Alberstat,
Master:—This
is
an
application
for
advice
and
directions
by
the
trustee
of
the
estate
of
Rockton
Shayne
Bernard
Neufeld.
Mr.
Neufeld
made
an
assignment
into
bankruptcy
September
19,
1991.
He
received
an
unconditional
discharge
on
April
21,
1992.
The
trustee
has
also
received
an
order
for
discharge.
The
bankrupt's
child,
Cody
Neufeld,
aged
14,
is
legally
blind.
He
has
very
limited
vision
and
can
see
no
details
except
with
the
assistance
of
special
glasses
and
an
enlarging
computer.
Specialized
computer
equipment
is
required
by
Cody
at
home
to
allow
him
to
do
his
school
work.
Cody's
access
to
similar
equipment
through
the
school
system
is
limited
because
the
equipment
at
school
is
shared
with
other
students
who
are
disabled.
After
Mr.
Neufeld
was
discharged
from
bankruptcy
he
was
advised
to
apply
for
a
disability
tax
credit
and
deductions
for
his
infant
son
Cody,
for
the
current
year
and
for
previous
taxation
years.
He
filed
returns
for
the
years
1985
through
1991
with
Revenue
Canada.
He
was
refunded
$6,154.12.
The
money
was
paid
to
the
trustee
pursuant
to
an
assignment.
The
trustee
now
applies
for
advice
and
directions
as
to
the
disposition
of
these
funds.
Subsection
71(2)
of
the
Bankruptcy
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
B-3
[now
Bankruptcy
and
Insolvency
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
B-3]
provides
that
tax
refunds
for
taxation
years
prior
to
the
date
of
bankruptcy
are
the
property
of
the
bankrupt,
vesting
in
the
trustee
and
are
available
for
disposition
to
creditors.
Anyone
applying
for
a
disability
tax
credit
requires
a
certificate
from
a
qualified
medical
practitioner.
The
certificate
sets
out
that
the
disabled
person
has
a
prolonged
impairment
and
is
“markedly
restricted"
in
his
"activities
of
daily
living".
The
special
exemption
for
visually-impaired
persons
was
changed
to
a
tax
credit
in
1988.
There
is
a
prescribed
formula
to
follow
to
arrive
at
the
tax
credit
allowed.
Any
amount
of
the
tax
credit
not
used
by
an
individual
entitled
to
the
tax
credit
may
be
transferred
to
a
parent
or
a
spouse.
Unlike
other
tax
credits
the
disability
tax
credit
is
not
dependent
upon
receipts.
If
a
disabled
child
has
no
income
and
is
residing
with
a
parent
who
is
wholly
supporting
that
child,
the
whole
of
the
tax
credit
may
be
used
by
the
parent.
The
special
exemptions
previously
given
to
disabled
people
who
were
blind
or
wheelchair
bound
was
replaced
by
a
general
disability
exemption.
The
exemption
was
converted
to
a
tax
credit
in
1988.
This
tax
credit
is
personal
to
the
person
disabled.
It
lives
and
dies
with
that
disabled
person.
The
clear
policy
reason
allowing
the
transfer
of
unused
amounts
of
the
disability
tax
credit
to
a
parent
or
spouse
wholly
or
partially
supporting
that
disabled
person
is
to
supply
financial
relief
for
the
support
and
maintenance
of
that
disabled
person.
The
tax
credit
was
never
intended
for
the
use
of
creditors
of
the
supporting
parent
or
spouse.
It
would
be
unfair
and
inequitable
for
creditors
to
benefit
financially
from
the
disability
of
a
child
or
spouse
of
a
bankrupt.
It
is
a
personal
tax
credit,
personal
to
the
disabled
person,
for
the
support
and
maintenance
of
that
disabled
person.
It
is
quite
independent
of
the
supporting
parent
or
spouse's
income
or
liabilities
or
obligations.
It
is
not
the
parent's
tax
credit
but
the
child’s
tax
credit,
albeit
it
may
be
used
by
the
supporting
parent
or
spouse.
It
would
be
against
public
policy
for
creditors
of
Cody's
parents
to
be
able
to
take
advantage
of
the
refund
directly
from
Cody
if
he
had
an
income.
