Kempo,
T.C.C.J.:—This
informal
procedure
appeal
of
Dorothy
Mary
Anderson
concerns
her
1989
taxation
year.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("the
Minister")
reassessed
Ms.
Anderson's
income
for
that
year
by
including
therein
the
amount
of
$21,722
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
paragraphs
56(1)(b)
and
(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
In
doing
so
the
Minister
made
the
assumptions
of
fact
as
outlined
in
clause
5
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
which
read:
5.
In
so
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
amount
was
received
by
the
appellant
in
the
1989
taxation
year;
(b)
the
amount
was
received
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
pursuant
to
a
written
agreement,
as
alimony
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
for
the
maintenance
of
the
appellant,
children
of
the
marriage,
or
both
the
appellant
and
children
of
the
marriage;
(c)
the
appellant
was
living
apart
from
the
spouse
or
former
spouse
required
to
make
the
payment
at
the
time
the
payment
was
made
and
throughout
the
remainder
of
the
year;
(d)
the
appellant
was
separated
pursuant
to
a
written
separation
agreement
made
on
July
20,
1988,
from
the
spouse
or
former
spouse
required
to
make
the
payment
at
the
time
the
payment
was
made
and
throughout
the
remainder
of
the
year.
Ms.
Anderson's
notice
of
appeal
dated
September
22,
1992
asserted
that
"the
money
that
he
[her
former
husband]
submitted
as
alimony
was
not
alimony
or
support”.
Evidence
at
the
hearing
was
given
by
Ms.
Anderson.
A
written
and
signed
separation
agreement
dated
July
20,
1988
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1.
Following
a
lengthy
trial
the
June
11,1992
judgment
thereof
given
by
Justice
David
Steinberg
of
the
Unified
Family
Court
of
Ontario
(Anderson
v.
Anderson,
[1992]
W.D.F.L.
928)
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-2,
and
copies
of
correspondence
between
counsel
acting
for
Ms.
Anderson
and
for
Mr.
Anderson
dated
January
3
and
11,
1989
and
April
10,
1990
respectively
were
filed
as
Exhibits
A-3,
A-4
and
A-5.
At
the
hearing
of
this
appeal
the
appellant
did
not
disavow
the
July
20,
1988
written
agreement
notwithstanding
her
firm
assertions
that
it
was
the
product
of
intense
emotions
and
unfair
bargaining
power
under
which
her
former
husband
had
enjoyed
the
advantage.
That
Ms.
Anderson
bargained
as
best
she
could
under
all
of
the
adverse
circumstances
then
operating,
and
that
she
knew
at
that
time
the
amounts
payable
thereunder
by
Mr.
Anderson
were
for
the
support
of
herself
and
the
two
children,
are
all
beyond
question.
However,
the
agreement
is
silent
respecting
fiscal
implications
of
the
support
payments.
Ms.
Anderson
testified
that
concurrent
with
the
signing
of
the
agreement
Mr.
Anderson
said
he
was
going
to
pay
the
tax
on
all
the
payments
made
until
a
court
hearing.
At
pages
16
to
17
and
18
respectively
of
Justice
Steinberg's
judgment
he
found
and
determined:
It
was
understood
by
both
parties
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
their
rather
clumsily
drafted
domestic
contract,
that
for
the
applicant
to
manage
the
household
and
care
for
the
children,
the
respondent
would
have
to
reimburse
her
for
any
income
tax
payable
by
her
as
a
result
of
the
support
payments
made
thereunder.
That
was
confirmed
by
the
respondents
oral
statement
made
immediately
after
he
signed
the
document.
I
find,
therefore,
that
there
is
an
implied
term
to
the
written
domestic
contract
requiring
the
respondent
to
discharge
the
income
tax
liability
of
his
wife
arising
from
his
support
payment.
.
.
.
The
respondent
shall
.
.
.
reimburse
the
applicant
for
any
income
tax
payable
by
her
as
a
result
of
payments
made
on
the
domestic
contract
for
the
years
1989
and
1990.
The
sum
total
of
all
of
the
essential
facts
underlying
this
appeal
are
that
the
appellant
and
her
then
husband
had
entered
into
a
written
separation
agreement,
that
periodic
payments
to
the
extent
of
$21,722
were
made
by
him
pursuant
thereto
and
received
by
her
for
the
support,
maintenance
and
benefit
of
herself
and
her
children
during
1989,
and
that
they
were
living
apart
when
the
payments
were
made
and
received
and
throughout
the
1989
year.
Thus,
all
or
the
conditions
of
paragraphs
56(1)(b)
and
(c)
have
been
met
which
operates
to
fix
the
income
tax
liability
as
assessed
by
the
Minister
upon
Mr.
Anderson
with
respect
to
her
receipt
of
the
support
payments
for
her
1989
taxation
year.
Counsel
for
Ms.
Anderson
submitted
that
it
was
inequitable
for
Mr.
Anderson,
being
the
richer
party,
to
have
the
fiscal
benefit
of
a
deduction
for
the
support
payments
leaving
Ms.
Anderson,
the
poorer
party,
with
an
onerous
and
non-affordable
tax
liability
arising
out
of
these
support
payments.
The
thrust
of
the
position
as
I
understand
it
was
that
the
Minister
should
not,
in
equity,
have
allowed
a
deduction
to
Mr.
Anderson
given
all
of
the
circumstances
or,
alternatively,
ought
to
have
advised
Ms.
Anderson
on
a
timely
basis
that
he
had
done
so.
In
answer
to
the
latter,
the
Minister
is
not
permitted
to
breach
a
taxpayer's
entitlement
to
confidentiality
in
these
circumstances.
As
to
the
former,
it
has
long
been
held
and
determined
that
there
is
no
equity
in
tax.
Further,
the
substantive
factual
matters
in
this
case
operate
to
satisfy
paragraphs
60(b)
and
(c)
of
the
Act
in
favour
of
Mr.
Anderson.
While
the
two
provisions,
56(1)(b)
and
(c)
on
the
one
hand
and
60(b)
and
(c)
on
the
other
do
mirror
each
other,
the
fact
that
Mr.
Anderson
might
have
chosen
not
to
have
taken
any
deductions
would
not
be
determinative
of
the
true
nature
and
characterization
of
the
amounts
received
in
Ms.
Anderson's
hands.
Expressed
another
way,
the
amounts
are
taxable
to
the
recipient
regardless
of
whether
they
were
deducted
by
the
payor.
It
is
by
operation
of
the
subject
provisions
or
the
Income
Tax
Act
that
the
payments
received
by
her
are
taxable
income.
The
two
provisions
are
not
tied
together
in
the
manner
suggested
by
counsel
for
Ms.
Anderson
wherein
if
the
support
payments
had
not
been
deducted
by
the
payor
they
somehow
thereby
would
or
could
not
be
income
to
the
recipient.
This
interpretation
amounts
to
adding
words
to
the
applicable
taxation
provisions
which
are
simply
not
there.
Conclusion
In
conclusion
then,
and
for
the
reasons
given,
the
appeal
fails
and
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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