P.R.
Dussault,
T.C.CJ.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
notice
of
reassessment
dated
July
4,
1988
with
respect
to
the
appellants
1985
taxation
year.
The
only
issue
is
the
nature
of
the
profit
from
the
sale
of
a
building
situated
at
141
est,
rue
Racine,
in
Chicoutimi,
Quebec,
and
known
as
the
F.
W.
Woolworth
building.
The
respondent
considered
the
profit
to
be
an
income
from
business
while
the
appellant
argued
that
it
was
a
capital
gain.
For
the
purposes
of
the
assessment,
the
respondent
relied
on,
inter
alia,
the
assumptions
of
fact
found
in
paragraphs
6(a)
to
(w)
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
which
read
as
follows:
(a)
the
appellant
was
incorporated
under
Part
1A
of
the
Companies
Act
on
November^
1983;
(b)
the
sole
director
and
shareholder
of
the
appellant
was
Mr.
GérardTremblay;
(c)
on
January
24,
1984,
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay
made
an
offer
to
purchase
a
building
situated
at
141,
rue
Racine,
in
Chicoutimi
(hereinafter
refused
[sic]
as
the
F.W.
Woolworth
building”).
This
offer
was
not
accepted
by
the
F.W.
Woolworth
Co;
(d)
in
February,
1984,
an
estimate
for
renovations
to
the
F.
W.
Woolworth
budding
was
prepared
by
Regard
2000
for
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay,
who
was
considering
converting
the
building
into
a
shopping
centre;
(e)
in
March
1984,
an
accounting
firm
prepared
pro
forma
financial
statements
for
Mr.
Tremblay
for
the
purpose
of
assessing
several
possibilities
depending
on
the
cost
of
acquisition,
rents
per
square
foot
and
occupation
rate;
(f)
between
April
and
June
1984
the
shopping
centre
project
was
abandoned;
(g)
in
August
1984,
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay
learned
that
the
CSST
was
looking
for
office
space.
Various
attempts
were
made
to
obtain
an
option
to
purchase
the
F.W.
Woolworth
building
in
order
to
be
able
to
submit
a
tender
to
the
CSST;
(h)
on
August
31,
1984,
the
appellant
obtained
an
option
to
purchase
on
the
F.W.
Woolworth
building.
The
option
was
valid
for
four
months
ending
on
January
7,
1985,
and
included
a
purchase
price
of
$900,000;
(i)
in
September
1984,
the
appellant
submitted
a
tender
for
rental
of
the
F.W.
Woolworth
building
by
the
CSST.
This
tender
covered
most
of
the
available
floor
space
in
the
said
building;
(j)
in
October
1984,
the
appellant
learned
that
the
CSST
had
refused
his
offer
to
rent;
(k)
on
October
22,
1984,
the
appellant
gave
a
rental
mandate
to
the
Société
Immobilière
Norbec
Inc.
with
respect
to
the
FW.
Woolworth
building.
That
mandate
contained
the
following
clause,
inter
alia:
This
mandate
will
be
valid
and
the
commission
will
be
payable
only
if
the
company
Les
Immeubles
M.H.T.
Inc.
or
its
principal
representative
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay,
or
another
company
which
has
been
or
is
to
be
incorporated
by
him,
purchases
the
building
situated
at
141
rue
Racine
in
Chicoutimi,
which
is
the
subject
of
this
mandate.
(l)
on
December
31,
1984,
the
appellant
notified
F.W.
Woolworth
Co.
Ltd.
that
it
was
exercising
its
option
to
purchase;
(m)
on
January
25,
1985,
the
appellant
purchased
the
F.W.
Woolworth
building
for
the
sum
of
$900,000
by
a
notarized
contract
of
sale
registered
on
January
29,
1985
under
No.
424236;
(n)
on
March
6,
1985,
the
appellant
sold
the
F.W.
Woolworth
building
for
the
sum
of
$1,120,000
by
a
notarized
contract
of
sale
registered
on
March
11,
1985
under
No.
425593;
(o)
the
appellant
realized
a
profit
of
$275,261
from
the
sale
of
March
6,
1985,
calculated
as
follows:
Proceeds
of
disposition
|
$1,120,000
|
ACB
|
844,739
|
Profit
|
$
275,261
|
(p)
on
February
29,
1984,
the
appellant
and
113064
Canada
Ltee
each
purchased
an
equal
share
in
a
building
situated
at
2469
rue
Langelier
in
Jonquitre
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
"the
Langelier
building")
for
the
sum
of
$531,000;
(q)
on
December
28,
1984,
the
appellant
and
113064
Canada
Ltée
sold
the
Langelier
building
for
the
sum
of
$625,000;
(r)
the
appellant
realized
a
profit
of
$36,082
from
the
sale
of
December
28,
1984,
calculated
as
follows:
1/2
proceeds
of
disposition
|
$312,000
|
1/2
ACB
|
276,418
|
Profit
|
$
36,082
|
(s)
during
the
year
in
issue,
the
appellant
disposed
of
a
third
building,
situated
on
rue
Massenet,
and
realized
a
profit
of
$5,420;
(t)
on
October
9,
1980,
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay
had
purchased
a
building
called
Place
de
la
Loire
for
the
sum
of
$1,4500.
This
building
was
subsequently
rolled
over
into
a
corporation
he
owned,
Telesag
Inc,
which
sold
this
building
on
December
22,
1982,
for
the
sum
of
$1,700,000;
(u)
on
June
10,1983
Telesag
Inc.
acquired
two
groups
of
buildings:
Georges
Vanier
|
$800,000
|
Des
Crécerelles
|
$455,000
|
which
were
sold
on
February
1,
1984
and
November
17,
1983,
for
$950,000
and
$600,000,
respectively;
(v)
the
Société
Immobilière
Norbec
Inc,
represented
by
Mr.
Denis
de
Champlain,
has
always
had
the
mandate
to
sell
the
FW.
Woolworth
building,
and
during
the
period
of
the
option
referred
to
above
there
were
several
contacts
with
potential
purchasers;
(w)
during
the
audit,
the
appellant
admitted
that
the
income
from
the
disposition
of
the
Langelier
building
was
income
from
business.
