Collver,
J.:—
This
is
an
application
to
determine
whether
it
would
be
contrary
to
the
public
interest
to
require
disclosure
to
the
defence
of
particulars
of
legal
advice
given
by
the
Department
of
Justice
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
Such
disclosure
was
ordered
by
His
Honour
Judge
Cronin,
of
the
Provincial
Court
of
British
Columbia,
pursuant
to
an
application
heard
at
the
commencement
of
Stephen
Sander's
trial
on
tax
evasion
charges.
Background
of
the
application
On
June
21,
1990,
Revenue
Canada
investigators
seized
business
records
at
the
home
and
at
the
business
and
accounting
offices
of
Stephen
Sander.
The
seizures
were
effected
pursuant
to
search
warrants
authorized
under
section
231.3
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
However,
on
November
28,
1990,
in
the
case
of
Baron
v.
Canada
(Attorney
General),
[1991]
1
C.T.C.
125,
91
D.T.C.
5055,
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
declared
section
231.3
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
be
of
no
force
and
effect,
after
finding
the
section
to
be
inconsistent
with
sections
7
and
8
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
In
Baron,
supra,
the
Court
ordered
that
seized
documents
be
returned
forthwith.
In
the
present
case,
notwithstanding
demands
by
Mr.
Sander's
counsel
for
return
of
the
business
records,
Revenue
Canada
obtained
another
search
warrant
on
March
21,
1991,
this
time
pursuant
to
section
487
of
the
Criminal
Code,
and
re-seized
the
documents
already
in
its
possession.
On
June
14,
1991,
Mr.
Sander
was
charged
with
the
present
offences.
The
Crown
elected
to
proceed
by
indictment.
In
the
mentioned
pre-trial
disclosure
application,
counsel
for
Stephen
Sander
sought
production
of
Revenue
Canada's
audit
and
special
investigation
files.
That
material
has
apparently
been
supplied.
But
Mr.
Sander
also
sought:
Relevant
notes,
memoranda,
reports,
however
described,
documenting
the
deliberations
of
Revenue
Canada
officials
with
members
of
the
Department
of
Justice,
and
or
others,
respecting
whether
to
retain
books
and
records
seized
pursuant
to
the
warrants
Exhibits
2
to
8
to
the
affidavit
of
Erin
Berger,
in
light
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
decision
in
Baron,
supra,
and
whether
to
and
how
to
purport
to
re-seize
the
said
records.
On
April
22,
1992,
Judge
Edmund
Cronin
ordered
production
of
the
above
materials.
In
his
reasons,
Judge
Cronin
assumed
the
existence
of
solicitor-client
privilege
between
Justice
Department
lawyers
and
Revenue
Canada
investigators.
However,
in
discussing
the
right
to
make
full
answer
and
defence,
Judge
Cronin
emphasized
Mr.
Sander's
right
to
explore
the
propriety
of
the
detention
and
the
re-seizure,
including
the
nature
of
the
advice
received
and,
“
whether
the
investigators
complied
with
the
advice
and
what
considerations
they
gave
to
the
decision
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
and
to
the
rights
of
Mr.
Sander
to
have
his
property
returned”.
The
original
demand
for
disclosure
On
March
30,
1992,
counsel
for
Mr.
Sander
demanded
disclosure
of
the
following
(summarized):
1.
On
what
date
was
the
Baron
decision
brought
to
the
attention
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue?
2.
What
legal
advice
was
tendered
regarding
the
course
of
action
to
be
followed
with
respect
to
the
Baron
decision?
3.
Does
the
Crown
consider
itself
bound
by
the
decision
in
Baron?
4.
What
was
the
response
of
Revenue
Canada
to
the
advice
it
received,
and
the
policy
it
followed
with
respect
thereto?
5.
Did
the
Department
consider
returning
the
seized
documents?
If
not,
why
not?
6.
Was
legal
advice
provided
to
the
Department
as
to
the
retention
of
seized
materials?
