Rouleau,
J.:—The
plaintiff,
335114
Alberta
Ltd.,
a
judgment
creditor
of
the
plaintiff
Lan-Mar
Developments
Ltd.
("Lan-Mar")
and
also
the
beneficial
owner
of
all
of
the
issued
and
outstanding
shares
of
Lan-Mar,
is
seeking
to
recover
from
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
money
on
deposit
to
the
credit
of
an
employee
payroll
deductions
account;
these
moneys,
initially
deposited
by
Lan-Mar,
were
eventually
credited
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
to
the
payroll
deduction
account
of
View
West
Construction
Limited
(“View
West").
During
the
calendar
year
1979,
Lan-Mar
had
forwarded,
from
time
to
time,
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
approximately
$83,000
to
be
credited
to
their
employee
payroll
deduction
account.
The
allegation
of
the
plaintiff
is
that
during
1979
or
during
any
previous
or
subsequent
year,
Lan-Mar
in
fact
had
no
employees.
Nevertheless,
in
July
of
1981,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
caused
the
amount
credited
to
this
company
to
be
transferred
and
applied
to
the
payment
of
outstanding
employee
deductions
owing
in
respect
of
a
corporation
known
as
View
West.
Lan-Mar
and
View
West
were
at
all
material
times
wholly
owned
and
controlled
by
the
same
principal,
Mr.
Derek
Marsh,
and
both
operated
out
of
the
same
premises.
It
is
alleged
by
the
plaintiff
that
the
transferring
of
these
moneys
from
one
account
to
the
other
was
concluded
without
any
authorization
of
Lan-Mar
or
its
legal
representative;
that
the
money
should
have
remained
as
a
credit
in
the
account
of
Lan-Mar
and
therefore
recoverable,
since
there
were
no
employees
from
which
the
sums
could
have
been
deducted
and
collected
and
no
T4s
had
been
issued
for
the
year
1979
or
any
subsequent
year,
nor
were
there
any
T4s
outstanding.
The
manner
in
which
the
plaintiff
335114
Alberta
Ltd.
as
well
as
Lan-Mar
acquired
the
right
to
bring
this
action
and
seek
recovery
is
complex
and
should
be
explained.
Mr.
Derek
Marsh
was
the
principal
shareholder
and
driving
force
behind
some
15
separate
and
distinct
development
and
construction
companies
operating
in
the
province
of
Alberta
during
the
late
1960s
and
19705.
During
1978
and
1979,
all
of
his
companies
were
in
serious
financial
difficulty
with
various
creditors
as
well
as
with
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
In
a
letter
dated
July
6,
1979
from
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
Mr.
Marsh,
(Exhibit
P-13),
it
was
revealed
that
some
six
of
his
companies,
including
Lan-Mar
as
well
as
View
West,
were
in
arrears
of
forwarding
payroll
deductions
between
the
years
1977
and
1979
in
an
amount
of
$292,828.
Other
creditors
were
pressing;
as
an
example,
in
September
of
1978
Mr.
Marsh
executed
a
personal
undertaking
with
Alcan
Canada
Products
Limited
for
the
indebtedness
of
a
number
of
his
companies
including
View
West.
I
make
particular
reference
to
this
guarantee
because
in
this
document
Mr.
Marsh
indicates
that
a
number
of
his
companies
have
amalgamated
to
form
Lan-Mar.
Sometime
during
the
next
few
years
a
number
of
these
organizations
which
Mr.
Marsh
had
incorporated
either
declared
or
were
petitioned
into
bankruptcy;
subsequently
Mr.
Derek
Marsh
himself
was
petitioned
into
bankruptcy
on
the
22nd
day
of
January
1980
and
a
receiving
order
issued
on
the
20th
day
of
May
1980.
In
June
of
1982,
one
of
his
many
creditors,
Crest
Metal
and
Covering
Limited,
sought
leave
of
the
court
to
bring
an
action
against
the
estate
in
bankruptcy
of
Mr.
Marsh
as
well
as
other
defendants.
The
order
was
granted
on
the
22nd
day
of
June
1982.
Lan-Mar
was
not
a
party
to
the
action.
Crest
Metal
and
Covering
Limited
eventually
obtained
a
consent
judgment
against
Mr.
