Couture,
C.J.T.C.
[Translation]:—This
appeal
is
from
an
assessment
made
by
the
respondent
dated
November
29,
1984
by
virtue
of
which
the
sum
of
$13,251.67
received
by
the
appellant
during
the
1982
taxation
year
was
considered
to
be
income
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act).
The
appellant,
relying
on
the
provisions
of
section
87
of
the
Indian
Act
in
effect
at
the
time,
argued
that
she
was
exempt
from
the
application
of
the
Act
for
the
year
under
appeal.
In
her
testimony,
she
explained
that
she
was
Indian
by
birth
and
that
until
her
marriage
in
1978
she
was
registered
as
an
Indian
in
the
Indian
register
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
the
Indian
Act.
In
1978
she
married
a
non-Indian,
and
her
name
was
then
stricken
from
the
register
as
required
under
paragraph
12(1)(b)
of
the
Act,
which
read:
12(1)
The
following
persons
are
not
entitled
to
be
registered,
namely,
(b)
a
woman
who
married
a
person
who
is
not
an
Indian,
unless
that
woman
is
subsequently
the
wife
or
widow
of
a
person
described
in
section
11
[persons
entitled
to
be
registered].
Section
87
provides
that
no
Indian
or
band
is
subject
to
taxation
with
respect
to
the
ownership,
occupation,
possession
or
use
of
any
property.
Subsection
2(1)
of
the
Indian
Act
defines
“Indian”
as
follows:
“Indian”
means
a
person
who
pursuant
to
this
Act
is
registered
as
an
Indian
or
is
entitled
to
be
registered
as
an
Indian.
The
respondent
established
that
the
income
tax
payable
by
the
appellant
on
the
salary
that
she
admitted
receiving
in
the
1982
taxation
year,
amounting
to
$13,251.67,
was
$1,194.50.
The
appellant
submitted
that
she
was
not
subject
to
taxation
on
her
salary
because
she
was
a
member
of
the
Indian
Reserve
of
the
Village
of
Huron
Wendaké
as
a
registered
Huron,
and
that
her
salary
was
earned
from
employment
held
on
her
reserve
of
origin.
She
argued
that
the
provisions
of
paragraph
12(1)(b)
of
the
Indian
Act
are
discriminatory
and
that
in
such
circumstances
this
provision
is
inoperative.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
submitted
to
the
Court
that
the
only
legislative
provision
that
could
support
the
appellant's
arguments
was
section
15
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms,
but
that
unfortunately
the
appellant
cannot
benefit
from
that
section
in
the
1982
taxation
year
because
it
came
into
effect
on
April
17,
1985.
He
further
noted
that
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights
also
cannot
be
relied
on
in
support
of
the
appellant's
arguments,
since
in
Attorney
General
of
Canada
v.
Jeanette
Vivian
Corbiere
Lavell,
[1974]
S.C.R.
1349,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
held
in
a
majority
judgment
that
the
provisions
of
paragraph
12(1)(b)
were
not
discriminatory
and
that
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights
did
not
have
the
effect
of
rendering
the
provisions
of
the
said
paragraph
12(1)(b)
inoperative.
The
respondent's
arguments
are
well-founded.
I
must
add
that
when
section
15
of
the
Charter
came
into
effect
the
provisions
of
paragraph
12(1)(b)
were
amended
to
correct
this
situation.
For
these
reasons
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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