What
was
that
advice?
What
response
did
the
Department
make?
7.
Was
there
a
practice
adopted,
following
Baron,
of
retaining
documents
seized
under
warrants
invalidated
by
the
decision?
8.
What
legal
advice
did
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
receive
regarding
the
right
to
apply
for
a
second
warrant?
What
policy
was
adopted
with
respect
thereto?
9.
What
consideration
was
given
to
returning
requested
documents?
10.
Before
either
warrant
was
obtained,
what
other
means
of
investigation
were
considered?
The
statutory
basis
for
the
objection
to
produce
The
application
of
the
“Disclosure
of
Government
Information"
provisions
of
the
Canada
Evidence
Act
requires
the
balancing
of
public
interests.
The
provisions
under
which
the
Minister
of
Justice
seeks
a
review
of
Judge
Cronin's
order
begin
as
follows:
37.
(1)
A
minister
of
the
Crown
in
right
of
Canada
or
other
person
interested
may
object
to
the.disclosure
of
information
before
a
court,
person
or
body
with
jurisdiction
to
compel
the
production
of
information
by
certifying
orally
or
in
writing
to
the
court,
person
or
body
that
the
information
should
not
be
disclosed
on
the
grounds
of
a
specified
public
interest.
Section
37(2)
provides
that
in
the
process
of
dealing
with
the
objection
the
court
may:
.
.
examine
or
hear
the
information
and
order
its
disclosure,
subject
to
such
restrictions
or
conditions
as
it
deems
appropriate,
if
it
concludes
that,
in
the
circumstances
of
the
case,
the
public
interest
in
disclosure
outweighs
in
importance
the
specified
public
interest.
The
specified
objections
to
production
in
the
present
case
James
D.
Bissell,
Q.C.,
Senior
General
Counsel
and
Director
of
the
Vancouver
Regional
Office
of
the
Department
of
Justice,
as
a
"person
interested”
has
objected
to
disclosure
of
the
matters
referred
to
in
Judge
Cronin's
order.
In
certifying
his
objections,
Mr.
Bissell
has
specified
the
following
“
public
interest"
grounds
(summarized):
1.
Disclosure
of
this
information
would
be
injurious
to
the
relationship
between
employees
of
Revenue
Canada
and
legal
counsel
in
the
Department
of
Justice
—
resulting
in
reluctance
to
consult
and
discouraging
full
and
frank
discussion;
2.
The
application
is
premature,
since
no
issue
has
yet
arisen
in
the
proceedings
to
which
the
requested
information
could
be
relevant;
3.
Production
of
the
information
offends:
(i)
legal
professional
privilege;
(ii)
Crown
privilege;
(iii)
solicitor-client
privilege.
4.
Disclosure
will”
impair”
the
administration
of
justice
since
the
Minister
of
Justice
and
her
agents
will,
unlike
other
solicitors
and
counsel,
become
compellable
witnesses
in
prosecutions
such
as
the
present
one,
and
will
be
required
to
disclose
the
advice
they
give,
leading
to
the
prospect
of
the
Justice
Department
testifying
to
the
very
issue
of
lawfulness
the
Court
must
ultimately
decide;
5.
The
confidential
exchange
of
information
and
advice
between
employees
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
counsel
employed
by
the
Minister
of
Justice
is
necessary
for
the
enforcement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
aside
from
the
public
protection
so
afforded,
the
advice
also
helps
employees
of
Revenue
Canada
avoid
violating
citizens’
Charter
rights.
6.
Exposure
of
such
legal
advice
to
public
view
would
aid
potential
tax
evaders
in
both
conducting
their
affairs
and
avoiding
detection
and
prosecution.
Discussion
In
my
view,
of
the
listed
public
interest
grounds,
only
the
issue
of
privilege
justifies
inhibiting
the
full
disclosure
now
afforded
to
accused
persons
through
reasonable
application
of
section
7
of
the
Charter.
