Beaubier,
T.C.C.J.:—This
matter
was
heard
at
Calgary,
Alberta
on
October
22,1993
pursuant
to
the
informal
procedure
of
this
Court.
The
appellant
was
the
only
witness.
The
appellant
deducted
$11,500
registered
retirement
savings
plan
premium
contributions
for
his
1991
taxation
year.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reduced
the
amount
deducted
to
$3,269.
The
appellant
appealed.
The
appellant
claimed
that
his
retiring
allowance
(as
defined
in
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"))
should
be
included
in
the
amount
of
his
earned
income
for
1990
in
order
to
calculate
18
per
cent
of
his
earned
income.
He
testified
that
the
retiring
allowance
was
included
in
his
income
pursuant
to
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
54,
and
Regulations
in
order
to
deny
him
unemployment
insurance
benefits.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
replied
that
paragraph
146(1)(c)
does
not
describe
a
retiring
allowance
as
part
of
"earned
income"
for
the
purpose
of
the
calculation.
The
definition
at
the
beginning
of
paragraph
146(1)(c)
reads:
(c)
“earned
income"
—“
"earned
income”
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
means
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is.
.
.
.
A
"retiring
allowance”,
defined
in
subsection
248(1),
is
not
included
in
what
follows
in
paragraph
146(1)(c)
for
the
year
in
question.
In
these
circumstances,
the
appellant
has
pleaded
that
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
its,
to
use
the
appellant’s
word,
“conflict”
with
other
relevant
laws
and
discriminates
against
the
unemployed
and
contravenes
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
in
response
that
the
appellant
and
unemployed
persons
do
not
fall
within
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Charter
and
cited
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Law
Society
of
British
Columbia
v.
Andrews,
[1989]
1
S.C.R.
143,
56
D.L.R.
(4th)
1,
and,
with
particular
reference
to
an
unemployed
person,
the
judgment
of
Strayer,
J.,
acting
as
an
umpire,
/n
the
matter
of
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
1971
and
Donald
Delparte
(unreported),
delivered
on
May
22,
1990,
in
which
he
stated:
The
claimant
sought
to
rely
on
section
15
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms,
claiming
that
he
was
being
discriminated
against
under
the
law
or
being
denied
equal
benefit
of
the
law.
I
am
satisfied
that
section
15
has
no
application
to
such
a
case.
It
now
seems
clear
that
section
15
is
directed
to
discrimination
based
on
personal
characteristics
such
as
race,
colour,
religion,
sex,
and
other
specified
grounds,
as
well
as
unspecified
grounds
of
a
similar
nature
involving
personal
characteristics
over
which
the
individual
has
little
or
no
control.
What
is
involved
in
this
case
is
a
distinction
between
those
who
have
entered
into
one
kind
of
a
contractual
arrangement
at
their
employment
and
those
who
have
entered
into
other
kinds
of
contractual
arrangements
there.
This
is
not
the
kind
of
distinction
which
is
the
subject-matter
of
section
15.
Mr.
Fraser's
response
to
the
Crown's
submission
respecting
Andrews,
supra,
is
that
he
is
an
individual
who
is
entitled
to
the
protection
of
subsection
15(1)
on
the
face
of
its
opening
words.
Subsection
15(1)
reads:
Every
individual
is
equal
before
and
under
the
law
and
has
the
right
to
the
equal
protection
and
equal
benefit
of
the
law
without
discrimination
and,
in
particular,
without
discrimination
based
on
race,
national
or
ethnic
origin,
colour,
religion,
sex,
age
or
mental
or
physical
disability.
The
Court
finds
the
principle
respecting
the
rights
of
the
individual
claim
by
Mr.
Fraser
to
be
most
attractive.
However,
the
analysis
of
Strayer,
J.
quoted
from
Delparte
does
apply
to
individuals
who
are
affected
by
"discrimination
based
upon
personal
characteristics
such
as
race,
colour,
religion,
sex
and
other
personal
grounds
.
.
.”
and
as
further
described
by
Strayer,
J.
The
appellant's
complaint
is
caused
by
the
effect
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
applied
to
the
appellant's
contractual
arrangements.
In
these
circumstances,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.