Marsh
before
the
Court
of
Queen's
Bench
in
the
Province
of
Alberta
on
the
20th
day
of
August
1985.
The
order
was
granted
pursuant
to
a
consent
by
counsel
acting
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Marsh
and
Lan-Mar.
The
judgment
entered
was
for
a
sum
in
excess
of
$1,000,000.
I
note
that
the
action
commenced
in
June
of
1982
by
Crest
Metal
and
Covering
Limited
did
not
disclose
as
a
party
defendant
Lan-Mar
and
there
is
no
evidence
whatsoever
to
indicate
that
the
style
of
cause
in
the
consent
judgment
should
have
been
amended
adding
it
as
one
of
the
defendants.
Subsequent
to
the
judgment
being
issued
it
was
assigned
by
Crest
Metal
and
Covering
Limited
to
the
plaintiff
335114
Alberta
Ltd.
in
a
document
dated
the
7th
day
of
October
1985;
this.
understanding
referred
to
an
agreement
of
March
of
1984
wherein
this
right
of
action
had
purportedly
been
previously
assigned
to
the
plaintiff
and
consented
to
by
Lan-
Mar.
The
assignment
of
March
of
1984
specifically
referred
to
the
action
brought
by
Crest
Metal
and
Covering
Limited
against
Mr.
Marsh
and
others,
and
again
Lan-Mar
is
not
referred
to
as
a
party
defendant
in
the
body
of
this
understanding.
Nevertheless
as
a
result
of
the
judgment,
I
assume
the
plaintiff
was
able
to
seize
as
an
asset
of
Mr.
Marsh,
the
shares
of
Lan-Mar;
or
in
the
alternative,
having
obtained
judgment
against
Lan-Mar,
it
had
a
right
to
execute
and
levy
against
any
of
the
assets
of
the
company.
At
trial,
the
principal
shareholder
of
the
plaintiff
company
334115
Alberta
Ltd.,
Mr.
Morton,
testified
that
he
was
an
accountant
by
profession
and
had
exercised
this
function
for
and
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Marsh
and
his
various
com-
panies
until
1976,
after
which
the
annual
audit
and
statements
for
the
Marsh
companies
were
handled
by
another
firm.
From
that
day
forward
Mr.
Morton
became
a
financial
consultant
to
Mr.
Marsh
but
was
no
longer
familiar
with
the
day-to-day
operations
of
any
of
the
construction
companies;
in
particular
he
was
not
aware
of
the
moneys
paid
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
by
Lan-Mar
during
1979
until
sometime
after
the
bankruptcy.
Nevertheless,
his
evidence
was
that
the
Lan-Mar
corporate
structure
had
never
been
actively
engaged
in
conducting
any
business
whatsoever;
he
agrees
with
the
evidence
of
Mr.
Marsh
that
this
corporate
structure
was
kept
in
abeyance
and
so
to
speak
"on
the
sidelines”
in
case
it
would
be
required
for
reorganizational
purposes.
The
main
bookkeeper
or
comptroller
who
was
directly
involved
in
the
day-
to-day
operations
of
Mr.
Marsh's
affairs
was
not
available.
The
only
person
who
could
testify
on
the
issuance
of
T4s
for
the
1979
fiscal
year
indicated
that
she
worked
for
some
five
or
six
months
in
late
1979
and
the
early
months
of
1980;
that
she
had
been
given
T4
summaries
for
View
West
and
as
a
result
issued
T4s
in
early
1980
for
the
employees
of
that
company.
Mr.
Marsh
himself
could
shed
very
little
light
on
the
proceeding
but
maintained
vehemently
that
Lan-Mar
had
never
been
activated
or
transacted
any
business
and
that
it
never
employed
a
single
worker
either
before,
during
or
after
the
relevant
dates.
When
questioned
about
the
depositing
of
funds
with
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
purportedly
as
employee
payroll
deductions,
his
answer
was
that
he
was
considering
using
Lan-Mar
for
reorganiza-
tional
purposes
and
that
he
trusted
the
government
to
hold
these
funds
rather
than
a
chartered
bank.
Witnesses
who
attended
at
the
offices
occupied
by
Lan-Mar
and
View
West
when
the
defendant
had
conducted
audits
during
1979
were
not
available;
it
could
not
produce
Mr.
