Stone,
J.A.
(Isaac,
C.J.,
and
Heald,
J.A.,
concurring):—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
McNair,
J.
rendered
January
16,
1990,
whereby
the
respondent's
action
by
way
of
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
dated
July
23,
1985,
was
allowed.
The
primary
issue
in
this
appeal
raises
a
question
as
to
the
proper
interpretation
of
subsection
20(14)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
and,
in
particular,
paragraph
(b)
thereof
as
it
pertains
to
the
deductibility
of
an
amount
of
interest
which
the
appellant
received
in
the
taxation
year
1977
in
the
circumstances
set
out
below.
Subsection
20(14),
as
it
stood
at
the
relevant
time,
read
as
follows:
20(14)
Where,
by
virtue
of
an
assignment
or
other
transfer
of
a
bond,
debenture
or
similar
security
(other
than
an
income
bond
or
an
income
debenture),
including
for
greater
certainty
an
assignment
or
other
transfer
after
June
18,
1971
of
a
bill,
note,
mortgage,
hypothec
or
similar
obligation,
the
transferee
has
become
entitled
to
interest
in
respect
of
a
period
commencing
before
the
time
of
transfer
and
ending
after
that
time
that
is
not
payable
until
after
the
time
of
transfer,
an
amount
equal
to
that
proportion
of
the
interest
that
the
number
of
days
in
the
portion
of
the
period
that
preceded
the
day
of
transfer
is
of
the
number
of
days
in
the
whole
period
(a)
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
transferor's
income
for
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
transfer
was
made,
and
(b)
may
be
deducted
in
computing
the
transferee's
income
for
a
taxation
year
in
the
computation
of
which
there
has
been
included
(i)
the
full
amount
of
the
interest
under
section
12,
or
(ii)
a
portion
of
the
interest
under
paragraph
(a).
On
March
1,
1975,
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Stanley
Trzop,
both
professional
engineers,
entered
into
an
agreement
with
the
New
Brunswick
Industrial
Finance
Board
(“the
Board")
for
the
purchase
from
the
Board
of
all
of
the
common
shares
it
held
in
the
capital
stock
of
a
company
known
as
Atlantic
Forest
Products
Ltd.
for
the
sum
of
one
dollar.
The
name
of
that
company
was
subsequently
changed
to
Resorts
Estates
Ltd.
(the
company").
By
clause
2
of
the
agreement,
the
Board
agreed
to
cause
the
company
to
be
debt
free
save
for
“the
present
indebtedness
of
the
company
to
the
Board
in
the
approximate
principal
amount
of
$5,000,000
and
interest
accruing
thereon",
and
to
postpone
the
payment
of
any
and
all
indebtedness
of
the
company
to
it
so
long
as
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Trzop”
shall
commence
and
continue
making
reasonable
efforts
to
operate
the
company
in
a
good
and
businesslike
manner"
over
the
next
ensuing
period
of
two
years.
In
the
same
clause,
the
Board
also
agreed,
at
the
end
of
that
period
and
for
the
consideration
of
$10,
to
sell
to
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Trzop
"the
mortgages,
chattel
mortgages,
debenture
and
other
like
securities
in
the
principal
amount
of
approximately
$5,000,000
and
interest
accruing
thereon
and
any
other
lawful
charges
thereon
then
owing
by
the
company
to
the
Board”
provided,
inter
alia,
that
the
two
purchasers"
shall
have
made
reasonable
efforts
to
operate
the
company
in
a
good
and
businesslike
manner”
during
the
two-year
period.
The
circumstances
which
led
the
Board
to
enter
into
this
agreement
may
be
briefly
described.
The
company
had
already
been
in
operation
for
a
number
of
years
at
or
near
Minto,
New
Brunswick,
where
it
produced
charcoal
briquettes.
On
March
31,
1971,
it
had
executed
a
fixed
and
floating
charge
debenture
in
favour
of
the
Board
as
security
for
a
guarantee
which
the
Board
had
only
recently
furnished
to
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
in
respect
of
a
commercial
loan
to
the
company
of
$3,000,000.
