Brulé
J.T.C.C.:-This
is
an
application
for
an
order
extending
the
time
within
which
an
appeal
may
be
instituted
from
the
reassessments
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
of
his
income
tax
returns
for
the
years
1986,
1988
and
1989.
Facts
These
are
not
in
dispute
but
for
understanding
the
issue
in
this
application
the
facts
are
summarized.
The
Court
allowed
notices
of
objection
to
the
above
reassessments
to
extend
time
and
such
were
filed
in
August
and
September
1991.
In
May
1992
the
applicant
moved
from
Canada
to
Belgium.
In
December
1992
Revenue
Canada
sent
to
the
applicant
notices
of
confirmation
to
the
reassessments
by
the
Minister
but
were
returned
without
having
been
forwarded
to
the
applicant.
In
early
1994
the
applicant
was
advised
that
collection
proceedings
were
being
taken
against
him.
Issue
Simply
put
do
the
circumstances
involving
the
applicant
not
receiving
notices
of
the
confirmations
merit
an
order
extending
the
time
to
file
an
appeal?
Applicant’s
position
Counsel
for
the
applicant
maintains
that
the
change
of
address
and
ab-
sence
from
the
country
prevented
the
applicant
from
being
properly
notified
of
the
date
of
the
notices
of
confirmation.
He
submits
that
the
time
for
filing
the
applicant’s
notices
of
appeal
ought
not
to
run
in
circumstances
where
it
is
clear
that
the
Minister’s
notification
has
not
been
made
known
to
the
applicant.
The
position
of
counsel
for
the
applicant
is
simply
that
no
notification
was
given
of
the
Minister’s
action
of
confirmation
and
therefore
the
applicant
should
not
be
penalized.
In
support
of
this
argument
both
Carswell’s
Words
and
Phrases
Legally
Defined
and
the
following
cases
were
relied
upon:
Brière
v.
Canada
(Employment
and
Immigration
Commission),
57
D.L.R.
(4th)
402,
93
N.R.
115
(F.C.T.D.);
Urbano
Ramos
v.
M.N.R.,
[1983]
C.T.C.
2744,
83
D.T.C.
643;
Charlotte
Hebert-Gravel
v.
M.N.R.,
[1982]
C.T.C.
2662,
82
D.T.C.
1690.
Respondent's
position
Counsel
submitted
that
the
application
should
be
dismissed
because
the
application
was
not
made
within
one
year
after
the
expiration
of
the
time
limited
by
section
169
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
1
(5th
Supp.)
(the
"Act")
as
required
by
paragraph
167(5)(a)
of
the
Act.
Analysis
The
consideration
here
is
whether
or
not
the
applicant
should
be
excluded
from
the
time
limitations
otherwise
imposed
on
him
because
he
did
not
receive
actual
notices
of
the
confirmation.
It
is
helpful
to
look
at
the
relevant
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
were
in
existence
at
the
time
of
the
confirmations.
Section
169
read
as
follows:
169(1)
Appeal-Where
a
taxpayer
has
served
notice
of
objection
to
an
assessment
under
section
165,
the
taxpayer
may
appeal
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
to
have
the
assessment
vacated
or
varied
after
either
(a)
the
Minister
has
confirmed
the
assessment
or
reassessed,
or
(b)
90
days
have
elapsed
after
service
of
the
notice
of
objection
and
the
Minister
has
not
notified
the
taxpayer
that
the
Minister
has
vacated
or
confirmed
the
assessment
or
reassessed,
but
no
appeal
under
this
section
may
be
instituted
after
the
expiration
of
90
days
from
the
day
notice
has
been
mailed
to
the
taxpayer
under
section
165
that
the
Minister
has
confirmed
the
assessment
or
reassessed.
Paragraph
167(5)(a)
indicates:
167(5)
When
order
to
be
made.—No
order
shall
be
made
under
this
section
unless
(a)
the
application
is
made
within
one
year
after
the
expiration
of
the
time
limited
by
section
169
for
appealing;
and
Subsection
165(3)
sets
out
the
Minister’s
duties:
165(3)
Duties
of
the
Minister-On
receipt
of
a
notice
of
objection
under
this
section,
the
Minister
shall,
with
all
due
dispatch,
reconsider
the
assessment
and
vacate,
confirm
or
vary
the
assessment
or
reassess,
and
shall
thereupon
notify
the
taxpayer
in
writing
of
the
Minister’s
action.
Counsel
for
the
applicant
stressed
the
importance
of
notice
being
given
by
the
Minister
of
any
confirmation.
He
also
referred
to
three
cases.
In
Briére,
supra,
the
Court
was
dealing
with
a
different
statute.
In
Ramos,
supra,
there
were
mitigating
circumstances,
while
in
Hebert-Gravel,
supra,
Revenue
Canada
did
not
use
the
applicant’s
address
but
chose
to
send
the
notification
of
confirmation
to
the
applicant’s
accountant.
As
for
the
respondent
reliance
was
placed
on
the
case
of
Bowen
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
266,
91
D.T.C.
5594
(F.C.A.),
wherein
the
Court
said
at
page
268
(D.T.C.
5596):
In
our
opinion,
the
duty
resting
upon
the
Minister
under
subsection
165(3)
was
to
do
precisely
what
he
did,
viz,
notify
the
respondent
of
the
confirmation
by
registered
mail.
Nothing
in
that
subsection
or
in
section
169
required
the
notification
to
be
"served"
personally
or
to
be
received
by
the
taxpayer.
In
dispatching
the
notification
by
registered
mail
the
Minister
was
entitled
to
avail
himself
of
the
address
or
addresses
which
the
respondent
himself
had
already
furnished.
There
was
no
obligation
on
him
to
look
beyond
that
information.
Moreover,
a
requirement
for
the
receipt
of
the
notification
would
be
difficult
if
not
totally
unworkable
from
an
administrative
standpoint.
Parliament
has
not
required
it;
it
has
required
merely
that
the
notification
be
dispatched
by
registered
mail.
It
is
apparent
that
the
reason
why
the
respondent
did
not
receive
the
notification
was
not
because
the
Minister
failed
to
do
all
that
was
required
of
him
but
because
the
respondent
did
not
keep
his
mailing
address
current.
Such
arrangements
as
he
did
make
for
the
receipt
of
mail
during
his
absence
from
Canada
between
March
1988
and
December
1989
broke
down-but
that,
surely,
cannot
be
laid
at
the
feet
of
the
Minister
who
acted
throughout
in
the
manner
required
by
the
Act.
This
reasoning
was
followed
in
McDonald
v.
The
Queen,
[1992]
1
C.T.C.
2167,
92
D.T.C.
1097.
Bowen,
supra,
was
quoted
therein.
Here
the
respondent
mailed
the
notifications
of
confirmation
to
the
address
for
service
of
the
applicant.
No
change
of
address
was
given
to
Revenue
Canada,
nor
was
a
forwarding
address
probably
left
when
the
applicant
moved
to
Belgium.
The
respondent
did
what
he
was
required
to
do
by
subsection
165(3)
which
states
from
notice
is
to
be
given.
This
is
all
that
is
required.
Accordingly
the
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
grant
to
the
applicant
the
relief
he
seeks
and
this
application
is
therefore
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.