Taylor,
T.C.J.:—
These
are
appeals
heard
in
Calgary,
Alberta,
on
July
4,
1988,
and
November
2,
1988,
against
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1977,
1978,
1979
and
1980
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
had
disallowed
as
deductions
from
corporate
income
several
items
of
operating
expenses
and
capital
cost
allowance
—on
surface
vehicles
and
aircraft.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
took
the
position
that
the
costs
related
to
the
above
were
personal,
rather
than
corporate.
The
Minister's
position
in
assessing
was
therefore
founded
substantially
on
paragraphs
18(1)(a)
and
18(1)(b)
of
the
Act.
Between
the
dates
of
July
4,
1988
and
November
2,
1988
(above)
the
parties
reached
agreement
on
a
number
of
items
in
dispute,
which
will
be
referenced
at
the
end
of
this
judgment.
In
the
end
analysis,
a
single
point
remained
in
dispute—whether
a
Bonanza
aircraft
had
been
acquired
by
the
appellant
corporation
as
a
business
asset—"for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income"—or
as
a
personal
asset
for
the
primary
use
of
the
company
president.
In
this
instance,
there
is
no
question
that
the
purchase
of
the
aircraft
was
a
"capital"
purchase,
if
a
business
purchase
at
all,
and
accordingly
paragraph
18(1
)(b)
of
the
Act
does
not
come
into
play
directly—that
is
not
the
issue.
The
appellant,
based
in
Calgary,
Alberta,
carried
on
the
business
of
oil
and
gas
exploration
and
development,
and
property
acquisition
and
investing.
During
the
years
under
review,
its
activities
were
substantial,
varied,
wide
spread,
and
successful.
The
only
witness
for
the
corporation
was
its
president,
Mr.
Barry
Joseph
McHugh,
who
identified
his
business
interest
as
"developer,
explorer,
marketer,
transporter
and
processor".
In
the
appellant
company,
as
well
as
personally
and
through
some
other
corporate
vehicles
he
covered
Canada's
western
provinces,
as
well
as
certain
incursions
into
the
United
States.
The
Court
accepts
that
Mr.
McHugh
is
qualified,
competent,
energetic
and
enterprising,
as
well
as
risk-oriented
when
necessary.
Critical
to
all
of
this,
however,
is
that
he
is
a
pilot
of
some
experience,
and
his
testimony
indicated
a
devotion
to
and
love
of
flying
itself.
From
the
very
general
description
of
the
company
operations
provided
to
the
Court,
it
was
asserted
that
it
was
not
unreasonable
for
such
a
corporation
to
own
and
operate
an
aircraft—it
might
well
be
warranted
considering
the
possible
savings
of
time,
money
and
human
resources.
Inland
did
have
one
aircraft—
and
the
Minister
has
accepted
that
the
"Lake
amphibian”
was
acquired
and
used
"for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income”.
The
"Lake"
(in
the
words
of
Mr.
McHugh)"
..
.
is
an
exploration
aircraft
which
has
the
capability
of
landing
on
waters
as
well
as
land.
It
has
limited
passenger
capacity,
limited
navigational
equipment
on
it.
.
.
.
The
Bonanza
is
known
as
a
business
aircraft.
It’s
the
most
sophisticated
single-engine
aircraft
offered
on
the
market.
It
has
the
speed
and
endurance
and
comfort,
and
when
properly
equipped
can
fly
under
instrument
flight
rules,
in
adverse
weather
conditions."
I
will
not
go
into
detail
regarding
the
use,
care,
storage,
repair,
etc.
for
the
Bonanza,
since
I
am
satisfied
that
record
does
not
add
to
support
for
the
appellant's
position
—rather
it
could
detract
from
it.
Many
of
the
trips
identified
in
the
aircraft
“log
book”,
had
a
business
flavour,
even
some
of
the
“training”
trips,
which
Mr.
McHugh
took
as
co-pilot,
earning
his
own
licence
to
fly
the
Bonanza,
and
gradually
increasing
his
competence
on
it.
Leaving
aside
whether
some
spill-over
could
be
demonstrated
from
the
“training”,
or
"personal"
flights
in
the
Bonanza,
the
basic
question
remains,
whether
its
acquisition
as
a
"corporate
asset"
with
all
the
attendant
complications
that
term
implies,
was
warranted
under
the
circumstances.
In
my
view
it
was
not
so
warranted.
There
can
be
little
or
no
valid
question
raised
by
the
Minister
regarding
the
purchase
of
assets
related
directly
to
a
business
operation—they
would
be
covered
by
the
phrase
"for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income".
As
a
simple
example,
if
a
grain
farmer
in
the
middle
of
the
prairies,
purchased
a
truck,
a
plough,
tractor,
or
some
other
equipment
or
some
other
similarly
related
assets,
the
need
for
the
acquisition
would
either
be
obvious,
or
easily
supported
—on
the
presumption
that
the
equipment
was
needed
and
used
for
hauling,
tilling
or
ploughing,
etc.
