Teskey,
T.C.J.:—The
appellant,
74712
Alberta
Ltd.
formerly
Cal-Gas
and
Equipment
Ltd.
(Cai-Gas)
appeals
its
reassessments
for
the
taxation
years
1983,
1984
and
1985.
Issue
The
only
issue
before
the
Court
is
whether
Cai-Gas
can
deduct
in
computing
income
the
interest
paid
on
a
1.7
million
dollar
loan
from
the
Wells
Fargo
Bank
(Wells).
Facts
On
September
30,
1979,
Jack
Anderson
owned
80
per
cent
of
Pioneer
Machinery
Company
Ltd.
(Pioneer),
68
per
cent
of
Cal-Gas
Ltd.,
100
per
cent
of
Trennd
Investments
Ltd.
(Trennd),
51
per
cent
of
Chinook
Auto
Electric
Ltd.
(Chinook),
90
per
cent
of
Trennd
Investments
(1979)
Ltd.
(Trennd
1979)
and
98
per
cent
of
Allied
Equipment
Ltd.
(Allied)
which
in
turn
owned
100
per
cent
of
Lethbridge
Crane
Service
Ltd.
(Lethbridge).
See
chart
#
1
attached
[not
reproduced].
As
a
result
of
corporate
restructuring
on
October
1,
1979,
Jack
Anderson
still
owned
90
per
cent
of
Trennd
1979
which
in
turn
owned
100
per
cent
of
Trennd,
69
per
cent
of
Cai-Gas,
80
per
cent
of
Pioneer
and
100
per
cent
of
Allied
which
in
turn
owned
Lethbridge.
See
chart
#
2
[not
reproduced].
The
reason
for
this
corporate
restructuring
was
to
have
Trennd
1979
become
the
banker
for
the
group.
Trennd
1979
arranged
with
the
Canadian
Imperial
Bank
of
Commerce
(C.I.B.C.)
for
a
common
operating
line
of
credit.
It
was
common
practice
even
before
this
that
the
companies
controlled
by
Jack
Anderson
supported
each
other.
The
companies
had
different
business
cycles.
Pioneer
and
Allied
were
busy
and
had
high
receivables
during
the
summer.
Cal-Gas
and
the
automotive
companies
were
busy
during
the
winter
with
high
receivables
and
during
the
summer
no
activity
and
low
receivables.
In
February
of
1980,
Trennd
was
wound
up.
In
April
of
1980
C.I.B.C.
agreed
to
lend
Trennd
1979
an
amount
that
would
cover
the
daily
operating
requirement
for
the
group
of
companies.
The
loan
was
limited
to
the
receivables
of
all
of
the
companies
as
a
group.
Trennd
1979
being
only
a
holding
company
had
no
other
business
than
the
borrowing
of
money
and
lending
the
same
to
the
group
of
companies.
During
the
relevant
period
of
times,
Trennd
1979
would
loan
to
its
subsidiaries
their
required
funds
at
an
interest
rate
of
one
half
of
one
per
cent
over
what
it
paid
for
the
same
money
from
C.I.B.C.
Cal-Gas
was
a
rapidly
growing
company.
It
required
operating
funds
for
about
eight
months
of
the
year.
Cai-Gas
also
had
substantial
capital
expenses
carrying
its
own
separate
debt
of
between
$
1,500,000
to
$2,000,000.
When
the
Cai-Gas
business
was
down
and
the
receivables
were
up,
then
it
received
a
benefit
from
the
support
of
the
other
companies.
Although
the
C.I.B.C.'s
operating
loan
was
$3,300,000,
however
it
was
agreed
that
during
the
period
January
1
to
March
31
during
the
term
of
the
commitment,
this
would
be
increased
to
meet
the
requirements
of
Cal-Gas.
The
group
of
companies
authorized
C.I.B.C.
to
transfer
funds
back
and
forth
between
the
group
of
companies
and/or
Trennd
1979.
Cal-Gas
in
September
of
1980
also
borrowed
money
directly
from
United
Dominion
Corporation
(Canada)
Limited
(United)
for
the
purchase
of
more
equipment
which
Trennd
1979
guaranteed.
The
loan
arrangement
with
the
C.I.B.C.
required
that
each
company
assign
its
receivables
to
the
bank
and
each
company
guaranteed
the
indebtedness
of
Trennd
1979
to
the
C.I.B.C.
