McGills,
J.:—
Introduction
From
1978
until
he
was
fired
in
1984,
the
chief
foreign
currency
trader
for
the
Bank
of
Montreal
made
large
personal
profits
by
using
funds
of
the
bank
to
speculate
in
foreign
currencies.
He
was
assessed
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
(Taxation)
as
owing
income
tax
in
the
amount
of
approximately
$350,000.
All
of
his
assets
were
seized,
including
two
homes,
two
vehicles,
a
bank
account
and
a
certificate
of
deposit
in
the
amount
of
$230,210.98.
The
bank
sought
unsuccessfully
in
litigation
against
him
in
the
Superior
Court
and
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec
to
obtain
payment
of
$777,650
and
a
declaration
that
it
was
the
owner
of
the
certificate
of
deposit.
The
former
employee
obtained
an
injunction
from
the
Superior
Court
of
Quebec
to
compel
the
bank
to
pay
the
moneys
represented
by
the
certificate
of
deposit
to
the
Department
on
account
of
his
income
taxes.
The
bank
paid
the
Department
$352,898.52
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
its
former
employee
after
declaring
to
the
Department
its
intention
to
seek
leave
to
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
subsequently
held
that
the
transactions
engaged
in
by
the
former
employee
were
fraudulent
and
that
he
was
indebted
to
the
bank
in
the
amount
of
$660,135.82.
The
Department
has
refused
to
reimburse
the
bank
for
the
moneys
which
it
paid
on
account
of
the
income
taxes
of
its
former
employee.
The
bank
has
instituted
this
action
to
obtain
the
return
of
the
moneys
paid
to
the
Department.
Facts
The
trial
in
this
matter
proceeded
on
the
basis
of
an
agreed
statement
of
facts,
documentary
evidence
and
the
testimony
of
two
witnesses.
The
following
is
a
summary
of
the
facts
as
I
find
them.
In
1978,
Philippe
Leong
became
the
Chief
Foreign
Currency
Trader
for
the
Bank
of
Montreal
("the
bank")
in
its
eastern
region.
From
1978
until
he
was
fired
October
1984,
Mr.
Leong
used
funds
made
available
to
him
by
the
bank
to
make
large
personal
profits
by
speculating
in
foreign
currencies.
Shortly
after
the
firing
of
Mr.
Leong,
the
bank
instituted
an
action
against
him
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
claiming,
among
other
things,
the
payment
to
it
of
$777,650
plus
interest
and
a
declaration
that
a
certificate
of
deposit
in
the
amount
of
$230,210.98
was
its
property.
As
a
result
of
the
profits
made
from
his
scheme,
Mr.
Leong
was
assessed
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
(Taxation)
("the
Department")
in
December
1984
for
the
taxation
years
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
for
income
tax
in
the
amount
of
$340,059.90,
with
interest
on
the
sum
of
$215,829.07
from
December
13,
1984.
Two
homes,
a
Porsche
and
an
Oldsmobile
Cutlass
belonging
to
Mr.
Leong
were
immediately
seized
under
orders
obtained
by
the
Department.
On
January
15,
1985,
the
Department
obtained
interim
orders
imposing
a
charge
on
land
and,
on
March
29,
1985,
final
orders.
These
orders
were
registered
against
the
seized
homes
of
Mr.
Leong.
On
January
23,
1985,
the
Department
obtained
an
interim
garnishment
order
to
permit
the
attachment
of
funds
owing
to
Mr.
Leong
from
Investors
Group
Trust
Co.
Ltd.
("Investors")
which
administered
an
employee
shareownership
program
for
the
bank.
On
or
about
February
14,
1985,
Mr.
Leong
filed
a
notice
of
objection
to
the
assessments
made
by
the
Department.
On
February
22,
1985,
the
Department
obtained
an
interim
garnishment
order
to
attach
the
funds
in
a
bank
account
and
the
moneys
allegedly
due
from
the
bank
to
Mr.
Leong
in
the
certificate
of
deposit.