The
debenture
provided,
inter
alia,
that
in
the
event
of
default
on
the
part
of
the
company
in
repaying
principal
and
interest
due
on
the
loan,
any
amount
made
good
to
the
bank
would
be
added
to
the
amount
secured
by
the
debenture.
In
1972
and
1973,
the
Board
made
direct
loans
to
the
company
aggregating
$1,425,000
at
annual
interest
rates
ranging
from
5
per
cent
to
9-1/2
per
cent.
On
October
3,
1974,
after
the
company
had
defaulted
in
fulfilling
the
terms
and
conditions
of
the
guaranteed
loan
agreement,
the
Board
paid
the
bank
the
sum
of
$3,375,000
in
full
satisfaction
of
outstanding
principal
and
interest
then
due.
This
amount,
when
combined
with
the
amounts
due
under
the
promissory
notes,
meant
that
as
of
March
1,
1975,
the
total
principal
indebtedness
of
the
company
to
the
Board
stood
at
approximately
$5,000,000
together
with
accrued
interest.
On
July
6,
1977,
for
the
stated
consideration
of
$10,
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Trzop
purchased
the
debenture
in
the
approximate
amount
of
$5,000,000
in
principal
and
accrued
interest
together
with
other
securities.
The
same
day
the
Minister
of
Commerce
and
Development
of
New
Brunswick
assigned
to
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Trzop
the
debenture
and
realty
mortgage
as
well
as
a
chattel
mortgage
which
the
company
had
given
to
the
Board
as
security
for
its
indebtedness.
In
his
return
for
the
taxation
year
1977,
the
appellant
included
the
amount
of
$38,335
as
income,
which
represented
a
portion
of
accrued
interest
earned
on
securities
purchased
from
the
Board
on
July
6,
1977,
and
deducted
this
same
amount
pursuant
to
paragraph
20(14)(b).
The
deduction
was
disallowed
by
the
Minister
in
his
notice
of
reassessment
of
December
16,
1980,
which
reassessment
was
confirmed
by
the
Minister
on
February
10,
1982.
The
trial
judge
found
on
the
evidence
that
interest
on
the
debenture
became
payable
from
October
3,
1974,
at
the
rate
of
11-1/2
per
cent
per
annum
and
that
it
accrued
on
a
daily
basis
from
that
date
forward
(see
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
208,
90
D.T.C.
6111).
He
also
found
that
interest
on
the
promissory
notes
at
the
rates
specified
therein
accrued
daily
from
their
respective
dates.
At
page
210
(D.T.C.
6113)
of
his
reasons
for
judgment,
the
trial
judge
found
that
in
disallowing
the
deduction
and
assessing
the
appellant
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions:
1.
the
Board,
as
transferor
of
the
obligations
and
accrued
interest,
did
not
include
in
its
income
the
amounts
sought
to
be
deducted
for
accrued
interest;
2.
in
computing
their
incomes
for
the
taxation
years
in
question,
the
defendants
were
not
entitled
to
deduct
the
amounts
of
accrued
interest
as
the
transferor
of
the
obligations
did
not
include
those
amounts
in
its
income
for
the
year;
3.
all
accrued
interest
on
the
obligations
of
the
company
transferred
by
the
Board
to
the
defendants
became
payable
coincidental
to
the
transfer,
except
to
the
extent
of
interest
accruing
for
the
last
monthly
period
commencing
before
the
date
of
transfer
and
ending
after
that
date;
and
4.
the
proportion
of
the
interest
accruing
for
the
last
monthly
period
commencing
before
the
date
of
the
transfer
and
ending
after
that
date
that
the
number
of
the
days
in
the
portion
of
the
period
that
preceded
the
day
of
transfer
was
of
the
number
of
days
in
the
whole
period
was
$3,325.
The
trial
judge
took
the
view
that
the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
deduct
the
interest
in
question
pursuant
to
paragraph
(b)
because
there
was
no
evidence
that
this
amount
was
included
in
computing
the
income
of
the
Board
under
paragraph
(a).
At
trial
as
in
this
Court,
the
appellant
argued
that
paragraphs
(a)
and
(b)
were
intended
to
operate
independently
of
one
another
once
it
was
shown
that
the
conditions
set
forth
in
the
language
which
precedes
those
paragraphs
were
satisfied.