[Translation.]
Summary
of
the
facts
The
Court
heard
two
witnesses:
Mr.
Denis
De
Champlain,
the
representative
of
La
Société
Immobilière
Norbec
Inc
("Norbec"),
a
real
estate
broker,
and
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay,
an
engineer
and
sole
shareholder
and
director
of
the
appellant
corporation,
Les
Immeubles
M.H.T.
Ltée
("M.H.T.").
Mr.
De
Champlain
testified
that
the
Woolworth
building
had
been
vacant
and
for
sale
for
about
a
year
when,
on
November
17,
1983
Norbec
obtained
the
non-exclusive
mandate
from
the
F.W.
Woolworth
Co.
Ltd.
(“the
Woolworth
Company")
to
sell
or
to
rent
it.
Mr.
De
Champlain
explained
that
the
building
was
located
downtown
in
an
area
that
had
been
particularly
affected
by
the
recession,
since
there
were
then
several
vacant
buildings
there
and
the
area
itself
was
at
some
distance
from
the
shopping
centres
around
which
development
was
then
taking
place.
The
asking
sale
price
for
this
building,
which
consisted
of
60,000
square
feet
on
one
floor,
plus
the
basement,
was
then
about
$1,000,000.
For
these
reasons,
and
also
the
fact
that
the
fixed
expenses
for
the
Woolworth
building
were
quite
high,
Mr.
De
Champlain
stated
that
he
considered
the
“case”
somewhat
difficult.
He
testified
that
after
he
placed
advertisements
in
the
newspapers
and
made
personal
contacts,
several
potential
purchasers
indicated
some
interest
but
no
serious
offer
was
made.
Mr.
De
Champlain
said
that
it
was
in
the
context
of
these
efforts
that
he
first
met
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay,
whom
he
knew
by
reputation
as
a
businessman
and
investor
in
the
Chicoutimi
region.
Mr.
Tremblay's
interest
in
the
Woolworth
building
was
then
put
into
concrete
terms
when
he
made
an
offer
to
purchase
for
$650,000
on
January
24,
1984.
However,
on
February
8
next,
this
offer
was
refused
by
the
Woolworth
Company,
which
was
still
asking
$1,000,000
for
the
building.
Mr.
De
Champlain
explained
that
after
the
offer
was
refused
Mr.
Tremblay
was
still
interested
in
developing
the
building
and
transforming
it
into
a
shopping
centre
or
a"
mini-mall”
type
of
centre
for
various
services,
and
that
he,
like
Mr.
Tremblay,
who
had
started
to
have
concept
and
profitability
studies
done,
was
concerned
about
finding
major
tenants
who
would
be
well
patronized
so
as
to
likely
generate
interest
among
other
smaller
tenants
and
make
it
possible
to
convert
and
develop
the
Woolworth
building.
Mr.
De
Champlain
further
testified
that
both
Mr.
Tremblay
and
himself
tried
for
several
months
to
find
major
tenants.
Mr.
De
Champlain
stated
that
during
that
entire
period
he
was
in
regular
contact
with
the
Woolworth
Company
with
whom
discussions
were
continuing.
Moreover,
on
July
20,
1984
Mr.
Tremblay
sent
to
Mr.
De
Champlain,
who
was
representing
Norbec,
a
letter
providing
an
outline
of
a
new
proposal
which
he
asked
Norbec
to
kindly
transmit
to
the
Woolworth
Company.
This
letter,
filed
as
Exhibit
A-6,
reads
as
follows:
I
am
interested
in
purchasing
the
Woolco
building
located
on
rue
Racine
in
Chicoutimi,
and
I
am
hereby
submitting
to
you
an
outline
of
my
purchase
proposal,
as
well
as
the
reasons
underlying
these
terms.
As
you
know,
the
risk
presented
by
the
Woolco
building
is
difficult
for
an
investor
to
calculate
because
of
several
constraints:
the
general
business
situation
in
the
downtown
area,
the
high
number
of
vacant
premises
which
puts
downward
pressure
on
rents,
competition
from
buildings
recently
constructed
along
the
boulevard
Talbot,
the
large
area
of
the
building,
the
costs
of
renovation,
which
are
difficult
to
assess
at
the
time
of
purchase
Like
any
other
potential
purchaser,
I
place
great
importance
on
these
factors,
although
I
am
very
familiar
with
the
real
estate
field
in
Chicoutimi;
at
present
I
own
several
commercial
buildings
and
I
am
very
active
in
this
market.
In
view
of
the
foregoing,
the
essence
of
my
proposal
is
as
follows:
I
offer
to
the
present
owner
to
seek
out
serious
tenants
and
sign
my
own
leases
with
them,
on
condition
that
Woolco
sublets
to
me
the
floor
area
required
by
my
potential
tenants
and
grants
me
a
one-year
option
to
purchase
its
building
for
cash.
I
would
not
charge
anything
for
locating
tenants.
I
would
receive
my
profit
from
the
rents
—
that
is,
the
sublease
that
would
be
granted
to
me
would
be
on
the
same
terms
as
those
I
would
require
from
my
tenants.
I
would
undertake
to
assign
my
leases
to
Woolco,
without
compensation,
in
the
event
that
I
did
not
purchase
the
building
at
the
end
of
one
year.
As
well,
the
terms
of
any
lease
to
be
signed
with
any
potential
tenant
would
be
previously
submitted
to
Woolco
for
their
approval.
At
present,
I
can
tell
you
that
I
have
an
opportunity
to
offer
a
serious
tenant
floor
space
of
20,000
to
24,000
square
feet
and
I
am
in
a
position
to
make
offers
to
two
other
prestigious
tenants.
However,
you
will
understand
that
given
the
constraints
referred
to
above
and
the
fact
that
none
of
these
potential
rentals
have
been
closed,
I
can
commit
myself
on
the
terms
set
out
in
this
letter
only.
If
the
owner
is
interested
in
a
proposal
of
this
nature,
I
am
prepared
to
meet
him
to
clarify
and
discuss
the
details
of
these
terms
within
a
short
period
of
time,
since
the
offer
to
rent
20,000
to
24,000
square
feet
of
floor
space
must
be
submitted
at
the
beginning
of
August
1984.