Bens
who
was
the
author
of
Exhibit
P-13,
the
letter
Originally
referred
to
earlier
in
this
decision,
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
referred
to
$292,828
owing
for
payroll
deductions
between
the
years
1977
and
1979
and
which
also
outlined
a
repayment
schedule
for
the
arrears.
The
defendant's
only
witness
was
the
Chief
of
Collections
for
the
Calgary
region
who
has
had
20
years
of
experience
and
was
familiar
with
audits
and
the
accounting
procedures
of
the
Department.
His
testimony
was
forthright,
honest
and
I
accept
it
in
its
entirety.
He
indicated
to
the
Court
that
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
does
not
open
an
account
to
record
employee
deductions
until
requested
by
a
prospective
employer.
He
pointed
to
Exhibit
P-11
which
was
an
application
submitted
by
Lan-Mar
on
March
19,
1979,
in
which
it
advised
that
the
company
had
commenced
operations
on
the
1st
of
January
1979,
had
some
30
employees
and
required
an
employer
registration
number
in
order
to
forward
to
the
Department
that
portion
of
employee
contributions
which
were
being
withheld
from
their
wages.
According
to
the
witness,
upon
receipt
of
such
a
request
and
in
view
of
the
fact
that
it
arrived
some
three
months
into
the
calendar
year,
this
would
require
attendances
to
review
payroll
records.
Relying
on
the
computer
printouts,
which
are
Exhibit
D-6,
he
was
able
to
interpret
and
ascertain
that
some
three
or
four
audits
were
conducted
between
March
and
July
of
1979;
as
a
result
of
these
attendances,
notices
indicating
arrears
owing
or
credits
were
issued
and
some
were
filed
as
Exhibit
P-6.
It
was
his
evidence
that
because
of
the
audit
and
payroll
checks,
the
computer
printouts
reflected
that
there
were
employees
working
for
or
on
behalf
of
Lan-Mar;
they
further
indicated
to
him
that
no
one
was
in
the
employ
of
View
West
during
1979.
As
explained
by
this
witness,
T4s
are
issued
to
employees
at
the
end
of
each
calendar
year.
They
are
subsequently
submitted
by
individuals
when
filing
their
annual
income
tax
returns
for
the
previous
year,
in
this
case
for
1979.
Upon
receipt,
the
amounts
retained
from
wages
declared
by
the
taxpayer
and
shown
on
his
accompanying
T4
are
offset
against
the
amount
paid
into
the
Department
to
their
credit
by
the
employer.
No
T4s
for
Lan-Mar
were
received
by
the
Department
during
1980
or
subsequently.
By
the
spring
of
1980
an
amount
of
money
almost
equal
to
the
sums
withheld
by
Lan-Mar
turned
up
in
T4s
accompanying
tax
returns
filed
by
employees
who
purportedly
would
have
worked
for
View
West
during
1979.
This
witness
further
explained
to
the
Court
the
audit
procedure:
the
auditors
attend
at
the
premises
of
the
employers;
they
would
check
payroll
records
and
submit
to
the
employers
notices
as
to
the
outstanding
amounts
owing
for
employee
deductions.
The
auditors
were
obviously
satisfied
that
there
were
employees
with
Lan-Mar
and
none
with
View
West
and
this
is
clearly
reflected
in
the
computer
printouts.
On
the
issue
of
transferring
the
credits
from
one
account
to
another,
it
was
his
evidence
that
before
any
amount
is
transferred,
the
official
would
normally
seek
authorization
from
the
proper
party.
Combined
with
the
audit
and
the
authorization,
a
report
would
then
be
forwarded
to
a
clerk
of
process
who
would
review
the
contents
of
the
file
and,
if
satisfied
that
there
was
proper
authorization,
would
direct
the
transfer
of
funds.
The
Crown
was
unable
to
produce
either
the
audit
file
or
the
authorization
document
since
they
were
no
longer
available.
However,
they
were
able
to
produce
directions
from
the
clerk
of
process
to
accounting
requesting
the
transfer
of
the
credit
from
Lan-Mar
to
the
View
West
account.
These
authorizations
are
dated
July
of
1981.
