P.R.
Dussault,
T.C.C.J.:—In
the
course
of
these
appeals
from
reassessments
for
the
appellant’s
1980
and
1981
taxation
years,
the
respondent,
after
having
filed
a
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
made
a
motion
for
the
following:
(i)
to
have
the
appeal
dismissed
on
the
ground
that
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
has
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
an
appeal
from
the
reassessments
in
issue,
because
those
reassessments
are
at
nil
dollar;
(ii)
subsidiarily,
should
the
matter
be
left
to
the
Judge
presiding
on
the
merits,
to
obtain
leave
of
the
Court
to
amend
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal,
to
plead
that
the
reassessments
in
issue
are
at
nil
dollar
and
that
there
is
no
appeal
from
reassessments
of
that
kind.
Mrs.
Colette
Vanasse
swore
an
affidavit
in
support
of
the
motion.
In
essence,
it
states
that
the
last
reassessments
for
the
appellant's
1980
and
1981
taxation
years,
notices
of
which
are
dated
May
15,
1984,
are
at
nil
dollar
and
that
these
so-called
reassessments
were
confirmed
November
5,
1990.
I
might
simply
add
here
that
the
T2
income
tax
returns
filed
by
the
appellant
for
its
1980
and
1981
taxation
years
showed
no
tax
payable
as
the
appellant
had
no
taxable
income
owing
to
a
carry
forward
of
previous
years”
losses.
Position
of
the
respondent
At
hearing,
counsel
for
the
respondent
proceeded
to
argue
that,
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
there
is
no
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment.
In
so
doing,
he
relied
on
the
following
cases:
—
Okalta
Oils
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1955]
C.T.C.
271,
55
D.T.C.
1176
(S.C.C.);
—
The
Queen
v.
Garry
Bowl
Ltd.,
[1974]
C.T.C.
457,
74
D.T.C.
6401
(F.C.A.);
—
The
Queen
v.
Bowater
Mersey
Paper
Company
Ltd.,
[1987]
2
C.T.C.
159,
87
D.T.C.
5382
(F.C.A.);
—
Lornex
Mining
Corporation
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1987]
2
C.T.C.
195,
88
D.T.C.
6399
(F.C.T.D.);
—
Consortium
Group
Ltd.
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1986]
2
C.T.C.
2095,
86
D.T.C.
1558
(T.C.C.);
—
Forest
Lane
Holdings
Ltd.
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1987]
1
C.T.C.
2051,
87
D.T.C.
1
(T.C.C.);
—
Martens
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
2
C.T.C.
2018,
88
D.T.C.
1382
(T.C.C.)
Position
of
the
appellant
Counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted
that,
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
the
assessments
are
at
nil
amount,
the
Court
can
hear
the
appeals
on
the
merits
as
existing
rights
of
the
taxpayer
have
not
been
exhausted.
In
effect,
the
appellant
is
confronted
with
the
problem
that
for
purposes
of
the
reassessments
for
its
1980
and
1981
taxation
years
the
Minister
has
rejected
its
method
of
valuing
its
inventory,
which
action
allegedly
has
a
serious
impact
on
the
computation
of
its
tax
for
future
years.
Counsel
based
his
argument
on
the
following
passage
in
the
decision
rendered
by
Chairman
Cardin
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
(as
he
then
was)
in
the
case
of
Hullmann
(A.)
v.
M.N.R.,
[1973]
C.T.C.
2106,
73
D.T.C.
94,
at
page
2107
(D.T.C.
95):
However,
if
in
spite
of
a
nil
assessment
the
taxpayer's
rights
pursuant
to
the
Income
Tax
Act
have
not
been
exhausted
in
respect
of
the
taxation
year
to
which
the
nil
assessment
pertains,
and
the
provisions
of
the
Act
confer
rights
to
the
taxpayer
notwithstanding
the
nil
assessment
such
as,
for
example,
the
right
of
a
taxpayer
to
carry
business
losses
back
to
a
previous
year
or
to
dispute
a
reserve
which
the
Minister
had
set
up
in
order
to
arrive
at
the
nil
assessment
although
the
taxpayer
had
not
claimed
the
reserve,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
taxpayer
cannot
be
precluded
from
appealing
the
nil
assessment
in
order
to
establish
and
exercise
an
existing
right
conferred
on
him
by
the
Act
because
it
might
be
of
great
importance
to
him
at
that
time
to
find
out
how
large
the
loss
is
which
he
may
apply
to
the
previous
or
future
years
or
how
great
a
reserve
he
has
to
account
for
in
future
years.
In
my
view
the
right
to
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment,
or
the
absence
of
such
a
right,
depends
entirely
on
the
facts
of
a
given
case.
.
..
This
case
was
appealed
to
the
Trial
Division
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
(Hullman
v.
The
Queen,
[1975]
C.T.C.
297,75
D.T.C.
5193)
and
dismissed
on
its
merits,
the
Court
not
expressing
any
opinion
as
to
whether
an
appeal
could
lie
from
a
nil
assessment.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
also
relied
on
the
following
cases:
—
Anjulin
Farms
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1961]
C.T.C.
