Couture,
C.J.T.C.
[Translation]:—The
appellant
is
appealing
from
an
assessment
dated
July
19,
1982
by
which
the
respondent
added
the
sum
of
$46,460
to
his
income
as
profit
from
the
operation
of
a
business
made
on
the
sale
of
real
property.
The
notice
of
appeal
refers
to
notices
of
reassessment
for
the
taxation
years
1974
to
1978
inclusive.
At
the
hearing,
counsel
for
the
appellant
and
counsel
for
the
respondent
agreed
that
the
only
point
at
issue
before
the
Court
was
the
profit
made
by
the
appellant
in
selling
two
properties
in
1976,
and
the
amount
of
the
penalty
deducted
under
the
assessment
if
the
Court
allows
the
appeal.
During
the
taxation
year
at
issue
the
appellant
was
a
real
estate
broker
working
for
himself.
He
had
previously
worked
for
the
Fiducie
du
Québec
for
seven
years
as
a
real
estate
agent.
He
explained
in
his
testimony
that
in
1975,
together
with
his
brother,
he
bought
a
motel
known
as
the
Motel
Hong
Kong
located
in
Ste-Foy
near
the
Quebec
bridge,
and
in
the
same
year
he
purchased
a
hotel
known
as
the
Château
Laurier
("the
Château")
also
located
in
Quebec.
In
1978,
he
purchased
another
establishment
known
as
the
Manoir
Lafayette.
Before
these
purchases
he
had
also
bought
six
apartment
buildings,
but
none
of
these
buildings
contained
more
than
eight
apartments.
The
witness
mentioned
that
as
a
real
estate
broker
for
the
Fiducie
du
Québec
he
had
specialized
in
the
sale
of
motels.
He
said
that
he
had
probably
sold
about
40
of
these
motels
while
he
was
with
the
Fiducie,
and
that
through
these
deals
he
had
acquired
considerable
experience
in
the
way
to
finance
such
purchases
and
sales
for
the
buyer,
while
still
allowing
the
seller
to
negotiate
a
profitable
deal.
The
reasons
why
he
left
the
Fiducie
du
Québec
and
went
into
business
for
himself
as
a
real
estate
broker
have
nothing
to
do
with
the
purposes
of
the
case,
except
to
add
that
the
appellant
said
that
in
1975
he
formed
the
idea
of
creating
a
capital
fund
to
ensure
the
future
financial
security
of
himself,
his
wife
and
their
six
children.
Based
on
his
experience
with
the
Fiducie
du
Québec,
and
in
order
to
proceed
with
his
capital
formation
project
in
1975,
he
purchased
the
motel
Hong
Kong
with
his
brother
on
September
10,1975.
According
to
the
witness
he
knew
this
motel
well
and
knew
that
it
was
operating
at
a
loss,
and
based
on
his
expertise
he
had
decided
that
for
such
an
operation
to
be
profitable
it
had
to
have
about
40
more
units.
The
appellant
pointed
out
that
he
approached
the
municipal
authorities
at
the
time
to
ensure
that
he
could
get
a
building
permit
and
to
be
certain
that
he
could
lease
adjacent
land
owned
by
the
municipality.
He
had
a
draughtsman
prepare
a
sketch
of
his
project,
which
he
submitted
to
the
authorities.
He
also
obtained
a
bid
from
a
contractor
in
Ste-Marie-de-Beauce
for
construction
of
the
additional
motel
units.
When
he
was
considering
the
purchase
of
this
motel
he
was
already
looking
into
the
possibility
of
buying
the
Château.
This
hotel
was
owned
by
a
company
in
which
the
shares
belonged
to
an
estate
and
at
the
time
negotiations
were
difficult,
which
is
essentially
what
prompted
him
to
buy
the
Motel
Hong
Kong.
The
appellant
admitted
that
he
acted
as
a
real
estate
broker
in
buying
the
Chateau,
but
with
a
prior
agreement
with
his
brother
that
if
the
latter
was
able
to
purchase
it
the
appellant
would
become
coowner
with
him.
The
appellant
testified
that
after
buying
the
Château
in
December
1975
he
realized
that
its
parking
lot
was
too
small
for
its
needs
and,
together
with
his
brother,
they
bought
two
adjoining
properties
so
as
to
enlarge
it.
