P.R.
Dussault,
T.C.C.J.
(orally):—Suite
à
votre
demande,
je
vous
soumets
les
motifs
du
jugement,
qui
sont
assez
courts,
en
langue
anglaise.
In
the
present
case,
the
burden
of
proof
was
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
conditions
of
paragraph
20(1)(p)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
had
been
satisfied
for
the
year
1984.
Both
counsel
referred
to
those
conditions.
One
of
the
conditions
for
the
applicability
of
paragraph
20(1)(p)
in
the
present
case
is
that
the
loan
(as
it
was
submitted
there
had
been
a
loan
and
some
evidence
tendered
in
this
respect)
from
Stadacona
to
Norado
be
made
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business
of
Stadacona.
But
first,
the
ordinary
business
of
Stadacona
must
have
included
the
lending
of
money.
The
evidence
as
to
whether
part
of
the
business
of
Stadacona
included
the
lending
of
money
is
very
poor,
indirect
and
sketchy.
However,
even
if
I
would
be
prepared
to
conclude
that
this
is
so,
there
is
no
evidence
whatsoever
that
the
loan
was
made
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business,
quite
the
contrary.
From
the
testimony
of
Mr.
Fleming,
and
it
is
the
only
evidence
tendered
in
this
respect,
the
loan
was
made
to
Norado
only
to
permit
Norado
to
acquire
the
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
Stadacona
held
by
Mr.
Robertson.
This
was
done
as
a
consequence
of
a
scheme
or
fraud
designed
by
Mr.
Robertson
himself
and
others
who
had
just
created
Norado
in
order
to
deprive
Stadacona
from
its
assets.
Norado
had
no
assets
whatsoever.
In
my
opinion,
this
finding
is
fatal
to
the
appellant's
case.
Although
many
interesting
arguments
were
submitted
by
both
counsel
concerning
the
other
requirements
of
paragraph
20(1)(p),
I
think
that
the
failure
to
satisfy
the
condition
just
referred
to
is
sufficient
to
dispose
of
these
appeals
with
respect
to
the
loan
to
Norado.
As
for
the
two
other
items
in
dispute,
no
evidence
was
tendered
by
the
appellant
and
counsel
for
the
appellant
agreed
that
they
were
no
longer
in
dispute.
As
the
possible
application
of
other
provisions
of
the
Act
was
never
raised
in
the
appellant's
pleadings,
the
appeals
for
1985,
1986
and
1987
are
therefore
dismissed
with
costs.
As
to
the
appeal
for
1984,
it
is
simply
quashed
as
being
an
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment
for
that
year.
Appeal
dismissed.
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