Giles,
A.S.P.:—The
motion
before
me
sought.
an
order
that
all
future
motions
in
this
action
be
heard
in
Ottawa.
An
earlier
motion
seeking
an
order
that
the
trial
be
held
in
Ottawa
was
dismissed
as
premature.
The
following
additional
facts
were
available
to
me.
The
plaintiff
lives
in
Palgrave,
a
centre
some
30
kilometres
north
of
the
main
Toronto
airport
at
Malton
and
perhaps
a
further
20
kilometres
from
the
Court.
The
plaintiff
can
fly
to
Ottawa
without
expense.
The
plaintiff
consults
a
legal
firm
in
Ottawa
about
this
action
but
the
firm
are
not
her
solicitors
[sic]
of
record.
They
might
occasionally
furnish
counsel
to
argue
a
particular
point
in
Court.
The
plaintiff
has
been
able
to
negotiate
lower
charges
for
fees
with
the
Ottawa
legal
firm
than
she
has
with
her
legal
connections
in
Toronto.
The
plaintiff
wishes
to
have
further
motions
heard
in
Ottawa.
The
plaintiff
has
commenced
actions
in
Toronto
against
individuals,
which
actions
involve
the
same
facts
or
many
of
them.
A
substantial
part
of
the
plaintiffs’
case
against
the
Crown
is
based
on
the
alleged
vicarious
liability
of
the
Crown
for
the
alleged
wrongdoing
of
the
individuals.
Counsel
for
the
Crown
based
in
Toronto
have
been
actually
involved
in
some
of
the
cases
involving
the
individuals
and
in
an
earlier
case
of
the
same
general
nature
as
the
present
one.
Counsel
for
the
Crown,
who
are
involved
in
the
Toronto
cases,
would
have
to
be
transported
at
expense
to
Ottawa
if
motions
were
to
be
held
in
Ottawa
or
alternatively
new
counsel
based
in
Ottawa
would
have
to
be
retained
who
would
not
have
the
advantage
of
direct
involvement
with
the
Toronto
based
actions.
In
my
view,
the
matter
of
the
place
for
hearing
a
motion
is
to
be
determined
by
the
balance
of
convenience
as
it
may
appear
when
each
motion
is
to
be
set
down.
It
is
not
appropriate
to
prescribe
the
place
of
hearing
of
motions
immutably
in
advance
and
today's
motion
will
be
dismissed.
It
may
however
be
helpful
to
forestall
regular
adverse
awards
of
costs
if
I
indicate
factors
which
should
be
considered
determining
the
balance
of
convenience.
In
the
ordinary
way
very
little
weight
would
be
given
to
the
preference
of
the
Crown
because
the
Crown
presumably
has
skilled
counsel
available
in
Ottawa
as
well
as
Toronto.
In
this
case,
where
there
are
other
cases
in
Toronto
involving
similar
facts,
other
considerations
will
enter
the
balance.
In
addition
one
has
to
consider
the
convenience
of
the
plaintiffs
and
the
public
interest
in
efficient
administration
of
justice.
The
convenience
of
the
plaintiffs
means
just
that
and
is
to
be
determined
objectively
on
the
evidence.
It
does
not
mean
the
expressed
preference
of
the
plaintiffs.
In
determining
the
convenience
of
the
plaintiffs
I
note
that
they
are
both
represented
by
Mrs.
David
personally,
the
individual
plaintiff.
Mrs.
David
lives
in
Palgrave
which
is
some
miles
north
of
the
Toronto
airport
at
Malton
which
is
almost
on
the
direct
route
from
Palgrave
to
the
Toronto
courthouse
and
from
which
frequent
flights
are
made
every
day
to
Ottawa.
The
plaintiff
consults
solicitors
in
Ottawa
and
wishes
to
continue
to
do
so
but
those
solicitors
do
not
appear
in
court
for
the
plaintiffs.
Court
sittings
for
motions
in
Ottawa
and
Toronto
start
at
10:00
a.m.
If
a
motion
was
to
be
heard
in
Ottawa,
Mrs.
David
would
have
to
go
from
Palgrave
to
Ottawa.
If,
as
she
indicates
is
preferable,
she
has
to
take
legal
advice
before
appearing
on
the
motions,
she
would
have
to
go
to
Ottawa
and
obtain
legal
advice
and
get
to
the
Court
before
10:00
a.m.
It
occurs
to
me
that
she
would
have
to
go
to
Ottawa
and
consult
her
lawyers
on
an
earlier
day
and
then
either
spend
the
night
in
Ottawa
or
return
to
Palgrave
and
come
again
to
Ottawa
on
the
day
the
motion
is
to
be
heard.
I
assume
staying
in
Ottawa
will
be
the
least
inconvenient
but
in
the
equation
I
am
about
to
set
up
it
should
be
remembered
that
an
additional
return
trip
between
Ottawa
and
Palgrave
may
be
substituted
for
"overnight
in
Ottawa”.
If
the
motion
is
to
be
heard
in
Toronto,
Mrs.
David
will
have
to
go
from
Ralgrave
to
Ottawa,
obtain
legal
advice,
return
to
Palgrave,
then
go
from
Ralgrave
to
Toronto,
appear
on
the
motion
in
Toronto
and
return
to
Palgrave.