The
bank
claimed
in
the
proceedings
that
it
owed
nothing
to
Mr.
Leong
and
the
hearing
to
obtain
a
final
order
of
garnishment
was
adjourned
sine
die.
The
action
instituted
by
the
bank
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
was
dismissed
on
March
19,
1986
on
the
basis
that
Mr.
Leong
was
an
employee
of
the
bank
as
opposed
to
a
mandatary
and,
as
such,
had
no
obligation
to
account
to
the
bank
for
his
profits.
The
bark
appealed
this
judgment
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec.
In
order
to
permit
Mr.
Leong
to
sell
one
of
his
homes,
the
Department
accepted
as
security
in
December
1986
a
bank
letter
of
credit
in
the
amount
of
$88,547.90
plus
interest,
representing
the
equity
in
the
property.
On
April
1,
1987,
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec
dismissed
the
appeal
brought
by
the
bank
on
the
basis
that
Mr.
Leong
was
an
employee
and
not
a
mandatary
of
the
bank
and
was
therefore
not
subject
to
a
fiduciary
duty.
On
April
7,
1987,
Mr.
Leong
sold
his
other
home
to
his
wife
for
the
sum
of
$210,000.
Shortly
thereafter,
Mr.
Leong
brought
an
application
in
the
Superior
Court
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
for
an
injunction
to
compel
the
bank
to
pay
the
moneys
represented
by
the
certificate
of
deposit
to
the
Department
on
account
of
his
income
tax
debt
and
to
his
lawyers.
The
application
for
an
interim
injunction
was
dismissed
and
the
request
for
an
interlocutory
injunction
was
adjourned.
On
May
21,
1987,
the
Department
set
down
for
hearing
on
June
26,
1987
its
application
for
a
garnishment
order
against
the
bank.
The
hearing
on
the
application
by
Mr.
Leong
for
an
interlocutory
and
permanent
injunction
to
compel
the
bank
to
pay
moneys
to
the
Department
on
account
of
his
income
tax
debt
took
place
on
June
16,
1987
and
judgment
was
reserved.
On
or
about
June
23,
1987,
the
bank
served
the
Department
with
an
affidavit
in
the
garnishment
proceedings.
In
this
affidavit,
the
deponent
swore
that
the
bank
would
bring
an
application
for
leave
to
appeal
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
within
the
appropriate
time
period.
The
affidavit
outlined
the
grounds
upon
which
the
application
for
leave
would
be
based,
including
among
other
things
that
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec
erred
in
law
in
failing
to
find
that
the
profits
made
by
Mr.
Leong
and
the
moneys
represented
by
the
certificate
of
deposit
were
the
property
of
the
bank.
On
or
about
June
26,
1987,
the
bank
filed
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
an
application
for
leave
to
appeal
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec.
The
application
by
the
Department
for
a
garnishment
order
was
adjourned
on
June
26,
1987.
In
a
judgment
dated
June
30,
1987,
Trudeau,
J.
of
the
Superior
Court
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
granted
the
application
of
Mr.
Leong
for
an
interlocutory
and
permanent
injunction.
He
ordered
the
bank
to
convert
the
certificate
of
deposit
which
was
in
the
name
of
Mr.
Leong
into
Canadian
funds
and
to
pay
the
moneys
to
the
Department
in
satisfaction
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leong.
The
order
was
made
subject
to
the
provision
that
Mr.
Leong
obtain
a
discharge
of
the
order
of
seizure
held
by
the
Department
on
the
certificate
of
deposit.
In
his
reasons
for
granting
the
injunction,
Trudeau,
J.
was
harshly
critical
of
the
conduct
of
the
bank
which,
in
his
view,
had
prevented
Mr.
Leong
from
accessing
"his
own"
money.
The
bank
did
not
appeal
the
order
of
Trudeau,
J.
granting
the
injunction
on
the
basis
that
the
adverse
judgments
of
the
Superior
Court
and
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec
concerning
the
ownership
of
the
funds
in
the
certificate
of
deposit,
together
with
the
severe
criticism
of
its
conduct
by
Trudeau,
J.,
would
render
futile
any
attempt
to
stay
the
operation
of
the
injunction.
