Lamarre
Proulx,
T.C.C.J.:—
This
is
an
appeal
by
way
of
the
informal
procedure
for
the
year
1991.
It
concerns
the
deduction
of
premiums
that
may
be
paid
pursuant
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
("RRSP").
The
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
that
are
of
application
in
this
instance
are
paragraph
60(i),
paragraph
146(1)(g.1),
subsections
146(5)
and
147.2(4),
section
248
and
section
8301
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations
(the
Regulations").
The
statutory
provisions
dealing
with
the
regime
of
the
registered
retirement
savings
plans
have
been
substantially
altered
in
1990.
The
appellant
invokes
section
15
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
(the
"Charter"),
respecting
these
new
provisions
for
the
reason
that,
according
to
her,
the
regime
does
not
take
into
account
that
women
on
maternity
leave
have
a
lower
income
and
are,
in
this
way,
by
reason
of
their
sex,
deprived
of
the
right
of
using
the
regime
to
its
full
extent.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
made,
at
the
outset
of
the
hearing,
a
motion
that
this
case
be
heard
having
regard
only
to
section
15
of
the
Charter,
and
in
the
event
that
the
Court
finds
for
the
appellant
in
respect
of
section
15
of
the
Charter,
that
the
hearing
be
continued
to
allow
the
respondent
to
bring
forward
a
defence
under
section
1
of
the
Charter.
This
motion
was
granted
as
the
Court
found
it
to
be
reasonable.
There
is,
indeed,
no
point
in
having
the
respondent
prepare
a
costly
justification
under
section
1
of
the
Charter
if
the
matter
is
not
to
pass
the
initial
step
of
section
15
of
the
Charter.
The
facts
The
facts
on
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
relied
upon
in
assessing
the
appellant
are
described
in
paragraph
6
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
and
read
as
follows:
(b)
the
appellant
did
not
contribute
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
during
1991;
(c)
the
appellant
did
not
contribute
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
in
the
60
days
following
the
end
of
the
1991
taxation
year;
(d)
the
appellant's
total
income
for
1990
was
$34,277;
(e)
the
appellant’s
pension
adjustment
for
1990
was
$6,294;
(f)
the
maximum
amount
deductible
in
respect
of
the
appellant's
RRSPs
for
1991
is
nil;
(g)
the
appellant
does
not
qualify
for
a
deduction
under
sections
146(5)
and
60(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
"Act");
and
(h)
the
amount
of
the
deduction
in
respect
of
a
contribution
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
for
which
the
appellant
is
eligible
for
the
1991
taxation
year
is
nil.
[Translation.]
The
appellant,
a
lawyer
working
as
a
relations
officer
for
the
Alberta
Government,
was
on
an
unpaid
maternity
leave
from
September
17,1990
to
June
3,
1991,
that
is
to
say
for
31/2
months
in
1990
and
5
months
in
1991.
Her
earned
income
was
$34,277
in
the
year
1990
and
18
per
cent
of
this
income
is
$6,106.90.
The
amount
of
the
pension
adjustment
for
the
year
1990
was
$6,294.
There
was
thus
no
entitlement
to
a
deduction
for
a
contribution
to
a
RRSP
by
virtue
of
paragraph
146(1)(g.1)
of
the
Act.
In
1991,
the
appellant's
contributions
to
her
employer's
registered
pension
plan
were
in
the
amount
of
$2,296.26.
There
is,
in
fact,
no
dispute
between
the
parties
as
to
the
correctness
of
the
amounts
arrived
at
in
the
calculation
relating
to
the
provisions
applicable
to
the
regime.
It
is,
however,
important
to
note
that
in
the
year
1991,
the
year
about
which
the
assessment
is
under
appeal,
the
appellant
did
not
contribute
to
a
RRSP.
The
appellant
states
that
with
the
former
regime,
she
would
have
been
entitled
to
contribute
an
amount
of
$1,203.74
($3,500
—
$2,296.26)
in
her
RRSP,
and
that
the
new
regime
discriminates
against
her
because
of
her
sex
because
her
low
earned
income
in
the
year
1990
was
occasioned
by
her
maternity
leave
and
maternity
is
a
woman's
specific
characteristic.
The
problem
with
the
evidence
that
the
appellant
adduced
at
the
hearing
is
that
she
compared
the
results
of
the
new
regime
with
those
of
the
old
regime.
It
is
evident
that
the
new
regime
is
different.
It
has
supposedly
been
enacted
for
the
purpose
of
a
fairer
fiscal
treatment
of
taxpayers.
The
appellant
did
not
adduce
figures
showing
how
the
scheme
of
the
new
regime
discriminates
against
women
on
unpaid
maternity
leave
in
comparison
to
those
who
are
not.
It
is
not
for
the
Court
to
calculate
how
much
she
would
have
been
allowed
to
deduct
within
the
new
regime
had
she
not
been
on
a
maternity
leave
in
the
years
1990
and
1991.
But
of
an
utmost
importance
to
the
resolution
of
this
appeal
is
the
fact
that
the
appellant
did
not
contribute
to
a
RRSP
for
the
year
1991
and
it
is
too
late
now
to
make
such
a
contribution.
I
must
therefore
find
that
the
appellant,
not
having
made
a
contribution
to
a
RRSP,
has
been
assessed
in
accordance
with
the
Act.
An
assessment
is
the
source
of
this
Court's
jurisdiction
and
having
found
that
the
appellant
has
been
correctly
assessed,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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