Yours
truly.
.
...
[Translation.]
Although
Mr.
Tremblay's
proposition
was
not
accepted
by
the
Woolworth
Company,
it
helped
to
intensify
the
negotiations
which
culminated
at
the
end
of
August
1984
in
a
visit
by
Mr.
De
Champlain,
Mr.
Tremblay
and
his
accountant
to
Woolworth’s
Company
head
office
in
Toronto.
On
August
31,
1984,
following
four
days
of
intense
negotiations,
Woolworth
granted
M.H.T.
an
option,
valid
until
January
7,
1985
at
4:00
p.m.,
to
purchase
the
Woolworth
building
for
a
price
of
$900,000.
The
agreement
provided
for
four
monthly
payments
of
$6,000,
payable
on
the
first
days
of
the
months
of
September,
October,
November
and
December
1984,
to
preserve
the
right
of
option
throughout
that
entire
period.
A
sum
of
$90,000
less
the
monthly
payments
already
made
was
to
be
paid
when
the
option
would
be
exercised.
Finally,
if
the
option
was
exercised,
the
sale
price
of
$900,000
was
to
be
paid
as
follows:
$250,000
to
be
paid
in
cash
on
signing
the
deed
of
sale,
this
sum
to
be
reduced,
however,
of
an
amount
of
$90,000
paid
when
the
option
was
exercised.
The
balance,
$650,000,
was
to
be
paid
at
the
end
of
a
five-year
period,
and
only
the
interests
at
12
per
cent,
are
to
be
paid
by
monthly
payments
of
$6,500
before
expiry
of
the
term.
Mr.
De
Champlain
testified
that
he
and
Mr.
Tremblay
then
set
about
interesting
two
major
tenants
in
the
Woolworth
building:
the
Commission
de
santé
et
sécurité
au
travail
("CSST")
and
the
City
of
Chicoutimi,
for
the
purpose
of
housing
the
municipal
library
there.
Moreover,
M.H.T.
made
a
detailed
tender
to
the
CSST
on
September
4,
1984
for
the
rental
of
an
area
of
23,000
square
feet.
However,
this
tender
was
refused
on
October
1,
1984.
On
October
22,
1984,
Norbec
officially
received
a
mandate
from
M.H.T.
to
rent
the
spaces
in
the
Woolworth
building
which
were
to
be
developed,
under
the
name
"Les
Galeries
Racine”.
Mr.
De
Champlain
also
testified
that
development
of
the
concept
of
the
commercial
centre
was
then
quite
advanced,
since
he
was
in
possession
of
the
architect's
plans
and
had
an
advertising
folder
containing
the
complete
information
on
the
planned
development,
including
a
detailed
draft
lease,
and
so
he
began
to
advertise
it
in
a
more
important
way
in
the
newspapers.
The
plans,
the
mandate,
the
sample
offer
to
lease
and
the
sample
lease,
as
well
as
the
advertisements
published
in
the
newspapers,
were
introduced
in
support
of
Mr.
De
Champlain's
testimony.
The
rental
mandate
given
by
M.H.T.
provided
that
space
would
be
available
for
rental
at
the
end
of
April
1985
and
that
the
commercial
centre
would
open
on
June
15
of
that
same
year
at
the
latest.
We
would
also
note
that
at
that
time
M.H.T.
was
committed
to
carry
Out
the
project
only
if
rental
offers
covering
at
least
75
per
cent
of
the
floor
space
were
received
by
December
15,
1984
at
the
latest.
Mr.
De
Champlain
went
on
to
testify
as
to
the
efforts
he
made
to
rent
space,
in
particular
of
is
meetings
with
various
interested
people
and
the
signing
of
four
or
five
offers
to
lease,
for
total
floor
space
of
about
15,000
square
feet.
On
October
30,
1984,
after
rental
advertisements
had
appeared
in
the
newspapers,
a
Mr.
Bendwell
appeared
on
the
scene
for
the
first
time.
According
to
Mr.
De
Champlain,
he
was
at
that
moment
interested
in
renting,
and
then
quite
quickly
in
purchasing
the
building.
A
first
proposal
to
M.H.T.,
which
was
considered
unacceptable,
may
have
been
made
by
Mr.
Bendwell
in
December
1984,
and
it
was
ultimately
in
January
1985
only
that
a
more
serious
offer
to
purchase
by
Mr.
Bendwell
was
accepted
by
M.H.T.,
which
had
decided
at
the
end
of
December,
1984
to
exercise
its
option
to
purchase.
The
contract
of
sale
of
the
Woolworth
building
by
M.H.T.
to
a
company
controlled
by
Mr.
Bendwell
was
signed
on
March
6,
1985.
Mr.
Gérard
Tremblay
testified
after
Mr.
De
Champlain.
He
explained
how
he
had
come
to
be
interested
in
the
Woolworth
building
after
being
contacted
by
Mr.
De
Champlain.
He
described
his
negotiations,
the
initial
offers
and,
finally,
the
option
obtained
from
the
Woolworth
Company,
the
studies
and
other
steps
taken
with
respect
to
converting
and
developing
the
building
as
a
commercial
centre,
and
the
efforts
made
to
attract
major
tenants,
in
particular
the
CSST
and
the
municipal
library.
He
explained
how,
after
the
CSST's
refusal
of
the
tender
at
the
beginning
of
October,
1984,
he
officially
gave
a
mandate
to
Mr
De
Champlain
to
rent
the
premises,
while
still
pursuing
his
personal
efforts
at
City
Hall
to
rent
space
to
house
the
municipal
library.
He
also
described
the
studies,
the
architect's
plans,
the
advertising
folders
and
the
advertisements
prepared
at
his
request
with
the
ultimate
aim
of
developing
and
operating
the
building.
With
respect
to
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
exercise
of
the
option,
and
the
purchase
and
resale
of
the
building
to
a
company
controlled
by
Mr.
Bendwell
in
March
1985,
Mr.