I
am
satisfied
that
the
transfer
of
funds
from
the
employee
payroll
deductions
account
of
Lan-Mar
to
View
West
cannot
be
attacked
or
set
aside.
No
doubt
Mr.
Marsh
probably
did
not
provide
this
authorization
as
the
procedure
of
the
Department
required.
I
am
of
the
view
that
more
than
likely
permission
would
have
been
obtained
from
the
trustee
in
bankruptcy.
The
evidence
is
that
Mr.
Marsh
was
bankrupt
in
1980,
his
assets
which
would
include
the
shares
of
Lan-Mar
would
have
been
under
the
control
of
a
trustee
and
one
can
suspect
that
authority
to
transfer
was
issued
by
a
trustee.
I
am
further
convinced
that
the
Department
would
not
have
unconscionably
deviated
from
its
regular
procedure.
Though
the
preceding
conclusion
is
speculative,
I
am
convinced
that
the
funds
were
properly
transferred
and
reliance
and
authorization
can
be
inferred
from
the
letter
of
July
6,
1979,
(Exhibit
P-13).
It
reveals
that
the
sum
of
$292,828
owing
as
of
July
1979
was
a
problem
not
only
for
the
Department
but
also
for
Mr.
Marsh.
Further,
it
indicates
that
an
agreement
had
been
reached
between
a
Mr.
Bens
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
Mr.
Marsh;
there
were
six
companies
in
arrears
of
forwarding
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
payroll
employee
deductions
which
were
all
lumped
into
one
collection
agreement.
The
Minister
was
to
receive
$100,000
and
was
to
be
assigned
mortgages
on
properties
held
by
various
companies
in
the
amount
of
$150,000.
Among
the
securities
were
mortgages
held
by
View
West;
realization
upon
repayment
of
these
mortgages
owed
to
the
various
corporations
as
well
as
the
sale
of
any
property
on
which
security
had
been
obtained
was
to
be
applied
to
the
outstanding
amounts
owing
on
various
payroll
deduction
accounts
but
not
specifically
applied
or
earmarked
to
any
particular
one.
The
Department
appears
to
have
retained,
through
the
agreement
of
July
6,
1979,
discretion
in
the
application
of
funds
received.
This
correspondence
was
not
objected
to
and
appears
to
be
the
best
evidence
of
the
relationship
between
the
Department
and
Mr.
Marsh.
It
seems
inconceivable
to
me
that
the
financial
consultant
would
not
be
aware
of
the
money
paid
into
the
Department
on
behalf
of
Lan-Mar
and
yet
on
the
other
hand
have
known
that
this
company
sat
inactive
for
the
purposes
of
an
eventual
re-organization.
As
I
objectively
weigh
the
evidence
adduced
at
trial,
I
totally
reject
the
testimony
of
Mr.
Marsh;
it
is
completely
inconsistent
with
the
documentary
evidence.
Why
would
he
execute
a
guarantee
in
September
of
1978
in
favour
of
Alcan
Canada
Products
Limited
in
which
he
stated
that
some
of
his
companies
had
already
merged
into
Lan-Mar
and
then
testify
that
it
had
carried
on
no
business
activity
whatsoever?
Why
would
Lan-Mar
participate
and
consent
to
various
judgments,
particularly
in
the
action
brought
by
Crest
Metal
and
Covering
Limited,
when
it
was
not
a
party
to
the
action?
To
suggest
to
the
Court
that
the
moneys
were
safer
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
than
in
a
bank
account
with
a
Canadian
chartered
bank
is
ludicrous.
This
complex
series
of
events
can
only
be
interpreted
through
some
documentary
evidence
and
vague
testimony.
Nevertheless,
I
am
prepared
to
accept
that
the
auditors
would
have
found
payroll
records
for
employees
of
Lan-Mar
and
rightfully
set
up
an
account
and
requested
payment.
It
should
be
remembered
that
both
Lan-Mar
and
View
West
operated
out
of
the
same
office
and
one
can
surmise
that
in
view
of
the
financial
difficulty
View
West
was
encountering
it
obviously
had
cash
flow
problems
during
1979
and
the
employees
must
have
been
paid
by
funds
provided
by
Lan-Mar;
this
corporate
structure
being
held
in
abeyance
for
reorganization
would
more
than
likely
have
had
funds
advanced
to
it
from
time
to
time
by
Mr.