250,
61
D.T.C.
1182
(Ex.Ct.);
—
Benaby
Realties
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.
(1961),
28
Tax
A.B.C.
176,
62
D.T.C.
3;
—
Ontario
Culvert
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.
(1965),
38
Tax
A.B.C.
256,
65
D.T.C.
379;
—
T.D.
Early.
M.N.R.
(1966),
40
Tax
A.B.C.
329,
66
D.T.C.
192.
Analysis
Jurisdiction
of
the
Court
As
regards
the
respondent's
submission
that
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
lacks
jurisdiction
to
entertain
the
present
appeal,
it
was
recognized
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
The
Queen
v.
Garry
Bowl
Ltd.,
supra,
at
page
460
(D.T.C.
6403)
that
the
Tax
Review
Board
the
predecessor
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
"had
jurisdiction
to
entertain
an
appeal
for
the
purpose
of
ascertaining
whether
the
appellant
had
a
right
to
relief
from
an
assessment
of
tax.”
Appeal
from
nil
assessment
The
respondent's
second
submission
is
that
there
is
no
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment.
A
review
of
the
case
law
reveals
that
although
at
one
time
there
existed
a
right
to
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment,
the
cases
granting
such
a
right
were
decided
under
provisions
substantially
different
from
the
provisions
applicable
to
the
taxation
years
in
issue
in
the
present
appeal.
In
particular,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
decision
in
Okalta
Oils
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra,
laid
down
the
principle
that
a
taxpayer
cannot
appeal
from
a
“nil
assessment"
because
the
word
"assessment"
as
used
in
section
58
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
(former
subsection
165)
did
not
include
a
“nil
assessment".
Section
55
and
subsection
58(1)
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
as
applicable
to
the
1946
taxation
year,
being
the
taxation
year
in
issue
in
Okalta
Oil,
supra,
read
as
follows:
55.
Notwithstanding
any
prior
assessment,
or
if
no
assessment
has
been
made,
the
taxpayer
shall
continue
to
be
liable
for
any
tax
and
to
be
assessed
therefor
and
the
Minister
may
at
any
time
assess
any
person
for
tax,
interest
and
penalties
and
may.
.
.
[emphasis
added]
58(1)
Any
person
who
objects
to
the
amount
at
which
he
is
assessed,
or
who
considers
that
he
is
not
liable
to
taxation
under
this
Act,
may
personally
or
by
his
solicitor
serve
a
notice
of
appeal
upon
the
Minister.
.
.
[Emphasis
added.]
In
1948,
section
55
and
subsection
58(1)
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
became
subsections
42(4)
and
53(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(1948),
respectively,
and
read
as
follows:
42(4)
The
Minister
may
at
any
time
assess
tax,
interest
or
penalties
and
may.
.
.
[emphasis
added]
53(1)
A
taxpayer
who
objects
to
an
assessment
under
this
Part
may,
within
days
from
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
of
assessment,
serve
on
the
Minister
a
notice
of
objection
in
duplicate
in
prescribed
form
setting
out
the
reasons
for
the
objection
and
all
relevant
facts.
[Emphasis
added.]
Furthermore,
section
54
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(1948)
provided
that:
54(1)
Where
a
taxpayer
has
served
notice
of
objection
to
an
assessment
under
section
53,
he
may
appeal
to
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
constituted
by
Division
I
to
have
the
assessment
vacated
or
varied
after
either.
.
.
[Emphasis
added.]
By
chapter
148
of
the
Revised
Statutes
of
Canada
of
1952,
sections
42,
53
and
54
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(1948)
became
sections
46,
58
and
59,
respectively
without
any
change
in
wording.
These
were
the
provisions
before
the
Exchequer
Court
when
it
decided
in
Anjulin
Farms
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra,
that
the
word
"assessment"
includes
a
“nil
assessment",
thus,
granting
the
taxpayers
a
right
to
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment.
The
Anjulin
Farms
case
was
followed
in
Benaby
Realities
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra,
Ontario
Culvert
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra,
and
T.D.
Earl
v.
M.N.R.,
supra.
By
chapter
43
of
the
Statutes
of
Canada
of
1960,
subsection
46(4)
(now
subsection
152(4))
was
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor:
46(4)
The
Minister
may
at
any
time
assess
tax,
interest
or
penalties
under
this
Part
or
notify
in
writing
any
person
by
whom
a
return
of
income
for
a
taxation
year
has
been
filed
that
no
tax
is
payable
for
the
taxation
year,
and
may.
.
.
[emphasis
added]
By
virtue
of
the
distinction
between
assessing
tax,
interest
or
penalties,
if
any,
and
notifying
a
person
in
writing
that
no
tax
is
payable,
made
by
the
1960
amendments
to
the
Act,
the
following
cases
reestablish
the
principle
that
there
can
be
no
appeal
from
a
“nil
assessment":
Newfoundland
Minerals
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1969]
C.T.C.