In
a
telephone
conversation
on
July
3,
1987,
counsel
for
the
bank
and
the
Department
discussed
the
injunction
granted
by
Trudeau,
J.
and,
in
particular,
the
possibility
of
the
bank
paying
under
protest
the
moneys
represented
by
the
certificate
of
deposit
to
the
Department
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leone.
They
further
discussed
the
possibility
of
the
Department
granting
conditional
discharges
of
its
orders
of
seizure.
However,
counsel
for
the
Department
made
no
commitment
to
give
conditional
discharges
in
the
event
that
the
bank
paid
the
moneys
under
protest.
In
the
course
of
a
meeting
held
in
the
offices
of
counsel
for
the
bank
on
July
8,
1987,
a
peremptory
demand
for
payment
in
the
amount
of
$352,985.28
was
given
to
the
bank
by
the
Department.
This
sum
represented
taxes,
penalties
and
interest
owed
by
Mr.
Leong
to
the
Department
as
of
that
date.
Counsel
for
the
bank
gave
the
representative
of
the
Department
a
cheque
in
the
amount
of
$353,898.52,
which
included
legal
fees
and
disbursements
payable
by
Mr.
Leong
to
the
Department.
The
sum
of
money
paid
by
the
bank
to
the
Department
came
entirely
from
the
profits
made
by
Mr.
Leong
by
speculating
in
foreign
currencies
in
the
course
of
his
employment,
save
and
except
for
the
amount
of
$59,728.94.
Counsel
for
the
Department
provided
counsel
for
the
bank
with
an
abandonment
of
the
interim
garnishment
order
dated
February
22,
1985
in
relation
to
the
certificate
of
deposit
and
advised
counsel
for
Mr.
Leong
that
he
could
dispose
of
the
sum
of
$20,000
in
his
trust
fund
which
represented
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
the
Porsche.
On
his
return
to
his
office
that
morning,
counsel
for
the
Department
signed
and
filed
with
the
Registry
of
this
Court
a
discharge
of
the
order
of
seizure
of
the
house
which
Mr.
Leong
had
previously
sold
to
his
wife.
At
approximately
1:24
p.m.
on
July
8,
1987,
a
bailiff
served
counsel
for
the
Department
with
a
letter
from
counsel
for
the
bank
indicating
that
the
payment
of
$353,898.52
was
made
under
protest.
Counsel
for
the
bank
further
stated
in
this
letter
that
the
bank
would
seek
reimbursement
of
the
moneys
paid
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leong
in
the
event
that
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
were
to
declare
the
bank
to
be
the
owner
of
some
or
all
of
the
profits
made
by
Mr.
Leong.
This
letter
had
been
signed
by
counsel
for
the
bank
and
given
to
a
bailiff
for
service
on
counsel
for
the
Department
prior
to
the
meeting
which
took
place
on
the
morning
of
July
8,
1987.
Later
the
same
day,
counsel
for
the
Department
wrote
to
counsel
for
the
bank
indicating
that,
even
if
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
were
to
allow
the
appeal
of
the
bank
and
declare
it
to
be
the
owner
of
the
certificate
of
deposit,
the
Department
would
"vigorously
contest"
any
attempts
by
the
bank
to
seek
the
return
of
the
moneys
paid
in
satisfaction
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leong.
In
his
letter,
counsel
for
the
Department
denied
that
there
was
any
basis
upon
which
the
moneys
could
be
reimbursed
and
outlined
certain
arguments
in
support
of
his
position.
He
sent
this
letter
by
ordinary
mail.
Despite
his
knowledge
that
the
bank
was
Claiming
a
payment
under
protest,
he
proceeded
to
release
immediately,
without
informing
counsel
for
the
bank,
all
of
the
security
held
by
the
Department.
In
particular,
he
forwarded
to
Investors
an
abandonment
of
the
interim
order
of
garnishment,
he
released
the
letter
of
guarantee
in
the
amount
of
$88,547.90
representing
the
equity
in
one
of
the
houses
sold
by
Mr.