That
is
the
only
issue
upon
which
I
propose
to
concentrate
in
these
reasons.
With
respect
to
the
other
listed
concerns,
it
seems
highly
unlikely
that
revelation
of
the
information
sought
in
the
tax
evasion
trial
of
Stephen
Sander
will
visit
upon
Revenue
Canada
or
any
other
department
or
agency
of
the
Government
of
Canada
the
ominous
consequences
predicted
in
the
Bissell
certificate.
Aside
from
my
scepticism
about
the
"floodgates"
fears
implicit
in
much
of
what
Mr.
Bissell
has
certified,
the
obvious
observation
to
be
made
is
that
arguments
in
favour
of
disclosure
will
vary,
from
case
to
case,
and
will
succeed
only
where
non-disclosure
will
impair
a
citizen's
right
to
make
full
answer
and
defence.
When
the
Crown
raised
the
issue
of
privilege
in
the
pre-trial
disclosure
applications
before
Judge
Cronin,
counsel
for
Mr.
Sander
submitted
that
support
for
overriding
the
claimed
privilege
is
to
be
found
in
the
reasons
of
Mr.
Justice
Oppal,
in
The
Queen
v.
Gray
(No.
CC910548,
Vancouver
Registry,
February
18,
1992,
unreported).
Gray,
Supra,
was
a
drug
conspiracy
case
in
which
defence
counsel
submitted
that
disclosure
of
advice
and
communications
between
Crown
counsel
and
the
R.C.M.
Police
was
necessary,
generally,
"to
make
full
answer
and
defence
and
more
particularly
on
the
issues
of
full
disclosure,
entrapment,
abuse
of
process
and
breaches
of
the
Charter".
In
his
reasons
in
Gray,
supra,
Mr.
Justice
Oppal
emphasized
the
extraordinary
nature
of
the
police
investigation,
the
most
controversial
aspect
of
which
involved
police
distribution
of
drugs
to
the
accused
as
part
of
a"
reverse
sting”
operation
in
which
the
police
posed
as
sellers.
Because
the
police
were
concerned
about
the
propriety
of
their
plan
in
Gray,
supra,
they
sought
legal
advice
throughout.
Defence
counsel
submitted
that
particulars
of
the
advice
were
relevant
in
order
to
make
full
answer
and
defence,
on
the
following
grounds:
1.
The
advice
of
Crown
counsel
went
to
the
issue
of
good
faith,
both
on
the
part
of
the
police
and
the
Crown;
2.
The
advice
went
to
the
issue
of
whether
the
conduct
of
the
police
was
illegal
and,
if
it
was,
whether
the
Crown
countenanced
it;
3.
The
provisions
of
the
Narcotic
Control
Act
do
not
allow
police
authorities
to
provide
samples
of
narcotics
to
suspects;
4.
Discussion
of
(police)
immunity
from
prosecution
is
a
consciousness
of
illegality
on
the
part
of
the
police,
and
that
granting
immunity
would
be
unlawful;
5.
Since
a
part
of
the
operational
plan
was
to
seize
the
funds
of
the
accused,
the
police
ought
to
have
proceeded
under
Part
XII
of
the
Criminal
Code
(seizure
of
proceeds
of
crime).
In
refusing
to
uphold
the
claim
to
privilege,
Mr.
Justice
Oppal
emphasized
that
the
right
to
confidentiality
or
solicitor-client
privilege,
initially
a
rule
of
evidence
but
now
also
a
substantive
rule
of
law,
is
not
absolute.
Mr.
Justice
Oppal
then
cited
several
instances
in
which
courts
have
declined
to
uphold
the
rule,
and
stated:
A
thread
which
is
common
to
the
authorities
is
that
solicitor-client
privilege
will
yield
where
it
is
necessary
to
obtain
justice
and
where
full
disclosure
is
necessary
to
establish
innocence,
keeping
in
mind
that
it
is
for
the
Crown
to
prove
the
guilt
of
the
accused.
