Teskey
J.T.C.C.:—The
appellant
appeals
from
an
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
year
1985,
wherein
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
added
to
the
appellant’s
income
an
additional
amount
of
$145,212
pursuant
to
paragraph
6(l)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
Issues
The
appellant
puts
the
following
issues
before
the
Court:
I.
Was
Klein
an
officer
or
employee
of
Canadian
Pioneer
Management
Ltd.
("Pioneer")
on
May
5,
1985?
II.
Was
the
forgiveness
of
the
share
loans
and
the
rights
loan
a
benefit
in
respect
of,
or
in
the
course
of
employment?
III.
If
the
forgiveness
of
the
share
loans
and
the
rights
loan
is
a
benefit,
should
the
amount
be
discounted
to
their
present
value
as
at
May
5,
1985?
IV.
Was
this
one
or
more
transactions
which
conferred
a
benefit
on
the
appellant?
V.
If
the
forgiveness
of
the
share
loans
and
the
rights
loan
is
a
benefit,
should
the
value
of
the
benefit
be
reduced
by
the
fossil
loan?
VI.
If
the
forgiveness
of
the
share
loans
and
the
rights
loan
is
a
benefit,
should
the
interest
which
has
accrued
on
the
assessment
be
eliminated
due
to
the
inaction
on
the
part
of
the
department?
The
respondent
in
her
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
(the
"reply")
simply
states
the
issues
are:
Whether
the
amount
of
$145,712
in
the
assessment
constituted
income
to
the
appellant
in
respect
of,
in
the
course
of,
or
by
virtue
of
an
office
or
employment
pursuant
to
paragraph
6(1
)(a)
of
the
Act;
or
in
the
alternative
Whether
as
a
result
of
a
series
of
transactions,
a
taxable
benefit
was
conferred
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
245(2)
of
the
Act.
Facts
The
pertinent
"undisputed"
facts
pertaining
to
these
issues
are:
1.
The
appellant
commenced
employment
with
Pioneer
on
or
about
January
1970;
2.
Pioneer
was
a
publicly
traded
corporation
whose
shares
were
traded
over
the
counter;
3.
Pioneer
wholly
owned
subsidiaries,
two
of
which
were:
(a)
Pioneer
Trust
Company
("Trust")
and
(b)
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company
("Life")
4.
Pioneer
went
from
zero
in
1970
to
a
200
million
dollar
enterprise
by
1981:
5.
The
appellant
entered
into
a
written
employment
agreement
with
Pioneer
dated
July
1,
1983;
(Exhibit
A-1)
6.
At
the
time
of
entering
into
the
employment
agreement,
the
appellant
was
Pioneer’s
executive
vice-president
and
chief
operations
officer.
He
was
also
the
president
of
Trust
and
of
Life;
7.
The
employment
contract
was
to
terminate
on
March
31,
1993
and
provided
for
a
base
salary
of
$135,000.
The
pertinent
portions
of
this
agreement
reads:
The
purchaser
shall
have
no
rights
whatsoever
as
a
shareholder
in
respect
of
any
of
the
optioned
shares
(including
any
right
to
receive
dividends
or
other
distribution
therefrom
or
thereon)
other
than
in
respect
of
optioned
shares
in
respect
of
which
the
purchaser
shall
have
exercised
his
option
to
purchase
hereunder
and
which
the
purchaser
shall
have
actually
taken
up
and
paid
for.
Article
6.
Termination'.
Either
party
may
terminate
this
agreement
at
any
time
upon
two
years
written
notice
of
termination
to
the
other;
provided
that
after
the
expiration
of
six
years
from
the
effective
date
of
this
agreement
either
party
hereto
may
terminate
this
agreement
upon
only
six
months
written
notice
of
termination
to
the
other.
Upon
the
expiration
of
such
termination
periods,
Pioneer
shall
pay
to
Klein:
A.
The
amounts
due
to
Klein
up
to
and
including
the
date
of
such
termination
under
the
provisions
of
Article
4
hereof.
B.
An
amount
in
cash
equal
to
the
sum
of
the
base
annual
sum
due
Klein
in
the
year
of
termination
together
with
one
month
of
pay
based
on
such
annual
sum
for
each
year
of
service
by
Klein
from
January
1,
1981
to
and
including
the
month
of
the
date
of
termination.
Upon
receipt
of
such
sums
the
liability
of
Pioneer
therefore
shall
cease
and
determine.
C.