Marsh.
Once
again,
turning
to
Exhibit
P-13,
we
see
it
clearly
established
in
the
body
of
this
correspondence
that
the
audit
disclosed
money
owing
for
payroll
deduction
of
Lan-Mar;
this
was
not
disputed
by
Mr.
Marsh.
The
testimony
of
the
Chief
Collections
Officer
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
is
much
more
consistent.
I
accept
the
evidence
that
the
auditors
did
attend
at
the
premises
occupied
by
both
Lan-Mar
and
View
West;
that
they
did
find
payroll
records
indicating
that
Lan-Mar
had
employees
and
that
View
West
had
none;
that
the
amounts
paid
by
Lan-Mar
for
payroll
deductions
were
almost
equal
to
the
amounts
claimed
in
T4s
submitted
by
View
West
employees;
that
the
bookkeeper
who
issued
the
T4s
in
early
1980
had
no
access
to
the
details
of
the
employees'
payroll.
It
is
obvious
to
me
that
she
relied
solely
on
T4
summaries
submitted
to
her
by
someone
in
authority.
On
the
balance
of
probabilities,
I
am
satisfied
that
there
was
consent
to
the
transfer
and
furthermore,
by
inference,
I
find
that
the
moneys
paid
by
Lan-Mar
were
to
apply
to
any
or
all
outstanding
payroll
deduction
accounts.
An
argument
was
raised
by
the
defendant
that
the
moneys
concerned,
if
they
constituted
a
debt
owed
by
the
Crown,
are
not
assignable
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
Financial
Administration
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
F-11,
and
therefore
are
not
recoverable
by
335114
Alberta
Ltd.
I
agree
that,
if
the
seizure
by
335114
Alberta
Ltd.
can
be
considered
an
assignment,
the
provisions
of
the
Financial
Administration
Act
prevents
any
such
assignment
from
being
effective
against
the
Crown
except
as
provided
in
that
Act.
In
any
event,
whether
this
can
be
considered
an
assignment
or
not,
I
am
Satisfied
that
even
if
a
debt
was
owing,
the
plaintiff's
action
is
now
statute-
barred.
Section
38
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
F-7,
provides
as
follows:
38.(1)
Except
as
expressly
provided
by
any
other
Act,
the
laws
relating
to
prescription
and
the
limitation
of
actions
in
force
in
any
province
between
subject
and
subject
apply
to
any
proceedings
in
the
Court
in
respect
of
any
cause
of
action
arising
in
such
province,
and
a
proceeding
in
the
Court
in
respect
of
a
cause
of
action
arising
otherwise
than
in
a
province
shall
be
taken
within
and
not
after
six
years
after
the
cause
of
action
arose.
(2)
Except
as
expressly
provided
by
any
other
Act,
the
laws
relating
to
prescription
and
the
limitation
of
actions
referred
to
in
subsection
(1)
apply
to
any
proceedings
brought
by
or
against
the
Crown.
Section
4
of
the
Alberta
Limitation
of
Actions
Act,
R.S.A.
1980,
c.
L-15,
provides:
4(1)
The
following
actions
shall
be
commenced
within
and
not
after
the
time
respectively
hereinafter
mentioned:
(a)
actions
for
penalties
imposed
by
a
statute
brought
(i)
by
an
informer
suing
for
himself
alone
or
for
the
Crown
as
well
as
for
himself,
or
(ii)
by
a
person
authorized
to
sue
for
the
penalties,
not
being
the
person
aggrieved,
within
one
year
after
the
cause
of
action
arose;
(b)
actions
for
penalties,
damages
or
sums
of
money
in
the
nature
of
penalties
given
by
a
statute
(i)
to
the
Crown,
(ii)
to
the
person
aggrieved,
or
(iii)
partly
to
one
and
partly
to
the
other,
within
2
years
after
the
cause
of
action
arose;
(c)
actions
(i)
for
the
recovery
of
money,
other
than
a
debt
charged
on
land,
whether
recoverable
as
a
debt
or
damages
or
otherwise,
and
whether
on
a
recognizance,
bond,
covenant
or
other
specialty
or
on
a
simple
contract,
express
or
implied,
or
(ii)
for
an
account
or
for
not
accounting,
within
6
years
after
the
cause
of
action
arose;
(d)
actions
grounded
on
fraudulent
misrepresentations,
within
6
years
from
the
discovery
of
the
fraud;
(e)
actions
grounded
on
accident,
mistake
or
other
equitable
ground
of
relief
not
hereinbefore
specifically
dealt
with,
within
6
years
from
the
discovery
of
the
cause
of
action;
(f)
actions
on
a
judgment
or
order
for
the
payment
of
money,
within
10
years
after
the
cause
of
action
thereon
arose;
(g)
any
other
action
not
in
this
Act
or
any
other
Act
specifically
provided
for,
within
6
years
after
the
cause
of
action
therein
arose.
