Hamlyn
J.T.C.C.
(orally):-This
is
in
the
matter
of
J.
W.
Pyefinch,
appellant,
versus
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
respondent.
It’s
an
appeal
for
the
1989,
1990,
and
1991
taxation
years.
In
computing
income
for
those
years
the
appellant
deducted,
respectively,
the
amounts
of
$2,097.20;
$5,448.22;
and
$2,478.00
as
other
employment
expenses.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
the
deduction
for
the
other
employment
expenses
in
the
1989,
1990,
and
1991
taxation
years.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact
that
were
admitted
by
the
appellant
under
oath.
At
all
material
times
the
appellant
was
employed
as
an
auto
mechanic
with
Malvern
Management
Limited.
The
appellant’s
employment
income
consisted
of
wages
and
salary
from
the
employer.
The
expenses
disallowed
related
to
the
purchase
of
expenses
for
tools,
tool
roll
cabinet,
and
boxes.
The
issue
to
be
decided
in
this
case
is
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
deduct
the
purchase
of
the
expenses
for
tools,
tool
roll
box,
and
the
boxes.
The
appellant
states
to
this
Court,
and
I
read
from
his
appeal
document
which
was
substantially
his
submission
to
the
Court:
The
deduction
requested
for
the
taxation
year
1989,
was
originally
rejected
by
Revenue
Canada,
but
after
discussion
with
officials
of
Revenue
Canada
was
allowed
under
the
existing
regulations.
The
statement
that
only
’supplies’
consumed
directly
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
employment
may
be
claimed
does
not
appear
to
reconcile
itself
with
the
fact
that
deductions
may
be
claimed
for
Musical
Instruments,
Power
Saws
and
Motor
Vehicles.
The
GST
completion
guide
dated
January
1992
at
page
4,
lists
items
which
may
be
claimed
as
expenses
for
income
tax
purposes
and
are
subject
to
GST
Item
#2
on
the
list
is
"TOOLS".
The
Employment
Expenses
Guide
states
that:
"You
cannot
deduct
the
cost
of
any
types
of
tools
that
generally
fall
into
the
category
of
equipment.”
Therefore,
since
this
statement
breaks
down
the
term
"tools"
into
those
that
are
classed
as
equipment
and
those
that
are
not,
it
allows
the
deduction
of
“tools”
that
are
not
classed
as
equipment.
So
states
the
appellant.
He
further
goes
on
to
argue
that:
Interpretation
Bulletin
No.
IT-422
defines
the
word
"tools".
Paragraph
(2)
states:
It
is
the
Department’s
view
that
a
tool
is
an
instrument
of
manual
operation,
that
is,
it
is
an
instru-ment
to
be
used
and
managed
and
controlled
by
machinery.
In
order
for
an
asset
to
be
a
tool
it
must
be
designed
to
create
a
physical
change
in
something
or
to
be
used
as
an
instrument
of
measurement
or
manipulation.
Examples
are
hammers,
saws,
squares,
screwdrivers
and
hand-held
power
tools.
Paragraph
(4)
states:
An
asset
can
be
a
tool
in
a
general
sense
but
its
predominating
character
may
be
that
of
machinery
and
equipment.
Thus,
an
item
such
as
a
typewriter
which
might
be
considered
a
tool,
is
properly
regarded
as
machinery
and
is
placed
in
class
8.
The
appellant
goes
on
to
state
in
the
argument
before
the
Court:
Based
on
the
foregoing,
it
becomes
obvious
that
there
is
a
difference
in
"tools"
classed
as
"equipment"
and
tools
not
classed
as
equipment.
Using
Revenue
Canada’s
own
definition
of
"tools"
and
IT-352R
of
May
30,
1989,
those
deductions
claimed
in
1989,
1990
and
1991
fall
into
the
category
of
"non-equipment";
and
as
such
are
legitimate
deductions.
In
terms
of
my
analysis,
I
find
that
this
appeal
deals
with
an
employee
mechanic
who
is
attempting
to
deduct
the
cost
of
his
tools,
at
least
according
to
his
tax
return,
pursuant
to
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(iii)
as
supplies
consumed
directly
in
the
performance
of
his
duties
of
his
office
or
employment
and
that
he
was
required
by
his
contract
of
employment
to
supply.