Concluding
that
the
legal
advice
upon
which
the
police
proceeded
in
Gray,
supra,
was
relevant
for
a
determination
of
the
issues
raised
by
the
defence,
Mr.
Justice
Oppal
ruled:
I
appreciate
that
the
advice
which
the
RCMP
sought
was
done
so
in
confidence
and
that
confidentiality
is
essential
to
ensure
that
police
authorities
seek
the
advice
of
officers
of
the
Crown.
I
am
also
mindful
of
the
fact
that
in
an
adversarial
system
the
parties
must
be
free
to
act
in
an
unfettered
manner
as
is
reasonably
possible.
However,
I
am
guided
by
the
right
of
a
person
to
make
full
answer
and
defence.
That
right
must
take
precedence
in
a
judicial
system
which
has
as
its
cornerstone
the
presumption
of
innocence.
It
is
for
these
reasons
that
the
application
is
allowed
and
the
Crown's
right
to
solicitor-client
privilege
is
removed.
I
have
quoted
at
some
length
from
the
decision
in
Gray,
supra,
because
in
the
present
case,
Judge
Cronin
indicated
that
the
disclosure
application
would
have
presented
him
with
greater
difficulty
had
it
not
been
for
the
Gray,
supra,
decision,
emphasizing
that
"the
principle
is
on
all
fours
with
the
situation
that
was
before
Mr.
Justice
Oppal".
In
stressing
the
right
of
Mr.
Sander
to
make
full
answer
and
defence
Judge
Cronin
expressed
concern
for:
1.
Mr.
Sander's
right
to
explore
whether
continued
detention
(of
seized
materials)
was
unconstitutional;
2.
Considerations
which
the
investigators
brought
to
their
decision
to
detain;
3.
Advice
investigators
received
from
the
Department
of
Justice,
and
whether
they
followed
it;
4.
Whether
the
advice
was
in
conformity
with
the
law.
With
respect,
the
issues
to
be
considered
in
addressing
the
above
concerns
hardly
parallel
those
facing
Mr.
Justice
Oppal
when
he
ordered
disclosure
in
the
face
of
the
plea
for
preserving
privilege
in
Gray,
supra.
Pursuant
to
subsection
37(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
I
requested
production
of
the
documents
which,
on
April
16,
1992,
the
special
prosecutor
listed
and
claimed
privilege
for.
I
have
examined
those
and
three
others
which
have
now
been
provided
to
me.
All
pertain
to
advice
given
by
the
Department
of
Justice
to
Revenue
Canada
following
the
decision
in
Baron,
supra.
Understandably,
the
decision
in
Baron,
supra,
posed
serious
legal
problems
for
Revenue
Canada
not
only
as
to
future
action,
but
also
with
respect
to
investigations,
prosecutions,
and
trials
already
under
way.
A
host
of
issues
required
immediate
attention,
and
legal
advice
had
to
be
sought.
The
ensuing
exchange
of
memoranda
between
Revenue
Canada
and
the
Department
of
Justice
reveals
not
only
the
realization
that
every
tactical
choice
made
after
Baron,
supra,
would
be
subjected
to
judicial
scrutiny,
but
also
that
the
consequences
of
any
and
all
measures
taken
after
Baron,
supra,
would
be
difficult
to
predict.
However,
I
now
turn
to
the
essential
issue
here
—
Mr.
Sander's
claim
that
he
will
not
be
afforded
his
right
to
full
answer
and
defence
unless
details
of
the
exchange
of
information
between
Revenue
Canada
and
the
Department
of
Justice
are
revealed
to
him,
pursuant
to
the
March
30,
1992,
demand
for
disclosure.
I
am
not
persuaded
that
advice
given
by
the
Department
of
Justice
to
the
Department
of
Revenue
with
respect
to
either
retention
of
items
seized
under
the
impugned
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
or
the
availability
of
reseizure
under
the
provisions
of
the
Criminal
Code
raises
the
spectre
of
unlawfulness.