(2)
Nothing
in
this
section
extends
to
an
action
when
the
time
for
bringing
the
action
is
by
statute
specially
limited.
Paragraph
4(1)(c)
of
the
Alberta
statute
is
the
governing
provision;
the
plaintiff's
action
against
the
Crown
must
be
brought
within
six
years
from
when
the
cause
of
action
arose.
The
question
which
remains
is
when
the
cause
of
action
arose.
Kamloops
v.
Neilson,
[1984]
2
S.C.R.
2;
[1984]
5
W.W.R.
1
and
Central
Trust
Co.
v.
Rafuse,
[1986]
2
S.C.R.
147;
31
D.L.R.
(3d)
481;
varied
[1988]
1
S.C.R.
1206;
44
C.C.L.
T.
xxxiv
are
authority
for
the
proposition
that,
in
tort,
the
cause
of
action
does
not
arise
until
the
damage
itself
was,
or
should
have,
by
the
exercise
of
reasonable
diligence,
been
discovered.
However,
in
an
action
based
on
contract,
the
cause
of
action
arises
at
the
time
of
the
breach
of
contract
(Fidelity
Trust
Company
V.
98956
Investments
Ltd.
(Receiver
of),
[1988]
6
W.W.R.
427;
61
Alta.
L.R.
(2d)
193).
In
an
action
for
a
debt
or
an
accounting,
it
accrues
when
the
debt
arises
or
there
arises
an
entitlement
to
account.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
debt
or
right
to
an
accounting
arose
at
the
time
the
moneys
were
deposited
to
the
payroll
deduction
account,
if
there
was
a
credit
balance.
The
evidence
indicates
that
this
took
place
in
1979;
therefore
the
latest
that
the
cause
of
action
could
have
accrued
is
January
1,
1980.
The
statement
of
claim
was
not
filed
until
June
of
1987,
thus
long
after
the
six-year
limitation
period
expired.
Therefore,
the
plaintiff's
cause
of
action
is
statute-barred.
In
the
body
of
this
decision
I
had
indicated
that
there
was
a
credit
in
the
amount
of
$83,000;
this
amount
is
taken
from
the
statement
of
claim.
On
the
other
hand,
the
printouts,
evidence
and
calculations
by
counsel
would
indicate
that
there
may
have
been
as
little
as
$88,000
or
as
much
as
$100,000
paid
in;
as
well,
that
there
may
have
been
a
surplus
varying
between
$5,000
and
$8,000
after
transferring
the
moneys
to
the
View
West
account.
Though
the
sum
transferred
may
exceed
the
requirements
of
the
payroll
account,
as
reflected
in
the
computer
printouts,
knowing
that
it
had
not
been
properly
audited
for
1979,
one
can
presume
that
penalties
and
interest
would
also
have
been
added
to
the
account.
For
that
reason,
as
well
as
the
almost
inconceivable
complexity
of
the
printouts,
I
am
satisfied
that
any
surplus
moneys
paid
could
and
should
be
applied
to
any
of
the
outstanding
accounts
of
Mr.
Marsh's
companies.
I
am
not
prepared
to
allow
for
the
reimbursement
of
any
sum
to
the
plaintiff
but,
on
the
other
hand,
taking
this
into
consideration,
no
costs
will
be
awarded
to
the
defendant.
The
plaintiff's
action
is
hereby
dismissed.
Action
dismissed.
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