Skipp,
J.:—The
petitioner
(hereinafter
called
"Guarantee")
seeks
an
order
that
it
is
entitled
to
$33,863.25
plus
accrued
interest
presently
held
by
Carlson
Construction
Company
("Carlson"),
a
division
of
George
Wimpey
Canada
Ltd.
Revenue
Canada
claims
entitlement
to
these
moneys
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
224(1.2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Carlson
has
no
claim.
The
issue
is
whether
subsection
224(1.2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
operates
to
deprive
Guarantee
of
the
funds
it
would
otherwise
be
entitled
to.
The
Canadian
National
Railway
Company
("C.N.")
contracted
with
the
Carlson
Construction
Company
("Carlson")
for
the
construction
of
a
building
referred
to
as
the
Pacific
Business
Centre.
Carlson
in
turn
retained
Seahawk
Construction
Ltd.
("Seahawk")
as
a
subcontractor
to
perform
the
drywall
work.
Guarantee
issued
a
performance
bond
and
a
labour
and
material
repayment
bond
with
respect
to
the
work
to
be
performed
by
Seahawk.
C.N.
paid
Carlson
for
its
work.
Carlson
paid
certain
funds
to
Seahawk
for
its
work,
but
retained
the
sum
of
$96,620.85
which
was
due
and
owing
to
Seahawk.
Seahawk
made
an
assignment
into
bankruptcy
pursuant
to
section
49
of
the
Bankruptcy
Act.
Carlson
then
called
upon
Guarantee
to
complete
Seahawk's
obligations
under
the
subcontract
and
to
pay
the
subtrades
of
Seahawk
under
the
labour
and
material
payment
bond.
Guarantee
has
done
so
and
paid
$95,683.35
to
the
various
employees
and
suppliers
of
Seahawk
for
their
labour,
equipment
and
materials
supplied
and
incorporated
into
the
Pacific
Business
Centre.
Guarantee
has
to
date
recovered
a
portion
of
this
amount
from
Carlson
which
has
retained
$33,863.25.
Guarantee
has
assignments
from
Seahawk's
subcontractors
in
the
sum
of
$65,910.14
as
a
result
of
paying
their
claims.
Guarantee
has
requested
Carlson
to
pay
it
the
remaining
sum
of
$33,863.25
pursuant
to
the
assignments.
On
or
about
July
22,
1988
Revenue
Canada
served
a
requirement
to
pay
pursuant
to
subsection
224(1.2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
on
Carlson
for
unpaid
assessments
of
Seahawk
in
the
amount
of
$44,058.90.
Revenue
Canada
relies
entirely
on
subsection
224(1.2),
which
I
reproduce:
224.(1.2)
Notwithstanding
any
other
provision
of
this
Act,
the
Bankruptcy
Act,
any
other
enactment
of
Canada,
any
enactment
of
a
province
or
any
law,
where
the
Minister
has
knowledge
or
suspects
that
a
particular
person
is
or
will
become,
within
90
days,
liable
to
make
a
payment
(a)
to
another
person
who
is
liable
to
pay
an
amount
assessed
under
subsection
227(10.1)
or
a
similar
provision,
or
to
a
legal
representative
of
that
other
person
(each
of
whom
is
in
this
subsection
referred
to
as
the
"tax
debtor"),
or
(b)
to
a
secured
creditor
who
has
a
right
to
receive
the
payment
that,
but
for
a
security
interest
in
favour
of
the
secured
creditor,
would
be
payable
to
the
tax
debtor,
the
Minister
may,
by
registered
letter
or
by
a
letter
served
personally,
require
the
particular
person
to
pay
forthwith,
where
the
moneys
are
immediately
payable,
and
in
any
other
case,
as
and
when
the
moneys
become
payable,
the
moneys
otherwise
payable
to
the
tax
debtor
or
the
secured
creditor
in
whole
or
in
part
to
the
Receiver
General
on
account
of
the
tax
debtor’s
liability
under
subsection
227(10.1)
or
a
similar
provision.
Revenue
Canada
submits
that
the
language
in
the
section,
particularly
paragraph
(1.2)(b),
settles
the
issue.
They
argue
that
Seahawk
subtrades
and
thus
Guarantee
by
assignment,
have
a
security
interest
in
this
money
which
money,
if
the
assignments
had
not
been
made,
would
belong
to
Seahawk.
Consequently
it
is
submitted
that
the
Income
Tax
Act
clearly
gives
the
Minister
authority
to
intervene
and
claim
the
funds
on
account
of
Seahawk's
liability
to
the
Receiver
General
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Guarantee
relies
on
two
recent
decisions
for
the
proposition
that
subsection
224(1.2),
which
purports
to
transfer
proprietary
rights
from
a
secured
creditor
to
the
Receiver
General
without
compensation,
must
be
strictly
construed.
