Pratte,
J.A.
(Létourneau,
McDonald,
JJ.A.,
concurring):—
This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Canadian
Tax
Court
allowing
the
respondent's
appeal
from
its
income
tax
assessment
for
the
1988
taxation
year
on
the
basis
that,
contrary
to
what
had
been
assumed
in
making
that
assessment,
the
respondent
was
entitled
to
the
deduction
provided
for
in
subsection
1251(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
since
more
than
90
per
cent
of
its
profit
for
that
year
had
been
derived
from
the
manufacturing
or
processing
in
Canada
of
goods
for
sale
in
Canada.
The
only
issue
on
this
appeal
is
whether
the
Tax
Court
correctly
held
that
the
bulk
of
the
respondent's
income
for
1988
was
derived
from
the
"manufacturing
and
processing
...
of
goods
for
sale.
.
.
."
The
respondent
recruits
its
customers
in
the
oil
and
gas
industry.
It
is
involved
in
the
making,
following
the
"seismic
method",
of
images
of
sections
of
the
earth
in
given
areas.
These
images
are
displayed
on
plastic
sheets
called
"seismic
sections”
and
their
study
allows
geophysicists
to
detect
the
presence
of
oil
or
gas.
At
the
hearing,
counsel
for
the
respondent
expressed
his
agreement
with
the
description
of
the
respondent's
activities
found
in
the
appellant’s
factum.
I
will
just
summarize
that
description.
The
seismic
method
involves
three
steps:
the
recording
of
the
seismic
data
in
the
field,
the
processing
of
those
data
and,
finally,
the
interpretation
of
the
seismic
data.
The
respondent
is
involved
only
in
the
second
stage,
the
processing
of
the
data.
In
the
first
stage,
the
respondent's
customer
collects
certain
data
in
the
area
to
be
explored.
A
charge
of
dynamite
is
exploded
in
the
area
and
the
effect
of
that
explosion,
which
sets
off
energy
that
goes
down
in
the
earth
and
comes
back
to
the
surface
after
being
reflected
by
various
geological
formations,
is
recorded
on
tapes
by
sensitive
listening
devices.
These
tapes,
together
with
other
information
on
the
area
to
be
explored
as
well
as
on
the
effects
of
the
explosion,
are
provided
to
the
respondent
by
its
customer.
At
the
beginning
of
the
second
stage,
the
information
on
the
field
tapes
is
transferred
by
the
respondent
to
tapes
of
a
different
format
compatible
with
its
computers.
The
field
tapes
are
then
returned
to
the
customer.
(The
other
information
received
from
the
customer
is
retained
until
the
completion
of
the
project.)
The
seismic
material
appearing
on
the
tapes
is
thereafter
subjected
to
23
operations
which
are
primarily
applications
of
computer
programs
in
which
the
respondent's
employees
determine
and
apply
various
mathematical
parameters
to
the
information.
At
the
conclusion
of
these
complex
computerized
operations,
the
respondent
has
extracted
from
the
raw
data
and
information
received
from
its
client
new
information
enabling
it
to
create
an
image
of
the
section
of
the
surface
of
the
earth
in
the
area
to
be
explored.
That
image
is
displayed
on
a
sheet
of
plastic,
the
“seismic
section".
From
that
section,
the
respondent
produces
an
output
tape
containing
the
same
information
as
the
section.
Both
the
section
and
the
tape
are
delivered
to
the
customer
who
must
then
submit
them
to
a
geophysicist
for
interpretation.
It
is
important
to
note
that,
as
the
respondent
does
not
own
the
information
received
from
its
customers,
it
cannot
dispose
of
the
further
information
extracted
from
that
raw
information
but
must
deliver
it
to
its
customers
who,
however,
may
choose
to
sell
the
seismic
sections
and
tapes
to
third
parties
rather
than
use
them
for
their
own
purposes.
Finally,
it
is
common
ground
that
once
the
new
information
has
been
extracted
from
the
raw
information
provided
by
the
customers,
the
costs
of
printing
that
new
information
on
the
seismic
sections
and
the
output
tapes
is
minimal.
On
that
evidence,
the
Tax
Court
held
that
the
seismic
sections
and
output
tapes
produced
by
the
respondent
were
goods,
that
those
goods
were
manufactured
or
processed
by
the
respondent
and
that
title
to
those
goods
passed
from
the
respondent
to
its
customers
in
the
course
of
the
respondent's
earning
activities.
It
concluded
that
the
respondent
was
engaged
in
the
manufacturing
or
processing
of
goods
for
sale
in
Canada
and
had
derived
more
than
90
per
cent
of
its
1988
profit
from
that
activity.
This
decision,
in
my
view,
cannot
stand.
It
is
based
on
the
erroneous
assumption
that
if
an
income
earning
activity
culminates
in
the
production
of
tangible
property
having
a
market
Value,
the
earnings
resulting
from
that
activity
are
necessarily
derived
from
the
manufacturing
or
processing
of
goods.
In
order
to
determine
whether
a
taxpayer
is
engaged
in
the
manufacturing
or
processing
of
goods,
one
must
consider
realistically
the
whole
of
the
taxpayer's
activity;
it
is
not
sufficient
to
have
regard
to
one
aspect
only
of
that
activity.
The
summary
that
I
made
of
the
respondent's
business
shows,
in
my
view,
that
the
respondent
was
providing
services
to
its
customers
by
processing
the
raw
information
received
from
them,
and
derived
its
income
from
that
activity
rather
than
from
the
manufacturing
or
processing
of
goods.
Indeed,
the
only
part
of
the
respondent's
activities
that
might
perhaps
be
characterized
as
manufacturing
or
processing
was
the
actual
physical
preparation
of
the
seismic
sections
and
the
output
tapes.
However,
those
two
simple
operations,
which
were
necessary
in
order
to
convey
the
result
of
the
respondent's
work
to
its
customers,
were
not,
in
themselves,
the
source
of
its
income.
The
real
source
of
that
income
was
the
processing
of
information
which
cannot
be
equated
to
the
processing
or
manufacturing
of
goods.
Both
counsel
referred
in
their
argument
to
the
decisions
of
this
Court
in
Nowsco
Well
Service
Ltd.
v.
Canada,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
416,
90
D.T.C.
6312,
and
Halliburton
Services
Ltd.
v.
Canada,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
427,
90
D.T.C.
6320,
two
judgments
which,
in
my
view,
have
little
relevance
to
the
issue
raised
by
this
appeal.
In
both
those
cases,
it
was
common
ground
that
a
substantial
part
of
the
taxpayer's
income
came
from
the
disposition,
in
favour
of
its
customers,
of
goods
that
it
manufactured
or
processed;
the
only
question,
which
the
Court
answered
in
the
affirmative,
was
whether
those
goods
could
be
said
to
be
manufactured
or
processed
"for
sale"
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
125.1
(3)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
even
though
the
contracts
whereby
the
taxpayer
disposed
of
them
in
favour
of
its
customers
were
contracts
for
work
and
material
rather
than
for
the
sale
of
goods.
I
would
allow
the
appeal
with
costs,
set
aside
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
allowing
the
respondent's
appeal
and,
rendering
the
judgment
that
ought
to
have
been
given
by
that
Court,
I
would
dismiss
with
costs
the
respondent's
appeal
from
its
1988
income
tax
assessment.
Appeal
allowed.