To
determine
the
convenience
of
Mrs.
David
we
have
the
following
factors:
1.
If
the
motion
is
to
be
heard
in
Ottawa:
(a)
journey
Palgrave
to
Ottawa
(b)
consult
solicitors
in
Ottawa
(c)
overnight
in
Ottawa
(d)
appearance
in
Court
in
Ottawa
(e)
journey
Ottawa
to
Palgrave
(2)
If
the
motion
is
to
be
heard
in
Toronto,
we
have
the
following:
(a)
journey
Palgrave
to
Ottawa
(b)
consult
solicitors
in
Ottawa
(c)
journey
Ottawa
to
Palgrave
(d)
journey
Palgrave
to
Toronto
(e)
appearance
in
Court
(f)
journey
Toronto
to
Palgrave
If
one
cancels
out
the
factors
in
common,
the
comparison
is
between
a
stay
overnight
in
Ottawa
and
a
return
trip
between
Palgrave
and
Toronto,
whichever
is
the
most
convenient.
The
difference
is
slight.
We
have
to
take
into
consideration
the
fact
that
the
convenience
of
the
Crown
is
to
be
ignored
only
because
the
Crown
presumably
could
retain
counsel
based
in
Ottawa
if
the
matters
were
always
heard
in
Ottawa.
Such
counsel
would
not
of
course
be
the
same
counsel
as
in
Toronto
and
therefore
would
not
be
the
counsel
whose
knowledge
of
matters
related
to
the
case
had
been
improved
by
knowledge
of
the
cases
current
in
the
Ontario
Courts
and
in
the
former
action
in
this
Court.
In
my
view
the
fact
that
the
motion
is
addressed
by
Crown
counsel
who
has
considerable
experience
in
litigation
arising
from
these
facts
(as
would
be
the
case
if
Toronto
were
the
location)
is
not
merely
of
advantage
to
the
Crown
but
also
of
potential
advantage
to
the
plaintiffs.
I
also
consider
that
the
deployment
of
counsel
who
have
been
educated
by
their
experience
in
other
actions
on
these
facts
would
contribute
to
the
efficiency,
economy
and
speed
with
which
this
matter
could
be
disposed
of.
It
is
not
only
a
matter
of
financial
advantage
to
the
Crown
(which
in
my
view
carries
very
little
weight)
but
it
is
in
the
objective
interests
of
justice
that
similar
case-educated
counsel
should
participate
(with
regard
to
the
objective
interests
of
justice
being
benefitted
by
retaining
similar
case-educated
counsel,
see
Spiliada
Maritime
Corp.
v.
Cansulex
Ltd.,
[1987]
1
A.C.
460,
[1986]
3
All
E.R.
843
(H.L.),
at
page
485
(A.C.)).
Considering
the
balance
of
convenience
as
to
the
place
of
hearing
the
motion,
I
note
that
in
favour
of
an
Ottawa
venue
we
have
the
possible
advantage
of
spending
the
night
in
Ottawa
over
the
return
trip
from
Palgrave
to
Toronto.
On
the
other
side
we
have
the
advantage
to
the
plaintiff
and
the
best
interests
of
justice
and
incidentally
the
benefit
of
counsel
who
have
ongoing
experience
with
the
issues.
It
will
be
noted
that
in
minimizing
the
weight
to
be
given
to
any
convenience
of
the
Crown,
I
did
so
because
of
the
reasoning
of
President
Jackett
in
The
Queen
v.
Mackinnon,
[1970]
1
Ex
C.R.
324
which
did
not
involve
Crown
counsel
with
special
knowledge
of
the
facts.
In
this
case
the
fact
that
there
has
been
considerable
other
litigation
handled
by
Toronto
offices
of
the
Crown
would
indicate
that
the
interests
of
justice
would
be
best
served
by
making
use
of
the
experienced
counsel
in
Toronto.
While
I
did
not
find
it
necessary
to
do
so,
I
believe
it
will
be
justifiable
to
include
in
the
balance
in
favour
of
a
Toronto
venue
for
the
motion,
the
fact
that
the
cost
and
inconvenience
of
sending
similar
case-educated
counsel
to
Ottawa
would
make
the
balance
in
favour
of
a
Toronto
venue
overwhelming.
As
I
have
indicated
the
motion
before
me
should
have
been
returnable
in
Toronto.
Each
other
motion
should
be
returnable
in
the
place
where
the
balance
of
convenience
dictates
at
the
time
it
is
set
down.
I
note
that
counsel
for
the
Crown
conceded
that
if
Ottawa
based
counsel
were
intending
to
appear
for
the
plaintiff,
the
Crown
would
not
object
to
having
to
fly
counsel
from
Toronto
and
notice
of
such
possible
appearance
should
be
given
to
the
Crown
counsel.
I
have
given
these
rather
extensive
reasons
in
the
hopes
that
future
misunderstandings
will
be
avoided.
It
does
occur
to
me
that
the
necessity
of
trips
to
Ottawa,
which
is
a
special
factor
of
this
case,
justifies
increasing
the
notice
necessary
for
regular
interlocutory
motions
from
two
clear
days,
to
say,
four
clear
days.
As
I
indicated
from
the
Bench
the
Crown
will
be
entitled
to
its
costs
of
this
motion
in
any
event.
Motion
dismissed.
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