Tremblay
explained
that
from
the
moment
he
acquired
the
option
from
the
Woolworth
Company
at
the
end
of
August
1984,
the
building
had
never
been
put
up
for
sale,
that
on
the
contrary
he
was
pursuing
his
primary
intention
of
turning
it
into
a
commercial
centre
in
trying,
as
many
other
local
businessmen,
to
revitalize
this
disadvantaged
sector
of
the
rue
Racine.
His
view
was
that
this
development
was
part
of
his
plans
to
operate
commercial
buildings;
companies
which
he
controlled
already
owned
three
other
buildings
of
this
nature
in
a
more
successful
area
of
the
same
street.
Mr.
Tremblay
further
testified
that
the
contact
with
Mr.
Bendwell
was
established
through
Mr.
De
Champlain,
as
a
result
of
the
advertising
in
the
newspapers
for
the
rental
of
space
in
the
building.
While
admitting
that
Mr.
Bendwell
had
appeared
on
the
scene
before
he
had
himself
decided
to
exercise
the
option
at
the
end
of
December,
1984,
Mr.
Tremblay
stated
that
no
acceptable
proposal
had
been
made
before
January,
1985,
and
that
Mr.
Bendwell
had
also
not
appeared
to
him
to
be
very
serious
at
the
outset.
Mr.
Tremblay
explained
the
fact
that
he
had
exercised
the
option
on
December
31,
1984
by
saying
that
it
expired
on
the
following
January
7
and
that
he
then
had
to
make
a
decision
despite
the
fact
that
rentals
had
not
progressed
as
anticipated.
At
that
moment,
four
future
tenants
had
made
a
deposit
and
there
were
negotiations
with
some
15
others
whom
Mr.
Tremblay
described
as
"serious"
for
the
rental
of
small
areas
of
floor
space.
He
testified
that
at
that
time
it
seemed
possible
to
rent
40
per
cent
to
50
per
cent
of
the
floor
space
in
the
building.
As
well,
the
negotiations
with
the
City
of
Chicoutimi
concerning
the
municipal
library
were
progressing,
since
the
Council
had
just
retained
an
architect
to
do
a
preliminary
study
in
relation
to
locating
the
library
in
the
Woolworth
building.
Thus,
while
75
per
cent
of
the
floor
space
had
not
been
rented
at
that
moment,
Mr.
Tremblay
believed
that
the
condition
as
to
M.H.T.'s
commitment
to
carry
out
the
plan
and
to
provide
rental
spaces
was
only
a
protection
against
potential
tenants
and
in
no
way
prevented
him
from
making
a
decision
to
carry
it
out
in
any
event.
Mr.
Tremblay
also
noted
that
$20,000
had
been
expended
at
that
point
on
legal
and
accounting
fees,
including
fees
relating
to
the
preparation
of
the
tender
to
rent
to
the
CSST,
and
that
$24,000
had
also
been
paid
to
preserve
the
option
right
until
it
was
exercised.
He
said
that
the
fees
for
the
preparation
of
the
renovation
and
architectural
plans
were
ultimately
assumed
by
the
new
purchaser
who
went
ahead
with
the
development
of
the
building
as
planned.
Mr.
Tremblay
also
testified
as
to
his
experience
and
his
track
record
in
the
real
estate
field.,
His
first
investments,
made
through
companies
which
he
controlled,
were
made
in
1980
when
he
purchased
some
residential
unit
buildings
which
were
resold
in
1982,
when
they
were
25
per
cent
vacant.
An
unsolicited
offer
from
a
promoter
of
a
limited
partnership
provided
him
with
an
opportunity
to
make
a
significant
profit,
and
so
he
was
in
a
way
happy
to
get
rid
of
it.
Other
residential
buildings
were
also
resold
to
the
same
promoter
after
being
owned
for
a
short
period
in
1983
and
1984,
and
without
any
offers
being
solicited;
the
explanation
provided
as
to
the
motives
for
reselling
was
the
same:
the
significant
profit
realized.
Mr.
Tremblay
also
admitted
that
M.H.T.
had
acquired
a
50
per
cent
interest
in
an
apartment
building
on
rue
Langelier
in
Jonquière
with
the
express
purpose
of
immediately
putting
it
back
up
for
sale
at
a
much
higher
price.
If
that
price
had
not
been
obtained
within
11
months
it
was
agreed
that
M.H.T.'s
interest
would
be
purchased
on
the
same
terms
by
the
other
corporation
which
also
owned
a
50
per
cent
interest
in
the
building.
Mr.
Tremblay's
explanation
on
this
point
was
that
this
was
a
residential
unit
building
which
the
National
Bank
had
repossessed
and
in
which
M.H.T.
had
acquired
a
50
per
cent
interest
in
order
only
to
assist
temporarily
to
finance
the
other
corporation
whose
principal
shareholder
was
interested
in
forming
a
limited
partnership
in
order
to
repurchase
the
building
shortly
thereafter.
Mr.
Tremblay
stated
that
he
was
at
that
time
no
longer
interested
in
investing
in
residential
buildings,
since
the
ones
he
had
purchased
before
had
all
been
resold
by
then.
He
testified
that
he
was
at
that
moment
interested
rather
in
developing
and
operating
commercial
buildings
and
that
the
corporations
he
controlled
owned
at
that
time
three
other
buildings
of
this
nature
on
rue
Racine.
One
of
those
buildings
is
still
owned
by
a
corporation
controlled
by
Mr.
Tremblay,
while
the
two
others
were
kept
for
five
and
seven
years,
respectively.
Mr.
Tremblay
also
stated
that
he
had
never
solicited
offers
for
the
buildings
sold,
but
that,
like
any
other
businessman,
he
did
not
hesitate
to
sell
them
when
it
seemed
to
him
to
be
advantageous
to
do
so.
Some
19
exhibits,
many
submitted
en
Haïsse,
were
filed
in
support
of
the
testimony
given
by
Mr.
De
Champlain
and
Mr.
Tremblay;
they
included,
inter
alia,
offers,
contracts,
renovation
plans
and
rental
advertisements.
Exhibit
A-18,
which
was
filed
in
support
of
Mr.
Tremblay's
testimony,
is
a
list
showing
a
summary
of
the
cost
of
the
rental
buildings
and
the
gross
income
of
the
corporations
controlled
by
him
from
August
31,
1982
to
August
31,
1991.