The
submission
is
that
the
language
in
this
section
must
convey
a
plain
meaning
that
is
unambiguous.
Guarantee
submits
that
it
does
not
do
so
and
that
the
court
should
not
construe
subsection
224(1.2)
in
a
manner
that
would
deprive
a
third
party
of
a
pre-existing
proprietary
right
without
compensation.
The
two
cases
relied
on
by
Guarantee
are
Lloyds
Bank
Canada
v.
International
Warranty
Ltd.,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
401;
89
D.T.C.
5279;
revd
(1989)
60
D.L.R.
(4th)
272;
68
Alta.
L.R.
(2d)
356
and
Concorde
International
Travel
Inc.
v.
T.I.
Travel
Services
(B.C.N.)
Inc.
(1989),
27
C.C.E.L.
254
(B.C.
Co.
Ct.);
76
C.B.R.
(N.S.)
73,
a
decision
of
His
Honour
Judge
Sheppard
in
the
B.C.
County
Court.
I
am
persuaded
by
the
aforesaid
decisions
and
I
refer
to
the
decision
of
the
British
Columbia
Court
of
Appeal
in
Homeplan
Realty
v.
Avco
Financial
Services
Realty
Ltd.
(1977),
81
D.L.R.
(3d)
289;
5
B.C.L.R.
289;
affd
(sub
nom.
Industrial
Rel.
Bd.
v.
Avco
Financial
Services
Ltd.)
2
S.C.R.
699;
98
D.L.R.
(3d)
695.
Both
the
Lloyds
and
Concorde
decisions
rely
upon
this
case
in
interpreting
subsection
224(1.2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
At
page
292
of
Homeplan,
Mr.
Justice
Robertson
writes
in
rather
colourful
terms
as
follows:
If
the
Legislative
Assembly
intends
to
produce
by
statute
results
that
are
so
brutal
and
piratical,
it
has
the
power
to
do
so,
but
the
courts
will
hold
that
was
its
intention
only
if
the
language
of
the
statute
compels
that
interpretation.
In
coming
to
the
conclusion
that
I
have
I
have
adopted
the
words
of
the
Alberta
Court
of
Appeal
in
Lloyds
at
D.L.R.
pages
275-76
as
follows:
In
particular
we
do
not
agree
that
the
section
has
the
“plain
meaning
that
is
unambiguous”
attributed
to
it
by
the
learned
chambers
judge.
For
Revenue
Canada
to
succeed
the
plain
and
unambiguous
meaning
of
the
section
must
be
that
it
deprives
a
properly
secured
creditor,
in
this
case
Lloyds,
of
all
or
part
of
its
security
without
compensation,
for
the
purpose
of
paying
another
debt
entirely
unrelated
to
the
security.
It
is
surely
equivalent
to
the
transfer
of
proprietary
rights
without
compensation.
With
respect
to
Revenue
Canada's
submission
that
the
plain
meaning
rule
of
statutory
interpretation
should
apply
I
agree
with
the
words
of
the
Honourable
Judge
Sheppard
at
C.C.E.L.
page
259
of
Concorde
as
follows:
Even
using
this
approach,
I
cannot
say
that
the
interpretation
given
to
the
section
by
the
Alberta
Court
of
Appeal
was
incorrect.
Reading
the
words
“harmoniously
with
the
scheme
of
the
Act",
it
must
be
noted
that
there
is
an
unproclaimed
amendment
to
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
specifically
addresses
the
issue
of
priority:
(10.2)
Notwithstanding
any
other
provision
of
this
Act,
any
other
enactment
of
Canada,
any
enactment
of
a
Province
or
any
law
where
a
person
has
been
assessed
under
subsection
(10.1)
or
a
similar
provision
the
amount
determined
under
subsection
(10.3)
is
secured
by
a
charge
upon
the
property
referred
to
in
subsection
(10.4)
and
the
charge
has
priority
over
all
other
claims
and
all
other
security
interests.
Counsel
for
Revenue
Canada
submits
that
this
should
not
be
a
consideration
due
to
the
opening
words
of
s.
224(1.2):
“Notwithstanding
any
other
provision
of
this
Act".
While
these
words
would
preclude
consideration
of
another
section
in
the
case
of
a
conflict,
it
would
otherwise
be
against
the
rules
of
statutory
interpretation
to
read
the
section
in
isolation.
I
find
that
Revenue
Canada
is
not
entitled
by
virtue
of
subsection
224(1.2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
the
money
held
by
Carlson
for
the
payment
of
Seahawk's
tax
debts.
The
sum
of
$33,863.25,
plus
accrued
interest
is
to
be
paid
by
Carlson
to
the
petitioner,
Guarantee.
Costs
to
follow
the
event.
Petition
granted.