Christie,
A.C.J.T.C.C.
(orally):—
These
appeals
were
heard
together
on
common
evidence.
The
appellants
are
husband
and
wife.
The
year
under
appeal
is
1990.
Paragraphs
one
to
14
of
the
notice
of
appeal
read:
APPELLANTS’
ADDRESS
1.
The
address
of
the
appellants
is:
Barry
J.
Reiter
and
Karen
Malatest
36
Bennington
Heights
Drive
Toronto,
Ontario
M4G
1A6
ASSESSMENTS
UNDER
APPEAL
2.
The
particulars
of
the
assessments
under
appeal
are
as
follows:
|
Name
of
taxpayer:
|
Barry
J.
Reiter
|
Karen
Malatest
|
|
Taxation
Year:
|
1990
|
1990
|
|
Date
of
assessment:
|
December
6,
1991
|
August
16,
1991
|
|
Date
of
confirmation:
|
October
15,
1992
|
October
15,
1992
|
3.
The
issues
raised
and
the
facts
and
reasons
relied
upon
are
the
same
for
both
taxpayers.
Accordingly,
the
notice
of
appeal
is
the
same
for
both.
FACTS
4,
These
tax
appeals
are
brought
jointly
by
Barry
J.
Reiter
and
his
wife,
Karen
Malatest
(hereinafter
collectively
the
"taxpayers")
in
respect
of
the
disposition
of
their
former
principal
residence
and
apartment
at
65
Harbour
Square,
Toronto
(the
"apartment")
which
they
owned
jointly.
1989
Change
of
Use
of
Apartment
5.
In
February
of
1989
the
taxpayers
were
residing
in
the
apartment,
as
their
principal
residence,
when
they
decided
to
purchase
a
house
on
Bennington
Heights
Drive
as
their
new
principal
residence.
They
entered
into
an
agreement
of
purchase
in
February
1989.
The
agreement
called
for
a
closing
of
the
house
purchase
on
July
31,
1989
and
the
purchase
was
duly
completed
atthat
time.
6.
It
was
the
intention
of
the
taxpayers
at
the
time
they
entered
into
the
house
purchase
agreement
in
February
of
1989
that
they
would
sell
their
apartment
and
move
into
their
new
house
in
July.
The
apartment
was
listed
for
sale
with
a
real
estate
broker.
They
had
a
moving
company
booked
for
their
move
in
July.
7.
On
July
31,
1989,
the
closing
date
of
the
house
purchase,
the
taxpayers
had
been
unable
to
successfully
sell
the
apartment.
(An
offer
which
had
been
accepted
in
early
June
in
the
amount
of
$735,000
was
withdrawn
by
the
purchaser
on
the
basis
of
a
condition
in
the
offer
that
it
was
conditional
upon
financing.)
8.
In
or
about
August,
1989
the
taxpayers
decided
to
try
to
lease
the
apartment
while
continuing
to
list
it
for
sale.
9.
In
order
to
enhance
their
ability
to
either
lease
or
sell
the
apartment
the
taxpayers
decided
to
continue
to
occupy
it.
Several
real
estate
agents
had
strongly
advised
them
that
the
apartment
should
remain
occupied
both
because
it
enhanced
the
appearance
of
the
apartment
and
because
a
vacant
apartment
would
indicate
desperation
on
the
part
of
the
taxpayers.
10.
From
August,
1989
onwards
the
apartment
was
listed
for
lease
and
for
sale
with
a
real
estate
agent
specializing
in
the
sale
and
lease
of
condominium
units
in
the
Harbour
Square
complex.
During
September,
October
and
November,
1989
the
taxpayers
also
placed
advertisements
in
newspapers
attempting
to
lease
the
apartment.
11.
On
November
15,
1989,
the
taxpayers
moved
into
their
new
house.
The
apartment
was
left
vacant
but
they
continued
to
try
to
lease
or
sell
it.
12.
On
November
25,
1989
the
taxpayers
accepted
an
offer
to
purchase
the
apartment
for
$650,000
with
closing
to
be
on
April
15,1990.
The
purchaser,
who
owned
13
other
units
in
the
Harbour
Square
complex
which
he
rented,
intended
to
rent
the
apartment
after
he
acquired
possession.
The
taxpayers
wanted
to
rent
the
apartment
for
the
period
up
to
the
closing
and
they
therefore
agreed
with
the
purchaser
that
they
would
attempt
to
rent
the
apartment
immediately
for
a
term
of
at
least
a
one
year
which
year
would
stretch
through
the
taxpayers’
ownership
until
April
15,
1990
and
thereafter
into
the
purchaser’s
ownership.
The
parties
agreed
on
all
terms
of
a
lease
that
would
be
acceptable
to
them
as
lessor.