This
list
indicates
the
following
changes
in
the
two
factors
in
question:
|
Building
Cost
|
Gross
rental
income
|
At
August
31,
1982
|
$1,376,861
|
$220,726
|
At
August
31,
1983
|
$2,515,418
|
$263,442
|
At
August
31,
1984
|
$2,603,556
|
$431,756
|
At
August
31,1985
|
$2,214,351
|
$476,843
|
At
August
31,
1986
|
$2,218,441
|
$481,364
|
At
August
31,
1987
|
$2,013,241
|
$505,867
|
At
August
31,
1988
|
$2,013,241
|
$455,703
|
At
August
31,
1989
|
$2,730,858
|
$539,869
|
At
August
31,
1990
|
$7,609,557
|
$982,194
|
At
August
31,
1991
|
$18,302,931
|
$2,475,896
|
The
appellant's
position
The
appellant's
position
is
essentially
that
the
sale
of
the
Woolworth
building
by
M.H.T.
in
1985
to
a
company
controlled
by
Mr.
Bendwell
gave
rise
to
a
capital
gain
and
not
to
business
income.
Counsel
argued
that
in
this
type
of
transaction
we
must
primarily
examine
the
subjective
intention
of
the
taxpayer
at
the
moment
of
acquisition.
We
must
then
study
the
facts,
both
before
and
after
the
acquisition,
in
order
to
determine
whether
they
are
compatible
with
that
intention.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted
that
in
a
situation
involving
an
option
to
purchase,
the
intention
of
the
taxpayer
must
be
determined
at
the
moment
the
option
was
acquired,
and
not
the
moment
it
was
exercised,
since
the
taxpayer
acquires
a
right
with
respect
to
the
building
at
the
moment
when
an
irrevocable
option
is
granted
to
him.
Thus,
according
to
counsel,
it
appears
to
be
clear
in
this
case
that
M.H.T.
did
not,
on
August
31,
1984,
the
date
of
the
option,
have
any
intention
of
acquiring
the
Woolworth
building
in
order
to
resell
it
at
a
profit,
and
that
there
could
have
been
no
such
intention
even
on
December
31,
1984,
when
the
option
was
exercised.
The
primary
intention,
he
argued,
was
to
acquire
a
right
in
the
building
with
the
aim
of
redeveloping
it
and
operating
it
as
a
rental
commercial
building.
In
support
of
his
position,
that
the
taxpayer's
intention
must
be
considered
as
of
the
moment
when
an
option
is
acquired
and
not
when
it
is
exercised,
counsel
for
the
appellant
referred
to
the
following
decisions:
Thom
and
Thom
v.
The
Queen,
[1979]
C.T.C.
403,
79
D.T.C.
5324;
Grenier
et
Frères
Ltée
v.
M.N.R.,
[1979]
C.T.C.
2021,
79
D.T.C.
5;
The
Queen
v.
Ginakes
Brothers
Ltd.,
[1977]
C.T.C.
18,
77
D.T.C.
5023;
Westcon
Engineering
Contractors
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1977]
C.T.C.
567,
77
D.T.C.
5398;
Snell
Farms
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1991]
1
C.T.C.
5,
90
D.T.C.
6693.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
acknowledged
that
the
facts
are
particularly
important
in
this
type
of
case,
and
emphasized
the
fact
that
the
actions
of
Mr.
Tremblay,
acting
on
behalf
of
the
appellant,
were
those
of
an
experienced
investor
in
the
circumstances,
and
that
his
conduct
was
essentially
dictated
by
prudence,
since
the
acquisition
of
the
Woolworth
building
was
a
risky
investment
in
an
area
of
the
city
which
was
rather
abandoned
at
that
time.
He
submitted
that
the
fact
that
the
Woolworth
building
had
been
vacant
for
a
long
time
and
that
there
had
been
no
serious
offers
before
the
one
made
by
M.H.T.
showed
that
resale
at
a
profit
could
not
have
been
seriously
contemplated
as
a
motive
for
the
acquisition.
The
other
facts
that
counsel
for
the
appellant
considered
to
be
important
in
the
circumstances
were
that
from
the
moment
when
M.H.T.
acquired
the
option,
no
offer
for
resale
was
solicited,
that
the
payment
made
by
M.H.T.
represented
a
substantial
portion
of
the
acquisition
price
and
that
financing
the
balance
over
five
years
was
prudent
in
the
circumstances.
Counsel
also
emphasized
the
fact
that
while
some
residential
buildings
had
been
acquired
and
resold
after
M.H.T.
had
owned
them
for
a
relatively
short
period,
the
approach
adopted
by
Mr.
Tremblay
and
the
companies
he
controlled,
including
the
appellant,
was
to
divest
himself
of
the
residential
buildings
and
to
invest
rather
in
commercial
buildings
which
were
then
held
for
relatively
long
periods
of
time.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
further
noted
that
Mr.
Tremblay
or
the
companies
he
controlled
never
solicited
offers
for
the
purpose
of
reselling
the
buildings
acquired,
but
that
Mr.
Tremblay,
like
any
other
investor,
did
not
hesitate
to
decide
to
resell
when
an
at
active
offer
was
made,
providing
him
with
a
significant
profit.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
also
recalled
that
it
has
been
recognized
on
many
occasions
that
a
taxpayer
may
have
two
different
approaches
to
real
estate
transactions,
and
thus,
while
he
may
be
looking
for
a
quick
profit
in
some
transactions,
this
in
no
way
prevents
him
from
behaving
like
a
true
investor
concerning
other
transactions.
Counsel
submitted
that
in
this
case
Mr.
Tremblay's
overall
conduct
in
relation
to
the
commercial
buildings
acquired
by
the
various
companies
he
controlled
was
definitely
the
conduct
of
an
experienced
and
prudent
investor
seeking
to
make
his
investments
profitable,
and
that
this
was
the
course
of
conduct
he
adopted
in
relation
to
the
transaction
involving
the
Woolworth
building.
Finally,
counsel
for
the
appellant
noted
that
the
respondent
did
not
allege
the
secondary
intention
of
reselling
at
a
profit
as
a
determinative
factor
which
motivated
the
appellant
to
acquire
the
Woolworth
building,
and
accordingly
that
the
appellant
did
not
have
to
prove
that
such
intention
did
not
exist.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
referred
to
the
following
decisions
in
support
of
his
argument:
Bell
v.