In
this
regard,
I
question
whether
investigative
moves
dictated
by
decisions
of
the
courts
should
attract
critical
scrutiny
unless
the
questioned
action
is
found
to
be
a
tactic
aimed
solely
at
circumventing
a
clear
judicial
direction
or
declaration.
I
also
question
whether
revelation
of
the
communications
over
which
privilege
is
claimed
is
necessary
to
determine
the
appropriateness
of
Revenue
Canada's
actions.
Surely
effective
cross-examination
of
its
investigators
will
see
to
that.
On
May
27,
1992,
in
another
application
brought
in
the
Gray
case,
supra,
Mr.
Justice
Oppal
was
called
upon
to
review
his
ruling
of
February
18,
1992
(also
by
way
of
an
objection
raised
pursuant
to
section
37
of
the
Income
Tax
Act).
In
answer
to
one
of
the
public
policy
objections
set
out
in
the
certificate
before
him
he
observed:
As
I
stated
earlier,
this
is
a
most
unusual
case
and
each
case
must,
of
course,
be
decided
on
its
own
set
of
circumstances.
In
making
the
findings
and
decisions
I
did
in
February,
I
made
no
general
statement
which
would
be
applicable
to
all
criminal
cases.
In
the
present
case,
had
he
had
the
benefit
of
the
above
comments
of
Mr.
Justice
Oppal,
qualifying
the
earlier
ruling
in
Gray,
supra,
I
question
whether
Judge
Cronin
would
have
concluded
that
Gray
is
a
decision
which
necessarily
provides
guidance
in
this
tax
evasion
prosecution.
Gray,
supra
was
a
unique
case
where
the
unusual,
perhaps
questionable,
nature
of
police
activity
was
found
to
justify
an
examination
of
the
advice
given
before
an
operational
plan
was
put
into
effect.
Good
faith
was
an
issue
in
light
of
the
tactics
of
the
undercover
police
officers.
Moreover,
the
questions
posed
in
Stephen
Sander's
case
(by
the
decision
in
Baron,
supra)
were
simple.
What
was
to
be
done
with
material
already
seized?
Was
there
another
statutory
means
by
which
material
could
be
seized
(or
reseized)?
Here,
in
considering
Revenue
Canada's
resort
to
the
search
provisions
of
the
Criminal
Code,
the
most
that
can
be
said
is
that
having
had
one
investigatory
door
slammed
shut,
the
taxing
authority
simply
sought
an
alternative
means
of
pursuing
its
probe
of
Stephen
Sander's
conduct.
In
response
to
the
submission
that
Mr.
Sander's
right
to
full
answer
and
defence
depends
upon
his
receipt
of
particulars
of
the
legal
advice,
which
possible
prompted
both
retention
of
the
seized
business
records
and
the
Criminal
Code
search
warrant
application
which
followed,
the
Crown
argues
that
in
the
absence
of
any
evidence
of
a
Charter
breach,
it
is
premature
to
order
revelation
of
the
privileged
communications.
Timing
aside,
I
think
there
is
a
more
important
reason.
Although
the
Charter
has
substantially
increased
prospects
for
examining
the
manner
in
which
the
state
intervenes
in
the
affairs
of
its
citizens,
law
enforcement
officers
and
agencies
have
long
been
conditioned
to
the
need
to
respond
to
developing
case
law.
For
example,
one
need
only
consider
the
many
adjustments
in
policy
and
practice
necessitated
by
the
plethora
of
judicial
decisions
which
followed
introduction
of
the
rather
complex
"blood-
alcohol
concentration"
provisions
in
the
1969
amendments
to
the
Criminal
Code.
Inevitably,
both
the
status
of
decisions
already
taken
and
guidelines
for
future
action
were
the
expected
subjects
of
discussion
between
law
enforcement
agencies
and
those
to
whom
they
turned
for
legal
advice.
Obviously,
such
discussions
could
only
effectively
take
place
in
a
privileged
environment.