Leong
and
he
sent
to
the
Department
for
signature
discharges
of
all
of
its
administrative
garnishments.
He
also
filed
a
new
discharge
of
the
order
of
seizure
of
one
of
the
homes
to
correct
a
clerical
error
in
the
document
which
he
had
filed
prior
to
his
receipt
of
the
letter
from
counsel
for
the
bank.
On
July
10
1987,
counsel
for
the
bank
received
the
letter.
On
the
same
date,
the
Department
issued
its
discharges
of
its
administrative
garnishments.
I
have
carefully
reviewed
all
of
the
evidence
tendered
at
trial
and
further
find
as
a
fact
that
the
income
taxes
owed
to
the
Department
by
Mr.
Leong
were
paid
by
the
bank
under
protest
and
that
counsel
for
the
Department
knew
or
ought
to
have
known
this
prior
to
the
meeting
on
July
8,
1987.
Counsel
for
the
Department
had
engaged
in
a
discussion
with
counsel
for
the
bank
concerning
the
possibility
of
a
payment
under
protest
and
was
well
aware
that
the
bank
was
seeking
leave
to
appeal
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Quebec
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
on
several
grounds
including
the
ownership
of
the
funds
in
question.
It
simply
would
not
make
any
sense
whatsoever
for
the
bank
to
pay
these
moneys
without
having
reserved
its
right
to
claim
a
reimbursement
in
the
event
of
a
successful
result
in
its
litigation
before
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
In
any
event,
it
is
clear
beyond
any
question
that
counsel
for
the
Department
knew
at
1:24
p.m.
on
July
8,
1987,
the
date
and
time
of
the
service
of
the
letter
from
counsel
for
the
bank,
that
the
payment
was
made
under
protest
and
nevertheless
chose
to
release
the
security
held
by
the
Department.
At
trial,
facts
were
admitted
by
counsel
concerning
the
reasons
why
counsel
for
the
Department
wrote
his
letter
dated
July
8,
1987.
These
purported
"facts"
constitute
some
of
the
legal
arguments
relied
on
by
counsel
for
the
Department
in
refusing
to
acknowledge
that
the
payment
of
the
bank
was
made
under
protest.
While
these
arguments
may
properly
be
advanced
before
the
Court
in
support
of
the
legal
position
advanced
by
the
Department,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
they
do
not
constitute
facts
and
are
therefore
not
relevant.
An
issue
arose
at
trial
concerning
whether
the
evidence
before
the
Court
established
that
the
sum
of
$20,000
allegedly
representing
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
the
Porsche
existed
or
were
held
in
trust
for
the
Department
as
of
July
8,
1987.
Although
counsel
agreed
at
trial
that
the
lawyer
for
Mr.
Leong
was
told
during
the
meeting
on
July
8,
1987
that
he
could
dispose
of
the
sum
of
$20,000
representing
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
of
the
Porsche
and
allegedly
held
in
his
trust
fund,
they
disagreed
as
to
whether
these
funds
existed.
Me
Jacques
Rossignol,
who
was
the
lawyer
for
Mr.
Leong
at
all
material
times,
was
called
as
a
witness
by
counsel
for
the
Department.
In
his
evidence,
Me
Rossignol
testified
that
he
could
neither
recall
in
what
context
the
sum
of
$20,000
had
been
negotiated
nor
whether
the
funds
had
been
in
his
trust
account.
On
the
witness
stand,
Me
Rossignol
was
evasive
in
his
responses
to
questions
posed
to
him.
Furthermore,
despite
having
been
served
with
a
subpoena
duces
tecum,
he
had
obviously
taken
no
steps
whatsoever
to
prepare
himself
to
give
evidence
on
the
matter
in
question.
Counsel
for
the
Department
attempted
to
refresh
the
memory
of
Me
Rossignol
by
producing
to
him
exhibit
D-2,
a
letter
dated
July
8,
1987
from
Me
Rossignol
to
counsel
for
the
Department
confirming
that
the
sum
of
$20,000
for
the
vehicle
could
be
released
to
Mr.