M.N.R.,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
2272,
89
D.T.C.
165;
Veltri
&
Son
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
1
C.T.C.
2691,
91
D.T.C.
862;
Woodbine
Developments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
C.T.C.
616,
84
D.T.C.
6556;
Les
Placements
Richard
Martineau
Ltée
v.
M.N.R.,
91
D.T.C.
1212;
Sorokin,
M.
v.
Canada,
[1991]
1
C.T.C.
139,
91
D.T.C.
5041;
Crystal
Glass
Canada
Ltd.
v.
Canada,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
330,
89
D.T.C.
5143;
Bead
Realties
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1971]
C.T.C.
774,
71
D.T.C.
5453;
Sharon
Mills
Developments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1983]
C.T.C.
384,
83
D.T.C.
5420;
Cappucitti
et
al.
v.
The
Queen,
[1986]
2
C.T.C.
184,
86
D.T.C.
6403;
Grouchy
v.
Canada,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
375,
90
D.T.C.
6267;
Lampard
v.
M.N.R.,
[1986]
1
C.T.C.
2562,
86
D.T.C.
1422;
Radiant
Properties
Inc.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1992]
2
C.T.C.
2135,
91
D.T.C.
1005;
The
Queen
v.
Bassani,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
314,
85
D.T.C.
5232;
Hillsdale
Shopping
Centre
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1981]
C.T.C.
322,
81
D.T.C.
5261;
Kit-Win
Holdings
(1973)
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1981]
C.T.C.
43,
81
D.T.C.
5030;
Hiwako
Investments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1978]
C.T.C.
378,
78
D.T.C.
6281;
Racine,
Demers
and
Nolin
v.
The
Queen,
[1965]
C.T.C.
150,
65
D.T.C.
5098;
Dubroskay
v.
M.N.R.,
[1973]
C.T.C.
2085,
73
D.T.C.
74;
The
Queen
v.
Stan
fold
Investment
Corp.,
[1974]
C.T.C.
19,
74
D.T.C.
6035;
Choice
Realty
Corp.
v.
The
Queen,
[1978]
C.T.C.
613,
78
D.T.C.
6415;
Dobrovsky
v.
M.N.R.,
[1970]
C.T.C.
403,
70
D.T.C.
6278.
The
respondent's
position
Counsel
for
the
respondent
noted
first
that
the
issue
of
whether
a
transaction
gives
rise
to
a
capital
gain
or
to
business
income
is
essentially
a
question
of
fact,
and
that
it
is
important
to
examine
a
whole
set
of
tests,
none
of
which
has
been
recognized
as
determinative
in
the
voluminous
case
law
on
the
subject.
Among
the
factors
to
be
considered,
he
referred
to
the
taxpayer's
intention
at
the
moment
of
acquisition,
the
reasonableness
of
that
intention,
the
change
of
intention,
the
taxpayer's
experience,
the
financing
of
the
acquisition,
the
length
of
time
it
was
held,
the
reason
for
the
sale
and
the
nature
and
quality
of
the
property
acquired.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
suggested,
with
respect
to
the
moment
when
the
taxpayer's
intention
is
to
be
examined,
that
the
decisions
to
which
counsel
for
the
appellant
referred
do
not
establish
the
principle
that
the
intention
must
be
examined
at
the
moment
the
option
was
acquired,
rather
than
at
the
moment
it
is
exercised.
He
argued
that
these
decisions
must
be
distinguished
in
that
in
several
of
the
situations
in
issue,
the
taxpayer
obtained
an
option
to
purchase
solely
in
order
to
protect
an
existing
business
or,
if
you
will,
its
source
of
income,
which
was
not
the
case
herein.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
then
reviewed
each
of
the
tests
referred
to,
arguing
that
Mr.
Tremblay's
intention
and
thus
the
intention
of
the
appellant
was
to
purchase
and
resell
at
a
profit,
and
that
this
intention
was
obvious
at
the
time
of
the
first
offer
made
to
the
Woolworth
Company
in
January
1984.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
then
argued
that
the
history
of
the
sales
of
residential
buildings
in
the
preceding
years
by
Mr.
Tremblay
or
by
the
companies
he
controlled
establish
a
course
of
conduct,
for
a
person
of
his
experience,
which
was
continued
in
relation
to
the
transaction
in
respect
of
the
Woolworth
building.
Counsel
argued
that
this
intention
did
not
change,
and
that
all
the
steps
taken
were
done
for
the
sole
perspective
of
resale.
The
financing
of
a
significant
portion
of
the
purchase
price
by
the
vendor,
the
Woolworth
Company,
over
a
five-year
period
with
repayment
of
the
capital
at
the
end
of
that
period,
as
well
as
the
very
short
period
of
ownership,
also
confirm
that
this
was
a
short-term
venture
by
an
experienced
person.
The
fact
that
the
option
was
exercised
in
December
1984
at
a
time
when
the
redevelopment
plan
had
not
progressed
very
far,
and
that
M.H.T.
had
assurances
of
only
a
few
minor
tenants,
also
indicated,
in
his
view,
that
the
project
was
speculative
in
nature
from
the
outset.
With
respect
to
the
fact
that
the
municipal
library
might
have
become
a
major
tenant,
counsel
for
the
respondent
submitted
that
M.H.T.
was
no
farther
ahead
in
December
than
in
August
1984,
since
the
only
development
that
had
occurred
was
that
the
council
of
the
city
of
Chicoutimi
had
agreed
in
December
to
have
a
preliminary
study
done
on
the
possible
redevelopment
of
the
Woolworth
building,
and
a
limited
mandate
had
been
given
to
an
architect
for
that
purpose.
With
respect
to
the
legal
and
accounting
fees
incurred
by
M.H.T.,
counsel
argued
that
they
were
incurred
primarily
for
the
purposes
of
the
rental
tender
to
the
CSST
in
September,
1984,
and
that
the
other
costs
incurred
in
relation
to
the
conversion
and
redevelopment
of
the
building,
including
costs
incurred
for
architectural
and
renovation
plans,
were
transferred
to
the
new
purchaser.