Here,
counsel
for
Mr.
Sander
submits
that
having
regard
to
the
expanded
bases
for
disclosure
approved
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
R.
v.
Stinchcombe,
[1991]
3
S.C.R.
326,
68
C.C.C.
(3d)
1,
the
perceived
breach
of
process
issues
cannot
be
properly
determined
without
access
to
the
discus-
sions
over
which
privilege
is
claimed—thus
the
March
30,
1992,
demand
for
disclosure,
which
I
summarized
earlier
in
these
reasons.
However,
the
question
to
be
answered
is
whether
there
is
a
reasonable
possibility
that
the
withholding
of
the
information
listed
in
the
demand
for
disclosure
will
impair
Mr.
Sander's
right
to
make
full
answer
and
defence.
In
other
words,
does
the
common
law
principle
of
privilege
constitute
a
reasonable
limit
on
Mr.
Sander's
right
to
make
full
answer
and
defence?
Counsel
for
the
petitioners
submitted
that
the
privilege
which
attaches
to
communications
between
solicitors
and
clients
is
a
fundamental
substantive
right
to
be
interfered
with
in
only
the
most
compelling
of
cases
(Desoteaux
v.
Mierzwinski,
[1982]
1
S.C.R.
860,
70
C.C.C.
(2d)
385.).
Ordering
access
to
legal
advice
which
an
accuser
has
received
can
only
be
justified
if
it
can
be
said
that
without
such
revelation
an
accused
citizen
will
be
seriously
handicapped
in
the
advancement
of
his
defence.
I
have
already
suggested
that
cross-examination
of
Revenue
Canada
officials
will
determine
the
appropriateness
of
the
action
taken
—
a
suggestion
reflecting
the
receipt
of
advice
in
what
counsel
for
the
Crown
calls
“the
most
routine
and
ordinary
context”.
Officials
of
Revenue
Canada
must
answer
for
their
decision
to
retain
and
then
reseize
the
mentioned
business
records,
and
in
doing
so
I
am
satisfied
that
a
determination
as
to
presence
or
absence
of
good
faith
can
be
made
without
establishing
the
exact
nature
of
the
advice
they
either
followed
or
rejected.
Although
I
concede
that
the
perceived
complicity
of
Department
of
Justice
lawyers
in
the
decision
to
retain
and
reseize
Stephen
Sander's
business
records
might,
if
proven,
assist
in
establishing
a
Charter
breach
(absence
of
good
faith),
I
make
two
observations.
First,
I
am
mindful
of
the
fact
that
Stephen
Sander's
trial
is
being
conducted
by
a
very
experienced
trial
judge
who
can
be
expected
to
respond
incisively
if
counsel
manages
to
ferret
out
a
Charter
breach
in
what
will
likely
be
penetrating
cross-examination
of
Revenue
Canada
investigators.
In
my
view,
communications
with
Revenue
Canada's
legal
advisors
are
not
critical
to
that
exercise.
Second,
and
more
important,
the
provision
of
legal
advice
to
departments
of
government
and
their
officials
is
one
of
the
most
important
functions
of
the
Attorneys
General
of
Canada
and
the
provinces.
Embellishment
of
that
statement
is
hardly
necessary.
Obviously,
the
significance
of
the
advisory
role
is
such
that
before
the
privileged
environment
in
which
advice
is
given
can
be
successfully
assailed,
the
circumstances
giving
rise
to
the
request
for
disclosure
must
be
compelling.
Such
circumstances
are
not
to
be
found
in
the
present
case.
Decision
On
the
ground
of
preserving
privilege
between
solicitor
and
client,
I
find
that
in
this
prosecution
of
Stephen
Sander
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
it
would
not
be
in
the
public
interest
to
require
the
Crown
to
disclose
to
the
defence
particulars
of
or
documents
pertaining
to
legal
advice
given
by
the
Department
of
Justice
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
Crown's
application
to
quash
allowed.