The
tax
credit
belongs
to
the
dependent
child,
Cody,
not
the
parent.
If
the
creditors
were
to
be
able
to
claim
the
tax
refund
from
the
parents’
estate,
they
the
creditors
would
be
benefiting
indirectly
from
that
which
they
could
not
do
directly.
It
is
settled
law
that
some
rights
such
as
personal
injury
damage
claims
do
not
vest
in
the
trustee.
In
Re
Hollister,
[1926]
3
D.L.R.
707,
7
C.B.R.
629
(Ont.
S.C.),
per
Fisher,
J.
at
pages
708-09
(C.B.R.
630-31):
The
law
is
well
settled
that
the
Bankrupcty
Act,
S.C.
1991,
c.
36,
never
intended
to
increase
the
assets
of
an
insolvent
for
division
amongst
his
creditors,
of
moneys
recovered
in
an
action
for
personal
injuries,
as
these
moneys
are
awarded
as
damages
to
the
debtor
for
his
pain,
suffering
and
loss
of
comfort
of
life,
to
pay
his
physician,
nurses
and
hospital
expenses,
and
to
compensate
him
whilst
he
is
incapacitated
from
earning
a
living
for
himself
and
his
family.
.
.
.
Causes
of
action
arising
from
bodily
or
mental
suffering,
such
as
actions
for
assault,
seduction,
criminal
conversation,
and
damages
for
personal
injuries,
remain
in
the
bankrupt.
In
Ritenburg
v.
Crown
Trust
Co.
(1961),
3
C.B.R.
(N.S.)
294,
33
D.L.R.
(2d)
498
(Alta.
T.D.),
per
Riley,
J.
at
page
298
(D.L.R.
501)
[quoting
McBride,
J.
in
Eggen
(Egan)
v.
Grayson
(1956),
36
C.B.R.
72,
8
D.L.R.
(2d)
125
(Alta.
S.C.),
at
page
75
(D.L.R.
127),
in
turn
quoting
Rugg,
J.
in
Sibley
v.
Mason
(1907),
196
Mass.
125
at
page
130]:
It
is
not
and
never
has
been
the
policy
of
the
law
to
coin
into
money
for
the
profit
of
his
creditors,
the
bodily
pain,
mental
anguish
or
outraged
feelings
of
a
bankrupt.
None
of
the
Federal
or
English
Bankruptcy
Acts
nor
our
own
insolvency
statutes
have
gone
to
that
length.
The
disability
tax
credit
is
personal
to
Cody.
It
is
as
personal
as
if
he
were
receiving
an
award
for
pain
and
suffering
arising
from
injuries
sustained
by
reason
of
another
person's
negligence.
The
tax
credit
exists
because
of
Cody
and
will
die
with
Cody.
The
fact
that
any
unused
portion
of
this
tax
credit
may
be
used
by
a
wholly-supporting
parent
or
a
spouse
to
obtain
funds
for
the
support
of
this
disabled
person
does
not
alter
the
fact
that
the
refund
is
personal
to
Cody,
the
dependent
person.
The
tax
credit
is
no
less
personal
to
Cody
even
though
received
by
his
parent.
Generally
tax
refunds
held
by
the
trustee
for
refunds
for
taxation
years
prior
to
the
bankruptcy
are
the
property
of
the
bankrupt
and
therefore
available
for
the
distribution
to
the
creditors
of
the
bankrupt.
Notwithstanding
this,
tax
refunds
received
by
a
bankrupt
in
taxation
years
prior
to
or
during
a
bankruptcy
on
behalf
of
a
disabled
person
who
is
being
supported
partially
or
wholly
are
not
the
property
of
the
bankrupt.
They
do
not
vest
in
the
trustee
and
are
not
available
for
distribution
to
the
creditors
of
the
bankrupt.
Disability
tax
refunds
are
the
property
of
the
disabled
person
although
claimed
by
the
parent
for
the
benefit
of
the
disabled
person.
Although
a
constructive
trust
of
the
refund
money
was
not
addressed,
it
seems
to
me
that
such
an
argument
might
also
apply.
Order
accordingly.