To
read
the
subsection
otherwise
would
render
it
meaningless
in
a
case
such
as
this
where
a
transferor
of
a
debt
obligation
is
exempt
from
paying
tax
under
the
Act.
These
arguments
were
rejected
by
the
trial
judge
at
page
213
(D.T.C.
6115)
of
his
reasons
for
judgment
where
he
stated:
With
respect,
I
must
disagree.
It
seems
to
me
that
this
innovative
approach
totally
ignores
the
words-in-total
contextapproach
to
statutory
interpretation
adopted
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Stubart
Investments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
1
S.C.R.
536,
[1984]
C.T.C.
2659,
84
D.T.C.
6305
and
approved
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Lor-Wes
Contracting
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1986]
1
F.C.
346,
[1985]
2
C.T.C.
79,
85
D.T.C.
5310.
Accepting
the
modern
principle
of
statutory
interpretation
expounded
by
these
cases,
it
seems
to
me
that
one
cannot
blithely
ignore
the
mandatory
requirement
of
paragraph
20(14)(a)
that
the
amount
of
accrued
interest
must
be
included
in
the
transferor's
income
before
the
transferee
of
the
debt
obligation
can
deduct
it
under
paragraph
20(14)(b).
In
my
view,
the
section
was
designed
to
provide
for
the
apportionment
of
accrued
interest
as
between
the
transferor
and
transferee
of
a
bond
or
other
debt
obligation
where
the
same
is
transferred
between
interest
dates,
thus
avoiding
the
incidence
of
double
taxation.
The
statutory
provisions
upon
which
the
assessment
is
based
are
found
in
paragraph
12(1)(c)
and
subsection
20(14)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Paragraph
12(1)(c)
requires
a
taxpayer
in
computing
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property
to
include
therein
"any
amount
received
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year.
.
.
as
.
.
.
interest".
The
appellant
contends
that
subsection
20(14)
allows
him
to
deduct
the
interest
in
computing
his
income
pursuant
to
paragraph
(b)
regardless
of
whether
the
same
amount
has
been
included
by
the
Board
in
computing
its
income
under
paragraph
(a).
He
submits
that
these
two
paragraphs
are
independent
of
one
another
so
that
compliance
with
paragraph
(a)
need
not
be
shown
before
a
transferee
may
take
advantage
of
the
deduction
afforded
by
paragraph
(b).
He
stresses
that
the
subsection
is
primarily
aimed
at
apportioning
accrued
interest
income
as
between
a
transferor
and
a
transferee
rather
than
with
the
incidence
of
taxation
thereon.
He
asserts
that
allowing
the
deduction
would
not
mean
that
the
amount
of
interest
would
escape
tax
entirely
because,
by
subsection
40(3)
and
paragraph
53(2)(l)
of
the
Act,
the
appellants
adjusted
cost
base
of
the
property
would
be
reduced
by
an
equivalent
amount
and
a
taxable
capital
gain
would
be
triggered.
The
appellant
points
also
to
what
he
characterizes
as
undesirable
implications
of
the
judgment
below.
A
taxpayer
could
not
take
advantage
of
a
paragraph
(b)
deduction
unless
he
could
identify
the
transferor
and
show
that
the
transferor
is
liable
for
tax,
that
he
has
filed
an
income
tax
return
and
has
reported
the
accrued
interest.
There
are
many
cases,
he
says,
where
the
identity
of
a
transferor
and
whether
he
had
reported
accrued
interest
income
could
not
be
established
by
a
transferee.
This
would
create
difficulties
for
buyers
and
sellers
in
the
open
pond
and
debenture
markets
in
Canada
and
for
the
operation
of
those
markets.
The
respondent
argues
that,
to
be
deductible
under
paragraph
20(14)(b),
the
amount
referred
to
in
paragraph
12(1)(c)
must
both
be
included
in
a
transferee's
income
and
in
computing
the
income
of
a
transferor
pursuant
to
paragraph
20(14)(a).
The
respondent
further
asserts
that
the
judgment
below
accords
with
accepted
interpretation
of
subsection
20(14).
In
Courtwright
v.
M.N.R.,
[1980]
C.T.C.
2632,
80
D.T.C.
