Lamarre,
J.T.C.C.:—This
appeal
was
heard
in
Saskatoon,
Saskatchewan
under
the
informal
procedure
against
an
assessment
issued
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("the
Minister")
in
respect
of
the
appellant's
1991
taxation
year.
In
the
said
assessment,
the
Minister
disallowed
moving
expenses
to
the
appellant.
The
latter
claimed
in
his
tax
return
an
amount
of
$2,007.09
for
moving
expenses
he
said
he
had
incurred
when
he
moved
from
Calgary
to
Saskatoon
in
1991.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
disallowed
$1,905.09
out
of
the
amount
of
$2,007.09
that
was
initially
claimed
by
the
appellant
on
the
basis
that
he
did
not
furnish
receipts
to
support
such
expenses
and
considered
the
said
expenses
as
being
unreasonable.
The
Minister
relied
upon
sections
62
and
67
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
At
the
hearing,
the
appellant
brought
some
vouchers
that
were
accepted
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
leaving
an
amount
of
$1,400
which
is
still
not
accepted
by
the
respondent,
for
the
same
reason
that
they
are
not
supported
by
any
receipts.
My
understanding
from
the
evidence
is
that
the
amount
of
$1,400
which
is
still
pending
before
this
Court,
represents
an
amount
of
cash
that
would
have
been
given
by
the
appellant
to
a
mover
called
McCartney
Cartage
on
Septem-
ber
5,
1991.
The
appellant
filed
into
evidence
a
document
showing
the
content
that
was
moved
by
McCartney
Cartage
(See
Exhibit
A-1,
Appendix
B)
which
were
in
fact
furnitures
of
the
appellant.
He
also
testified
that
he
had
a
receipt
from
them
that
was
lost
last
year
with
other
papers
that
were
filed
in
a
box.
He
testified
that
he
tried
to
find
out
what
happened
to
McCartney
Cartage
in
order
to
obtain
a
copy
of
his
receipt.
He
went
to
Calgary,
looked
in
the
telephone
books,
telephoned
small
companies
who
would
know
about
McCartney
Cartage,
but
nobody
was
aware
of
any
such
company.
He
further
went
to
the
Registration
Corporation
office
in
Calgary
to
find
out
that
the
said
company
was
not
formally
registered
in
Alberta.
He
testified
that
he
did
everything
he
could
to
try
to
obtain
a
copy
of
the
receipt,
without
any
success.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
under
section
230
of
the
Act,
a
taxpayer
must
keep
adequate
books
and
records
in
order
to
claim
deductions.
She
said
that
the
expenses
could
not
be
deductible
without
the
production
of
receipts.
Furthermore,
she
argued
that
the
expenses
were
unreasonable
in
the
circumstances,
and
relied
on
that
point
upon
section
67
of
the
Act.
The
appellant
answered
that
section
230
did
not
apply
because
he
did
keep
records
but
lost
his
receipt
which
was
not
his
fault.
He
also
mentioned
that
the
amount
of
$1,400
was
fairly
reasonable
and
was
not
invented
because
that
amount
was
claimed
in
his
1991
tax
return,
when
it
was
fresh
in
his
memory.
His
1991
tax
return
was
filed
into
evidence
as
Exhibit
R-1.
The
obligation
of
providing
vouchers
is
not
imposed
by
the
Act
itself.
It
is
a
directive
given
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
his
own
information
circular.
In
order
to
succeed
the
appellant
must
produce
evidence
satisfactory
to
the
Court
that
the
Minister
erred
in
disallowing
the
moving
expenses,
and
that
he
really
incurred
the
expense.
In
the
result
therefore,
the
appeal
must
turn
on
the
credibility
of
the
appellant.
"The
credibility
of
a
witness
depends
upon
his
knowledge
of
the
facts,
his
disinterestedness,
his
integrity,
his
veracity"
(Levine
v.
M.N.R.
(1950)
2
Tax
A.B.C.
240,
50
D.T.C.
337
(T.A.B.)
at
page
243
(D.T.C.
339)).
As
far
as
receipts
are
concerned,
it
would
be
preferable
that
anyone
who
appears
before
the
Court
substantiates
the
claims
that
he
is
making.
However,
in
the
present
case
the
oral
evidence
given
by
the
appellant,
and
I
believe
him
as
being
a
credible
witness,
established
that
the
appellant
incurred
such
expenses,
and
that
he
did
everything
he
could
to
find
the
receipts
without
any
success.
As
the
appellant
pointed
out
to
the
Court,
I
do
not
think
he
was
negligent
by
not
keeping
adequate
books
and
records.
As
to
the
reasonableness
of
the
amount,
I
accept
the
expense
of
$1,400
as
being
reasonable
under
the
Act.
For
all
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed
without
costs.
Appeal
allowed.