The
pension
and
retirement
benefits
provided
for
and
contained
in
subparagraphs
(B)
and
(C)
of
Article
7
hereof.
Article
9.
Settlement
Notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
Articles
6,
7
and
8
hereof
Klein
shall
immediately
upon
termination
of
this
agreement
or
upon
retirement,
whichever
shall
first
occur,
satisfy
and
repay
to
Pioneer
or
any
of
the
Pioneer
group
of
companies
any
outstanding
loans,
advances,
or
indebtedness
to
Pioneer
or
any
of
the
Pioneer
group
of
companies
and
the
same
shall
immediately
then
become
due
and
payable;
saving
and
excepting
only
those
loans
and
advances
made
the
subject
to
specific
written
contractual
obligations
and
the
term
of
which
by
their
specific
provision
extends
beyond
the
date
of
such
termination
or
retirement.
8.
From
time
to
time,
Klein
borrowed
money
from
Pioneer
in
order
to
purchase
Pioneer
shares.
9.
On
December
9,
1981,
Klein
Purchased
32,000
rights
to
subscribe
for
common
shares
for
$64,000,
which
was
advanced
by
Pioneer
as
a
non-interest
bearing
loan.
Exhibit
A-2,
a
repayment
schedule
is
set
out
therein.
The
first
payment
of
$6,400
was
due
on
December
31,
1984.
The
agreement
provided
that
the
loan
was
payable
in
full
if
Klein
should
no
longer
be
an
employee
of
Pioneer
or
in
default.
Findings
Over
and
above
the
foregoing
undisputed
facts
are
my
findings
from
the
evidence
put
before
me:
1.
The
appellant
resigned
pursuant
to
Article
6
of
the
employment
agreement
in
writing
on
May
1,
1985,
effective
that
day.
(Exhibit
A-l)
2.
Also
on
May
1,
a
termination
agreement
was
entered
into
between
Pioneer
and
the
appellant
(Exhibit
A-4).
This
termination
agreement
contains
the
following
recital:
and
whereas
each
of
the
parties
hereto
wishes
to
resolve
all
claims
and
issues
outstanding
between
them
and
to
avoid
protracted
litigation
and
consequent
costs
and
accordingly
have
agreed
that
the
provisions
of
the
employment
agreement
shall
not
apply
to
such
matters
and
have
further
agreed
to
settle
such
claims
and
issues
as
herein
set
out;
The
termination
agreement
provides
for
compensation
of
approximately
$220,000
and
a
life
time
pension
of
$45,000
a
year.
It
also
provides
in
paragraph
6
thereof
that
the
appellant
shall
pay
Pioneer
the
balance
of
his
Fossill
Resource
Loan.
Paragraph
7
thereof,
deals
with
a
mortgage
loan
on
the
appellant’s
personal
residence.
Paragraph
23
reads:
Klein
acknowledges
that
he
has
had
the
opportunity
to
consult
and
has
consulted
with
and
obtained
the
advice
of
independent
legal
counsel
in
respect
of
all
rights
which
he
may
be
entitled
to
pursue
against
Pioneer
prior
to
the
execution
of
this
agreement.
There
is
no
full
and
final
release
by
Pioneer
in
favour
of
the
appellant;
there
is
a
limited
release
for
or
in
respect
of
any
act
or
thing
properly
and
lawfully
done
by
him
as
a
director,
officer
or
employee.
There
is
a
full
and
final
release
by
the
appellant
in
favour
of
Pioneer
and
any
other
of
the
Pioneer
group
of
companies.
3.
The
employment
agreement
provided
on
termination
for
compensation
to
the
appellant
approximately
$472,500
together
with
a
life
pension
of
$45,000
a
year.
4.
A
further
agreement
(purportedly
dated
May
2,
1985,
the
2
and
the
May
being
in
writing),
was
entered
into
between
the
appellant
and
Pioneer,
which
I
refer
to
as
the
share
transfer
agreement,
which
provided
that
the
appellant
transfer
to
Pioneer
all
stock
in
Pioneer
held
by
him,
the
value
of
which
will
be
used
by
Pioneer
to
reduce
a
debt
of
$20,000
and
that
any
difference
shall
remain
due
and
payable
by
the
appellant
on
demand
of
Pioneer.
5.
A
further
agreement
(purportedly
dated
May
5,
1985)
was
entered
into
between
the
appellant
and
Pioneer,
which
I
refer
to
as
the
loan
agreement.