1609,
the
chairman
of
the
Review
Board
expressed
the
view
that
paragraphs
(a)
and
(b)
are
interdependent,
so
that
relief
under
paragraph
(b)
is
not
available
unless
there
has
been
compliance
with
paragraph
(a).
At
page
2635
(D.T.C.
1612)
of
his
decision,
the
learned
chairman
stated:
For
the
section
to
apply
it
must
be
read
and
integrated
as
a
whole
and
subsection
20(14)(b)
of
the
Act
can,
in
my
view,
only
be
applied
if
subsection
20(14)(a)
of
the
Act
has
been
complied
with.
The
circumstances
of
that
case
differed
from
those
which
here
obtain.
However,
it
does
appear
that
the
above
views
were
necessary
to
the
decision
because
the
Court
found
that
a
valid
assignment
and
transfer
of
the
debt
obligation
with
accrued
interest
had
occurred.
These
views
are
echoed
by
the
same
chairman
in
Hill
v.
M.N.R.,
[1981]
C.T.C.
2120,
81
D.T.C.
167,
at
page
2126
(D.T.C.
171),
but
by
way
of
obiter
dicta
because
that
case
involved
a
so-called
“bond
flip”
transaction
rather
than
a
valid
assignment.
At
bottom,
the
respondent
says
that
subsection
20(14)
was
not
intended
to
be
applied
in
circumstances
like
the
present
because
the
appellant
cannot
be
said
to
have
made
an
investment
to
earn
interest
but
to
rescue
a
business
which
was
plainly
in
distress
and
whose
failure
would
jeopardize
jobs
in
the
community.
The
price
at
which
the
securities
were
sold
did
not,
as
would
ordinarily
be
the
case,
reflect
the
fact
that
interest
had
accrued
at
the
date
of
sale.
Here,
the
transferee
paid
nominal
consideration
for
the
debts
assigned
with
the
result
that
there
was
nothing
to
apportion
between
himself
and
the
transferor.
Finally,
the
respondent
submits
that
if
this
Court
were
to
find
paragraph
20(14)(b)
to
be
applicable,
it
would
become
necessary
to
determine
the
duration
of
the
"period"
for
which
the
appellant
"has
become
entitled
to
interest”
within
the
meaning
of
these
words
in
the
portion
of
subsection
20(14)
which
precedes
paragraphs
(a)
and
(b).
In
my
view,
it
is
important
at
the
outset
to
discern
the
purpose
of
subsection
20(14)
at
the
time
it
was
adopted
by
Parliament
with
an
eye
to
the
economic
and
commercial
reality
of
a
taxpayer's
actions.
To
do
so,
it
seems
to
me,
would
be
in
harmony
with
recent
guidance
for
interpreting
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
developed
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
beginning
with
its
decision
in
Stubart
Investments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
1
S.C.R.
536,
[1984]
C.T.C.
294,
84
D.T.C.
6305.
More
recently,
in
McClurg
v.
M.N.R.,
[1990]
3
S.C.R.
1020,
[1991]
1
C.T.C.
169,
91
D.T.C.
5001,
Dickson,
C.J.,
for
a
majority,
had
occasion
to
describe
this
new
approach,
at
pages
1049-50
(C.T.C.
182,
D.T.C.
5010-11):
In
recent
years
this
Court,
in
an
income
tax
appeal,
has
found
it
beneficial
to
engage
explicitly
in
the
development
of
an
interpretive
approach
to
the
Income
Tax
Act;
an
approach
which
is
wedded
neither
to
a
rule
of
"strict
construction”
nor
to
an
all-encompassing
test
of"
independent
business
purpose”.
This
trend
began
with
the
judgment
of
Estey,
J.
in
his
majority
reasons
in
Stubart,
supra.
In
that
case,
Estey,
J.
undertook
an
extensive
discussion
of
interpretive
techniques,
and
he
drew
a
conclusion
as
to
the
preferred
approach
to
be
taken
by
the
courts
at
576
(C.T.C.
315,
D.T.C.
6322):
It
seems
more
appropriate
to
turn
to
an
interpretation
test
which
would
provide
a
means
of
applying
the
Act
so
as
to
affect
only
the
conduct
of
a
taxpayer
which
has
the
designed
effect
of
defeating
the
expressed
intention
of
Parliament.
