Bonner,
T.C.C.J.:—This
is
an
appeal
under
the
informal
procedure
.from
an
assessment
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
for
the
1991
taxation
year.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
was
entitled
to
a
child
tax
credit
under
section
122.2
of
the
Act.
The
answer
depends
on
the
appellants
status
under
the
Immigration
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
I-2
in
January
of
1992.
The
“explanation
of
changes”
forming
part
of
the
notice
of
assessment
stated
"We
have
disallowed
your
claim
for
the
child
tax
credit
as
you
did
not
provide
a
TFA1
slip
and/or
schedule
7
as
we
requested”.
The
appellant
objected
to
the
assessment.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("Minister")
confirmed
it
and
notified
the
appellant
"You
are
not
entitled
to
the
Child
Tax
Credit
as
you
do
not
meet
the
conditions
to
claim
the
credit
as
defined
in
section
122.2
of
the
Act".
I
have
quoted
the
relevant
portions
of
the
notice
of
assessment
and
the
notice
of
confirmation
because
I
have
a
disquieting
feeling
that
this
appeal
would
never
have
arisen
had
the
appellants
position
been
explained
to
her.
Neither
of
the
notices
points
to
the
relevant
law
to
be
found
in
the
Immigration
Act
or
to
the
facts
on
which
the
Minister
found
the
appellant
to
be
disqualified.
Furthermore
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
is
hardly
a
model
of
clarity.
Paragraph
4
of
the
reply
states:
In
so
assessing
the
appellant
for
the
1991
taxation
year,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
appellant
did
not
have
an
eligible
child
for
whom
she
was
entitled
to
receive
family
allowance
in
January
1992,
as
she
failed
to
meet
the
requirements
for
eligibility
to
receive
such
allowance
under
the
Family
Allowances
Act,
1973,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
F-1:
(b)
the
appellant,
in
January
of
1992,
was
not
a
Canadian
citizen
or
a
person
who
is
a
permanent
resident
within
the
meaning
of
the
Immigration
Act,
or,
in
prescribed
circumstances,
is
a
visitor
in
Canada
or
the
holder
of
a
permit
in
Canada
within
the
meaning
of
the
Immigration
Act.
Entitlement
to
the
tax
credit
which
the
appellant
seeks
arises
under
section
122.2
of
the
Act
which
reads
in
part
as
follows:
122.2(1)
Where
an
individual
who
has
an
eligible
child
files
with
his
return
of
income
.
.
.
under
this
Part
for
a
taxation
year
a
prescribed
form,
containing
prescribed
information,
completed
by
the
individual
.
.
.
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
(a)
the
aggregate
of
.
.
.
exceeds
(b)
.
.
.
shall
be
deemed
to
be
an
amount
paid
by
the
individual
.
.
.
on
account
of
his
tax
under
this
Part
for
the
year.
The
term
"eligible
child”
is
defined
in
paragraph
122.2(2)(a)
of
the
Act
as:
(a)
Eligible
child”.—
eligible
child”
of
an
individual
for
a
taxation
year
means
a
child
in
respect
of
whom
the
individual
is
entitled
(i)
in
January
of
the
following
taxation
year,
or
(ii)
.
.
.
to
receive
a
family
allowance
under
the
Family
Allowances
Act,
1973.
This
definition
requires
an
examination
of
subsection
3(1)
of
the
Family
Allowances
Act
to
determine
whether
the
appellant
was
entitled
in
January
of
1992
to
receive
a
family
allowance
in
respect
of
her
daughter.
That
subsection
reads:
3(1)
Subject
to
this
Act,
there
shall
be
paid
out
of
the
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund,
for
each
month,
a
family
allowance
.
.
.
in
respect
of
each
child
.
.
.
who
has
at
least
one
parent
who
(a)
is
a
Canadian
citizen;
or
(b)
is
a
person
who
(i)
is
a
permanent
resident
within
the
meaning
of
the
Immigration
Act,
or
(ii)
in
prescribed
circumstances,
is
a
visitor
in
Canada
or
the
holder
of
a
permit
in
Canada
within
the
meaning
of
the
Immigration
Act.
It
is
common
ground
that
the
appellant
was
not
a
Canadian
citizen
in
January
of
1992.
The
submission
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
was
that
she
was
a
permanent
resident
because,
as
was
established
by
the
evidence,
she
worked
and
lived
here,
paid
tax
here
and
had
no
real
connection
with
any
other
country.
The
term
"permanent
resident”
is
defined
in
section
2
in
the
Immigration
Act
as
follows:
“permanent
resident”
means
a
person
who
(a)
has
been
granted
landing,
(b)
has
not
become
a
Canadian
citizen,
and.
.
.
.
The
appellant
testified
that
she
was
a
citizen
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
of
Cyprus.
Eliminating
unnecessary
history,
she
visited
the
Soviet
Union
in
September
of
1988.
She
returned
to
Canada
with
her
daughter
in
October
of
1988
as
a
visitor.
Subsequently
she
asserted
a
claim
to
refugee
status.
She
testified
that
the
first
hearing
of
her
claim
for
landed
immigrant
status
took
place
in
December
of
1992
and
that
she
became
a
landed
immigrant
in
May
of
1993.
The
language
of
subparagraph
3(1)(b)(i)
of
the
Family
Allowances
Act
is
clear.
To
be
entitled
to
family
allowance
and,
as
a
consequence,
to
the
child
tax
credit,
at
least
one
parent
must
be
a
permanent
resident
“.
.
.
within
the
meaning
of
the
Immigration
Act
.
.
.".
Thus
a
grant
of
landing
under
the
Immigration
Act,
giving
rise
to
what
is
commonly
called
landed
immigrant
status
is
essential
to
the
appellant's
claim.
The
appellant
did
not
secure
that
status
until
May
of
1993.
Accordingly
the
appeal
will
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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