If
the
same
farmer
purchased
a
yacht—and
there
was
no
water
on
his
farm
related
to
the
farming
operation,
a
reasonable
question
might
be
expected
from
the
Minister
regarding
what
possible
value
to
the
operation
of
the
farm
could
be
expected
from
the
yacht.
Again,
it
might
be
satisfactorily
answered,
but
the
effort
required
to
dispel
the
Minister’s
skepticism
would
be
substantial.
The
real
difficulty
comes
when
the
asset
(or
other
expenditure)
in
question,
can
or
may
have
a
useful
function
to
perform
in
the
operation
of
the
business-
but
it
is
far
from
normally
required,
and
in
addition
it
has
a
clearly
perceived
personal
value,
at
least
a
utility
very
unconnected
with
the
business
operation.
It
is
not
sufficient
to
state
that
because
a
taxpayer
is
in
"business",
or
even
because
he
is
operating
that
business
in
a
“corporation”,
he
may
acquire
assets
of
any
description
using
corporate
funds,
or
make
any
and
all
expenditures,
and
assume
that
they
are
properly
tax
deductible.
They
may
well
seem
appropriate
as
company
business
expenses
but
they
may
not
be
so
acceptable
as
income
tax
business
expenses,
where
such
a
distinction
must
be
made.
Only
amounts
of
expenditures
made
"for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income”,
and
that
are
“reasonable”
may
be
deducted
to
arrive
at
"net
income"
for
income
tax
purposes.
In
the
circumstances
of
these
appeals,
I
am
satisfied
that
it
was
very
pleasant
and
gratifying
to
Mr.
McHugh
to
have
available,
under
his
control,
the
larger,
more
comfortable,
better
equipped
and
probably
safer
aircraft
—
"Bonanza",
and
I
am
sure
he
intended
to
and
hoped
to
find
some
business
use
for
it,
perhaps
even
some
regular
business
use
for
it.
I
have
taken
into
account
Mr.
McHugh's
information
regarding
the
very
ebullient
economic
times
which
pervaded
the
western
Canadian
resource
provinces
in
1979
when
this
aircraft
was
acquired,
and
the
rather
sudden
turn-around
a
few
years
later.
Even
that
optimism
and
the
exhilaration
of
those
earlier
years
does
not
make
the
acquisition
of
this
second
aircraft
for
Inland
a
"reasonable"
expenditure.
It
was
convenient,
but
not
reasonable.
There
was
no
demonstrated
need
for
it
before
acquisition,
and
there
were
no
subsequent
developments
which
would
have
required
it
after
purchase.
Its
purpose
and
use,
in
my
view,
were
largely,
perhaps
exclusively,
related
to
personal
indul-
gence
by
Mr.
McHugh.
A
major
part
of
its
air-time
was
in
the
United
States,
and
at
most
times,
quite
convenient
to
Mr.
McHugh's
preference
for
winter
residence
in
the
southern
States,
rather
than
for
business
purposes.
It
was
stored
almost
exclusively,
when
not
being
used,
in
the
southern
United
States.
I
would
mention
only
in
passing
that
Mr.
McHugh
did
make
a
serious
effort
to
justify
the
need
for
the
aircraft
on
the
basis
of
searching
out
a
new
route
for
a
proposed
natural
gas
pipeline
in
the
United
States.
I
am
more
inclined
to
think
that
this
was
a
side-line
to
a
major
purpose
of
flying
the
aircraft
by
Mr.
McHugh
—either
for
personal
purposes
or
to
have
it
stored
near
his
winter
residence.
Mr.
McHugh's
hope
for
the
development
of
such
a
pipeline
route,
and
his
role
in
it,
may
indeed
come
about,
but
that
possible
end
development
is
in
no
way
dependent
on
the
aircraft
"Bonanza"
nor
directly
related
to
its
acquisition
or
use
in
the
company.
The
appellant
has
not
succeeded
in
overturning
the
Minister’s
position
that
the
aircraft
(and
therefore
the
costs
associated
with
its
operation)
was
not
a
reasonable
expenditure
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income.
For
purposes
of
the
record
I
quote
from
the
transcript
of
the
hearing,
the
agreement
on
other
points
reached
by
the
parties,
read
by
Mr.
Low:
MR.
LOW:
Thank
you,
Your
Honour.
Your
Honour,
my
understanding
of
the
agreement
reached
between
the
parties
is
as
follows,
and
it's
going
to
take
a
while
to
recite,
but
it
will
be
there
on
the
record.
In
1978
the
Appellant
showed
meals
and
promotion
expenses
of
$2,405.27;
1979,
$3,825.06;
and
in
1980,
$9,052.37,
for
a
total
of
$15,282.70.
It
is
my
understanding
that
we
are
agreed
that
the
Appellant
will
be
allowed
37
/i
per
cent
of
those
numbers
in
each
year,
and
will
be
disallowed
62
/z
per
cent
of
those
numbers
in
each
year.