Leong,
and
exhibit
D-3,
a
letter
dated
January
27,
1987
from
the
Department
to
Me
Rossignol
requesting
confirmation
of
the
transaction.
These
attempts
to
refresh
the
memory
of
Me
Rossignol
proved
futile.
I
have
carefully
considered
the
failure
of
Me
Rossignol
to
prepare
himself
to
testify
in
response
to
the
subpoena
and
his
demeanour,
including
his
evasiveness
as
a
witness
and
his
inability
to
respond
to
basic
questions
concerning
the
matter
in
issue.
Regrettably,
I
have
concluded
that
the
evidence
given
by
Me
Rossignol
was
unreliable.
Counsel
for
the
Department
then
called
Mr.
Leong
as
a
witness.
He
testified
that
the
Porsche
was
sold
for
$20,000
and
that
the
funds
were
given
to
Me
Rossignol.
Despite
the
evidence
of
Mr.
Leong
that
the
funds
were
given
to
Me
Rossignol,
I
am
not
satisfied
on
the
basis
of
the
evidence
adduced
before
me
that
these
funds
were
held
by
Me
Rossignol
in
trust
for
the
Department
and
Mr.
Leong.
On
December
3,
1987,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
allowed
the
application
for
leave
to
appeal.
In
1988,
Mr.
Leong
made
an
assignment
in
bankruptcy.
The
bank
filed
a
proof
of
claim
with
the
trustee
in
bankruptcy
in
the
amount
of
$898,334.81.
The
trustee
in
bankruptcy
did
not
reject
this
proof
of
claim.
The
bank
neither
took
any
steps
nor
required
the
trustee
in
bankruptcy
to
take
any
measures
on
its
behalf
in
the
bankruptcy
proceedings.
In
particular,
the
bank
did
not
seek
to
annul
the
sale
of
one
of
the
homes
of
Mr.
Leong
to
his
wife.
Mr.
Leong
was
discharged
in
bankruptcy
on
September
18,
1989
without
any
opposition
from
the
bank.
On
September
28,
1989,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
unanimously
allowed
the
appeal
of
the
bank.
[See
Bank
of
Montreal
v.
Kuet
Leong
Ng,
[1989]
2
S.C.R.
429.]
In
delivering
the
judgment
of
the
Court,
Gonthier,
J.
concluded
that
the
transactions
in
which
Mr.
Leong
realized
profits
in
the
course
of
his
employment
with
the
bank
were
fraudulent.
The
Court
therefore
declared
that
Mr.
Leong
was
indebted
to
the
bank
in
the
amount
of
$660,135.82,
with
interest
and
the
special
indemnity
under
article
1056c
of
the
Civil
Code
of
Quebec.
The
Department
refused
a
request
by
the
bank
for
reimbursement
of
the
moneys
it
paid
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leong.
The
Department
has
known
since
the
date
of
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
that
the
bank
was
the
owner
of
the
moneys
in
question
and
that
Mr.
Leong
had
no
entitlement
to
any
of
these
funds.
Issue
Whether
the
bank
is
entitled
to
the
return
of
the
moneys
paid
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
its
former
employee
Mr.
Leong.
Analysis
The
action
instituted
by
the
bank
seeking
the
return
of
the
moneys
paid
to
the
Department
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
its
former
employee
Mr.
Leong
is
premised
on
the
principle
in
article
1140
of
the
Civil
Code
of
Quebec
that
every
payment
presupposes
a
debt
and
that
which
has
been
paid
in
the
absence
of
a
debt
may
be
recovered.
In
determining
whether
the
bank
is
entitled
to
recover
from
the
Department
the
moneys
it
paid
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leong,
guidance
may
be
obtained
from
the
principles
enunciated
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
The
Queen
v.
Premier
Mouton
Products
Inc.,
[1961]
S.C.R.
361,
[1961]
C.T.C.
160,
61
D.T.C.
