Sarchuk
J.T.C.C.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
Elenita
A.
Baltazar
from
assessments
of
tax
for
the
1989,
1990,
1991
and
1992
taxation
years.
The
appellant
has
elected
to
have
the
provisions
of
section
18.1
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act
apply
in
respect
of
her
appeal.
The
issue
in
each
year
is
the
same
and
arises
as
follows:
In
computing
income
for
the
1989
taxation
year
the
appellant
claimed
the
amount
of
$6,066
as
a
basic
personal
amount
in
the
calculation
of
the
non-refundable
tax
credit.
For
the
1991
taxation
year
the
appellant
claimed
the
amount
of
$5,233
as
an
amount
for
a
dependent
child
in
the
calculation
of
non-refundable
tax
credits.
With
respect
to
the
1990
and
1992
taxation
years
she
claimed
the
amount
of
$5,141
and
$5,380
respectively
as
an
equivalent-to-married
amount
in
the
calculation
of
her
non-refundable
tax
credits.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
assessed
the
appellant
for
the
1989,
1990,
1991
and
1992
taxation
years
by
notices
of
assessment
mailed
on
May
8,
1990,
May
15,
1991,
June
3,
1992
and
May
4,
1993
respectively.
Objections
followed
and
ultimately
by
way
of
reassessments,
notice
of
which
were
sent
on
January
6,
1994,
the
Minister
allowed
an
additional
amount
for
a
dependent
child
of
$392
in
the
calculation
of
the
non-refundable
tax
credits
for
taxation
year
1989;
disallowed
$4,827
with
respect
to
the
claim
for
a
non-refundable
tax
credit
for
a
dependent
child,
thereby
allowing
a
claim
of
$406
for
a
dependent
child
for
the
1991
taxation
year;
and
disallowed
the
claims
for
the
equivalent-to-
married
amount,
but
allowed
an
amount
for
a
dependent
child
of
$399
and
$417
respectively
in
the
calculation
of
the
non-refundable
tax
credits
for
the
1990
and
1992
taxation
years.
The
appellant’s
position
is
that
the
assessments
were
based
on
an
incorrect
interpretation
by
the
Minister
of
the
provisions
of
paragraph
118(l)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
As
I
understood
her
agents’s
comments,
the
appellant
also
contends
that
with
respect
to
the
taxation
years
1990,
1991
and
1992,
the
Minister
initially
assessed
on
the
basis
that
she
was
entitled
to
claim
the
equivalent-to-married
amount
in
her
calculation
of
non-refundable
tax
credits
but
subsequently,
although
the
facts
had
not
changed,
reversed
this
position.
Her
agent
also
maintained
that
the
equivalent-to-married
amount
was
claimed
in
accordance
with
the
instructions
provided
in
the
tax
return
guide
and
those
claims
were
approved
by
Revenue
Canada
officials.
The
basic
facts
are
not
in
dispute.
The
appellant
is
a
single
mother
resident
in
Canada
who
maintained
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment.
She
has
a
daughter,
Helen
Kathlene
(born
on
October
1,
1987),
who
throughout
the
taxation
years
in
issue
lived
in
the
Philippines.
At
all
relevant
times
the
daughter,
who
was
a
full-time
student,
had
no
income
and
was
dependent
upon
the
appellant.
The
question
to
be
determined
is
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
deduct
the
equivalent-to-married
amount
in
the
taxation
years
in
issue.
She
takes
the
position
that
the
Act
and
the
relevant
tax
return
guides
create
an
exception
to
the
requirement
that
the
dependant
be
a
resident
of
Canada.
That
exception
permits
her
to
claim
her
daughter
as
a
dependant
for
the
purposes
of
this
deduction
even
if
she
is
not
a
resident
of
Canada.
The
Minister
takes
the
position
that
since
the
dependent
child
did
not
live
with
the
appellant
in
the
taxation
years
in
issue
in
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment
maintained
by
her
the
equivalent-to-married
amount
was
properly
disallowed.
The
relevant
section
provides
in
part:
118(1)
For
the
purpose
of
computing
the
tax
payable
under
this
Part
by
an
individual
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
an
amount
determined
by
the
formula....
(b)
in
the
case
of
an
individual
not
entitled
to
a
deduction
by
reason
of
paragraph
(a)
who,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
(i)
is
an
unmarried
person
or
a
married
person
who
neither
supported
nor
lived
with
his
spouse
and
is
not
supported
by
his
spouse,
and
(ii)
whether
by
himself
or
jointly
with
one
or
more
other
persons,
maintains
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment
(in
which
the
individual
lives)
and
actually
supports
therein
a
person
who,
at
that
time,
is
LS
(A)
except
in
the
case
of
a
child
of
the
individual,
resident
in
Canada,
(B)
wholly
dependent
for
support
on
the
individual,
or
the
individual
and
such
other
person
or
persons,
as
the
case
may
be,
(C)
related
to
the
individual,
and
(D)
except
in
the
case
of
a
parent
or
grandparent
of
the
individual,
either
under
18
years
of
age
or
so
dependent
by
reason
of
mental
or
physical
infirmity,
an
amount
equal
to
the
aggregate
of...