The
Appellant
showed
automobile
expenses
in
1978
of
$4,563.07;
in
1979
of
$1,672.00;
in
1980
of
$2,879.88,
and
it
is
my
understanding
that
the
Appellant
will
be
allowed
80
per
cent
of
those
expenses
and
disallowed
20
per
cent
of
those
expenses
in
each
year.
Under
the
heading
of
international
travel,
the
Appellant
showed
in
1978,
$10,001.62;
in
1979,
$8,491.66;
in
1980,
$7,578.49.
My
understanding
of
the
agreement
is
that
the
Appellant
will
be
allowed
in
1979,
$839.00,
referable
to
travel
on
the
North
American
Continent;
in
1980,
$3,525.00,
referable
to
travel
on
the
North
American
Continent;
and
with
regard
to
the
balance
of
$22,836.00
over
the
three
years,
the
Appellant
will
be
allowed
25
per
cent
of
those
expenses
and
will
be
disallowed
75
per
cent
of
that
$22,836.00.
With
regard
to
travel
in
Alberta,
Saskatchewan
and
British
Columbia,
the
Appellant
showed
travel
costs
in
1978
of
$1,021.77;
in
1979
of
$2,232.59;
in
1980
of
$754.93.
My
understanding
is
that
the
Appellant
will
be
allowed
100
per
cent
of
those
expenses.
The
Appellant
showed
aircraft
expenses
in
1978
of
$244.45;
in
1980
of
$274.75,
for
a
total
of
$519.20.
My
understanding
is
the
Appellant
will
be
allowed
100
per
cent
of
those
expenses.
With
regard
to
trade
memberships
and
conventions,
the
Appellant
showed
an
expense
of
$328.67
in
1979,
which
is
to
be
allowed
100
per
cent,
and
showed
an
expense
of
$289.28
in
1980,
which
is
to
be
disallowed
in
its
entirety.
Under
the
category
of
"other"
expenses,
the
Appellant
showed
$1,002.34
in
1978,
and
is
to
be
allowed
60
per
cent
of
that,
or
$601.40.
The
Appellant
showed
other
expenses
of
$4,155.63
in
1979,
and
is
to
be
allowed
$1,985.00
and
disallowed
the
balance.
The
Appellant
showed
other
expenses
in
1980
of
$2,484.80,
is
to
be
allowed
$1,408.70
and
disallowed
the
balance.
The
total
of
the
allowed
other
expenses
then
is
$3,995.10.
Now,
Your
Honour,
if
you’re
scrupulous
about
the
counting,
you
may
find
that
those
numbers
don't
exactly
match
the
numbers
on
schedule
2
of
the
Respondent's
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal.
HIS
HONOUR:
I
suspect
they
may
not.
MR.
LOW:
But
close
enough
that
we're
content
on
both
sides.
HIS
HONOUR:
There's
no
big
quarrel
with
that,
is
there?
MR.
BENDIN:
No.
MR.
LOW:
Further,
Your
Honour,
with
regard
to
the
capital
items
recited
in
schedule
1
of
the
Respondent's
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal,
those
items
in
1977,
as
I
understand
it,
are
beyond
the
scope
of
this
hearing
and
we
simply
won't
comment
on
those.
It
will
have
to
be
some
other
action.
We
understand
with
regard
to
1978
that
the
Respondent
is
prepared
to
allow
the
$61,501.00
item
representing
the
Lake
aircraft,
call
sign
C-GILD
in
its
entirety.
The
Appellant
consents
to
the
disallowance
of
the
Datsun
at
$7,700.00.
Give
me
just
a
moment
here.
HIS
HONOUR:
No
problem.
MR.
LOW:
Sorry,
Your
Honour.
Your
Honour,
continuing
on
schedule
1
for
1978,
the
Respondent
had
disallowed
the
value
of
a
trailer
at
$8,782.00.
We
understand
that
is
now
to
be
allowed.
It
is
an
office
trailer
at
the
Abee
Gas
Plant.
Similarly
the
shortwave
radio
is
in
use
in
the
field
and
had
been
disallowed
at
$270.00,
is
now
to
be
allowed
as
a
capital
item
at
$270.00.
Looking
at
1979,
you
will
appreciate,
Your
Honour,
that
the
Bonanza
Beech
A-36
is
the
question
which
is
left
with
you.
With
regard
to
the
Pontiac
Safari
Wagon,
the
Appellant
has
agreed
to
the
disallowance
of
that
as
a
class
10
capital
item
as
indicated
on
the
schedule.
And
I
believe
there
are
no
capital
items
in
1980.
Mr.
Bendin,
is
that
a
complete
and
accurate
summary,
as
far
as
you're
aware?
MR.
BENDIN:
Yes.
The
appeals
are
allowed,
without
costs,
and
the
entire
matter
is
referred
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
in
order
that
adjustments
to
the
assessments
at
issue
may
be
made
where
necessary,
in
accordance
with
the
Court
record
cited
in
these
reasons
for
judgments.
In
all
other
respects
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeals
allowed
in
part.