In
short,
the
tax
statute,
by
this
interpretative
technique,
is
extended
to
reach
conduct
of
the
taxpayer
which
clearly
falls
within
"the
object
and
spirit”
of
the
taxing
provisions.
Estey,
J.
expanded
upon
this
test
of
“
object
and
spirit"
in
his
majority
judgment
in
The
Queen
v.
Golden,
[1986]
1
S.C.R.
209,
[1986]
1
C.T.C.
274,
86
D.T.C.
6138
at
pages
214-15
(C.T.C
277,
D.T.C.
214-15):
.
.
.the
law
is
not
confined
to
a
literal
and
virtually
meaningless
interpretation
of
the
Act
where
the
words
will
support
on
a
broader
construction
a
conclusion
which
is
workable
and
in
harmony
with
the
evident
purposes
of
the
Act
in
question.
Strict
construction
in
the
historic
sense
no
longer
finds
a
place
in
the
canons
of
interpretation
applicable
to
taxation
statutes
in
an
era
such
as
the
present
More
recently,
in
Bronfman
Trust
v.
The
Queen,
[1987]
1
S.C.R.
32,
[1987]
1
C.T.C.
117,
87
D.T.C.
5059,
I
described
the
approach
in
terms
of
the
need
to
discern
the
commercial
reality
of
a
taxpayer's
transaction:
I
acknowledge,
however,
that
just
as
there
has
been
a
recent
trend
away
from
strict
construction
of
taxation
statutes
.
.
.
so
too
has
the
recent
trend
in
tax
cases
been
towards
attempting
to
ascertain
the
true
commercial
and
practical
nature
of
the
taxpayer’s
transactions.
There
has
been,
in
this
country
and
elsewhere,
a
movement
away
from
tests
based
on
the
form
of
transactions
and
towards
tests
based
on
.
.
.
a
common
sense
appreciation
of
all
the
guiding
features
of
the
events
in
question
This
is,
I
believe,
a
laudable
trend
provided
it
is
consistent
with
the
text
and
purposes
of
the
taxation
statute.
Assessment
of
taxpayers’
transactions
with
an
eye
to
commercial
and
economic
realities,
rather
than
juristic
classification
of
form,
may
help
to
avoid
the
inequity
of
tax
liability
being
dependent
upon
the
taxpayer's
sophistication
at
manipulating
a
sequence
of
events
to
achieve
a
patina
of
compliance
with
the
apparent
prerequisites
for
a
taxation
deduction
(at
pages
52-53).
Thus,
in
proceeding
to
analyze
the
tax
consequences
of
the
application
of
the
discretionary
dividend
clause,
it
is
necessary
to
determine
both
the
purpose
of
the
legislative
provision
and
the
economic
and
commercial
reality
of
the
taxpayer's
actions.
In
attempting
to
discern
the
purpose
of
subsection
56(2),
it
is
helpful
to
refer
to
the
body
of
jurisprudence
dealing
with
the
subsection.
As
McClurg,
supra,
indicates,
we
should
search
for
the
object
and
spirit
of
subsection
20(14)
in
existing
jurisprudence.
The
only
case
in
which
a
statement
of
purpose
is
contained
is
that
of
Courtwright,
supra,
where,
at
page
2635
(D.T.C.
1612),
the
chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
(Hon.
L.J.
Cardin)
explained
the
purpose
of
the
subsection
as
follows:
It
appears
to
me
that
section
20(14)
of
the
Act
expresses
the
elementary
principle
of
not
taxing
the
same
interest
twice,
viz,
in
the
hands
of
the
transferor
and
in
those
of
the
transferee.
These
views
appear
to
be
implied
by
Professor
Harris,
Canadian
Income
Taxation,
4th
ed.,
(Toronto,
Butterworths,
1986),
at
page
183,
where
he
states:
Where
an
interest-bearing
obligation
is
assigned
or
transferred
between
interest
payment
dates,
the
accrued
interest
at
that
time
is
included
in
computing
the
transferor’s
income
and
is
deductible
by
the
transferee
against
the
next
interest
payment.