[Emphasis
added.
I
This
subsection
is
rather
awkwardly
worded
and
it
is
not
surprising
that
it
was
read
by
the
appellant
as
entitling
her
to
the
appropriate
deduction.
At
first
glance
one
might
conclude
that
the
appellant’s
position
is
arguable
and
the
fact
that
a
taxpayer’s
child
is
a
non-resident
does
not
disentitle
the
taxpayer
from
utilizing
the
provisions
of
paragraph
118(l)(b).
However,
a
careful
perusal
of
the
relevant
provisions
leads
to
a
different
conclusion,
being
that
other
conditions
of
the
paragraph
in
issue
have
not
been
met.
I
specifically
refer
to
subparagraph
(ii)
which
requires
the
taxpayer,
in
addition
to
maintaining
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment,
to
"actually
support
therein
a
person
who,
at
that
time,
is...except
in
the
case
of
a
child
of
the
individual,
resident
in
Canada"
[emphasis
added].
This
requirement
has
not
been
complied
with
and
in
my
view
that
failure
is
sufficient
reason
for
the
Minister
to
assess
as
he
did.
As
to
the
exception
in
clause
(ii)(A)
I
quote
with
approval
the
following
comments
of
my
colleague
O’Connor
J.
in
Ruzicka
v.
Canada,
[1994]
1
C.T.C.
2092:
The
reason
for
the
exception
in
(A)
is
that
there
will
be
cases
where
a
taxpayer
will
be
deemed
resident
in
Canada
although
actually
residing
abroad
and
supporting
a
child
in
that
residence
abroad.
For
example
subsection
250(1)
of
the
Act
provides
in
part:
250(1)
For
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
a
person
shall,
subject
to
subsection
(2),
be
deemed
to
have
been
resident
in
Canada
throughout
a
taxation
year
if
(a)
he
sojourned
in
Canada
in
the
year
for
a
period
of,
or
periods
the
aggregate
of
which
is,
183
days
or
more,
(b)
he
was,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
a
member
of
the
Canadian
Forces,
(c)
he
was,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
(i)
an
ambassador,
minister,
high
commissioner,
officer
or
servant
of
Canada,
or
(ii)
an
agent-general,
officer
or
servant
of
a
province,
and
he
was
resident
in
Canada
immediately
prior
to
appointment
or
employment
by
Canada
or
the
province
or
received
representation
allowances
in
respect
of
the
year,
(d)
he
performed
services,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
in
a
country
other
than
Canada
under
a
prescribed
international
development
assistance
program
of
the
Government
of
Canada
and
he
was
resident
in
Canada
at
any
time
in
the
three
months’
period
preceding
the
day
on
which
such
services
commenced,
(d.l)
he
was,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
a
member
of
the
overseas
Canadian
Forces
school
staff
who
filed
his
return
for
the
year
on
the
basis
that
he
was
a
person
resident
in
Canada
throughout
the
period
during
which
he
was
such
a
member,
Reference
is
also
made
to
Interpretation
Bulletin
IT-513
dated
February
3,
1989,
which
although
not
binding,
succinctly
explains
the
point.
Paragraph
19
of
the
bulletin
reads:
An
individual
who
is
actually
resident
in
Canada
is
ordinarily
not
entitled
to
the
married
equivalent
tax
credit
in
respect
of
a
non-resident
dependant,
including
the
child
of
the
individual,
because
the
dependant
is
ordinarily
not
supported
in
a
self-
contained
domestic
establishment
in
which
both
the
individual
and
the
dependant
lived.
Where
the
other
requirements
of
118(l)(b)
are
met,
an
individual
who
resides
abroad
but
is,
by
virtue
of
subsection
250(1),
deemed
to
be
resident
in
Canada,
will
be
entitled
to
the
married
equivalent
tax
credit
only
in
respect
of
(a)
the
individual’s
child,
or
(b)
a
person
related
to
the
individual
who
is
also
deemed
to
be
resident
in
Canada
by
virtue
of
subsection
250(1).
O’Connor
J.
held
that
Ruzicks’s
claim
for
the
married
equivalent
tax
credit
had
properly
been
disallowed.
I
fully
agree
with
the
foregoing
interpretation
of
paragraph
118(
1
)(b)
of
the
Act.
I
have
concluded
that
the
Minister’s
assessments
were
correct.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.