Counsel
also
believed
that
in
reality
no
significant
funds
were
invested
by
M.H.T.
Finally,
counsel
submitted
that
if
the
option
to
purchase
was
exercised
by
M.H.T.
at
the
end
of
December,
1984
it
was
not
because
the
company
had
any
assurance
of
major
tenants,
but
because
an
agreement
had
probably
already
been
made
with
the
future
purchaser
before
that
moment.
Analysis
If
there
is
one
constant
element
in
the
voluminous
case
law
concerning
the
distinction
between
a
capital
gain
and
a
business
income,
it
is
the
fact
that
each
case
must
be
examined
in
the
light
of
its
own
circumstances.
On
this
point,
it
has
often
been
said
that
the
jurisprudence
established
on
the
basis
of
different
situations
was
therefore
of
quite
limited
scope.
It
has
also
been
clearly
established
that
an
appellant
does
not
have
the
burden
of
proving
that
a
fact
on
which
the
Minister
did
not
rely
in
making
his
assessment,
and
further
not
alleged
in
the
pleadings,
does
not
exist.
On
this
point,
we
may
refer
to
the
decisions
cited
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
in
Kit
Win
Holdings,
supra,
Hillsdale
Shopping
Centre,
supra,
and
Bassani,
supra.
In
this
present
case,
since
the
secondary
intention
of
reselling
at
a
profit
was
not
alleged
by
the
respondent
in
his
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
as
a
determinative
factor
which
motivated
the
appellant
to
purchase
the
Wool-
worth
building,
the
appellant
did
not
have
to
lead
evidence
that
there
was
no
such
intention.
This
being
said,
the
appellant
nonetheless
has
the
burden
of
showing,
on
a
balance
of
probabilities,
that
its
primary
intention
or
true
intention
was
to
acquire
the
Woolworth
building
in
order
to
redevelop
and
operate
it
as
a
commercial
centre,
and
not
in
order
to
resell
it
at
a
profit.
As
we
know,
numerous
tests
have
been
proposed
by
the
courts
over
the
years
as
guides
in
examining
the
facts
submitted
in
evidence,
in
order
to
reach
a
conclusion
in
respect
of
this
distinction,
which
appears
clear
enough
but
which
is
difficult
to
apply,
since
it
rests
primarily
on
the
subjective
element
of
the
taxpayer's
intention
at
the
moment
a
property
is
acquired.
In
examining
all
of
the
facts
of
a
given
situation
which
appears
to
be
at
the
limit
of
the
distinction,
the
taxpayer's
true
intention
is
often
difficult
to
determine,
and
the
extent
to
which
his
or
her
testimony
is
found
to
be
credible
on
this
point
takes
on
great
significance.
Moreover,
by
examining
a
taxpayer's
overall
conduct,
not
only
in
this
given
situation
but
also
in
a
more
general
way,
we
may
verify
whether
this
conduct
is
compatible
with
what
the
taxpayer
maintained
in
his
or
her
testimony,
and
thus
determine
the
probability
that
there
was
a
specific
intention
in
respect
of
a
particular
transaction.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
in
a
situation
in
which
a
taxpayer
obtains
an
option
to
acquire
a
property,
we
must
examine
his
or
her
intention
at
the
moment
when
the
option
is
acquired,
and
not
at
the
moment
when
the
property
itself
is
acquired,
that
is,
when
the
option
is
exercised.
On
this
point,
he
referred
to
the
decisions
in
Thom
and
Thom,
supra,
Grenier
et
Freres
Ltée,
supra,
Westcon
Engineering
and
Contractors
Ltd.,
supra,
and
Snell
Farms
Ltd.,
supra.
However,
no
reference
was
made
to
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Hill-Clark-Francis
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1963]
C.T.C.
337,
63
D.T.C.
1211,
which
dealt
with
the
sale
of
shares
acquired
after
an
option
was
exercised,
and
from
which
it
clearly
appears
that
the
crucial
moment
is
when
the
property
subsequently
resold
is
acquired.
That
moment
is
when
the
option
is
exercised.
While
this
aspect
has
no
impact
on
my
decision,
in
that
in
my
opinion
the
evidence
established
that
the
intention
was
to
acquire
the
Woolworth
building
in
order
to
transform
it
and
operate
it,
both
at
the
moment
the
option
was
acquired
and
at
the
moment
it
was
exercised,
I
consider
it
useful
to
note
that
this
decision
was
accepted
as
being
authoritative
on
this
point
by
Judge
Bonner
of
this
Court
in
Airway
Acceptance
Corp.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1986]
1
C.T.C.
2259,
86
D.T.C.
1212,
which
dealt
with
a
similar
problem
and
where
he
concluded,
at
page
2262
(D.T.C.
1214):
The“
moment
of
purchase”
of
the
land
to
which
reference
is
made
in
the
jurisprudence
is
the
moment
when
the
taxpayer
becomes
legally
bound
to
buy.
In
this
case
it
was
the
moment
when
the
option
was
exercised.
The
appellant
did
not
at
that
moment
bind
itself
to
buy
in
order
to
carry
out
an
intention
to
acquire
the
land
for
use
as
a
site
for
its
business.
The
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Hill-Clark-Francis
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.
([1963]
C.T.C.
337,
63
D.T.C.
1211)
affirming
the
decision
of
the
Exchequer
Court
([1960]
C.T.C.
303,
60
D.T.C.
1245)
is
determinative.
Moreover,
the
same
principle
was
stated
in
the
decision
of
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division
in
Western
Wholesale
Drug
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1977]
C.T.C.
1,
77
D.T.C.
5021,
this
time
in
circumstances
dealing
not
with
an
option,
but
rather
with
an
offer
to
purchase,
Mahoney,
J.
nonetheless
held,
at
page
3
(D.T.C.
5023):
It
is
the
intention
of
the
purchaser
of
an
asset
when
he
acquires
it
that
is
crucial
to
the
question
whether
that
asset
is
an
investment
or
stock
in
trade.
The
time
of
acquisition
cannot
antedate
the
moment
that
the
purchaser
becomes
firmly
committed
to
the
essential
terms
of
the
purchase.
