Rip,
T.CJ.:—The
appellant,
Kodandaraman
Balasubramanian,
appeals
from
an
income
tax
assessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
June
30,
1988,
pursuant
to
subsection
227(10)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
'Act")
for
an
amount
payable
by
him
under
section
227.1.
The
respondent
assessed
the
appellant
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant
was
a
director
of
Process
Piping
Specialty
Inc.
("Process")
during
the
period
July,
1985
to
July,
1986,
being
the
time
the
corporation
was
required
to
remit,
but
did
not
remit,
amounts
the
corporation
had
withheld
from
salary
and
wages
of
its
employees
on
account
of
income
tax
("source
deductions")
in
accordance
with
subsection
153(1)
of
the
Act.
The
appellant
is
a
professional
engineer.
Prior
to
July
1976
he
was
an
Assistant
General
Manager
in
charge
of
manufacturing
for
Crane
Canada
Ltd.
His
job
required
him
to
travel
to
his
employer's
plants
throughout
Canada.
In
July,
1976
the
appellant
accepted
an
offer
of
employment
in
Montreal
from
a
Mr.
Louis
Bakelmun
("Bakelmun")
who
controlled
Process.
Process
was
in
the
business
of
making
special
valves
for
ships.
The
appellant
was
in
charge
of
manufacturing
and
production
at
Process.
Bakelmun
was
in
charge
of
Process’
management
and
administration.
Soon
after
the
appellant
commenced
his
new
job
in
August,
1976
he
realized
Process
required
capital.
He
at
first
offered
to
acquire
shares
in
the
company.
However,
a
loan
by
the
appellant
to
Process
for
$40,000
was
negotiated
ana
Bakelmun
promised
the
appellant
he
would
have
the
right
to
acquire
forty
per
cent
of
the
issued
shares
of
the
company
over
one
or
two
years.
The
company
grew
over
the
next
two
years
and
Bakelmun
suggested
the
appellant
invest
another
$40,000
in
the
company,
and
he
did.
At
approximately
the
same
time
five
promissory
notes
from
the
appellant
to
Process
were
prepared,
each
in
the
principal
amount
of
$5,000
with
interest
on
the
principal
at
ten
per
cent
per
annum.
It
was
understood
that
the
appellant
would
acquire
five
per
cent
of
the
shares
of
Process
as
each
note
was
satisfied.
This,
the
appellant
reminded
the
Court,
was
different
from
the
original
deal.
In
any
event
in
July
1980
the
appellant
paid
$5,000
on
a
note,
requested
a
share
certificate
but
received
nothing.
The
appellant
stopped
making
any
payments
on
the
notes
in
1982,
telling
Bakelmun
he
would
not
pay
until
he
received
a
certificate
for
five
per
cent
of
the
shares.
To
his
mind
and
Bakelmun's
mind,
said
the
appellant,
he
owned
five
per
cent
of
the
shares.
He
stated
Bakelmun
had
instructed
the
company's
lawyer
to
prepare
documents
reflecting
such
ownership.
As
well
an
application
by
Process
for
a
loan
to
a
Quebec
Industrial
Development
Corporation
stated
Bakelmun
was
the
owner
of
95
per
cent
of
the
shares
and
the
appellant
5
per
cent.
By
letter
date
October
21,
1985
to
Bakelmun
the
appellant
indicated
he
no
longer
wished
to
act
as
an
officer
of
Process.
At
trial
he
stated
the
word
"officer"
included
"director".
However,
he
did
not
resign
at
the
time
since
he
wished
to
reconsider
the
situation.
Apparently
two
of
Bakelmun's
sons
had
entered
the
business
and
the
appellant
was
of
the
view
too
many
people
were
involved
in
the
business.
In
carrying
on
its
business
Process
purchased
all
of
its
raw
material
from
one
supplier,
Wilson
Brass,
which
operated
from
Scarborough,
Ontario.
Wilson
Brass
prepared
the
casts
for
the
pipes.
In
August
1985
Wilson
Brass
closed
its
operations
and
Process
was
without
a
source
of
supply.
The
appellant
made
arrangements
with
the
creditors
of
Wilson
Brass
to
purchase
its
assets
and
to
this
end
incorporated
Montreal
Bronze
Ltd.
("Bronze").
Bakelmun
and
the
appellant
agreed
the
appellant
would
continue
to
manage
Process'
manufacturing
plant
in
Montreal
and
at
the
same
time
commute
to
Scarborough
to
supervise
the
preparation
of
the
castings.