It
states
that
the
appellant
is
indebted
to
Pioneer
of
four
outstanding
loans,
namely:
(a)
$79,212
(b)
$
2,500
(c)
$64,000
(This
is
the
rights
loan,
Exhibit
A-2)
(d)
the
remainder
of
the
$20,000
loan.
This
agreement
also
states:
"all
of
which
loans
are
now
due
and
payable’.
In
this
loan
agreement,
Pioneer
forgives
the
balance
owing
and
discharges
Klein
of
his
obligations
to
make
further
payments
to
Pioneer
on
these
loans.
It
is
the
first
three
loans
therein
which
total
$145,212
that
is
in
issue
herein.
I
find
as
a
fact
that
these
three
loans
were
in
fact
due
and
payable.
The
5
and
the
May
are
typed
in,
in
this
loan
agreement.
May
5,
1985
was
a
Sunday.
I
do
not
accept
that
as
the
date
of
execution.
From
these
facts,
I
can
dispose
of
issues
I
and
III
placed
before
me
by
the
appellant
as
follows:
I.
The
appellant
ceased
being
an
officer
and
an
employee
of
Pioneer
on
May
1,
1985;
III.
Since
the
said
loans
were
due
and
payable
on
demand
by
Pioneer,
(the
moment
Pioneer
received
the
appellant’s
resignation
pursuant
to
the
employment
contract,
which
is
confirmed
by
the
terms
of
the
loan
agreement),
there
is
no
valid
reason
these
amounts
should
be
discounted
to
a
present
value
according
to
the
appellant’s
life
expectancy.
The
finding
of
fact
that
is
crucial
to
this
appeal
is
whether
the
termination
agreement,
the
share
transfer
agreement
and
the
loan
agreement
are
three
separate
unrelated
agreements
or
are
they
a
negotiated
severance
package
all
relating
to
the
appellant’s
employment
with
Pioneer.
The
appellant
in
his
examination-in-chief
gave
the
impression
that
he
had
no
input
whatsoever
into
the
termination
agreement,
and
that
he
was
called
into
Pioneer’s
lawyer’s
office
to
sign
it
on
a
take
it
or
leave
it
basis
and
he
believed
it
was
a
final
agreement.
He
also
stated
that
he
was
called
back
to
the
same
lawyer’s
office
on
May
2,
and
he
signed
again
on
a
take
it
or
leave
it
basis
the
share
transfer
agreement,
and
that
the
same
thing
occurred
again
on
May
5
with
the
loan
agreement,
which
was
totally
unrelated
to
the
previous
agreements.
From
the
appellant’s
examination-in-
chief,
I
was
also
left
with
the
impression
that
there
had
been
no
negotiation
or
attempted
negotiation
of
the
agreements
and
that
the
appellant
was
acting
on
his
own
without
benefit
or
advice.
I
refer
to
the
following
questions
and
answers
given
by
him
in
his
examination-in-chief:
Q.
April
22?
Okay,
do
you
want
to
explain
that
a
little?
A.
While
all
of
this
was
going
on,
I
did
have
some
discussions
about
the
middle
of
April
and—well
we
discussed
it
constantly
day
and
night,
my
wife
and
I,
as
to
what
actions
that
we
should
take.
At
that
point
we
decided,
we
had
this
employment
agreement,
that
we
would
resign-that
I
would
resign
in
accordance
with
the
employment
agreement,
and
so
those
were
the
steps
that
I
took.
Approximately
the
22
or
thereabouts
in
April,
I
supplied-I
gave
a
letter
of
resignation
and
placed
it
on
Mr.
Rawlinson’s
desk
because
at
that
point
in
time
he
and
Mr.
DeFehr
were
running
the
company’s
day
to
day
operations,
and
Mr.
Rawlinson
brought
it
back
and
asked
me
to
take
it
back
and
that
they
would
be
dealing
with
the
matter
in
due
course,
and
he
would
present
me
with
a
letter
of
resignation
which
would
be
acceptable
to
them.
Q.
I
am
showing
you
a
document
dated
May
1,
1985.
Can
you
identify
that
document
please?
A.
This
document
was
directed
by
me
to
Mr.
Sneath,
who
was
still
chairman
of
the
board
at
that
point,
and
I
stated
in
the
letter
that
pursuant
to
Article
6
of
the
above
noted
agreement
I
give
you
two
years
written
notice
of
my
termination,
said
termination
to
be
effective
May
1,
1987.
And
copies
to
Mr.
Rawlinson
and
Mr.
DeFehr-that
was
presented
to
me
and
I
signed
that
document.