The
taxpayers
continued
their
efforts
to
rent
the
apartment
but
they
were
unsuccessful.
13.
The
purchaser
failed
to
close
the
purchase
on
April
15,
1990.
The
taxpayers
therefore
continued
to
try
to
lease
or
sell
the
apartment.
1990
Disposition
of
the
apartment
14,
Ultimately,
in
June,
1990,
the
apartment
was
sold
for
$525,000.
The
taxpayers
realized
$493,500
net
after
six
per
cent
commission.
There
are
11
additional
paragraphs
in
the
notice
of
appeal
(paragraphs
15
to
25)
relating
to
a
number
of
matters
required
by
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Rules
(General
Procedures).
They
need
not
be
reproduced
here.
Paragraphs
one
to
ten
inclusive
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
filed
by
Barry
Reiter
read:
A.
STATEMENT
OF
FACTS:
1.
He
admits
the
facts
stated
in
paragraphs
4,
5,
and
14
of
the
notice
of
appeal.
2.
With
respect
to
paragraph
6
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
he
has
no
knowledge
of
whether
the
appellant
and
his
spouse
had
a
moving
company
booked
for
a
move
in
July,
but
otherwise
admits
said
paragraph.
3.
He
admits
paragraph
7
of
the
notice
of
appeal
except
insofar
as
he
says
he
has
no
knowledge
of
and
puts
in
issue
the
amount
of
the
offer.
4,
With
respect
to
paragraph
8
of
the
notice
of
appeal
he
admits
that
the
appellant
and
his
spouse
("the
appellants"),
being
unable
to
sell
a
condominium
unit
at
65
Harbour
Square,
Toronto
(“the
condominium"),
tried
to
lease
it
in
November,
1989
while
continuing
to
list
the
condominium
for
sale.
5.
With
respect
to
paragraph
9
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
he
admits
that
the
appellants
continued
to
occupy
the
condominium
in
order
to
enhance
their
ability
to
sell
it,
but
otherwise
has
no
knowledge
of
and
puts
in
issue
the
facts
stated
in
paragraph
9
of
the
notice
of
appeal.
6.
With
respect
to
paragraph
10
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
he
says
as
follows:
(a)
he
admits
that
from
August
1989
onwards,
the
condominium
was
listed
for
sale
with
a
real
estate
agent
specializing
in
the
sale
of
condominium
units
in
the
Harbour
Square
complex;
(b)
at
the
beginning
of
November
1989,
the
appellants
also
placed
advertisements
in
newspapers
attempting
to
lease
the
condominium;
(c)
he
otherwise
denies
the
allegations
of
fact
contained
therein.
7.
With
respect
to
paragraphs
11,12
and
13
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
he
says
as
follows:
(a)
he
admits
that
on
November
15,
1989,
the
appellants
moved
into
their
new
house
and
that
the
condominium
was
left
vacant
while
they
continued
to
try
to
sell
it;
(b)
he
admits
that
on
November
25,
1989,
the
appellants
accepted
an
offer
to
purchase
the
condominium
with
closing
to
be
on
April
15,
1990;
(c)
he
admits
that
the
"purchaser"
failed
to
close
the
purchase
on
April
15,
1990
and
accordingly,
the
appellants
continued
trying
to
sell
the
condominium;
(d)
he
otherwise
has
no
knowledge
of
the
allegations
of
facts
contained
therein
and
puts
them
in
issue.
8.
He
denies
the
facts
stated
in
paragraphs
15,
16,
17,
18
and
19
of
the
notice
of
appeal.
9.
In
filing
his
income
tax
return
for
his
1990
taxation
year,
the
appellant
reported
a
“rental
loss"
of
$71,076.48
in
respect
of
the
condominium,
of
which
$68,250
was
claimed
as
a
capital
cost
allowance
and
determined
as
follows:
|
Cost
of
Additions
during
year
|
$650,000
|
|
Disposal
Proceeds
during
year
|
$513,500
|
|
Capital
Cost
Allowance
for
year
|
$136,500
|
|
Appellant’s
share
(50
per
cent)
|
$68,250
|
10.
In
assessing
the
appellants
so
as
to
disallow
the
portion
of
the
loss
related
to
the
capital
cost
allowance
deduction,
the
Minister
made,
inter
alia,
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
appellants
jointly
owned
the
condominium
which
was
their
principal
residence.