The
appellant
spent
two
days
a
week
at
Process
in
Montreal
and
four
days
at
Bronze
in
Scarborough.
His
family
continued
to
live
in
Montreal.
Beginning
in
March
1986
Process
had
cash
flow
problems
and
was
unable
to
meet
its
obligations
to
its
banker,
the
National
Bank
of
Canada.
The
appellant
testified
Bakelmun
would
tell
him
"the
bank
called
and
something
has
to
be
done".
The
first
time
the
appellant
became
aware
that
source
deductions
were
not
being
remitted
to
the
Receiver
General
was
in
April
1986
when
an
official
of
the
respondent
informed
him
Process
was
"two—three
months
behind”
in
remitting
the
source
deductions.
The
appellant
asked
the
official
to
meet
with
him
at
the
company's
plant.
The
meeting
took
place
during
the
second
week
of
April.
In
attendance
were
the
appellant,
Bakelmun,
who
was
responsible
for
source
deductions,
and
the
Revenue
Canada
official.
The
meeting
took
place
in
Bakelmun's
office.
The
appellant
and
Bakelmun
agreed
to
rectify
the
situation
and
give
post-dated
cheques
to
the
official:
a
cheque
dated
May
1,
1986
in
the
amount
of
$8,000,
two
cheques
dated
June
1
and
July
1,
1986
in
the
amount
of
$12,000
each
and
a
cheque
dated
August
1,
1986
for
$9,955.
The
purpose
of
the
cheques
was
to
bring
the
source
deductions
up
to
date.
The
cheque
for
May
1986
was
cashed.
The
appellant
said
he
heard
nothing
further
from
Revenue
Canada
until
July
1986.
In
the
meantime
he
said
he
had
an
understanding
with
Bakelmun
that
from
then
on
all
remittances
would
be
made
on
time.
He
generally
was
not
involved
in
the
administration
of
Process
unless
"Bakelmun
discussed
(it)
with
me”.
He
relied
on
Bakelmun
for
all
administrative
matters.
Bakelmun
was
very
"cash
conscious"
according
to
the
appellant.
If
he
had
cash
he
paid
his
bills.
The
appellant
testified
that
during
the
period
September
1985
to
the
end
of
January
1986
Process
had
monthly
sales
of
approximately
$150,000
and
at
the
time
problems
began
the
company
had
a
backlog
of
orders
aggregating
$600,000.
He
said
he
personally
tried
to
bring
sales
to
their
usual
levels
and
"assumed
Louis
was
doing
his
work".
On
this
basis
the
appellant
was
of
the
view
source
deductions
would
be
remitted.
The
appellant
acknowledged
he
was
aware
of
his
liability
as
director
under
section
227.1
of
the
Act.
He
stated
Process
had
no
problems
with
source
deductions
before
1986.
When
trouble
began
"we"
intended
to
use
the
same
system
used
at
Bronze
which
was
working
well.
The
system
at
Bronze
was
not
described.
The
appellant
admitted
he
had
access
to
Process'
books
and
records
but
never
asked
to
see
them
"because
(there
was)
no
need”.
At
the
end
of
April
or
the
beginning
of
May
1986,
according
to
the
appellant,
Process
had
"overdraft
problems"
with
the
banker.
During
the
second
week
of
May
a
bank
inspector
was
sent
to
Process
to
verify
the
company's
inventory
and
accounts.
The
inspector's
report
was
unsatisfactory.
The
bank
demanded
a
financial
statement
be
prepared
immediately
or
that
it
would
cause
an
outside
auditor
to
prepare
the
statement.
The
company's
accountant
prepared
a
statement
for
the
seven-month
period
ending
on
April
30,
1986.
While
the
statement
was
being
prepared
the
bank
advised
Process
it
“would
hold
the
account
'as
is'
and
not
honour
any
further
cheques
above
the
overdraft".
Cheques
in
circulation
were
in
jeopardy.
"We
no
longer
had
control
over
cheques
we
had
issued,”
the
appellant
said.
By
mid-June
the
bank
was
returning
cheques.
A
meeting
with
the
bank
employees
was
held
on
the
2nd
or
3rd
of
July
1986.
Three
days
later
the
bank
sent
a
firm
of
chartered
accountants,
Raymond,
Chabot,
Martin
&
Paré
("Raymond,
Chabot”)
to
audit
Process.