Q.
I
am
showing
you
a
copy
of
an
agreement
dated
May
1,
1985
which
is
now
referred
to
as
the
severance
agreement.
Can
you
identify
the
document
please?
A.
Yes,
I
can.
This
is
a
document
that
I
agreed
with
and
signed
on
May
1,
1985.*
Q.
When
did
you
receive
or
first
see
a
copy
of
this
severance
agreement?
A.
I
may
have
seen
the
agreement
a
day
or
so
before
then,
I
don’t
recall.
I
do
recall
though
that
the
agreement
was
signed
at
the
offices
of
the
lawyer
for
Canadian
Pioneer
Management,
Bob
McCrank.
Q.
Can
I
ask
you,
who
gave
you
the
severance
agreement
to
sign?
A.
Mr.
McCrank.
Q.
Can
you
tell
me,
what
was
your
relationship
with
CPM
after
May
1,
1985?
A.
Well
I
think
I
would
describe
it
even
prior
to
that,
but
at
that
point
it
would
be
of
an
adversarial
nature
I
would
think.
It
would
be
the
way
I
would
describe
it.
I
was
not
welcome
in
the
company.
Q.
Were
you
an
employee
after
May
1,
1985?
A.
No.
Q.
Can
you
tell
me,
why
did
you
sign
this
severance
agreement?
A.
Well
when
I
read
the
severance
agreement
and
what
was
involved
in
it,
I
felt
at
the
time
that
that
was
the
best
situation
that
I
could
get
and
that’s
the
reason
that
I
signed
it.
And
again
you
have
to
understand
that-it’s
awfully
easy
to
look
at
these
documents
today
and
look
back
nine
years
and
say
well,
you
know,
in
that
time
frame
how
did
these
things
happen?
Well
every
day
was
forever
at
that
point,
and
in
this
document
I
felt
that
if
I
had
any-if
there
was
any
litigation-I
had
no
money
to
pursue
any
litigation
against
the
company
and
I
still
at
that
point
in
time
cared
for
the
company
as
well,
and
why
would
I
get
involved
in
anything
of
that
nature,
and
so
therefore
I
signed
this
document.
I
didn’t
believe
in
my
own
mind
there
was
any
way
that
there
could
really
be
any
great
improvement
on
it
so—
Q.
Can
you
tell
me,
why
were
the
share
loans
not
included
in
this
severance
agreement?
A.
I
don’t
know.
Q.
What
did
you
think
would
happen
after
this
severance
agreement
was
signed?
A.
When
I
signed
this
agreement,
in
my
mind
I
basically
felt
that
I
was
through
and
finished
with
Canadian
Pioneer
Management
at
that
point
in
time,
that
basically-well
everything
was
over.
I
wasn’t
a
party
to
anything
even
for
several
weeks
prior
to
this
agreement.
I
wasn’t
a
party
to
any
decision
making
of
any
nature
and
quite
frankly,
when
I
signed
this
agreement,
I
felt
that
this
was
the
best
situation
and
that
my
involvement
with
Pioneer
was
over.
Q.
I
am
going
to
refer
to
this
as
the
share
transfer
agreement
for
ease
of
reference
and
so
that
everybody
is
on
the
same
page.
Can
you
tell
me,
what
is
the
date
of
this
agreement?
A.
May
2,
1985.
Q.
Can
you
tell
me,
who
instigated
this
transaction?
A.
Canadian
Pioneer
Management
instigated
the
transaction.
Q.
And
what
hand
did
you
have
in
drafting
this
agreement?
A.
I
did
not
have
a
hand
in
drafting
this
agreement.
Q.
And
when
did
you
first
receive
or
see
this
share
transfer
agreement?
A.
The
first
time
I
saw
this
agreement
would
have
been
on
the
day
that
I
had
signed
the
agreement,
and
I
was
called
to
go
to-and
I
believe
I
was
at
home.
I
was
called
to
go
to
Mr.
McCrank’s
office.
Q.
And
again
for
ease
of
reference
Your
Honour,
I
am
going
to
refer
to
it
as
the
loan
forgiveness
agreement.
Can
you
tell
me,
what
is
the
date
of
the
loan
forgiveness
agreement?
A.
May
5,
1985.
Q.
Can
you
tell
me,
who
instigated
this
document?
A.
Canadian
Pioneer
Management.
Q.
And
what
hand
did
you
have
in
drafting
this
loan
forgiveness
agreement?
A.
I
did
not
have
a
hand
in
drafting
this.
