Kempo,
T.C.J.:
—I
am
delivering
these
reasons
for
judgment
orally,
however
I
expressly
reserve
the
right
to
edit
and
expand
upon
them
subsequently
if
need
be.
This
appeal
concerns
Mr.
Mah's
1987
taxation
year
from
the
respondent's
disallowance
of
a
deduction
claimed
under
the
provisions
of
section
110.7
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
regulations
7302
and
7303
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations.
The
deduction
being
sought
has
been
commonly
described
as
the
northern
resident
deduction.
The
matter
proceeded
before
me
by
way
of
argument
only,
it
being
agreed
that
the
applicable
and
essential
facts
are
those
as
set
out
in
the
Minister's
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
paragraphs
5
and
6,
thusly:
5.
The
Town
of
Smithers
("Smithers")
is
not
a
prescribed
area
pursuant
to
Schedule
IX
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations.
6.
In
so
confirming
the
Notice
of
Assessment,
the
Minister
assumed,
inter
alia:
(a)
the
Appellant
resided
in
Smithers,
in
the
Province
of
British
Columbia,
during
the
1987
taxation
year;
(b)
Smithers
is
south
of
the
55
degree
North
altitude;
(c)
the
population
of
Smithers
is
less
than
10,000;
(d)
Smithers
is
not
entitled
to
a
total
of
50
points
or
more
in
accordance
with
Income
Tax
Regulation
7303(5),
but
is
entitled
to
a
total
of
35
points
based
on
the
following:
(i)
25
points
for
population
pursuant
to
Income
Tax
Regulation
7303(7)(a);
(ii)
0
points
because
there
is
an
all-weather
road
providing
access
to
Smithers,
pursuant
to
Income
Tax
Regulation
7303(7)(b);
(iii)
0
points
because
the
distance
by
all-weather
road
between
Smithers
and
the
administrative
centre
of
the
urban
centre
with
a
population
of
15,000
or
more,
namely,
Prince
George,
is
less
than
402
kilometres
pursuant
to
Income
Tax
Regulation
7303(7)(c);
(iv)
0
points
because
Smithers
is
neither
tundra
nor
open
woodland
as
defined
by
Income
Tax
Regulation
7302,
and
pursuant
to
Income
Tax
Regulation
7303(7)(d);
(v)
10
points
for
falling
on
or
being
encompassed
by
a
line
with
a
point
value
of
10
on
the
British
Columbia
map
set
out
in
Schedule
X
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations,
pursuant
to
Income
Tax
Regulation
7303(7)(e).
Stripped
down
to
its
essentials,
the
issue
is
one
of
statutory
interpretation.
A
deduction
is
permitted
to
an
individual
residing
in
a
“prescribed
area”
of
Canada
pursuant
to
section
110.7.
Under
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
“prescribed”
means
prescribed
by
regulation.
Under
Regulation
7302(1)
"area"
is
defined
in
an
inclusive
manner
as
including
a
city,
town,
village
or
hamlet
or
any
place
listed
in
the
most
recent
edition
of
the
Place
Name
Reference
List
published
by
Statistics
Canada.
Regulation
7303(1)
provides
that
an
area
is
a
prescribed
area
for
the
purposes
of
section
110.7
of
the
Act
in
a
manner
of
Canadian
geographic
east-west
planes.
An
area
on
or
north
of
the
60th
parallel
of
north
latitude
is
one
without
any
limitative
conditions
imposed
respecting
matters
of
population,
roads
and
access
to
defined
administrative
centres
of
defined
urban
centres.
Another
area
is
one
south
of
the
60th
parallel
and
north
of
the
55th
parallel
encompassing
certain
such
limitative
provisions.
The
third
area,
in
which
the
subject
Smithers,
British
Columbia
is
found,
is
one
south
of
the
55th
but
north
of
the
50th
parallel
with
more
stringent
limitative
conditions
imposed
of
the
kind
already
described.
The
appellant
argues
that
a
single
family
residence
located
immediately
outside
the
boundary
of
Smithers
would
qualify
for
the
allowance
in
that
having
a
population
of
one
it
thereby
gathers
the
necessary
50
points
on
population
alone
to
qualify.
This,
he
says,
makes
the
limitative
requirements
of
the
regulations
somewhat
ludicrous
and
certainly
unequitable
to
those
living
inside
Smithers
on
otherwise
adjacent
property.
I
have
a
great
deal
of
sympathy
for
this
and
the
other
analysis
and
arguments
advanced
by
the
appellant
that
major
inequities
arise
out
of
the
plain
meaning
of
the
subject
regulations.
The
difficulty
that
does
present
itself,
however,
is
that
the
appellant
is
seeking
to
establish
an
ambiguity
in
the
otherwise
plain
meaning
of
the
word
"area"
simply
because
of
the
result.
The
principal
of
statutory
interpretation
that
I
am
aware
of
is
that
the
word
or
words
themselves
must
firstly
present
an
ambiguity
before
the
Court
may
disregard
the
application
and
consequences
of
the
plain
meaning
rule.
Put
another
way,
the
inequitable
result
of
legislation
does
not
itself
invite
or
allow
a
judicial
finding
that
certain
legislative
terminology
must
therefore
be
ambiguous.
The
interpretative
consequences
of
the
legislation
(which
may
well
have
been
intentional)
is
the
drawing
of
arbitrary
lines
in
which
a
taxpayer
may
be
within
or
without.
Unfairness
of
result
in
this
case
is
one
curable
by
Parliament
and
not
by
the
Courts.
Conclusion
In
the
result,
and
for
the
reasons
given,
the
appeal
is
to
be
dismissed.
I
am
advised
that
the
outcome
of
this
appeal
is
to
apply
to
and
be
binding
upon
the
appeals
of
twenty
other
appellants
who
are
in
the
identical
circumstances
of
Mr.
Mah.
These
twenty
appeals
are
listed
and
are
called
for
hearing
this
date.
The
reasons
for
judgment
given
in
the
Eric
Mah
appeal
will
also
apply
to
each
of
these
other
appeals
with
the
consequence
that
each
is
to
be
similarly
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.