Lamarre
Proulx,
T.C.J.:—These
are
appeals
from
reassessments
of
income
tax
for
the
1977,1978
and
1979
taxation
years
of
the
appellant.
There
are
two
questions
in
issue
in
this
case,
the
first
one
is
whether
the
appellant
was
carrying
on
a
farming
business
for
the
purpose
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
second
one
is
whether
he
is
entitled
for
the
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
to
the
married
status
deduction
under
paragraph
109(1)
(a)
of
the
Act.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
that
for
the
taxation
years
here
in
issue,
the
appellant
was
employed
as
an
operator
in
a
mine
in
the
Town
of
Fort
Saskatchewan
on
a
full-time
basis;
(b)
that
the
appellant,
in
addition
to
other
reported
sources
of
income,
reported
income
from
a
trucking
business
in
his
1979
taxation
year;
(c)
that
the
alleged
farming
operations
of
the
appellant
were
not
carried
on
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
and
as
such
did
not
constitute
the
carrying
on
of
a
business
in
the
1977,
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
of
the
appellant;
(d)
that
amounts
deducted
as
expenses
from
income
declared
as
farming
income
by
the
appellant
in
his
1977,
1978,
and
1979
taxation
years
were
in
fact
personal
or
living
expenses
of
the
appellant
and
not
deductible
from
income;
(e)
that,
with
respect
to
amounts
deducted
in
his
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
under
married
status,
the
appellant
did
not
support
his
spouse
in
the
said
taxation
years.
At
the
hearing,
the
evidence
showed
that
on
or
about
1977,
the
appellant
purchased
approximately
168
acres
of
land
for
the
purpose
of
establishing
a
farm
where
he
could
retire
when
he
reached
the
age
of
45
which
would
be
the
year
1986.
The
price
of
that
piece
of
land
was
about
$36,000.
The
appellant
installed
a
mobile
home
on
the
land
and
with
the
assistance
of
his
wife
and
his
children
who
in
1977
were
11
and
12
years
old,
he
started
to
clear
the
land,
removing
the
brush
and
piling
the
wood.
The
appellant
had
a
full-time
job
as
a
heavy
equipment
operator
at
a
work
site
located
33
miles
from
the
farm.
His
wife
had
a
beauty
salon
business
located
20
miles
from
the
said
farm.
After
their
respective
day's
work,
they
worked
on
the
farm
four
to
six
hours
and
during
the
weekends.
The
trucking
business
mentioned
in
the
respondent's
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
did
not
apparently
occupy
much
of
the
appellant's
time.
His
involvement
in
this
business
was
rather
to
help
in
the
purchase
of
the
trucks.
Much
of
the
land
was
pasture
land
with
55
acres
being
cultivated
for
grain
or
hay.
The
cultivation
and
harvesting
was
done
by
a
neighbouring
farmer
and
the
proceeds
would
be
shared
in
half
between
that
farmer
and
the
appellant.
In
the
years
under
appeal,
there
were
very
few
buildings
on
the
land.
There
was
the
mobile
home,
a
small
shed
for
feed,
some
structure
to
cover
the
pump
and
a
chicken
coop
of
15’
x
10'.
There
was
a
small
corral
for
feeding
purposes
and
for
horse
training.
The
appellant
owned
two
cows
and
six
or
seven
ponies.
The
ponies
were
for
chuck
wagon
shows
or
fairs
which
the
appellant
enjoyed
quite
a
lot.
It
was
a
hobby
for
the
appellant.
The
plans
as
to
the
farming
operations
were
and
remained
extremely
vague.
He
wanted
to
raise
cattle.
For
this
he
would
gradually
build
up
the
herd
to
30
heads.
There
is
no
evidence
up
to
this
day
that
he
owns
a
large
amount
of
cattle.
Because
of
high
payments
he
had
to
make
on
the
purchase
of
the
lands,
he
did
not
have
the
money
in
the
years
in
question
to
finance
his
projects.
One
of
his
projects
was
to
fence
his
land.
This
has
been
done.
A
storage
shed
has
been
purchased
and
a
small
barn
constructed
after
the
years
under
appeal.
In
all
the
years
in
question
the
gross
income
from
the
farming
operations
have
been
of
a
total
of
$1,400
and
the
expenses
$20,000.
The
appellant
had
some
experience
in
farming.
He
was
raised
on
a
farm,
he
worked
in
a
continuous
manner
throughout
his
life
for
farmers
and
enjoyed
farmland.
His
1988
income
tax
return
shows
a
small
profit.
Agent
for
the
appellant
has
put
forward
that
the
expenses
claimed
as
business
expenses
are
true
business
expenses
and
not
personal
or
living
expenses.
The
appellant
had
always
intended
to
develop
his
farming
operations
into
a
viable
farming
business,
that
a
business
takes
time
to
establish
itself,
that
the
interest
payments
at
that
time
had
escalated
and
that
explains
the
small
scale
of
the
farming
operations.
He
quoted
to
me
the
following
cases:
Gorjup
v.
M.N.R.,
[1985]
2
C.T.C.
2194;
85
D.T.C.
530,
Joseph
Said
v.