Q.
When
did
you
first
receive
or
see
this
loan
forgiveness
agreement?
A.
I
received
a
call
to-from
Mr.
McCrank’s
office
that
I
was
to
come
to
his
office
and
I
went
to
his
office
and
signed
this
agreement
at
that
time.
In
cross-examination,
it
turns
out
that
even
though
the
appellant
had
denied
that
there
were
negotiations
leading
to
the
severance
contract,
notwithstanding
the
wording
therein,
that
he
also
had
independent
legal
advice
from
Gordon
A.
Kuski
of
that
law
firm
of
McDougall,
Ready
and
paid
that
firm
a
fee
of
$1,100
for
advice
and
finalization
of
an
agreement
concerning
Pioneer
and
the
appellant.
I
believe
that
this
account
would
represent
at
least
four
hours
of
legal
work.
The
appellant
in
his
notice
of
appeal,
in
paragraph
24
pleaded
24.
On
or
about
May
1,
1985
after
lengthy
negotiations,
Klein
entered
into
a
severance
agreement
with
CPM
(the
"severance
agreement")
the
particulars
of
which
are
attached
hereto
and
marked
as
Schedule
"B"
to
the
notice
of
appeal.
Paragraph
6
of
the
respondent’s
reply
states:
6.
Regarding
paragraph
24
thereof,
he
states
that
an
agreement
was
signed
on
May
1,
1985
and
that
same
was
part
of
a
series
of
transactions
constituting
a
retirement
compensation
arrangement
between
CPM
and
the
appellant.
I
find
from
this
that
it
is
an
admitted
fact
that
there
was
lengthy
negotiations
between
the
appellant
and
Pioneer.
This
is
contrary
to
the
appellant’s
testimony.
The
appellant
also
called
Albert
Hilton
DeFehr
(’’DeFehr")
to
give
evidence.
DeFehr
was
on
the
board
of
directors
in
February
1985,
it
was
he
and
Rawlinson
that
were
asked
by
the
board
of
directors
to
take
control
of
Pioneer,
which
they
did,
in
February
1985.
The
collapse
of
Trust
was
a
total
disaster.
Because
of
tight
financing,
he
decided
that
it
was
both
critical
and
prudent
to
dismiss
both
Sneath,
the
president
of
Pioneer,
and
the
appellant
which
is
what
he
did.
Although
DeFehr
gave
conflicting
testimony
on
this
prime
issue,
he
did
say
in
his
examination-in-chief:
Q.
Can
you
tell
me
who
instigated
this
loan
forgiveness
agreement?
A.
That
was
all
part
of
our
severance.
and
on
cross-examination,
he
said:
Q.
When
Mr.
Anderson
put
before
you
the
agreement
dated
May
5,
1985
your
answer
to
begin
with
was,
this
was
all
part
of
the
severance.
Do
you
recall
saying
that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
that
answer
that
you
gave
to
Mr.
Anderson,
that
was
accurate?
A.
Yes.
Robert
Daniel
McCrank
("McCrank"),
the
lawyer
retained
by
Pioneer
to
prepare
the
severance,
stock,
and
loan
agreements
was
called
as
a
witness
for
the
appellant.
He
stated
that
his
files
have
all
been
destroyed.
He
said
his
usual
practice
when
preparing
agreements
such
as
these,
that
the
date
would
be
left
blank
and
filled
in
on
the
actual
date
of
signing.
Neither
counsel
asked
any
questions
to
assist
me
in
determining
the
central
issue
herein,
it
is
up
to
the
appellant
to
produce
all
available
evidence
to
support
his
position.
The
onus
being
on
the
appellant,
there
was
no
need
for
the
respondent’s
counsel
to
ask
the
appropriate
questions.
The
questions
that
should
have
been
asked
were
those
necessary
to
determine
issue
II
as
put
forth
by
the
appellant.
The
type
of
questions
that
should
have
been
put
to
him
after
he
stated:
"I
got
all
my
instructions
from
Pioneer",
were:
A.
Did
these
all
come
at
once
or
over
a
period
of
time?
B.
Do
you
remember
when
these
contracts
were
prepared?
Obviously,
if
he
had
said:
"I
got
all
my
instructions
all
at
once,
and
all
these
contracts
were
prepared
at
the
same
time",
the
appellant’s
testimony
would
have
been
completely
destroyed.
On
the
other
hand,
if
he
had
said
he
got
instructions
for
each
agreement
separately
and
over
a
period
of
days,
his
testimony
may
have
supported
the
appellant’s
testimony.
