his
appeal
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.