M.N.R.,
[1986]
1
C.T.C.
2115;
86
D.T.C.
1009
and
Parent
v.
M.N.R.,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
2337;
85
D.T.C.
312,
These
cases
which
were
all
in
favour
of
the
taxpayers
may
all
be
distinguished
from
the
case
at
bar
on
one
major
point.
In
all
these
cases
the
farmers
had
the
material
and
the
equipment
to
operate
a
farming
operation,
they
held
a
large
inventory
of
farm
animals
and
had
definite
plans
as
to
their
farming
operations.
All
these
important
elements
of
business
operations
are
missing
in
the
case
at
bar
for
the
years
in
issue.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
quoted
to
me
the
following
cases:
Victor
Croutch
v.
M.N.R.,
[1986]
2
C.T.C.
246;
86
D.T.C.
6453;
Paul
J.
Taillefer
v.
M.N.R.,
[1987]
2
C.T.C.
2137;
87
D.T.C.
418;
Paul
Galloway
Arnold
v.
M.N.R.,
[1965]
Tax
A.B.C.
268;
65
D.T.C.
653;
Philias
C.
Castonguay
v.
M.N.R.,
[1970]
Tax
A.B.C.
35;
70
D.T.C.
1056;
Morris
I.
Boddington
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
1
C.T.C.
2195;
88
D.T.C.
1146.
In
the
Croutch
case
at
page
250
(D.T.C.
6456),
Mr.
Justice
Rouleau
states
as
one
element
why
the
taxpayer
was
not
carrying
on
a
farming
business:
.
.
.There
is
no
evidence
of
a
plan
wherein
the
plaintiff
indicated
how
he
expected
to
ever
make
a
profit
from
the
farming
operation
in
question;
there
is
no
evidence
that
such
a
plan
had
been
formulated
at
the
outset
of
the
operation
or
at
any
point
in
time
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
the
farming
operation.
In
the
Arnold
case,
the
assistant
chairman
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
says
at
pages
268-69
(D.T.C.
654):
.
.
.The
keeping
of
four
horses
in
the
circumstances
narrated
by
the
appellant
hardly
could
be
termed
a
recognizable
farming
operation.
In
my
view,
such
a
small
stable
does
not
take
its
owner
out
of
the
hobby-farmer
category,
for
want
of
a
better
description.
One
may
own
considerably
more
than
four
horses
and
still
not
be
in
a
farming
venture
as
a
result.
Here,
the
appellant
made
no
profit
from
his
stable.
Instead,
it
was
the
cause
of
steady
expense,
albeit
the
appellant
and
his
family
derived
enjoyment
from
having
horses
that
could
be
ridden
and
exhibited
at
shows.
I
think
that
the
outlays
occasioned
were
no
more
than
"personal
or
living
expenses"
.
.
.
Appellant's
activities
in
connection
with
his
stable
were
far
too
limited
and
on
too
narrow
a
scale
for
this
proceeding
to
succeed.
In
the
case
at
bar,
there
is
no
planning,
no
machinery,
no
adequate
structures.
There
are
two
cows,
six
or
seven
ponies
for
chuck
wagon
fairs
and
a
field
that
is
cultivated
by
a
neighbour.
All
this
does
not
make
a
farming
business.
I
therefore
find
that
the
appellant
did
not
operate
a
farming
business.
To
have
the
right
to
the
restricted
farm
loss
under
section
31
of
the
Act,
the
appellant
must
first
prove
that
his
farming
operations
are
a
business
for
the
purpose
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act.
This
he
did
not
do.
The
second
question
in
issue
for
the
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
is
the
right
to
the
marital
status
deduction
provided
for
paragraph
109(1)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
appellant
says
that
he
has
been
married
to
his
wife
for
the
past
25
years
and
that
he
has
supported
her
and
his
family
throughout
this
time.
For
the
1978
taxation
year,
the
respondent
disallowed
the
marital
exemption
that
has
been
claimed
in
the
amount
of
$846.60.
In
the
1979
taxation
year,
the
amount
disallowed
was
$2,320.
The
wife's
assessments
were
not
entered
as
evidence.
What
was
entered
as
evidence
was
the
income
tax
returns
of
the
wife
for
those
years.
In
the
final
analysis
it
would
have
been
better
evidence
if
the
wife
had
testified
about
her
tax
assessments
for
those
years
or
if
the
respondent
had
provided
the
Court
with
a
copy
of
these
assessments.
As
this
has
not
been
done,
as
the
returns
are
concordant
with
the
claimed
marital
status
deduction,
as
the
husband
and
wife
were
living
together
during
those
years,
and
as
there
is
evidence
that
the
husband
was
providing
for
his
family,
I
give
the
appellant
the
benefit
of
the
doubt
and
find
that
he
should
be
allowed
the
marital
status
deductions
that
he
has
claimed
for
the
years
in
question.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
appeal
for
the
1977
taxation
year
is
dismissed
and
for
the
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
the
appeals
are
allowed,
without
costs,
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant
did
not
carry
on
a
farming
business
and
that
he
is
entitled
to
claim
the
married
status
deductions.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.