In
the
fall
of
1981
and
in
early
1982,
all
assets
of
Allied
were
sold,
Chinook
ceased
operation,
Pioneer
and
Lethbridge
were
placed
in
receivership.
Thus,
Trennd
1979
ended
up
having
as
its
only
asset
a
69
per
cent
interest
in
Cal-Gas.
In
the
fall
of
1981,
the
bank
insisted
that
a
consultant
of
its
choice
be
retained
to
assess
the
liability
of
all
the
businesses.
As
a
result,
Peat
Marwick
and
Partners
conducted
an
investigation
and
recommended
that
all
the
companies
be
put
into
receivership.
The
C.I.B.C.
called
the
loan
demanding
payment
from
all
entities.
Jack
Anderson
was
successful
in
staving
off
the
bank
so
that
Cal-Gas
could
continue
to
operate
with
a
limited
credit
line.
Cai-Gas
also
obtained
a
loan
from
the
Toronto
Dominion
bank
for
an
additional
$150,000
which
allowed
Cal-Gas
to
carry
on
in
a
limited
fashion.
In
1982,
the
C.I.B.C.
would
not
re-finance
the
loans
and
again
demanded
payment
from
all
entities
on
its
loan
to
Trennd
1979.
Cai-Gas
then
arranged
a
loan
from
Wells
for
$
1,700,000.
This
money
was
paid
by
Cai-Gas
directly
to
the
C.I.B.C.
who
then
released
Cal-Gas
from
all
liabilities,
guarantees
and
assigned
back
its
account
receivables.
There
was
no
evidence
that
Cal-Gas
owed
any
money
to
Trennd
when
the
$1,700,000
from
Wells
was
received
and
paid
directly
to
the
C.I.B.C.
At
the
time
of
the
Wells
loan,
there
was
owing
to
the
C.I.B.C.
by
Trennd
1979
approximately
$2,200,000.
Jack
Anderson
personally
paid
off
the
difference,
namely
the
sum
of
$500,000.
Cai-Gas
received
a
non-
interest-bearing
promissory
note
for
$1,7000,000.
from
Trennd
1979.
The
note
was
worthless
as
Trennd
1979
did
not
have
any
assets.
In
1982,
Jack
Anderson
received
the
Cai-Gas
shares
from
Trennd
1979
and
thus
became
a
85
per
cent
owner
of
Cal-Gas.
The
$1,700,000
loan
was
sufficient
to
remove
all
demands
and
pressure
by
the
C.I.B.C.
and
allowed
Cal-Gas
to
conduct
its
business
efficiently
from
that
time
on.
It
was
able
to
service
the
debt.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
in
argument
stated
that
the
loan
has
been
paid
off,
however
this
fact
was
not
given
in
evidence.
At
the
time
the
$1,700,000
was
borrowed
from
Wells,
the
book
value
of
the
Cal-Gas
assets
was
$3,500,000.
Cal-Gas
was
in
the
industrial
propane
distribution
business.
It
had
propane
tanks
on
location
in
the
heavy
oil
fields
where
the
oil
storage
facilities
had
to
be
heated
in
the
cold
winter
months.
Because
of
having
these
tanks
in
place,
the
total
value
was
in
excess
of
the
book
value.
If
the
tanks
had
been
taken
off
location
and
stored
in
one
location
and
sold
at
public
auction,
they
would
have
sold
for
next
to
nothing.
There
was
a
large
goodwill
factor
having
the
tanks
in
place.
Jack
Anderson
tried
to
sell
Cai-Gas
as
a
going
concern
at
the
time
and
was
unable
to
find
a
buyer.
Jack
Anderson
and
the
other
shareholders
decided
that
they
would
attempt
to
bail
out
Cal-Gas
and
keep
it
going.
They
wanted
to
preserve
the
income-producing
capacity
of
Cal-Gas.
That
is,
they
wanted
to
protect
not
only
the
capital
asset
but
the
employees'
reputations.
By
making
the
deal
and
borrowing
the
$1,700,000
from
Wells,
Cal-Gas
kept
its
unsaleable
life.
Between
1982
and
1987,
Cai-Gas
had
annual
profits
of
between
$300,000
and
$500,000.
Profits
for
1988
were
way
down
to
$50,000
up
to
$250,000
for
1989.
