Bonner,
T.C.C.J.
(orally):—The
whole
debate
comes
down
to
what
is
the
appellant
entitled
to
by
way
of
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
in
respect
of
his
two
sources
of
employment
income.
One
is
his
employment
with
the
Cypress
School
Division.
The
appellant
served
as
a
principal
at
a
one-room
school
house
at
the
Elkwater
Hutterite
Colony.
The
appellant’s
claim
to
deduct
travel
expenses
from
his
home
in
Medicine
Hat
to
the
Colony
was
founded
on
the
premise
that
he
was
carrying
on
duties
either
away
from
his
employer's
place
of
business,
namely,
the
school
board
office
in
Medicine
Hat;
or
in
different
places,
namely,
the
school
board
office
in
Medicine
Hat
and
the
school
at
the
colony.
Whichever
was
the
case
the
appellant
does
not,
in
my
view,
qualify
under
subparagraph
8(1)(h)(i).
I
recognize
that
Judge
Bowman
found
otherwise
in
an
earlier
appeal
by
this
taxpayer
from
assessments
for
other
years,
but
there
is
a
large
distinction.
I
had
the
benefit,
which
Judge
Bowman
did
not,
of
the
evidence
of
Mr.
Moss
which
is
summarized
in
his
letter
of
May
20,
1992.
Mr.
Moss
pointed
out
that
Mr.
Krause,
the
appellant,
elected
to
pick
up
materials
on
his
way
home
from
school
and
he
elected
to
deliver
the
monthly
reports
which
apparently
are
required
of
him.
Mr.
Moss
made
it
quite
clear,
and
I
accept
his
evidence,
that
this
was
a
matter
of
choice
by
the
appellant
and
not
a
matter
of
the
discharge
by
the
appellant
of
a
contractually
required
function.
On
the
evidence
I
found
that
the
appellant
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
out
the
duties
of
his
employment,
in
one
place
and
one
place
only,
that
is
to
say,
the
school
at
the
Elkwater
Hutterite
Community.
He
therefore
cannot
qualify
to
deduct
travel
expenses
under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
in
respect
of
travel
between
Medicine
Hat
and
the
Elkwater
Colony.
I
turn
to
the
second
branch
or
basis
on
which
travel
expenses
were
claimed,
that
is,
the
appellant's
employment
as
a
pastor
of
the
Christ
Lutheran
Church
in
Manyberries,
Alberta.
The
evidence
on
this
issue
is,
to
put
it
mildly,
confusing.
Part
of
the
confusion
stemmed
from
what
Mr.
Krause
now
says
was
a
misunderstanding
by
him
of
the
first
two
questions
asked
in
cross-
examination,
that
is
to
say,
what
part
of
the
32
per
cent
of
the
total
expenses
related
to
travel
to
Sunday
services.
Mr.
Krause’s
response
was
20
per
cent
of
that
32
per
cent.
I
am
satisfied
that
there
was
a
simple
breakdown
in
communications,
a
failure
to
understand
the
question.
I
think
Mr.
Krause
is
an
honest
and
truthful
person,
and
on
that
basis,
I
think
that
he
is
correct
in
saying
he
was
mistaken
in
his
understanding
of
the
question.
Therefore,
I
accept
his
evidence
that
20
per
cent
of
the
$3,768
in
parish
travel
related
to
the
cost
of
going
to
and
from
church
on
Sunday.
Now
all
of
these
figures
are
approximations
and
none
has
been
established
with
mathematical
precision.
So
I
take
it
then
that
$750
of
the
$3,768
in
parish
travel
relates
to
going
to
and
from
church
on
Sunday
for
the
purpose
of
conducting
services.
I
find
that
that
$750
is
not
deductible
because
the
travel
was
not
for
the
purposes
of
carrying
on
the
duties
of
employment.
The
travel
was
not
in
the
course
of
the
appellant's
employment.
He
was
not
required
to
carry
on
his
duties
as
pastor
anywhere
other
than
that
at
church.
He
was
not
required
to
carry
them
on
in
different
places.
The
$750
therefore
does
not
qualify
under
subparagraph
8(1)(h)(i)
and,
accordingly,
I
find
that
the
total
amount
proved
in
relation
to
parish
travel
is
$3,000.
The
appellant
was
allowed
on
assessment
$2,756.68,
thus
the
amount
allowed
is
low
by
approximately
$250.
The
appeal
will
be
allowed
and
the
assessment
will
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
an
additional
$250
in
travel
expenses.
Judgment
will
go
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.
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