The
appellant
further
said
that
he
was
faced
with
an
expenditure
of
some
$500,000
for
renovations
at
the
Château.
To
finance
the
purchase
and
the
renovations,
they
had
to
get
rid
of
the
Motel
Hong
Kong.
In
1976
the
doctors
found
that
his
brother
was
suffering
from
brain
cancer,
and
this
acted
as
a
warning
to
the
appellant,
since
he
was
co-owner
with
his
brother
of
a
substantial
investment
and
if
the
latter
could
no
longer
look
after
his
business
the
situation
would
be
much
more
difficult
for
him,
not
only
as
regards
managing
the
business
but
also
as
to
division
of
the
property
in
the
event
of
his
brother's
death.
The
appellant
said
he
consulted
his
auditor
and
the
latter
recommended
the
transfer
of
the
assets
in
question,
which
at
that
time
consisted
of
the
Château,
to
a
corporation
on
the
ground
that
it
is
easier
to
deal
with
company
shares
for
purposes
such
as
the
settlement
of
an
estate
than
to
deal
with
assets
such
as
a
hotel
that
is
jointly
owned.
For
this
reason,
the
appellant
said,
the
Château
was
sold
to
a
company
known
as
Cogires
Inc.,
in
which
the
appellant
and
his
brother
held
equal
shares,
in
1976
for
$406,000
according
to
the
deed
of
sale,
a
copy
of
which
was
submitted.
In
the
years
following
purchase
of
the
Château
the
appellant
also
personally
bought
three
other
properties
located
on
rue
Grande
Allée
in
Quebec,
while
Cogires
Inc.
bought
two.
The
list
of
real
estate
deals
arranged
by
the
appellant
on
his
own
behalf
was
indicated
by
the
evidence
as
the
purchase
before
1975
of
six
apartment
buildings,
the
purchase
and
sale
of
half
of
the
Motel
Hong
Kong,
the
purchase
and
sale
of
half
of
the
Château
and
the
purchase
of
three
apartment
buildings
in
the
years
after
1975.
According
to
his
testimony
at
the
date
of
the
hearing,
he
still
owned
nearly
all
these
apartment
buildings
except
for
two
that
were
bought
in
1974
and
sold
in
1976.
The
Château
is
still
owned
by
Congires
Inc.
In
view
of
the
evidence
on
the
appellant's
activities
in
the
real
estate
field,
and
bearing
in
mind
the
circumstances
which
led
him
to
engage
in
these
deals,
I
do
not
think
that
a
speculative
intent
can
be
attributed
to
him
in
respect
of
the
purchase
and
sale
of
the
Motel
Hong
Kong
and
the
Château.
I
accept
his
version
of
the
reasons
for
purchasing
the
two
properties
in
question
and
later
disposing
of
them,
namely
that
of
carrying
out
what
appears
to
me
to
be
a
very
legitimate
project
of
creating
a
capital
fund
as
security
for
himself
and
his
family.
At
the
date
of
the
hearing
this
capital
fund
was
substantial.
Not
only
was
his
testimony
credible
but
his
actions
in
the
real
estate
field
in
the
years
following
the
year
on
appeal
were
also
consistent
with
the
intent
he
mentioned,
which
he
said
prompted
him
to
engage
in
these
deals.
The
evidence
further
disclosed
that
the
profits
made
by
the
appellant
when
he
sold
the
Motel
Hong
Kong
and
the
Chateau
were
not
reported
by
him
in
his
tax
return
for
the
taxation
year
1976,
which
led
the
respondent
to
deduct
a
penalty
under
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Act
in
the
amount
of
$4,953.08.
The
appellant’s
excuses
were
that
he
instructed
his
auditor
at
the
time
to
prepare
his
tax
return
and
that
the
latter
died
suddenly
without
completing
the
work,
which
after
several
months
had
elapsed
was
transferred
to
another
auditor
who
died
accidentally
also
without
completing
the
work,
and
that
the
necessary
financial
statements
were
only
finally
prepared
by
a
third
auditor.