It
expects
a
profit
of
$500,000
for
1990.
Statutory
Provision
The
provision
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
the
applicant
must
come
within
to
enable
it
to
write
off
the
interest
on
the
Wells
loan
is
paragraph
20(1)(c),
the
relevant
portions
are:
20.
Deduction
permitted
in
computing
income
from
business
or
property.
(1)
.
.
.
in
computing
a
taxpayer's
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(c)
interest—an
amount
paid
in
the
year
.
.
.,
pursuant
to
a
legal
obligation
to
pay
interest
on
(i)
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property.
.
.
Respondent's
Position
The
respondent
argues
that
the
money
borrowed
from
Wells
does
not
fall
within
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i)
as
interpreted
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
The
Queen
v.
Bronfman
Trust,
[1987]
1
S.C.R.
32;
[1987]
1
C.T.C.
117;
87
D.T.C.
5059.
Appellant's
Position
The
appellant
argues
that
the
Court
should
look
at
the
entire
transaction
and
that
the
true
purpose
of
the
borrowed
money
was
for
Cai-Gas
to
maintain
the
use
of
its
unsaleable
assets
(including
its
accounts
receivable)
or
to
preserve
its
assets
(i.e.
its
very
existence)
and
therefore
there
was
a
business
purpose
and
the
borrowing
then
falls
within
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i).
It
argues
that
the
Bronfman,supra,
facts
can
be
distinguished
in
that
there
was
no
alternative
available
than
the
borrowing.
If
the
money
had
not
been
made
available
to
Cal-Gas,
the
producing
assets
would
have
been
liquidated
for
next
to
nothing.
Analysis
Although
both
the
appellant
and
respondent
referred
this
Court
to
various
decisions
of
various
courts,
the
leading
authority
is
Bronfman,
supra.
The
Chief
Justice
set
out
the
main
issue
involved
therein
at
page
119
(D.T.C.
5060):
The
issue
is
whether
the
interest
paid
to
the
bank
by
the
trust
on
the
borrowings
is
deductible
for
tax
purposes;
more
particularly,
is
an
interest
deduction
only
available
where
the
loan
is
used
directly
to
produce
income
or
is
a
deduction
also
available
when,
although
its
direct
use
may
not
produce
income,
the
loan
can
be
seen
as
preserving
income-producing
assets
which
might
otherwise
have
been
liquidated.
Under
the
heading
Direct
and
Indirect
Uses
of
Borrowed
Money,
the
Chief
Justice
said
at
page
128
(D.T.C.
5066
and
5067):
I
acknowledge,
however,
that
just
as
there
has
been
a
recent
trend
away
from
strict
construction
of
taxation
statutes
(see
Stubart
Investments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
1
S.C.R.
536,
[84
D.T.C.
6305]
at
pp.
573-79;
[1984]
C.T.C.
294
at
313-316
and
The
Queen
v.
Golden,
[1986]
1
S.C.R.
209,
[86
D.T.C.
6138]
at
pp.
214-15;
[1986]
1
C.T.C.
274
at
277),
so
too
has
the
recent
trend
in
tax
cases
been
towards
attempting
to
ascertain
the
true
commercial
and
practical
nature
of
the
taxpayer's
transactions.
There
has
been,
in
this
country
and
elsewhere,
a
movement
away
from
tests
based
on
the
form
of
transactions
and
towards
tests
based
on
what
Lord
Pearce
has
referred
to
as
a
"common
sense
appreciation
of
all
the
guiding
features"
of
the
events
in
question:
B.P.
Australia
Ltd.
v.
Commissioner
of
Taxation
of
Australia,
[1966]
A.C.
224
at
264;
[1965]
3
AIl
E.R.
209
at
218
(P.C.).
See
also
F.H.
Jones
Tobacco
Sales
Company
Ltd.,
[1973]
F.C.
825
at
834;
[1973]
C.T.C.
784
at
790
(T.D.);
[73
D.T.C.
5577]
per
Noel
A.C.J.;
Hallstroms
Pty.
Ltd.
v.
Federal
Commissioner
of
Taxation
(1946),
8
A.T.D.
190
(High
Ct.),
at
196
per
Dixon
J;
and
Cochrane
Estate
v.
M.N.R.,
[1976]
C.T.C.
2215;
76
D.T.C.
1154
(T.R.B.),
per
Mr.
A.W.