"Basically,"
the
appellant
explained,
"the
company's
operations
were
seized
.
.
.
We
couldn't
do
anything
.
.
.
We
signed
cheques
but
Raymond,
Chabot
decided
which
cheques
the
bank
would
honour.
.
.
.”
In
the
meantime,
the
appellant
declared,
he
“specifically
told
the
National
Bank
not
to
refuse
Revenue
Canada
cheques".
In
the
first
week
of
July
an
employee
of
the
respondent
informed
the
witness
that
one
of
the
post-dated
cheques
had
been
returned.
Raymond,
Chabot
eventually
determined
the
company
was
not
viable.
Subsequently
an
official
from
the
respondent
attended
at
Process
and
requested
details
of
customers,
accounts
receivable,
orders
and
other
matters.
Revenue
Canada
was
advised
that
Process
had
a
receivable
of
$50,000
due
from
the
Department
of
National
Defence.
The
appellant
testified
he
was
told
Revenue
Canada
would
"try
to
seize
the
government
receivable
and
apply
it
to
source
deductions"
before
the
bank
acted.
Two
days
after
the
appellant
met
with
Revenue
Canada,
the
bank,
on
July
23,
1986,
called
in
its
loans
and
seized
the
company's
receivables
under
section
178
of
the
Bank
Act.
This
included
the
$50,000
receivable
from
the
federal
government.
Ms.
Patricia
Alferez,
a
Collections
Officer
with
Revenue
Canada,
testified
a
third
party
demand
was
made
on
July
21,
1986
to
the
Commanding
Officer
of
Canadian
Forces
Base
St.
John’s,
but
only
$8,651
was
collected.
She
had
“no
idea"
for
the
reason
not
all
the
money
due
the
respondent
was
collected
before
the
bank
exercised
its
rights.
The
appellant
said
he
had
telephoned
the
Commanding
Officer
at
CFB
St.
John's
and
was
advised
the
$50,000
was
to
be
withheld.
Process
had
completed
its
contract
for
the
Department.
However,
once
the
bank
took
action
on
July
23,
the
bank
had
priority,
the
appellant
said.
By
September
1986
Process
was
bankrupt.
The
appellant's
loans
of
$80,000,
were
lost.
The
payroll
of
Process
had
been
prepared
by
the
National
Bank
with
funds
from
the
company's
line
of
credit;
the
last
payroll
it
prepared
was
that
of
June
20,
1986.
Subsequent
payables
were
made
with
Process'
own
cheques
as
directed
by
Raymond,
Chabot,
stated
the
appellant.
Process'
bookkeeper,
Jocelyne
Lacoste,
maintained
the
books
of
account
for
Process
including
invoices,
payables
and
receivables
and
prepared
cheques.
She
also
dealt
with
the
bank.
Cheques
were
usually
signed
by
Bakelmun
and
if
he
was
absent,
by
the
appellant.
Process
was
housed
in
a
building
owned
by
Bakelmun
until
it
had
to
move
in
July
1986
because
the
property
had
been
sold.
At
the
time
of
the
move
in
July
the
appellant
saw
cancelled
cheques
payable
to
Lacoste
purporting
to
bear
his
signature
but
which
he
had
not
signed;
the
amount
represented
by
the
cheques
for
the
past
year
was
$80,000.
Criminal
charges
were
laid
against
Lacoste
but
she
was
acquitted.
Copies
of
several
of
the
cheques
bearing
the
appellant's
forged
signature
were
adduced
as
evidence.
Civil
action
was
taken
against
Lacoste
as
well
but
was
withdrawn
once
she
became
bankrupt.
Bakelmun
did
not
testify.
He
and
the
appellant
are
not
on
speaking
terms,
the
appellant
said.
The
appellant
stated
that
when
an
action
between
Process
and
the
Canadian
Imperial
Bank
of
Commerce,
its
former
banker,
was
settled
on
September
15,
1986,
the
cheque
for
the
settled
amount
was
deposited
by
Bakelmun
in
the
account
of
Process
Piping
Canada
Ltd.,
and
not
that
of
Process.
The
appellant
revealed
he
became
aware
of
the
settlement
one
and
a
half
years
after
the
settlement
and
had
not
known
Bakelmun
had
received
funds.
He
testified
that
at
one
time
he
and
Bakelmun
agreed
that
any
money
from
the
Canadian
Imperial
Bank
of
Commerce
would
be
applied
to
the
debt
with
Revenue
Canada.