639,
69
D.T.C.
5432
(Ex.Ct.);
The
Queen
v.
Garry
Bowl
Ltd.,
supra;
Consortium
Group
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra;
The
Queen
v.
Bowater
Mersey
Paper
Company
Ltd.,
supra,
and
The
Queen
v.
Consumers'
Gas
Company
Ltd.,
[1987]
1
C.T.C.
79,
87
D.T.C.
5008
(F.C.A.).
On
that
point,
I
need
only
refer
to
Mr.
Justice
Hugessen's
comments
in
The
Consumers’
Gas
Company
Ltd.
case,
supra,
where
he
said
at
pages
83-84
(D.T.C.
5012):
What
is
put
in
issue
on
appeal
to
the
courts
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
the
Minister’s
assessment.
While
the
word
"assessment"
can
bear
two
constructions,
as
being
either
the
process
by
which
tax
is
assessed
or
the
product
of
that
assessment,
it
seems
to
me
clear,
from
a
reading
of
sections
152
to
177
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
that
the
word
is
there
employed
in
the
second
sense
only.
This
conclusion
flows
in
particular
from
subsection
165(1)
and
from
the
well
established
principle
that
a
taxpayer
can
neither
object
to
nor
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment.
Consequently,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
there
is
compelling
authority
that
there
is
no
relief
to
which
the
appellant
is
entitled
or
which
this
Court
can
properly
grant.
Since
no
tax,
interest
nor
penalty
was
assessed
and
since
the
Court
cannot
increase
the
amount
assessed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
one
can
readily
understand
the
logic
of
the
principle
that
a
taxpayer
cannot
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment.
It
has
been
decided
that
whenever
a
taxpayer
alleges
that
the
Minister
has
erred
in
computing
the
tax
resulting
in
a
nil
assessment,
the
matter
can
be
dealt
with
on
its
merits
in
other
taxation
years
for
which
there
are
no
nil
assessments
and
where
it
is
pertinent
in
determining
the
taxes
owed
for
those
years.
In
this
respect,
reference
can
be
made
to
Day
&
Ross
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1976]
C.T.C.
707,
76
D.T.C.
6433,
at
page
708
(D.T.C.
6434)
(F.C.T.D.)
and
Forest
Lane
Holdings
Ltd.
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra.
As
that
solution,
however,
was
not
thought
to
be
entirely
satisfactory
in
many
cases,
amendments
were
brought
to
section
152
of
the
Act
by
section
61
of
chapter
4
of
the
1976-77
Statutes
of
Canada,
thereby
adding
subsection
152(1.2)
which
created
some
special
rights
of
appeal
from
certain
determinations
made
by
the
Minister.
These
rights
now
outlined
in
subsections
152(1.1)
to
152(1.3)
of
the
Act
stand
in
addition
to
the
original
right
of
appeal
from
an
assessment.
However,
the
process
outlined
in
subsections
152(1.1),
and
152(1.2)
of
the
Act
which
enables
a
taxpayer
to
object
or
appeal
in
respect
of
a
determination
is
not
available
to
the
appellant
in
the
case
at
bar.
In
view
of
the
above
findings,
what
the
appellant
is
in
fact
seeking
is
a
declaratory
judgment
on
a
particular
issue
relating
to
the
computation
of
its
income
for
1980
and
1981
or
of
its
taxable
income
for
future
years.
In
either
case,
this
Court
has
no
authority
to
issue
such
a
judgment.
This
Court
derives
its
jurisdiction
from
Parliament
and
more
particularly
from
section
12
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act.
With
respect
to
appeals
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
this
section
now
gives
the
Court
exclusive
original
jurisdiction
to
hear
and
determine
appeals
which
are
provided
for
in
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
right
to
appeal
from
an
assessment
under
that
Act
is
provided
for
in
section
169
and
the
manner
in
which
the
Court
can
dispose
of
it
is
set
forth
in
section
171.
The
relief
sought
by
the
appellant
falls
outside
the
requirements
of
those
provisions
as
they
have
been
interpreted
by
our
Courts.
As
stated
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
the
Okalta
case,
supra,
at
page
1177
(D.T.C.),
the
“right
of
appeal
is
a
right
of
exception
which
exists
only
when
given
by
statute”.
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
this
proposition
still
holds
true
today.
The
Tax
Court
of
Canada
cannot
expand
that
right
and
is
bound
by
its
own
decisions
and
decisions
of
higher
Courts
that
have
restricted
its
application.
I
might
add
that
even
if
this
Court
could
grant
a
declaratory
judgment,
there
would
still
be
no
tax
payable
for
1980
and
1981.
The
right
course
of
action
for
the
taxpayer
would
have
been
to
have
the
matter
decided
on
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
for
a
future
year
where
it
might
have
proven
pertinent
to
determine
its
tax
liability
for
that
year.
For
these
reasons,
the
motion
requesting
the
dismissal
of
the
appeals
is
dismissed
but
the
purported
appeals
are
quashed.
Dismissal
of
appeals
dismissed;
appeals
quashed.