To
show
that
an
employee
was
required
by
the
contract
of
employment
to
provide
the
supplies,
the
prescribed
form
must
be
filed
with
the
return
of
income
and
that’s
subsection
8(10).
If
it
is
an
employment
requirement,
further
the
Minister
alleges
that
the
tools
are
not
supplies
directly
consumed.
The
prescribed
form
for
1989
and
1990,
the
T2200,
did
not
so
indicate,
but
for
the
year
1991
the
prescribed
form
did
so
indicate.
The
issue
focuses
on
what
is
meant
by
the
phrase
“supplies
directly
consumed"
and
whether
there
is
a
distinction
between
tools
that
are
equipment
and
tools
that
are
not
equipment.
Being
an
employee,
the
appellant
must
contend
with
the
general
prohibition
in
subsection
8(2)
that
limits
deductions
from
employment
income
to
those
that
are
found
in
section
8.
The
position
that
the
Minister
has
argued
this
morning
stems
from
the
case
of
Luks
v.
M.N.R.,
[1958]
C.T.C.
345,
58
D.T.C.
1194.
This
case
dealt
with
an
electrician
who
was
required
by
his
contract
of
employment
to
supply
his
own
tools,
namely
a
blow
torch,
screwdrivers,
pliers,
and
a
chalk
line.
Mr.
Justice
Thurlow
dismissed
the
appeal
in
this
respect
holding
that
these
were
not
supplies
but
equipment.
At
page
352
(D.T.C.
1198)
he
States:
"Supplies”
is
a
word
of
narrower
meaning
than
’’things”,
and
in
this
context
does
not
embrace
all
things
that
may
be
consumed
in
performing
the
duties
of
employment,
either
in
the
sense
of
being
worn
out
or
used
up.
The
line
which
separates
what
is
included
in
it
from
what
is
not
included
may
be
difficult
to
define
precisely
but,
in
general,
I
think
its
natural
meaning
in
this
context
is
limited
to
materials
that
are
used
up
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
the
employment.
It
obviously
includes
such
items
as
gasoline
for
a
blow
torch
but,
in
my
opinion,
it
does
not
include
the
blow
torch
itself.
The
latter,
as
well
as
tools
in
general,
falls
within
the
category
of
equipment.
Justice
Thurlow’s
comments,
as
indicated
in
argument
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
are
that
the
tools
are
supplies
that
are
not
consumed
in
performing
duties
of
employment.
That
same
decision,
that
the
tools
are
equipment,
was
reached
with
respect
to
an
air
craft
mechanic
in
Komarniski
v.
M.N.R.,
[1980]
C.T.C.
2170,
80
D.T.C.
1134,
by
the
Tax
Review
Board.
In
conclusion,
the
appellant
argues
that
there
exists
a
class
of
tools
that
are
not
equipment.
I
agree
that
not
all
tools
are
equipment,
but
it
doesn’t
necessarily
make
them
supplies
nor
does
it
make
them
deductible
under
paragraph
8
of
the
Act
without
specific
reference.
The
agent
for
the
appellant
argued
that
musical
instruments
are
allowed
for,
motor
vehicles
are
allowed
for,
and
so,
therefore,
he
argued
that
equal
treatment
would
state
that
the
claims
made
by
the
appellant
should
be
allowed.
I
remind
the
agent
for
the
appellant
that
those
are
specifically
provided
for
in
the
Act,
but
the
tools
claimed
by
the
appellant
are
not
specifically
provided
for.
The
jurisprudence
is
clear;
tools
are
not
supplies
as
that
term
is
used
in
paragraph
8(l)(i)(iii),
but
even
if
they
were,
they
are
not
consumed,
and
the
specific
deduction
for
tool
expense
is
not
specifically
provided
for
in
the
Act.
Therefore,
as
a
consequence,
I
must
conclude
that
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
Thank
you
for
your
attendance
this
morning.
Unfortunately,
I
cannot
agree
with
your
position.
Thank
you
for
coming
to
Court.
Appeal
dismissed.