The
appellant
also
testified
that
he
learned
from
Raymond,
Chabot
that
some
of
Process'
customers
had
been
paying
their
accounts
directly
to
Bakelmun
rather
than
to
Process;
the
receivables
paid
to
Bakelmun
were
estimated
to
be
between
$30,000
and
$40,000.
Mr.
Pierre-André
Lavoie,
an
auditor
with
Raymond,
Chabot
helped
audit
Process
in
1986.
He
testified
that
from
July
11
to
July
18
the
firm
was
working
at
Process
to
determine
the
feasibility
of
the
company
continuing
operations.
His
firm's
approval
for
cheques
was
not
required
during
this
period,
he
said.
However,
the
bank
honoured
only
"indispensable"
cheques,
such
as
payroll,
suppliers,
C.O.D.
for
necessary
material,
even
if
they
were
for
amounts
above
the
line
of
credit.
Sometimes
he
would
advise
the
bank
to
accept
certain
other
cheques.
Mr.
Gaétan
Bouffard,
at
time
of
trial
an
employee
of
Bronze,
worked
at
Process
from
1974
to
1986.
He
corroborated
the
appellant's
evidence
that
Bakelmun
was
in
charge
of
administration
at
Process
and
that
the
appellant
worked
on
a
regular
and
daily
basis
at
the
production
section.
No
source
deductions
had
been
remitted
by
Process
to
the
Receiver
General
during
the
period
July
1985
to
July
1986.
The
assessed
amount
in
issue
is
a
liability
under
subsection
227.1(1)
of
the
Act
and
represents
the
amount
of
unpaid
deductions,
interest
and
penalties
payable
by
Process
in
respect
of
notices
of
assessment
dated
November
23,
1985,
May
16,
1986,
July
23,
1986
and
December
31,
1986.
It
is
clear
from
the
notice
of
assessment
that
the
assessed
amount
is
in
respect
of
a
liability
under
the
Act
only
and
does
not
represent
any
liability
under
any
other
statute
such
as
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act.
Subsections
227.1(1)
and
(3)
read
as
follows:
(1)
Where
a
corporation
has
failed
to
deduct
or
withhold
an
amount
as
required
by
subsection
135(3)
or
section
153
or
215,
has
failed
to
remit
such
an
amount
or
has
failed
to
pay
an
amount
of
tax
for
a
taxation
year
as
required
under
Part
VII
or
VIII,
the
directors
of
the
corporation
at
the
time
the
corporation
was
required
to
deduct,
withhold,
remit
or
pay
the
amount
are
jointly
and
severally
liable,
together
with
the
corporation,
to
pay
that
amount
and
any
interest
or
penalties
relating
thereto.
(3)
A
director
is
not
liable
for
a
failure
under
subsection
(1)
where
he
exercised
the
degree
of
care,
diligence
and
skill
to
prevent
the
failure
that
a
reasonably
prudent
person
would
have
exercised
in
comparable
circumstances.
The
appellant
says
he
exercised
the
degree
of
care,
diligence
and
skill
to
prevent
the
failure
by
Process
that
a
reasonably
prudent
person
would
have
exercised
in
comparable
circumstances.
There
is
absolutely
no
evidence
the
appellant
did
anything
before
April
1986
to
prevent
Process'
failure.
In
fact
he
could
not
have
done
anything
before
that
time
because
he
was
unaware
of
the
failure
or
that
any
failure
to
remit
was
imminent.
He
was
unaware
of
the
failure
because
Bakelmun
was
responsible
for
administration,
including
the
remission
of
source
deductions
to
the
respondent,
and
he
did
not
interfere
in
Bakelmun's
bailiwick.
The
appellant
and
Bakelmun
had
delegated
to
each
other
certain
management
functions
which
each
carried
on
without
interference
by
the
other.
The
only
occasions
the
appellant
would
address
his
mind
to
an
administrative
matter
was
when
invited
to
do
so
by
Bakelmun.
The
appellant
testified
that
Process
had
no
difficulty
in
remitting
source
deductions
prior
to
1985.
This
may
be
true,
but
a
director
cannot
assume
that
because
source
deductions
were
remitted
previously
on
time
they
will
continue
to
be
so
remitted
in
the
future.
A
director
must
have
a
basis
to
his
confidence
that
source
deductions
will
be
remitted
as
required
by
law.