1105.
In
this
case,
the
officers
of
the
company
paid
excise
tax
under
protest
in
order
to
avoid
having
their
business
closed.
In
the
majority
judgment
of
the
Court
which
held
that
the
company
was
entitled
to
recover
the
taxes
paid,
Taschereau,
J.
stated
at
page
369
that
he
was
”.
.
.satisfied
that
the
payments
made
were
not
prompted
by
the
desire
to
discharge
a
legal
obligation,
or
to
settle
definitely
a
contested
claim.”
As
a
result,
he
concluded
that
the
payments
were
not
made
voluntarily.
He
further
observed
that
the
payment
of
the
taxes
was
not
made
"...with
the
intention
of
giving
up
a
right,
but
with
the
intention
of
preserving
the
right
to
dispute
the
legality
of
the
demand
.
.
Of
course,
the
mere
fact
that
the
payment
was
made
‘under
protest’
is
not
conclusive
but,
when
all
the
circumstances
of
the
case
are
considered,
it
flows
that
the
respondent
[company]
clearly
intended
to
keep
alive
its
right
to
recover
the
sum
paid.”
Taschereau,
J.
also
held
that
there
had
been
no
error
of
fact
or
law
committed
by
the
officers
of
the
company,
thereby
precluding
the
application
of
articles
1047
and
1048
of
the
Civil
Code
of
Quebec
which
are
premised
on
the
existence
of
an
error.
The
principles
outlined
by
Taschereau,
J.
in
Premier
Mouton
Products,
supra,
are
directly
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar.
I
have
found
as
a
fact
that
the
bank
paid
under
protest
to
the
Department
moneys
from
the
certificate
of
deposit
on
account
of
the
income
tax
debt
of
Mr.
Leong
and
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
has
held
the
bank
to
be
the
owner
of
these
funds.
In
the
circumstances,
I
therefore
conclude
without
hesitation
that
the
bank
is
entitled
to
the
recovery
of
its
moneys.
Alternatively,
if
I
am
wrong
in
deciding
the
case
on
this
basis,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
circumstances
of
the
case
as
a
whole
establish
unequivocally
that
the
bank
intended
to
pursue
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
the
question
of
the
ownership
of
the
funds
and
the
Department
knew
this
before
accepting
the
payment
of
the
moneys
in
question.
The
funds
were
therefore
not
paid
by
the
bank
voluntarily
or
with
a
view
to
relinquishing
its
right
to
dispute
their
ownership
in
the
pending
litigation
before
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
Accordingly,
the
bank
is
entitled
to
the
recovery
of
the
moneys.
I
should
note
that,
on
the
facts
of
this
case,
no
error
of
fact
or
law
was
committed
by
the
bank
in
making
the
payment
to
the
Department.
Accordingly,
in
keeping
with
the
rationale
in
Premier
Mouton
Products,
supra,
articles
1047
and
1048
of
the
Civil
Code
of
Quebec
are
not
applicable
on
the
facts
of
this
case.
Before
closing,
I
feel
compelled
to
observe
that,
in
refusing
to
return
the
moneys
to
their
lawful
owner,
the
Department
has
sought
to
force
the
victim
of
a
fraud
to
pay
the
income
taxes
owed
by
the
perpetrator
of
the
crime.
To
say
that
this
is
manifestly
unjust
is
only
to
state
the
patently
obvious.
Furthermore,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that,
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case,
the
failure
of
the
Department
to
return
the
moneys
following
the
unanimous
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
that
the
bank
was
the
owner
of
these
funds,
constitutes
bad
faith.
Decision
In
view
of
the
admission
that
the
sum
of
$59,728.94
did
not
flow
from
the
fraudulent
activities
of
Mr.
Leong,
the
Department
will
not
be
ordered
to
repay
that
amount.
The
Department
shall
therefore
pay
the
bank
the
sum
of
$293,869.58
with
interest
and
the
additional
indemnity
from
July
8,
1987
in
accordance
with
the
Civil
Code
of
Quebec.
Action
allowed.
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