The
appellant
for
no
explained
reason,
did
not
call
Kuski
as
a
witness.
His
possible
testimony
falls
within
the
same
ambit
as
McCrank’s.
It
is
up
to
an
appellant
to
convince
me
that
these
three
agreements
(the
severance
agreement,
share
agreement
and
loan
agreement)
are
three
separate
independent
agreements.
By
their
very
nature,
it
stretches
the
imagination
that
they
were
not
negotiated
as
one
single
package.
I
come
to
the
conclusion
that
I
cannot
accept
the
appellant’s
testimony
on
this
issue.
His
testimony
was
not
consistent.
In
his
examination-in-chief,
he
said
that
a
severance
package
pursuant
to
his
employment
agreement
was
equal
to
$270,000
plus
the
pension,
whereas
when
cross-examined,
he
admitted
that
his
chartered
accountant
agent
claimed
that
the
severance
package
was
equal
to
$472,500
plus
pension
which
he
acknowledged
was
correct.
As
a
result
of
the
appellant’s
testimony
being
weakened
in
cross-
examination
the
appellant
has
not
convinced
me
that
these
three
agreements
are
three
separate
unrelated
agreements.
I
cannot
think
of
a
valid
reason
for
Pioneer
to
voluntarily
forgive
$145,212
on
May
5,
1985.
At
that
date,
Pioneer
had
its
severance
and
share
agreements
and
was
rid
of
the
appellant,
there
was
no
consideration
whatsoever
or
benefit
for
Pioneer
to
forgive
these
loans
at
that
time,
even
if
they
truly
felt
they
were
uncollectible.
I
cannot
find
as
a
fact
that
Pioneer
did
determine
that
these
loans,
totalling
$145,212,
were
uncollectible
because
the
May
1st
agreement
provided
that
they
were
going
to
pay
the
appellant
some
$220,000
over
a
period
of
time.
Pioneer
could
have
deducted
this
$145,212
from
the
$220,000.
When
you
add
the
monetary
benefit
in
the
termination
agreement
and
the
forgiveness
of
loans
together,
you
get
a
figure
far
more
realistic
when
compared
to
the
compensation
the
employment
contract
provided
for
than
if
you
ignore
the
$145,212
forgiveness
amount.
I
therefore
find,
on
the
facts
before
me,
that
the
three
agreements,
namely:
the
severance
agreement
(Exhibit
A-4),
the
share
agreement
(Exhibit
A-5)
and
the
loan
agreement
(Exhibit
A-6),
were
in
fact
all
part
and
parcel
of
the
negotiated
severance
package
that
was
put
into
effect
by
these
three
agreements.
I
also
conclude
that
they
were
all
prepared
at
the
same
time
from
one
set
of
instructions.
The
three
agreements
made
up
the
"severance
package".
This
finding
of
fact
determines
issue
II,
as
put
forward
by
the
appellant.
Since
all
three
loan
agreements
make
up
a
single
severance
package,
the
loan
agreement
was
a
benefit
in
respect
of
or
in
the
course
of
employment
and
therefore
conferred
a
benefit
on
the
appellant.
Issue
V,
as
put
forth
by
the
appellant
on
his
evidence
only,
would
have
resulted
in
a
negative
finding.
However,
the
appellant
put
into
evidence
a
series
of
questions
and
answers
given
by
the
respondent’s
representative
on
examination
for
discovery.
The
most
important
question
and
answer
being
question
16,
namely:
16.
Q.
And
Klein
ultimately
repaid
the
loan
to
CPM
(Pioneer)
for
the
Fossill
shares?
A.
Yes.
I
find
as
a
fact
that
Klein
did
pay
in
full
for
the
Fossill
interest,
since
this
was
between
the
appellant
and
Pioneer
and
paid
long
after
the
loan
forgiveness,
the
payment
does
not
affect
the
assessment.
It
was
up
to
the
appellant
to
demand
from
Pioneer
what
he
felt
was
his,
and
to
take
whatever
action
he
deemed
appropriate.
In
regards
to
issue
VI
as
put
forward
by
the
appellant,
this
was
in
effect
withdrawn
and,
in
any
event,
there
was
no
evidence
adduced
by
the
appellant
concerning
this
issue
and
I
would
not
have
found
in
favour
of
the
appellant
on
it.
The
appeal
is
dismissed
with
party-and-party
costs
to
the
respondent.
Appeal
dismissed.
Email this Content