Thus,
the
net
effect
to
the
transferee
is
that
he
need
include
in
computing
his
income
only
the
portion
of
that
interest
payment
that
accrued
since
his
acquisition
of
the
obligation.
(Subsection
20(14).
See
also
subsections
12(9),
20(14.1),
paragraph
20(21)(c),
subsections
214(6)-(12),
(14),
paragraphs
53(2)(l),
110.1(2)(j);
IT-410R,
n.
36
supra.)
As
we
have
seen,
the
trial
judge
himself
agreed
that
subsection
20(14)
"was
designed
to
provide
for
the
apportionment
of
accrued
interest
as
between
the
transferor
and
transferee
of
a
bond
or
other
debt
obligation
where
the
same
is
transferred
between
interest
dates,
thus
avoiding
the
incidence
of
double
taxation".
My
reading
of
subsection
20(14)
also
leads
me
to
conclude
that
its
purpose
is
to
apportion,
as
between
a
transferor
and
a
transferee,
interest
which
accrues
on
a
debt
obligation
which
is
transferred
at
some
point
in
time
between
interest
dates
specified
therein
so
as
to
avoid
taxation
of
the
same
amount
in
both
the
hands
of
the
transferor
and
the
transferee.
The
effect
is
that,
ordinarily,
interest
which
accrues
before
the
transfer
date
becomes
taxable
in
the
hands
of
the
transferor
only
and
that
the
transferee
is
taxable
on
the
interest
which
accrues
after
that
date.
In
my
view,
this
appeal
must
be
decided
on
its
own
facts.
How
the
provisions
of
subsection
20(14)
might
be
applied
in
different
circumstances,
such
as
where
interest
accrues
on
a
debt
obligation
purchased
on
the
open
market,
is
not
before
us.
What
needs
to
be
decided
here
is
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled,
under
paragraph
20(14)(b),
to
relief
from
tax
on
the
accrued
interest
in
the
peculiar
circumstances
of
this
case.
I
have
already
expressed
the
view
that
the
purpose
of
subsection
20(14)
is
to
avoid
double
taxation
of
the
same
amount
of
interest
once
it
is
apportioned
in
the
manner
required
by
that
subsection.
That,
indeed,
appears
to
be
generally
accepted.
Of
controversy
is
the
application
of
the
subsection
in
individual
situations
having
regard
to
its
structure.
As
I
understand
the
transactions
of
March
1,
1975,
and
July
6,
1977,
the
Board
did
not
receive
payment
for
the
interest
which
had
accrued
on
the
debt
obligations
which
it
committed
itself
to
transfer
in
the
agreement
of
March
1,
1975.
Nominal
consideration
for
the
transfer
was
provided
for
in
that
agreement,
but
what
bound
the
Board
to
carry
out
the
transfer
was
that
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Trzop
had
kept
their
promise
to
make''
reasonable
efforts
to
operate
the
company
in
a
good
and
businesslike
manner”
during
the
two
year
period
following
acquisition
of
the
common
shares.
The
objective
of
the
purchasers,
it
seems,
was
not
so
much
to
purchase
accrued
interest
by
acquiring
debt
obligations,
although
that
did
occur,
as
to
take
control
of
a
corporation
in
distress
with
a
view
to
turning
its
fortunes
around,
to
making
its
business
profitable
and,
coincidentally,
to
preserving
jobs
in
the
community
where
the
business
was
located.
In
my
opinion,
the
subsection
was
not
intended
to
apply
in
such
unique
circumstances.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
the
debt
obligation
could
be
viewed
as
one
to
which
the
subsection
applies,
I
would
agree
that
a
deduction
under
paragraph
(b)
is
not
available
because
it
has
not
been
shown
that
the
Board,
whose
identity
is
unquestioned,
included
the
same
amount
in
computing
its
income.
In
my
view,
the
word
"and"
at
the
end
of
paragraph
(a)
and
the
object
and
spirit
of
the
subsection
support
this
construction.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
I
would
dismiss
this
appeal.
As
this
appeal
and
the
appeals
in
Court
Files
Nos.
A-104-90
and
A-105-90
were
heard
together
there
should
be
one
set
of
costs
but
with
disbursements
in
each
appeal.
Court
File
No.
A-104-90
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