Prociuk,
Q.C.
This
is,
I
believe,
a
laudable
trend
provided
it
is
consistent
with
the
text
and
purposes
of
the
taxation
statute.
Assessment
of
taxpayers'
transactions
with
an
eye
to
commercial
and
economic
realities,
rather
than
juristic
classification
of
form,
may
help
to
avoid
the
inequity
of
tax
liability
being
dependent
upon
the
taxpayer's
sophistication
at
manipulating
a
sequence
of
events
to
achieve
a
patina
of
compliance
with
the
apparent
prerequisites
for
a
tax
deduction.
This
does
not
mean,
however,
that
a
deduction
such
as
the
interest
deduction
in
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i),
which
by
its
very
text
is
made
available
to
the
taxpayer
in
limited
circumstances,
is
suddenly
to
lose
all
its
strictures.
It
is
not
lightly
to
be
assumed
that
an
actual
and
direct
use
of
borrowed
money
is
any
less
real
than
the
abstract
and
remote
indirect
uses
which
have,
on
occasion,
been
advanced
by
taxpayers
in
an
effort
to
achieve
a
favourable
characterization.
In
particular,
I
believe
that
despite
the
fact
that
it
can
be
characterized
as
indirectly
preserving
income,
borrowing
money
for
an
ineligible
direct
purpose
ought
not
entitle
a
taxpayer
to
deduct
interest
payments.
In
my
view,
the
text
of
the
Act
requires
tracing
the
use
of
borrowed
funds
to
a
specific
eligible
use,
its
obviously
restricted
purpose
being
the
encouragement
of
taxpayers
to
augment
their
income-producing
potential.
This,
in
my
view,
precludes
the
allowance
of
a
deduction
for
interest
paid
on
borrowed
funds
which
indirectly
preserve
income-earning
property
but
which
are
not
directly
"used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
.
.
.
property".
.
Even
if
there
are
exceptional
circumstances
in
which,
on
a
real
appreciation
of
a
taxpayer's
transactions,
it
might
be
appropriate
to
allow
the
taxpayer
to
deduct
interest
on
funds
borrowed
for
an
ineligible
use
because
of
an
indirect
effect
on
the
taxpayer's
income-earning
capacity,
I
am
satisfied
that
those
circumstances
are
not
presented
in
the
case
before
us.
It
seems
to
me
that,
at
the
very
least,
the
taxpayer
must
satisfy
the
Court
that
his
or
her
bona
fide
purpose
in
using
the
funds
was
to
earn
income.
Conclusion
Even
though
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
acknowledged
that
there
might
be
exceptional
circumstances
where
it
would
be
appropriate
to
allow
the
taxpayer
to
deduct
interest
on
funds
borrowed
for
an
ineligible
use
because
of
an
indirect
effect
on
the
taxpayer's
income-earning
capacity,
and
Cal-Gas
had
no
other
business
alternative
but
to
borrow
the
money,
the
circumstances
herein
are
not
those
exceptional
to
warrant
this
Court
from
not
applying
the
principle
laid
down
in
Bronfman,
supra.
Even
though
the
$1,700,000
borrowed
from
Wells
was
paid
directly
to
the
C.I.B.C.,
it
was
in
essence
loaned
to
Trennd
1979.
Cal-Gas
received
from
Trennd
a
worthless
non-interest
bearing
promissory
note.
The
funds
borrowed
from
Wells
were
used
by
Cai-Gas
to
pay
off
a
debt
owed
by
Trennd
1979
to
the
C.I.B.C.
which
covered
debts
incurred
by
the
other
subsidiary
companies.
This
was
the
direct
use
of
the
borrowed
funds
which
falls
outside
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
20(1)(c)(i).
The
indirect
effect
of
this
borrowing,
besides
allowing
Cai-Gas
to
remain
in
business,
also
saved
Jack
Anderson
substantially
the
same
amount
as
he
had
personally
guaranteed
the
debts.
The
Chief
Justice
in
Bronfman,
supra,
page
129
(D.T.C.
5067-68)
directed
this
Court
and
others
to
deal
with
"what
the
taxpayer
actually
did,
and
not
what
he
might
have
done".
Therefore,
even
though
it
appears
this
matter
could
have
been
structured
differently
to
avoid
this
pitfall,
that
is
immaterial.
For
the
reasons
set
out
above,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.