(b)
in
1989,
the
appellants
placed
the
condominium
on
the
market
and
purchased
a
house
at
65
Bennington
Heights
("the
house");
(c)
in
November
1989,
the
appellants
moved
into
the
house
and
also
attempted,
at
the
beginning
of
November
1989,
to
lease
the
condominium
pending
its
sale;
(d)
the
appellants’
primary
intention
was
to
sell
the
condominium
as
soon
as
ossible
and
to
lease
the
condominium
to
defray
expenses
pending
its
sale
and
to
facilitate
that
sale;
(e)
the
condominium
sold
in
June
1990;
(f)
the
appellants
did
not
rent
out
the
condominium
prior
to
its
sale;
(g)
the
condominium
was
never
used
by
the
appellants
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property.
The
reply
also
contains
additional
paragraphs
that
need
not
be
reproduced.
The
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
filed
by
Karen
Malatest
is
essentially
the
same
as
the
reply
filed
regarding
the
appeal
of
Barry
Reiter.
The
appellants
seek
to
deduct
a
terminal
loss
under
subsection
20(16)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
in
respect
of
the
disposition
of
their
former
apartment
at
65
Harbour
Square,
Toronto.
The
appellants
say
that
the
amount
of
the
loss
on
the
disposition
depends
on
whether
it
is
measured
from
July
1989
or
November
1989
or
some
time
in
between.
Counsel
informed
the
Court
that
they
are
in
agreement
that
for
the
purpose
of
calculating
the
loss
$660,000
relates
to
July
1989
and
$635,000
relates
to
November
1989.
Only
the
appellants
gave
oral
evidence.
Their
testimony
is
essentially
what
is
said
in
the
paragraphs
cited
from
the
notice
of
appeal.
The
purchaser
in
the
failed
sale
referred
to
in
paragraphs
12
and
13
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
Mr.
George
Kolentsi,
was
sued
successfully
by
the
appellants
but
he
became
a
bankrupt
and
the
judgment
was
not
paid.
The
appellants
did
retain
the
$20,000
down-payment
that
was
forfeited
under
the
agreement
of
sale
and
purchase.
Kolentsi’s
offer
was
placed
before
the
appellants
by
Mr.
Ed
Wery,
a
real
estate
agent
with
whom
the
apartment
had
been
listed
for
sale.
It
was
said
that
by
this
time
Karen
Malatest
was
very
reluctant
to
sell.
So
was
Barry
Reiter,
but
less
so.
Both,
however,
changed
their
minds
on
the
same
day
that
they
received
the
offer
and
agreed
to
sell.
Copies
of
advertisements
placed
in
the
Globe
and
Mail
on
November
3,
6
and
7,1989
are
in
evidence.
They
all
read:
Harbour
Sq,
(65)
S.E.
corner,
two
bdrm.,
two
bath,
in-suite
laundry,
balc.,
all
rooms
face
lake.
Designer
decorated,
Unfurn.,
rec.
facil.,
Parking.
Dec.
1,
$2,450/mo.
(The
phone
number
is
listed)
865-7381.
There
is
oral
evidence
that
advertisements
to
rent
were
also
placed
in
September
and
October
1989
with
the
tenancy
to
run
from
October
1
and
November
1
respectively.
The
appellants
were
prepared
to
rent
in
the
range
of
$2,000
to
$2,400
per
month.
The
apartment
was
never
rented
by
them.
In
order
for
a
terminal
loss
to
be
deductible
under
subsection
20(16)
of
the
Act
the
property
to
which
it
relates
must
be
depreciable
property.
That
is
to
say,
it
must
be
property
held
by
a
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
producing
income
therefrom.
To
succeed
on
these
appeals
the
appellants
must,
therefore,
establish
on
a
balance
of
probability
that
at
some
relevant
timethey
held
the
apartment
for
the
purpose
of
producing
income.
To
my
mind
that
has
not
been
established.
The
basic
reason
the
apartment
was
held
by
the
appellants
from
the
end
of
July
1989
to
June
1990
was
that
they
could
not
dispose
of
it.
Further,
their
overriding
purpose
throughout
was
to
sell
the
apartment.
It
was
never
removed
from
the
for
sale
market.
Unfortunately
for
them
the
appellants
were
in:
the
position
of
simultaneously
having
two
residences
in
a
rapidly
declining
market.
The
notion
of
renting
was,
I
think,
really
related
to
the
hope
of
somehow
cutting
losses
rather
than
for
the
purpose
of
producing
income.
The
appellants
had
a
heavy
interest
payment
burden
and
the
declining
market
is
reflected
in
the
fact
that
they
accepted
an
offer
of
$735,000
in
June
1989
that
failed
because
of
fimancing.
They
sold
in
June
of
1990
for
$525,000,
a
decline
of
some
28
per
cent.
In
light
of
what
I
have
said
these
appeals
must
fail.
Judgments
shall
issue
accordingly.
The
respondent
is
entitled
to
party-and-party
costs.
Appeals
dismissed.