Similarly,
the
decision
of
Jackett,
J.
in
Warnford
Court
(Canada)
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1964]
C.T.C.
175,
64
D.T.C.
5103,
established
that
the
intention
of
a
purchaser
becomes
significant
at
the
moment
when
the
contract
becomes
legally
binding
on
him
or
her,
and
not
when
title
to
the
property
acquired
passes.
In
my
opinion,
the
option
granted
to
M.H.T.
in
this
case
must
not
be
confused
with
the
actual
acquisition
of
the
property.
The
option
merely
confers
an
irrevocable
right
to
acquire
property
in
the
future,
and
it
is
the
exercise
of
the
option
which
constitutes
the
acquisition,
since
it
is
only
at
that
moment
that
there
is
a
legally
binding
obligation
on
the
taxpayer.
As
I
have
already
indicated,
I
find
that
the
true
intention
of
Mr.
Tremblay,
and
accordingly
of
the
appellant,
at
the
moment
the
option
was
exercised
on
December
31,
1984,
was
to
acquire
the
Woolworth
building
in
order
to
transform
it
and
operate
a
commercial
centre.
Mr.
Tremblay’s
testimony,
which
was
supported
by
Mr.
De
Champlain's
testimony,
was
unquestionably
to
that
effect.
The
decision
to
exercise
the
option
at
that
point,
when
it
was
expiring
several
days
later,
appears
to
me
to
be
compatible
with
the
steps
taken
and
studies
done
up
to
that
point,
and
with
the
efforts
made
to
rent
the
space.
The
decision
which
was
finally
made
on
December
17,
1984
by
the
City
of
Chicoutimi,
to
have
a
preliminary
evaluation
done
concerning
the
possibility
of
housing
the
municipal
library
in
the
Woolworth
building,
also
confirms
the
steps
taken
in
that
sense.
The
expenditures
of
about
$20,000
already
incurred
for
legal
and
accounting
fees,
inter
alia,
for
studies
of
costs
and
preparation
of
the
tender
to
the
CSST,
as
well
as
the
$24,000
paid
for
the
option,
in
my
opinion
fully
justified
pursuing
the
plan
and
putting
it
into
concrete
effect
by
exercising
the
option,
despite
the
fact
that
the
level
of
assurance
in
terms
of
rentals
had
not
yet
attained
the
objective
which
Mr.
Tremblay
had
at
first
set
for
himself.
The
actual
location
of
the
building
in
what
was
at
the
time
a
rather
disadvantaged
area,
the
fact
that
it
had
been
vacant
for
a
relatively
long
period
of
time
without
having
received
really
serious
offers,
and
finally,
the
condition
of
the
building,
which
required
major
renovations,
appear
to
me
to
be
additional
factors
which
make
the
suggestion
that
this
was
from
the
outset
a
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade
or
a
speculative
concern
unlikely.
The
unexpected
arrival
of
Mr.
Bendwell
and
his
interest
in
acquiring
the
building
before
the
appellant
had
exercised
the
option
might
perhaps
have
given
him
the
additional
idea
that
he
might
resell
the
building
if
the
development
plan
did
not
turn
out
as
planned.
However,
what
I
would
see
as
having
been
nothing
more
than
a
mere
possibility
at
the
moment
the
option
was
exercised
did
not
take
on
the
determinative
character
which
must
characterize
the
secondary
intention,
as
that
concept
has
been
explained
by
our
courts,
particularly
since
the
decision
in
Racine,
Demers
and
Nolin,
supra.
Moreover,
as
I
have
noted,
such
intention
was
not
even
alleged
by
the
respondent.
Finally,
I
come
to
the
consideration
of
the
other
real
estate
transactions
as
indicative
of
a
taxpayer's
course
of
conduct.
While
in
prior
years
and
on
one
other
occasion
during
the
year
in
question
Mr.
Tremblay
and
the
appellant
bad
divested
themselves
of
unit
residential
buildings
after
owning
them
for
a
short
period,
the
approach
they
elected
to
take,
to
invest
in
commercial
buildings
which
appeared
to
be
more
profitable,
must
be
noted.
The
summary
of
investments
submitted
in
support
of
Mr.
Tremblay's
testimony,
and
to
which
reference
was
made
earlier,
speaks
volumes
on
this
point.
While
we
find
the
increase
of
the
cost
of
the
buildings
acquired
between
August
31,
1982
and
August
31,
1984,
to
have
nearly
doubled,
and
a
slight
decrease
between
August
31,
1984
and
August
31,
1985,
nonetheless
we
find
a
constant
increase
in
gross
rental
income
despite
this
decrease
in
the
cost
of
the
buildings
between
August
31,
1984
and
August
31,
1985.
These
figures,
and
the
figures
for
subsequent
years,
show
not
only
an
intention
to
increase
assets
overall,
but
also
an
intention
to
improve
the
profits
substantially.
In
this
context,
the
decision
by
any
investor
to
sell
certain
assets
in
order
to
acquire
more
productive
ones
does
not
transform
a
transaction
which
consists
in
liquidating
an
asset
into
a
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade.
Moreover,
I
would
add
that
it
has
been
clearly
established,
inter
alia,
in
Lampard,
supra,
and
Radiant
Properties
Inc.,
supra,
that
a
taxpayer
may
have
two
different
approaches
to
the
ownership
of
assets
consisting
in
real
property,
and
that
the
fact
that
he
or
she
previously
acquired
a
property
in
order
to
resell
it
at
a
profit
does
not
mean
that
all
subsequent
transactions
by
the
taxpayer
must
be
considered
as
giving
rise
to
a
business
income
rather
than
to
a
capital
gain.
In
my
opinion,
the
testimony
and
documents
submitted
in
evidence,
as
a
whole,
establish
on
the
balance
of
the
probabilities
that
when
he
acquired
the
Woolworth
building
the
appellant
had
the
intention
of
redeveloping
it
and
operating
it
as
a
commercial
centre,
and
not
the
intention
of
reselling
it
at
a
profit.
Accordingly,
the
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
assessment
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment,
the
whole
with
costs.
Appeal
allowed.