MacKay,
J.:
—This
is
an
application
on
behalf
of
the
applicant
to
address
the
Court
on
the
matter
of
costs,
the
costs
in
question
being
those
included
in
an
Order
dated
October
12,
1989.
In
that
Order,
which
allowed
the
application
by
the
plaintiff
corporation,
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(8)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"),
to
set
aside
a
"jeopardy
order",
earlier
granted
on
application,
ex
parte,
by
the
Crown,
it
was
also
directed
that
"Costs
are
awarded
to
the
applicant
corporation".
Having
considered
the
submissions
of
the
parties
made
in
accord
with
my
directive
for
considering
the
application
on
the
basis
of
written
submissions,
pursuant
to
Rule
324,
an
Order
goes
dismissing
the
application,
with
costs
awarded
to
the
respondent,
against
the
applicant
corporation,
as
is
the
usual
course,
in
an
amount
fixed
at
$250.
That
Order
is
made
for
the
following
reasons.
1.
The
applicant's
application
is
in
essence
an
appeal
from
the
Order
of
October
12,
1989,
in
relation
to
costs
then
awarded.
That
Order
in
relation
to
costs
was
made
and
intended
to
be
on
the
normal
party
and
party
basis.
The
applicant
now
seeks
an
order
for
extraordinary
costs,
in
an
amount
proposed
to
be
fixed
at
$1,000,000.
This
Court
has
no
authority
to
consider
an
appeal
from
its
original
Order
as
to
costs,
and
no
authority
to
fix
costs
in
an
extraordinary
amount
as
proposed.
Costs
must
be
related
to
the
costs
incurred
in
proceedings
before
the
Court;
they
are
not
akin
to
damages
for
alleged
loss
or
wrongful
conduct.
2.
The
respondent
submits
that
under
subsection
225.2(13)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
no
appeal
from
the
order
of
a
judge
in
proceedings
reviewing
a
jeopardy
order
is
permitted.
Whether
that
statutory
bar
is
applicable
to
an
order
as
to
costs
in
such
proceedings
need
not
be
determined
in
my
view.
If
an
appeal
were
possible
it
would
be
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
and
pursuant
to
the
Federal
Court
Act,
section
27(2),
an
appeal
ought
to
have
been
initiated
within
30
days,
unless
further
time
is
allowed
by
the
Trial
Division.
In
this
case
it
is
urged
that
the
usual
time
limit
be
waived
and
the
applicant
be
permitted
to
be
heard
for
reasons,
including
the
alleged
impecunious
state
of
the
applicant
following
the
Order
of
October
12,
1989,
alleged
motives
of
the
respondent,
and
the
inability
of
the
applicant
corporation
at
the
time
of
the
Order
to
be
represented
other
than
by
counsel.
Since
that
time
by
change
in
the
Court's
Rules
a
corporation
may,
with
approval
in
special
circumstances,
be
represented
by
an
officer
or
director.
By
Order
of
Giles,
A.S.P.,
dated
March
11,
1991,
David
B.
Brough,
President
of
the
applicant
corporation
was
authorized
to
represent
the
applicant.
I
am
not
persuaded
that
any
of
these
reasons
submitted
warrant
allowing
the
applicant
to
proceed
to
appeal
an
Order
as
to
costs,
made
now
22
months
ago.
Moreover,
at
the
time
of
the
Order
and
for
some
time
thereafter
the
corporation
was
apparently
represented
by
counsel
and
steps
were
not
taken
either
to
appeal
or
to
seek
directions
to
the
taking
officer
as
provided
for
in
Rule
344(7).
There
is
no
basis
to
extend
the
normal
time
either
to
initiate
an
appeal
or
to
seek
directions
as
to
costs.
3.
The
grounds
urged
to
support
the
application
herein,
allege
that
the
respondent
pursued
an
inappropriate
remedy
in
seeking
and
obtaining,
ex
parte,
a
"jeopardy
order",
that
this
was
done
for
wrongful
purposes
and
on
the
basis
of
questionable
affidavit
evidence.
I
point
out
that
the
time
for
raising
those
concerns
was
when
this
matter
was
heard.
Then
no
evidence
was
presented
to
support
the
serious
allegations
now
made
on
behalf
of
the
applicant.
Nor
is
there
yet
any
evidence
to
support
the
allegations
on
behalf
of
the
applicant.
The
beliefs
of
David
B.
Brough
about
the
purposes
of
the
respondent
and
the
nature
of
the
respondent's
affidavit
evidence
in
the
original
proceedings
in
this
matter
are
not
evidence.
The
concerns
now
expressed,
may
not
now
be
raised
in
this
matter
under
the
guise
of
a
motion
to
address
the
Court
on
the
matter
of
costs.
4.
The
respondent
urged
dismissal
of
this
motion
with
costs
to
be
awarded
against
David
B.
Brough
personally
in
the
amount
of
$250.
The
Order
goes
with
costs
in
that
amount
awarded
against
the
applicant
corporation.
Costs
are
not
awarded
against
David
B.
Brougn
personally,
though
the
Order
of
Giles,
A.S.P.
permitting
Brough
to
represent
the
applicant
is
made
subject
to
the
possibility
of
such
an
award
being
made
"for
the
cost
of
any
unsuccessful
motion
except
one
connected
with
the
taxation
of
party
and
party
costs
in
this
matter".
While
those
words
may
not
have
been
intended
to
exclude
the
costs
of
the
application
herein,
now
unsuccessful,
they
are
sufficiently
broad
in
my
view
to
include
this
application.
As
I
read
those
words
the
exception
would
not
extend
to
any
other
proceedings
in
this
Court
in
which
Mr.
Brough
may
represent
the
applicant
corporation.
Application
dismissed.
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