The
evidence
further
disclosed
that
the
appellant
filed
two
returns
for
the
taxation
year
1976.
The
first,
duly
signed
by
him,
appears
to
have
been
filed
before
May
1,
1977,
while
an
amended
return
also
signed
by
him
was
filed
on
October
11,
1978.
The
appellant
did
not
report
the
profit
made
by
him
in
the
sales
of
the
Motel
Hong
Kong
and
the
Château
in
either
the
first
or
the
second
return.
He
tried
to
explain
this
omission
by
alleging
he
had
been
confused,
as
he
suffered
losses
in
the
year
in
question
from
other
activities
and
these
losses
led
him
to
think
that
they
would
offset
the
profit
in
question.
For
an
appellant
to
avoid
liability
under
the
Act
when
he
fails
to
report
income,
he
cannot
simply
attribute
the
omission
to
circumstances
apparently
beyond
his
control
and
try
to
place
the
blame
on
third
parties.
When
he
signs
his
tax
return
for
a
taxation
year
he
also
signs
the
following
certificate:
I
hereby
certify
that
the
information
given
in
this
return
and
in
any
documents
attached
is
true,
correct
and
complete
in
every
respect
and
discloses
my
income
from
all
sources.
This
statutory
formula
appears
to
me
to
be
quite
clear
and
to
require
no
explanation.
When
signed
by
a
taxpayer
it
creates
a
presumption
that
the
return
is
correct,
based
on
the
fact
that
the
taxpayer
was
aware
of
and
satisfied
with
its
contents
when
he
signed
it.
The
same
is
true
for
all
additions
that
must
be
completed
and
filed
with
the
statement
without
exception,
if
the
circumstances
so
require.
I
do
not
suggest
that
the
fact
that
a
taxpayer
signed
such
a
certificate
automatically
makes
him
liable
to
the
penalty
mentioned
in
subsection
163(2)
if
he
commits
any
offence
in
the
return.
I
admit
that
there
are
a
whole
range
of
circumstances
in
which
he
will
be
entirely
free
of
liability
under
this
subsection;
but
for
him
to
succeed
in
persuading
the
Court
that
the
offence
committed
by
him
resulted
from
independent
circumstances
beyond
his
control,
and
so
avoid
liability,
he
must
show
that
in
the
circumstances
he
exercised
reasonable
attention
and
diligence
in
preparing
and
filing
his
return.
I
cannot
agree
that
in
the
situation
under
consideration
the
appellant
did
not
“knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence
in
the
carrying
out
of
any
duty
or
obligation
imposed
by
or
under
this
Act
.
.
.
[make]
a
false
statement
or
omission
in
a
return",
as
required
by
the
subsection,
in
failing
to
report
income
of
$46,460
for
the
taxation
year
1976
resulting
from
disposing
of
the
Motel
Hong
Kong
and
the
Château.
His
original
return
showed
his
net
income
for
the
year
as
$20,000.
This
fact
alone
should
have
told
him
that
the
return
might
not
be
complete.
The
appellant
gave
me
the
impression
of
being
an
experienced
businessman
and
as
such
should
easily
have
realized
that
in
view
of
the
two
major
transactions
carried
out
during
the
year
the
amount
of
$20,000
income
for
the
taxation
year
1976
was
unrealistic.
If
he
had
looked
carefully
at
his
return,
he
would
have
seen
that
Schedule
C,
titled
"Summary
of
disposition
of
real
property",
was
not
included.
He
would
also
have
realized
that
there
was
no
mention
in
his
return
of
the
sale
of
the
motel
and
the
Château.
I
cannot
help
concluding
that
he
demonstrated
a
lack
of
care
sufficient
to
justify
a
finding
of
gross
negligence
on
his
part.
For
all
these
reasons
the
appeals
are
dismissed
for
the
taxation
years
1974,
1975,
1977
and
1978.
The
appeal
is
allowed
for
1976
and
the
assessment
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
him
to
issue
a
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
$46,460
added
to
the
appellant's
income
for
the
said
taxation
year
is
a
capital
gain.
The
penalty
which
was
applied
under
the
provisions
of
the
Act
will
nevertheless
have
to
be
reduced
to
allow
for
tax
on
the
capital
gain.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.