He
must
satisfy
himself
that
the
system
the
corporation
has
in
place
ensures
payments
of
the
source
deductions
to
the
Receiver
General
of
Canada
as
and
when
required
by
the
Act
and
its
Regulations.
I
am
not
satisfied
that
the
appellant
prior
to
April
1986
was
even
familiar
with
Process'
practise
of
remitting
source
deductions.
The
appellant
was
not
in
the
same
situation
as
the
director
in
Merson
v.
M.N.R.,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
2074;
89
D.T.C.
22;
where
source
deduc
tions
continued
to
be
made
even
after
the
corporation's
banker
intervened.
At
the
same
time
it
is
true
that
a
director,
barring
any
reason
to
the
contrary,
is
entitled
to
have
some
confidence
in
the
ability
and
integrity
of
fellow
directors,
in
particular
when
the
directors
are
also
employed
by
the
corporation
in
capacities
other
than
as
a
director;
however,
there
must
be
a
reasonable
basis
for
the
confidence.
After
the
meeting
in
Bakelmun's
office
in
the
second
week
of
April
1985,
when
post-dated
cheques
were
delivered
to
Revenue
Canada,
the
appellant
and
Bakelmun
agreed
the
situation
would
not
be
repeated.
They
intended
to
use
a
new
system
to
ensure
source
deductions
would
be
remitted
on
a
timely
basis.
The
appellant
said
he
was
endeavouring
to
increase
Process'
cash
flow
and
assumed
Bakelmun
was
doing
the
same.
However
within
a
month
of
the
meeting
with
the
Revenue
Canada
official,
the
bank
was
reviewing
Process'
finances
and
was
not
honouring
all
the
cheques
issued
by
the
bank.
The
appellant
asked
the
bank
to
honour
the
cheques
representing
the
amounts
of
source
deductions
but
the
bank
ignored
his
request.
Each
appeal
from
an
assessment
under
section
227.1
is
to
be
considered
on
its
own
particular
set
of
facts.
In
the
appeal
at
bar
the
appellant
has
failed
to
convince
me
that
he
exercised
any
degree
of
care,
diligence
and
skill
to
prevent
any
failure
by
Process
to
remit
amounts
it
was
required
to
remit
with
respect
to
wages
paid
during
the
months
ending
prior
to
March
1986.
However
the
appellant
did
use
his
best
efforts
in
attempting
to
prevent
any
further
failure
by
Process
once
the
meeting
in
April
1986
took
place.
He
and
Bakelmun
together
undertook
that
Process
would
commence
to
remit
on
a
timely
basis.
The
appellant's
obligations
to
Process
and
Bronze
forced
him
to
be
away
from
Process'
offices
in
Montreal
during
the
majority
of
the
work
week
and
at
the
time
he
had
no
reason
to
believe
Bakelmun
would
not
honour
their
mutual
undertaking.
His
absence
from
Montreal
and
his
original
disinterest
in
administration
may
have
influenced
Process
to
default
in
remitting
the
source
deductions
prior
to
April
1986.
However,
after
the
meeting
of
April,
the
appellant
believed
he
had
come
to
an
understanding
with
Bakelmun
which
would
ensure
that
Process
would
remit
source
deductions
on
a
timely
basis.
His
belief
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
In
order
to
achieve
the
level
of
conduct
described
in
subsection
227.1(3),
a
director
need
not
act
on
the
assumption
the
other
directors
will
fail
to
do
what
they
have
undertaken
to
do
unless
there
are
circumstances
which
warrant
such
an
assumption.
The
appellant
did
what
a
reasonable
person
would
be
expected
to
do
bearing
in
mind
the
business
required
his
presence
in
Toronto.
In
fact
the
appellant
continued
to
try
to
ensure
Process
would
remit
source
deductions
once
the
bank
entered
the
scene
by
instructing
the
bank
to
honour
cheques
for
source
deductions.
After
meeting
with
the
officer
of
Revenue
Canada
during
the
second
week
of
April
1986
the
appellant
exercised
the
same
degree
of
care,
diligence
and
skill
to
prevent
the
failure
by
Process
that
a
reasonable
person
would
have
exercised
in
similar
circumstances.
This
would
apply
to
amounts
required
to
be
withheld
after
February
1986
and
to
be
remitted
on
April
15,
1986
and
subsequently.
The
appeal
will
be
allowed
with
costs
and
the
assessment
will
be
referred
back
to
the
respondent
to
reassess
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.